

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM BY INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN LIBYA

ANNA MOLNÁR

National University of Public Service, Hungary

| 7 |

IVETT SZÁSZI

National University of Public Service, Hungary

LILI TAKÁCS

National University of Public Service, Hungary

In our paper we aim to examine the contribution of three inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) to Libyan Security Sector Reform (SSR) by providing case studies of their activities carried out in Libya. The starting point of our analysis is the military intervention of 2011 based on UNSCR 1973, since it contributed greatly to the regime change. Even though it is not part of the SSR, its dynamics must be displayed. We identified three stages in the evolution of the Libyan crisis (2011–2014, 2014–2017, 2017–2019), thus the activities of our IGO's are examined separately within each time period. In our paper we build on Law's (2013) guide on SSR field activities and we seek to apply that specifically to the case of Libya. Our aim is to evaluate the variance of SSR activities by comparing the IGOs' theoretical SSR activities to those that were allowed to occur by the circumstances in Libya. Analysing the SSR activities of three different international organizations (European Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, United Nations) we find that their actual activities and commitments are lagging behind their theoretical commitments towards SSR. Libya has not experienced a truly peaceful period ever since the protests of the Arab Spring broke out in early 2011. The international community contributed significantly to the regime change by intervening militarily. Nevertheless, the military intervention was not followed by a successful state building process. Even



though several international organizations are active in Libya and committed to reform the country's security sector, a striking success is still missing.

Key words: Security Sector Reform, Libya, United Nations, European Union, North-Atlantic Treaty Organization

INTRODUCTION

| 8 |

Even though the Arab Spring did bring to Libya the much-desired regime change, ever since the Gaddafi regime fell, Libya has not seen neither durable peace, nor stability. The lack of security inhibits progress in Libya: pervading insecurity has hampered economic progress and undermined the credibility of the central government, threatening the fragile democratic transition (Mikai 2013), since no other reform (e.g. political, economic, social) can stem from insecurity. It has been increasingly recognised that the connection between the state of a country's security sector and its prospects for fostering sustainable social development and prosperity is relevant to all socio-economic contexts including developed countries (Law 2013). Since security is regarded as a precondition of sustainable development and stability, Security Sector Reform (SSR) must be a top priority for the international community in any plan for rebuilding Libya. SSR in the fragile Libya would be critical to regional security as well in order to prevent the potential spill-over of insecurity in the region.

The civil war-torn country became scene of a proxy war where not only regional and European, but also great powers aim to secure their often-conflicting interests. Parallel to this proxy war several intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) – whose very members are active participants of the proxy war – are committed to reform the Libyan security sector. Currently, apart from bilateral cooperation, Libya's SSR has depended on three main external actors: the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). The UN is acting as a coordinator of international SSR assistance, primarily in the form of the United Nations Support



Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). NATO has been virtually absent from Libya since the end of its military intervention, however, from 2017 on, it is supposed to provide SSR assistance to the Libyan government upon its request. The EU acts as Libya's long-term strategic partner and, via its EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM), focuses on Libya's border protection.

In our paper we aim to examine the three IGOs' contribution to Libyan SSR by providing case studies of their activities carried out in Libya. The starting point of our analysis is the military intervention of 2011 based on UNSCR 1973, since it contributed greatly to the regime change. Even though it is not part of the SSR, its dynamics must be displayed. We identified three stages in the evolution of the Libyan crisis (2011–2014, 2014–2017, 2017–2019), thus the activities of our IGOs are examined separately within each time period. In our paper we build on Law's (2013) guide on SSR field activities and we seek to apply that specifically to the case of Libya. We seek to compare the prospective SSR activities that each IGO intended to foster against the reforms that were eventually implemented in Libya. By so doing we aim to evaluate whether the circumstances in the field allowed for the SSR to fully come to fruition or not.

Our paper argues that despite the decennial international cooperation and the comprehensive development programmes implemented by the above-mentioned IGOs, the SSR attempts - even though there were partially successful programmes - were unsuccessful. Moreover, that only a fraction of the programmes undertaken in the aforementioned three IGOs' SSR concepts have been fulfilled in reality. The paper is structured as follows: the next section provides a short definition of SSR and an overview of the relationship between SSR and IGOs which we use as our conceptual background. The following section will examine the SSR related activities of the UN, NATO and the EU in the field of the Libyan security sector. This section in turn is itself divided into three sub-sections based on the events within Libya. At the beginning of each sub-section, we provide a short overview of the Libyan situation in order to contextualize our analysis, then the case studies are displayed.

CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY

SSR and IGOs

At its core SSR is about development: the concept itself emerged from the security-development discourse after the end of the bipolar world order, when scholarly attention shifted towards the so-called security-development nexus (Duffield 2010; Spear and Williams 2012; Jackson 2015; Denney 2015; Schnabel 2015). The international community became increasingly entrenched in complex international peacekeeping missions which resulted in acknowledging the importance of stabilizing fragile states, thus facilitating regional stability (McFate 2008). A secure and stable environment is essential to sustainable economic development. Effective governance of security and justice can contribute to structural stability and is key for preventing conflict and resolving disputes without violence (Schnabel 2015; ISSAT).

Scholars agree that SSR is a fundamentally political process (United Nations 2008; Schröder and Chappuis 2014; Tansey 2009; Hensell and Gerdes 2012; Eckhard 2016; OECD 2016) involving institutions associated with national sovereignty (which remains a significant problem in the Libyan case). SSR becomes even more political once one considers the relationships between local communities and donors, amongst donors themselves, and with other regional actors (Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance).

As Law (2013) claimed IGOs play a crucial role in security sector reform, not only by norm development but also by their implementation. Empirical data supports his argument: in almost all recent and current SSR programmes IGOs lead or support the lead provided by other actors (e.g. Liberia, Ukraine, Kosovo, Georgia, Iraq, Moldova, etc.) When analysing IGOs' contributions to the Libyan SSR, it must be taken into consideration that their approaches to SSR partly diverge, since different matters are the focus of their attention. The main "cleavage" between their approaches to SSR is whether they focus more on development or on security (usually depending on the organizations' core functions). Based on their approaches IGOs tend to focus



on one component of SSR while ignoring others, however, they can be involved in both areas (See later Table 1 and Table 2). In the following part the SSR concepts of the three IGOs are briefly displayed.

The SSR concept of the UN

As a global international organization, the UN has always played a key role from the outset in strengthening the security sector of fragile states. SSR is an integral element of the UN's sustaining peace and prevention agendas. As in other fragile states, in the case of Libya, the United Nations Support Mission has implemented its peace operation programme with an SSR mandate since 2011. The UNSC-sanctioned mandate for Libya includes the promotion of national dialogue, transparency, and public financial management (United Nations Peacekeeping).

The first coordinated and comprehensive approach of the UN to SSR was embodied in resolution 2151(2014) (UNSCR, 2014). The UN's activities in the scope of the SSR mandate include the reform of the police and justice system, the support of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of militias/irregular troops/combatants, in addition to the establishment of legislative institutions backed by a dedicated and strong civil society. The main guiding principles for the aforementioned approach include – without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law (United Nations Peacekeeping) – the promotion of effective, inclusive and accountable security institutions; national consultation; the effective commitment to the tasks by involved states; the creation of flexible and country-region-environment-specific projects; a focus on gender sensitivity and early recovery and development strategies; the following of a clearly defined strategy including in the identification of priorities, indicative timelines and partnerships; shaping the international support by the integrity of motive, the level of accountability and the amount of resources provided; the coordination between the efforts of the national and international partners is essential; and lastly, the monitoring and evaluation of all the processes (United Nations 2017).

The SSR concept of NATO

Until recently the term SSR has not been used as an operational concept within NATO. Until the end of the bipolar era the Alliance concentrated its efforts on traditional collective defence-related tasks. For most of its history “defence reform” for NATO has meant trying to bring the military capabilities of its members, particularly its European members, more in line with what would be needed to achieve NATO’s stated military objectives (Fluri and Lunn 2007). Nevertheless, NATO contributed greatly to the Euro-Atlantic integration of the post-Soviet European countries which can be considered as some predecessor to SSR (Molnár 2016). In that process, changes in the security sector – the army, the other armed services, the intelligence services and the police – played a central part. Partnerships were forged with several countries through programmes (e.g. Partnership for Peace Programme (PfP) and action plans (e.g. Membership Action Plan) with the scope of forging practical security links (Neretnieks and Kaljurand 2007).

NATO does not have an official SSR concept agreed on by its member states, but a strongly SSR related initiative was launched after the Crimean events unfolded. In September 2014 at the NATO Summit in Wales the Defence and Related Security Capacity Building (DCB) Initiative was launched. The DCB’s aim is to help projecting stability by providing support to nations requesting assistance from NATO. DCB helps partners improve their defence and security-related capacities, as well as their resilience, and, therefore, contributes to the security of the Alliance. It can include various types of support, ranging from strategic advice on defence and security sector reform and institution-building, to development of local forces through education and training, or advice and assistance in specialised areas such as logistics or cyber defence (NATO 2014).

The SSR concept of the EU

Prior to the SSR concept, the European Union has already played a significant role in areas related to security sector reform through its external relations, development policy, the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)



and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in several crisis situations. The European Security Strategy, adopted in 2003, identified SSR as one of the key instruments of EU foreign policy and drew attention to the fact that “security is a precondition for development”. Subsequently, in 2005, the Council developed its own second-pillar SSR concept to support ESDP operations (Council of the European Union 2005). In 2006 the European Commission also developed the Concept for European Community Support for SSR for the first pillar’s external relations activities (European Council 2016a). The 2005 Concept set out the EU’s SSR-related principles: 1. democratic norms and internationally accepted human rights principles, the rule of law and, where necessary, international humanitarian law; 2. respect for local ownership; and 3. coherence with other areas of EU external action (Council of the European Union 2005). Following the Treaty of Lisbon, the implementation of SSR-related activities was essentially the responsibility of the High Representative and thus of the European External Action Service. However, it is important to emphasize that the European Commission has continued to play a key and active role both in the development of the SSR framework and in the implementation process.

The process leading to the development of a new EU SSR framework began in autumn 2015 and resulted in a new policy framework (a joint communication by July 2016 summarizing Elements for an EU-wide strategic framework to support security sector reform) strengthening the EU’s effectiveness in supporting third countries’ efforts to ensure security for individuals and the state. The new comprehensive policy framework puts an emphasis on the respect for the rule of law, the application of human rights and transparency and accountability, and the need for local ownership. According to the comprehensive approach, all EU diplomatic, development and CSDP support action should be coherent, coordinated, complementary, properly sequenced and in line with legal, policy and institutional frameworks” (European Commission 2016; European Parliament 2020). According to the proposal, it will finance capacity building of military actors in support of development and security for development (CBSD) (European Parliament 2020).



METHODOLOGY

In order to avoid any risk of bias in evaluating these three IGOs, we eschew their definition of SSR (displayed above) in our paper, instead we build upon the SSR reform definition put forward by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD DAC): [s]ecurity sector reform means transforming the security sector/system, which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions, so that they work together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework” (OECD DAC 2008). Based on the framework provided by the OECD-DAC definition, the primary goals of SSR can be described as follows:

1. Establishment of effective governance, oversight and accountability in the security system.
2. Improved delivery of security and justice services.
3. Development of local leadership and ownership of the reform process.
4. Sustainability of justice and security service delivery

Based on their own definitions the SSR profiles of the above-mentioned organizations can be described as follows in Table 1.

Table 1: *IGO SSR Profiles*

Name of IGO	SSR focus	Geographical scope	Country context
UN	capacity-building technical assistance	global	developing transition post-conflict
NATO	capacity-building technical assistance norms development	global	developing transition post-conflict developed (as concerns defence reforms)



EU	capacity-building technical assistance norms development	regional/ Euro-Atlantic	developing transition post-conflict developed (through members' ESDP activities)
-----------	--	----------------------------	---

Authors' own elaboration based on Law (2013).

| 15 |

Table 2: *SSR Field Activities by IGOs*

	UN	NATO	EU
Special post-conflict programmes	primary	secondary	primary
Gender & Security	secondary	secondary	secondary
Civil Society & Media Capacity Building	secondary	secondary	secondary
Judicial & Legal Reform	primary	-	primary
Police Reform	primary	secondary	primary
Border Service Reform	secondary	primary	primary
Intelligence Reform	secondary	secondary	-
Defence Reform	secondary	secondary	primary
Good Governance of the Security Sector	secondary	secondary	secondary

Authors' own elaboration based on Law (2013).

Reading: 'Primary' represent the main activity of the respective IGOs and "secondary" represents other SSR activities that can be carried out by them based on their *own* definitions and strategies.

In our study we use the contents of Table 2 as a conceptual background, building on this we aim to identify the main differences between theoretical SSR commitments and their practical implementation through the case of Libya. We analyse the Libyan SSR activities of the above-mentioned three IGOs as case studies. When analysing IGOs's contribution to the SSR in Libya the special domestic situation of the country must be taken into consideration: after the international community intervened militarily in 2011 the rhetorical commitments of IGOs such as UN or EU did not turn into concrete actions since the new interim government was not able to control rebel groups. As a consequence, state building and democratisation process halted. It is of utmost importance to highlight the significance of the Weberian concept of statehood used by the intervening international community. State formation processes in post-colonial and post-conflict states differs greatly from the European one. As a consequence, when these states receive international assistance the recipient political and security institutions rarely comply with the ideal-typical Weberian form of statehood (e.g. state monopoly on the legitimate use of force). Regarding security issues, state monopoly on the use of force is frequently contested by several domestic groups, while the provision of security by state institutions can be limited territorially or to specific groups (Herbst 2000; Hagman and Péclard 2008). In post-colonial or post-conflict states, the settings that structure the political life are informal – opposed to the formal structures of the classical Weberian concept (Schröder and Chappuis 2014).

We analyse the SSR attempts in Libyan from 2011 to 2019 by dividing this timeframe into three periods based on the characteristics of the prolonged uncertain nature of the crisis. In the first period between 2011 and 2014 it seemed that the National Transitional Council (NTC) could replace the Gaddafi-regime and could become the central authority in a *Weberian sense*, however, in 2014 the second Libyan civil war broke out. This hopeful period abruptly ended when the civil war broke out, thus we decided to end the first period of our analysis in 2014. From the onset of the civil war, Libya basically splits into three parts, similar to the era before the official unification of the state: Tripolitania

(the Western part), Cyrenaica (the Eastern part) and Fezzan (Southern territories) functioned almost as independent entities. Several Eastern and Western groups have been fighting for power and since foreign actors started to support them, the internal conflict became international/was internationalised. Our second period regards the first phase of the civil war from 2014 until 2017 when the majority of the IGOs present in Libya were forced to relocate to Tunisia due to the worsening of the security situation on the field. We decided to draw the line of the second phase here, since from 2011 on this was the first time that the active IGOs left Libya while representation and cooperation activities of several of their member states continued. We mark the third period from 2017 to 2019. The internationalisation of the conflict (about Libya see: Sawani 2012; Eriksson 2016; Aliboni et al. 2017; Joffé 2020) was once again clearly confirmed when Khalifa Haftar launched its attack against Tripoli in April 2019 and a new – third – civil war emerged. Taking into consideration these conditions two questions arise from the Libyan (recipient's) point of view: 1.) Is the country already in post-conflict phase? 2.) Is the UN-backed Sarraj-government an institution with national sovereignty? While acknowledging the above-mentioned facts about the peculiarity of the Libyan situation and the importance of local ownership we do not seek to answer whether without these prerequisites SSR could be successful or not. Using a donor-centred approach we focus on IGOs activities in Libya and we try to identify barriers to success from their point of view.

DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS

PERIOD 2011-2014

Overview of the Libyan situation

In 2011 the Arab Spring spread throughout the MENA region, and in February demonstrations began in Libya. The early demonstrations against the Qaddafi regime were non-violent, nevertheless Qaddafi responded rapidly and fiercely using a



combination of verbal threats, intimidation and violence. By 26 February 2011, the opposition had formed the NTC in a bid to oust the Qaddafi regime and its supporters. Upon the repression of the demonstrations the international community decided to intervene (see later) thus from March 23 to October 31 a military intervention was underway. As the Qaddafi regime fell on 20 October 2011, Libya entered a new political transition phase, which laid the ground for political chaos: power vacuums allowed militias to claim their stake in the post-Qaddafi Libya. While the international community backed the NTC, there was no overall plan for how to support Libya as a country (Erikson 2016). Since taking office officially, the NTC (5 March 2011–8 August 2012) was constantly faced by repeated armed challenges by a number of militias from across Libya that attempted to secure their own political and economic interests. The NTC was unable to maintain law and order across the territory of the country. On 7 July 2012 national elections were held in Libya for the first time, leading to the transfer of power from the NTC to the democratically elected General National Congress (GNC). The GNC failed to address the country's economic, political, and security problems. General Khalifa Haftar managed to capitalize on rising anti-Islamist sentiment by launching a full-scale military campaign against Islamist militias based in the East with strong popular support. The armed confrontation between Haftar's Karama (Dignity) coalition and the Fair Libya (Libya Dawn) coalition (composed mostly by Islamist forces related to Tripoli) pushed the country into chaos (Badi et al. 2018). Amidst these circumstances national elections were held on 25 June 2014.

The 2012 Fragile State Index (FSI) was unsurprisingly focused on Libya as the state went through a rough civil war in 2011. In that year, according to the Index Libya was the 111th out of the 177 examined countries indicating that Libya was in the 'warning' category.¹ At the time of the 2011 FSI researchers could not yet predict the outbreak of the civil war, however, the

1 Fragile State Index Categories: Very Sustainable – Sustainable – Very Stable – More Stable – Warning – Elevated Warning – High Warning – Alert – High Alert – Very High Alert.

country was ranked among the five (along with Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Syria) states at risk in this regard (FSI 2011). Later, by 2011 according to the 2012 FSI Libya has suffered the worst deterioration, landing straight to the 111th place from the 50th² within a year. The FSI emphasizes the fact that even though the revolution was successful, the unemployment rate reached a peak as Libyan oil-based economy is highly sensitive to disruptions (FSI 2012). After Libya achieved the largest and fastest deterioration in the history of the FSI, by 2013 it seemed that the situation was beginning to stabilize (FSI 2013), however in 2014 the second civil war broke out (FSI 2014).

SSR by IGOs

At the beginning, EU Member States expressed very different views on NATO's intervention in Libya. Having very different interests they were not united on whether and how to establish a no-fly zone over the country. France with full support of the UK led the intervention, Germany refused to take part in any military operation, while during the first week Italy hesitated. The intergovernmental decision-making method of CFSP did not help the European Union to act coherently and effectively (Koenig 2011; Overbeck 2014; Fabbrini 2014; Weitershausen et al. 2020). After this short period of disagreement at the end of February, both the EU and the United States decided to impose sanctions on Libya (e.g. an arms embargo). In February the EU adopted sanctions and started to prepare a CSDP military operation (named EUFOR Libya) to support other humanitarian interventions. In the absence of a UN call for that and full support of EU member states, the operation was not implemented (Stavridis 2014).

Following the intervention, the EU tried to give immediate answers to the crisis promoting democratic reforms and economic growth. In May 2011, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice President

2 The higher a country ranks in the list, the more serious political, economic and security difficulties are present in the country.

of the Commission (HR/VP) Catherine Ashton visited Libya in order to discuss the EU's support and to open the EU office in Benghazi. In November the EU Delegation also opened in Tripoli. In 2011 the EU launched the SPRING programme (Support for Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth) and supported local authorities to build democratic institutions. Approximately €39 million were provided in 2011 for projects in the field of "public administration, democratic transition, civil society, health and education". The EU provided humanitarian assistance (€80.5 million) during the conflict phase. In addition, €68 million were provided between 2012 and 2013 for projects regarding "security, technical and vocational education and training, economic development, migration and civil society" (European Commission 2013). In 2012 the EU started to help institution-building, it deployed an Election Assessment Team, provided technical assistance to organise democratic elections and supported civil society organisations (Civil Society Facility). In 2013 the European Commission announced an additional €15 million support package.

The European Union launched the European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) in Libya under the CSDP in 2013. The objectives of the mission aimed to support the capacity development of Libyan authorities to improve border security in the short term, and to develop Integrated Border Management in the long term. (IECEU 2017; European Council 2013; Molnár and Vecsey 2020). According to Gaub the assistance provided by the EU was mainly bound by the Libyan security conditions (Gaub 2014). Security and political developments in Libya are closely related to the security of NATO member states for several reasons, be it energy security, immigration and illegal trafficking of people, the fight against terrorism or preventing state failure in the EU's neighbourhood.

Since the protests broke out in Libya in early 2011, NATO's most important 'act' have been to intervene militarily in Libya. The NATO-led intervention in Libya remains the only overt foreign military intervention during the Arab Spring which targeted a ruling regime. As per the UNSC Resolution 1970 (imposing arms embargo on Libya) adopted on 26 February, from

8 March, NATO increased its surveillance operations in the Mediterranean. After further deterioration of the Libyan situation the UNSC resolution 1973 (17 March) was adopted, which gave authorisation to use ‘*all necessary measures*’ to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas. Thereafter/subsequently, a US-led multinational coalition launched Operation Odyssey Dawn. On 22 March 2011, NATO agreed to deploy forces in Libya as a response to the UN’s call to prevent the supply of “arms and related materials”. The Operation Unified Protector (OUP) was officially launched on 23 March. In support of UNSCR 1973, NATO then agreed to enforce the UN-mandated no-fly zone over Libya on 24 March 2011, then it took sole command and control of the international military effort for Libya on 31 March 2011. The military intervention lasted 222 days, the North Atlantic Council decided to end the mission immediately after the killing of Gaddafi, thus on 31 October 2011 a NATO AWACS conducted the last sortie and OUP ended (Gaub 2013).

| 21 |

Only ten days after the killing of Muammar Gaddafi NATO prematurely declared the accomplishment of the mission and with the subsequent – premature – withdrawal of international actors a political and military vacuum was created in Libya (Eljarh 2018). The aftermath of NATO’s Libyan operation was not planned at all by either side. The National Transitional Council’s communication was mixed: it asked for NATO’s military operations to continue and for the provision of military advisers on the ground to counter any attacks by remnants of the regime’s forces and to secure the border (Sengupta 2011). At the same time, the NTC rejected any military personnel on the ground³, including even UN observers. Thus, NATO did not take any role in the country’s post-conflict stabilization efforts, however, it

3 It has to be mentioned that the NTC’s communication was very mixed, since in the same time it called NATO to maintain air patrolling: “We hope (NATO) will continue its campaign until at least the end of this year to serve us and neighbouring countries, ensuring that no arms are infiltrated into those countries and to ensure the security of Libyans from some remnants of Qaddafi’s forces who have fled to nearby countries” (Gaub, 2013 and Al Arabiya 2011)



pointed out that member states could offer military commitment to Libya on an individual basis (Sengupta 2011). The absence of demand on the ground for an international force coincided with a clear lack of political will on the supply side (Sergei and van Zuijdewin 2016). As a result of the lack of a decisive and internationally-led state-building process, the Libyan power vacuum turned into a proxy battleground. In order to understand current security conditions in Libya, due to the long-term consequences of OUP some of its features should be considered.

Regarding Unified Protector we must acknowledge that at the early stage at the campaign, the air strikes were launched by France, the UK and the US acting unilaterally and not within NATO. Unlike former NATO interventions carried out after the Cold War (e.g. the Balkans, Afghanistan) Unified Protector was characterized by a sparse participation of member states, poor organization and different levels of support by member states, as Jeffrey argues it was conducted by a '*coalition within the alliance*' (Jeffrey 2014). In Libya, NATO coordinated the actions of 18 countries — 14 member states and four partners — under a unified command, however, it has to be mentioned that an equal number of NATO member states (14) decided not to participate. Several of the non-participating countries lacked the resources to do so but lent their political support, but others, such as Germany, decided not to participate despite their resources. (Daalder and Stavridis 2012). When taking into consideration the current security situation in Libya, one of the biggest limitations of the NATO's intervention is the lack of a post-conflict mission in Libya, which is in contrast with the original formulation of the R2P concept.⁴

Taking into consideration all the above-mentioned characteristics from the international institution's point of view, NATO played a leading role in 2011 despite its internal divisions. In comparison with other international organizations featured in

4 According to the initial formulation of R2P, it consists of three elements: responsibility to prevent (1), react (2), and rebuild (3), however, as the doctrine developed further the responsibility to rebuild was removed. (Jay 2014).

this study - the UN and the EU – in this phase NATO was by far the most active and influential. However, by taking on the role of the enforcer of the UN resolution, NATO did not follow an inclusive notion of the international community, its particularistic character prevailed. (Carati 2017:16) Ever since the protests broke out in early 2011, NATO played a decisive role only until the regime change, after which the weak state-building initiatives were carried out by the UN.

It is difficult to analyse NATO's involvement in Libya after the military intervention ended in October 2011, since then, the member states' interests have prevailed, hindering the implementation of joint actions. A particularistic-universalistic parallel can be drawn: during the intervention the Alliance with its particularistic nature was handled by a significant part of the international community as if it were a universalistic organ. However, even if we accept NATO as a universalistic institution, the particularistic nature of the member states' interest overwhelmed its 'universalism' immediately after the regime change happened.

When Collin Powell claimed in his often-quoted statement *"if you break it, you own it"*, he referred to the fact that *"when you take out a regime and you bring down a government, you become the government"* (Samuels 2007). However, this was not the case in Libya, where during military operations, political planning for the transition took stock with the NTC in line to govern the country after the 'liberation' from Gaddafi. Since the military intervention was characterised by a 'light footprint' it was unlikely there would be a heavier footprint during the transition, better still, after the aerial bombardment campaign, NATO has been virtually absent from Libya.

The Libyan government – then led by Ali Zeidan – formally requested NATO to support SSR efforts as early as May 2013 then again in October 2013, before the overall security situation worsened in Libya and the second Libyan civil war broke out in 2014. Therefore, NATO took on the responsibility to provide advice to the Libyan authorities on SSR and on defence and security institutions. Expert support in the SSR was underway and perspectives of cooperation in the field of training,

joint exercises and educational cooperation in the field of security studies and military science became possible. NATO conducted its advisory work in full coordination with the efforts of other national and international actors, including the United Nations Support Mission to Libya (UNSMIL) and the European Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM)'. However, it was evident that the Alliance was not willing to deploy troops to Libya, not even in the form of a training mission (Filípková and Kužvart 2013). Later the cooperation was put on hold by the Libyan side, due to domestic political upheavals (Ghasem 2018).⁵

In a statement on 15 February 2011, the UN reacted quickly for the events by urging Gaddafi to put an end to the cruel response to the revolution. On 26 February 2011, 1970 resolution was voted by the UNSC. As part of the resolution Libya was urged to end the massive and systematic human rights violations, an arms embargo was imposed on the country, along with a travel ban and a freeze on the Libyan authorities' properties. were imposed (UNSC RES/1970 2011). Gaddafi did not comply with the instructions given in the resolution, thus on 17 2011, the 1973 resolution was voted on, in which a no-fly

-
- 5 Then Prime Minister of Libya Ali Zeidan visited NATO Headquarters on 27 May 2013 and officially requested NATO's assistance for the creation of a National Guard aimed at the reintegration of Libya's revolutionary brigades. The North Atlantic Council decided to send an expert-level fact-finding delegation to Libya to clarify the specific requirements of the Libyan request, assess the situation and identify areas in which NATO could possibly add value. Following that initial request, on 22 July 2013, Libyan Prime Minister Ali Zeidan sent a second letter to the NATO Secretary General in which he confirmed that the National Guard concept (on which he had earlier asked for NATO support) had been put on hold. This was due to the fact that the Libyan General National Congress (GNC) could not find agreement on the law establishing the National Guard. In his new request, Prime Minister Zeidan asked NATO's assistance in developing Libya's security architecture and its security and defence institutions, into which eventually the National Guard concept might later fit. The North Atlantic Council agreed that the NATO Team of experts led by the International Staff, would continue exploratory work with the Libyan authorities and key stakeholders. (Ghasem, 2018)

zone was over the country introduced in order to protect the civilian population and a mandate was given to enforce a cease-fire (Brockmeier, Stuenkel, Tourinho, 2015).

Since October 2011, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) has also been present in the country and later, in January 2012, the SSR Unit of UN was deployed too, to support the joint efforts. The main goal of UNSMIL is to coordinate the international assistance in peacekeeping and to build up a democratic institutional system in Libya, namely by facilitating political dialogue and delivering targeted technical support in the areas of electoral assistance, constitution drafting, human rights, transitional justice and public security (Nasr 2013 and Filípková-Kužvart 2013). All UN bodies are involved in the UNSMIL-led mission in order to achieve constitutional, judicial, electoral, and social security progress (Marsai 2014).

On the 16th of September 2011 the UN General Assembly accepted the National Transitional Council - that was established earlier in 2011 by the liberated cities' city councils (Transitional National Council 2011) - as the new Libyan Government and as the representative of Libya in the UN. On the same day UNSC Resolution Nr. 2009 (year: 2011) that allowed the supply of arms to the new Libyan authorities under certain conditions was passed (SIPRI, 2011). Following the consultation process between UNSMIL and the Libyan government, a draft electoral bill was ready by early 2012 and published by the NTC for consultation with civil society. In May 2014, the Second Libyan Civil War broke out and by the 7 July 2014, the security situation had worsened so much that the UN decided to evacuate all its international personnel to Tunisia (UNSMIL 2014). Regarding human rights, UNSMIL was working to establish an impartial judicial system and a police force to coordinate international cooperation and to encourage the Libyan state to carry out a full review of detention facilities (UNSMIL 2012a). The Libyan Government had managed to bring some former revolutionaries and their arms under state control with the support of UNSMIL. They developed an integration plan at the end of 2012 (UNDP 2014). In addition, UNSMIL trained 700 police officers to prepare them to secure the elections (UNSMIL 2012b).

PEIOD 2014–2017

Overview of the Libyan situation

Since the summer of 2014, political power has been split between two rival governments in Tripoli and in Tobruk. The enhanced diplomatic efforts aiming for a power-sharing deal, led by multilateral institutions led to the signature of the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) among Libyan factions in December 2015 and the establishment of a Government of National Accord (GNA) in March 2016. Despite its international recognition the GNA could not exercise executive functions without the consent of local militias (Eriksson and Bohman 2018). The rivalry between the eastern and western sectors intensified.

The GNA lacked the military capacity to enforce binding decisions, since its power was undermined by a fragile political consensus among its constituencies, and by the technocratic nature of its leadership. As a consequence, the sovereignty of the GNA remained dependent on the precarious consent of a multitude of non-state armed actors, possessing a large degree of independence and impunity (Raineri 2019).

From 2014 to 2017 the main conflict remained the incompatibility between the GNA in Tripoli, under Prime Minister Sarraj, and the House of Representatives (HoR) in Tobruk, under the influence of Chairman Aguila Saleh Issa and General Haftar (Fitzgerald and Toaldo 2017). The HoR is supported by the so-called Dignity coalition, backed by the Libyan National Army (LNA) and various domestic actors with anti-Islamist agenda. The LNA is by far the most important domestic military actor in eastern Libya. Experts estimate that during the second half of 2017, the LNA and its allies controlled about 70 per cent of Libyan territory (Pack et al. 2014). The Islamic State's emergence in late 2014 further complicated the crisis. Both governments were soon forced to turn their attention to the Islamic State's growing presence.

In 2017 little progress was made in reconciling the GNA and Haftar. The political situation deteriorated in December when Haftar declared that the political agreement from 2015 was void and the GNA was obsolete (Al Jazeera 2017). As stated by the



FSI, in the period of 2014 and 2017 Libya's situation has further worsened becoming the 25th of the 178 countries and keeping its place through the examined three years. The country gained an alert rating in the 2015 FSI and even then, it was probable that Libya could join Iraq, Syria, and Yemen with a high alert rating in the next few years (FSI 2015). In 2015 and 2016 Libya was in the limelight as the world was much more concerned about the Middle East and North Africa since Europe faced a massive refugee crisis that time (FSI 2016).

SSR by IGOs

Due to the worsening security situation, many institutional building projects were suspended in 2014. Since 2015 the EU has been backing the implementation of the Libyan Political Agreement, it has also supported the UN-backed Government of National Accord and local authorities in order to strengthen inter-governmental cooperation and coordination. In 2017, the EU provided €120 million to support 37 projects in six sectors: civil society; governance; health; youth and education; migration and protection; and support to the political process, security and mediation (European External Action Service 2019).

Due to the deterioration of the situation in Libya, the EUBAM Libya mission had to relocate to Tunis in 2014 and was put on hold from February 2015 to early 2016 (IECEU 2017), which provided limited tools for assessing and understanding the complex Libyan situation. In this period EUBAM's field of action reduced to advising Libyan authorities. The political fragmentation of the country prevented the mission from identifying and establishing systemic relations with local actors, thus it was not capable to carry out its tasks successfully. (Christensen, G et al. 2018). By the time of EUBAM's evacuation, the EU was no longer capable of carrying out a civilian crisis management operation in Libya. After the second Libyan civil war broke out in 2014, three conflicting, rival powers emerged in the country, however, EUBAM's mandate dictated that its only counterpart should be the western-backed GNA (Loschi and Russo 2020), even though it gradually lost its power over the majority of the country. In 2016 upon the request of the Government



of National Accord the mandate of the EUBAM Libya mission was prolonged. Despite the local difficulties the tasks remained the same with one addition: support of a comprehensive civilian security sector reform was included in its mandate (European Council 2016b; European Council 2016c).

In April 2015 the European Union launched an EU military operation, EUNAVFOR MED, to tackle the migration and refugee crisis outside the Libyan territory. In June 2016 the mandate of the operation was reinforced with the supporting tasks of capacity building, training of and information sharing with the Libyan Coast Guard and the implementation of the UN arms embargo on the high seas (Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/993).

In 2014 NATO again offered its advice to the Libyan Government, stating that the Alliance was ready to help. In the Rome Conference (March 2014) of international efforts to help Libya were discussed with the participation of international organisations and a high-level Libyan delegation led by Prime Minister Ali Zeidan. At the Conference, Deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbow said that NATO's first objective would be to advise the Libyan authorities on the establishment of the necessary structures, processes and arrangements to enable them to develop a national security strategy. Only after this goal was achieved it would have been possible to give advice on the adaptation of Libya's existing security architecture to make sure that is compatible with the new policy framework. It was once again underlined, however, that NATO's advisory mission will "not seek to establish a full-time presence on the ground in Libya). Six months after Zeidan's original request, a NATO advisory team was not yet put together (NATO 2014).

In March 2016 and in June 2016 (NATO 2016a) NATO reiterated, in line with the Wales Summit decisions, to assist Libya in the field of defence and security institution building, if requested by the Government of National Accord and in concert with other international efforts (NATO 2016b). Since 2012 GNC ignored the ICD roadmap (Democracy Reporting International). In 2015, part of UNSMIL's delegation returned

to Tripoli, but the majority was still working from Tunisia even in 2016 (UNSMIL 2016a).

Over the period 2015-2016, the UN's primary task was to solve the political and institutional crisis, and to end the armed conflict, furthermore to handle the political disagreements in the country. UNSMIL was trying to ease the tension by bringing the rivals namely the HoR and its associated government, based respectively in the eastern cities of Tobruk and al-Bayda, and the GNC and its government in Tripoli to the negotiating table (Lamont, 2016). UNSMIL, UNDP and UN-Women, as in the parliamentary elections, supported the population by giving lectures and presentations for the citizens about the elections (UNSMIL 2016b).

| 29 |

Regarding the Police Reform, the programme management capacity of UNDP in cooperation with UNSMIL Police Advisory Section has developed a 3-year project to support the Ministry of Interior and the Libyan Police to implement a police reform in the country. The main objective of the project was to increase the operational capacity and also the trust and legitimacy of the Police, furthermore to improve them to be able to tackle modern day challenges with effective law enforcement (UNDP 2014).

PERIOD 2017–2019

Overview of the Libyan situation

Within this period the UN-brokered LPA failed largely due to the exclusion of key armed groups, anti-Islamists, tribes and elements loyal to Qaddafi. Despite several revival initiatives (such as the Libyan Action Plan), the conflictual nature of intra-national east-west relations contributed to a lack of durable success. The GNA remained impotent due to the split with the LNA, lack of control over Tripoli, and the power of armed factions (al-Shadeedi, van Veen and Harchaoui 2020).

In April 2017, Serraj called for international help concerning the escalation of hostilities in southwestern Libya. After the hostilities stabilised at a certain – tolerable – level in early April 2019, Haftar instructed the LNA to take Tripoli by force,



initiating Libya's latest war of Post-Qadhafi Succession. During the latest few years Libya did not gain a high alert rate as it was predicted in the 2015 FSI, however its situation has worsened. After the unsuccessful Berlin Meeting in January 2019 between the warring parties and the international stakeholders to secure a ceasefire, clashes continued and the Libyan conflict remained one of the world's most dangerous one. Most of the peace-making attempts were proved to be slow and fraught with numerous clashes between the fighting parties. For 2019 according to the FSI Libya became the 20th most fragile state from the examined 178. This worsening was due to Haftar's (unsuccessful) attack against Tripoli in April 2019 which led to the third civil war in Libya. It appears that chaos will continue in Libya for the foreseeable future (FSI 2020).

SSR by IGOs

In the end of 2017, the situation allowed EUBAM to re-establish its presence in Tripoli, (European External Action Service 2019), and due to its new mandate, it was no longer a mission with overarching strategic objectives, but a mission to support Libya's security sector reform in the fields of border management, law enforcement and the criminal justice system (European Council 2017).

In 2019, due to conflict of interests between EU member states and to the resistance of the Italian government, the deployment of the EUNAVFOR MED Sophia operation's naval assets was suspended temporarily. The operation continued with strengthening surveillance by air assets and reinforcing support to the Libyan Coastguard and Navy. (European Council 2019/a) After heated debates about the future of the operation, the member states of the EU agreed to extend the mandate of EUNAVFOR MED operation Sophia until 31 March 2020, but the deployment of the operation's naval assets remained suspended (Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/535; European Council 2019/b; Molnár -Vecsey 2020).

The European Union adopted special measures in favour of Libya for 2019 and 2020 and provided €32 million. The two programmes were entitled 'European Union Mousanada for Libya

– European Union support to Public Administration in Libya’ and ‘European Union for Private Sector Development in Libya’. The Mousanada programme aims to support Libyan institutions in institution building with full respect for the rule of law, helping the ‘stabilisation, conflict prevention and democratic transition’. The ‘European Union for Private Sector Development in Libya – Phase 2’ programme intends to strengthen the Libyan business environment (Commission Implementing Decision 2019).

| 31 |

As reflected in the 2016 Warsaw Summit communiqué, the allied leaders agreed on “projecting stability” on the southern flank (NATO 2016c). Based upon the experiences of the Arab Spring this strategy recognized the fact that NATO members can be secure only if their neighbourhoods are stable. In 2017, NATO officially joined the anti-ISIS coalition and (Wilson Center 2017), in the same year, the NATO Strategic Direction South Hub was inaugurated in Naples. After the Warsaw Summit “Active Endeavour” counter-terrorism mission was transformed and another pillar of NATO’s Mediterranean engagement became Operation Sea Guardian (OSG) which is a non-Article V maritime security operation aimed at working with Mediterranean stakeholders to maintain maritime situational awareness, deter and counter-terrorism (including the prevention of foreign fighter influx into NATO territory) and enhance capacity-building in the region (NATO n.d.). OSG is a direct “link” between NATO and the EU as it supports the EU’s Operation Sophia to tackle the migrant crisis and human trafficking.

In February 2017, when Fayez Al Sarraj visited the Brussels NATO Headquarters, he requested NATO’s assistance⁶ in the area of security and defence institution-building. The stated goal was to develop Libya’s ministry of defence, the chief of defence staff and intelligence and security services under the civilian control of the government (Ghasem 2018). Although several

6 Libya requested assistance within the framework of Defence and Related Security Capacity Building (DCB) Initiative which is a mechanism provided by the NATO alliance to bolster and support partner countries by improving their defence and security capacities

meetings have taken place, actual assistance did not make it past the planning stage.

The latest offer of assistance marks the prevalence of a bilateral approach to reform the security sector. Promising attempts to provide assistance in a multilateral context suffered from the conflicting agendas of different powers regarding the Libyan crisis. Even though NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg reiterated several times the organisation's readiness to help Libya rebuild security and military institutions, the offer was undermined by intra-European rivalries. According to Maghreb Confidential, France and Germany raised their objections, in a moment in which both Paris and Berlin were at odds with Italy over Operation Sophia (Profazio 2019).

NATO's offer was to run parallel to other initiatives that were discussed in international fora. The several Libya conferences organized by member states clearly show that interferences of regional and international powers resulted detrimental to NATO's efforts which never concretised further than just rhetoric. These developments limited NATO's room for manoeuvre in Libya, confining the activity of the organisation to the Operation Sea Guardian. There have been speculations about a bigger role for NATO in the fight against human smuggling networks, responsible for the migrant crisis in the Mediterranean Sea, but the lack of will prevented concrete action. In an interview with the Italian newspaper *La Repubblica*, Stoltenberg claimed that there are no military solutions to the migrant crisis, but reaffirmed NATO's commitment to tackle the problem, referring to NATO's mission in the Aegean Sea as a success that helped decrease the illegal and dangerous trafficking of human beings (Cadalanu 2018). As tensions have begun to ease a bit after the signing of the LPA, the UNSMIL evacuation was abolished and the entire delegation was gradually repatriated to Tripoli in February 2018 (UNSMIL 2018a).

Following the completion of the Libyan Election Assistance Project in December 2016, the UNDP was given a new mandate to evaluate Libyan electoral processes, during which a new electoral support project was developed (Talbot 2018). UNSMIL - as in previous years - continued to provide comprehensive



assistance during the preparation of elections, in October 2017, the mission set up three working groups to coordinate the registration of voters, public information and the international support for electoral legislation. Despite the efforts and positive outcomes of the preparation period, parliamentary elections have not taken place until today, but the municipal elections were held in a few communities 2019 (Elumami 2019). After this modest success, the UN launched a new project to organize and to secure further municipal elections and a national one (UNDP 2018-2020) that is also supported by the rival parties in Libya (Laessing and al-Warfalli 2019).

CONCLUSION

The security sector reform can be seen as a strategic institutional reform process aimed at creating a stable security environment that is optimal when obtained through the coordinated action of different actors (external, internal, state, non-state, etc.), in accordance with the principles of the rule of law. When implemented in such manner, security sector reform that emphasises civilian control of the armed forces can promote sustainable economic and social development in the medium and long term, while contributing to poverty reduction and supporting the creation of the conditions for good governance and the respect human rights. Since the beginning of the development of the SSR concept, it has become clear that its success may be hampered when it misses the objective of economic and social development and of local ownership of the process.

A fundamental barrier to NATO's effective and active participation in the Libyan SSR was that several member states that intervened in the R2P mission under UNSC1973 remained interested parties in the conflict in the post-intervention phase (e.g., France, Italy, Turkey, etc.) and they either continue to support their respective local partners materially, or side with different armed factions in reaction to local and regional developments (Eljarh 2017,69). The increasingly independent policies of NATO member states add further complexity to the conflict and weaken the Alliance cohesion. NATO can only address human



security problems and the terrorism challenge through a renewed cooperation model with its partners, because these risks are emanating particularly from the southern neighbourhood due to instability. In this theatre, the West should be capable of deterring Russia from turning the eastern Mediterranean into its backyard (Kasapoğlu 2019). Although in theory NATO could offer Libya various forms of partnerships like the Partnership for Peace (PfP) or its Middle Eastern equivalents called the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), the particular interests of member states seem to overshadow the Alliance activities on Libya. As a whole, military victory was not turned into a strategic success: since NATO has been virtually absent from Libya, the lack of state building limited the possibility of having a lasting impact. The fact that NATO was not able/willing to commit to providing help and assistance to Libya beyond rhetoric – upon the request of the Libyan government – shows lack of determination.

The EU can be considered as the opposite of NATO: indecisive at the beginning of the crisis, but more active later. After the intervention the Union tried to promote a democratic transition and economic growth, as within the first phase (2011-2014) more than €200 million were spent on supporting Libya. However, the EU's actions were dominated by member states' interest, thus real progress lagged behind. The establishment of EUBAM Libya is in strong connection with the EU's own interests, since member states' views on how to handle migration differ significantly. EUBAM's mandate is closely related to the SSR, but to this day the mission fails to deliver, since it lacks proper staff and tools to fulfil its mandate. In 2015 the European Union launched an EU military operation, EUNAVFOR MED, to tackle the migration and refugee crisis outside the Libyan territories, then its mandate was reinforced with the supporting tasks of capacity building, training of and information sharing with the Libyan Coast Guard. Even though the mission was replaced by a new one (IRINI) in 2020, EUNAVFOR MED was more likely meant to treat the symptoms of a problem rather than treating its root causes. Eventually EUNAVFOR MED fell victim of member states' disputes.

Critics say that there could be two the major obstacles for the UN in implementing a security sector reform. The first is that every time a major armed conflict burst out in the country UNSMIL refuses to use military power, except once, in the beginning of the conflict when UN resolution 1970 was approved. As the UN does not want to use hard power (Soudan 2020), they are trying to make peace by mediating between the two major actors, the HoR and the GNA, who are fighting for the leadership of Libya. However, as neither of the rivals has actual control over their militias (Libya's Conflict 2019), any peace-making attempt from the UN has remained unsuccessful in the long run. The second obstacle is that the UNSC passed numerous resolutions and statements regarding the SSR in Libya which cover almost every programme in the field of development and security. This is due to the UN's comprehensive approach, however, with the exception of resolutions 1970 and 1973, the UN was unable to implement any other resolution properly (Fetouri 2018).

For the UN some of the most challenging parts of implementing the SSR program were to enforce a police reform, giving electoral assistance and draft a constitution. Regarding the electoral assistance, with the support of UNSMIL, Libya could hold two parliamentary elections in 2012 and 2014 and some municipal elections in early 2019. Regarding the police reform, UNSMIL trained 700 former revolutionaries to police officers in 2012, and developed a 3-year project to execute a police reform with the Police Advisory Section and the Ministry of Interior. Regarding the constitution, as for now the efforts to create and vote on a permanent constitution have been fruitless. Besides all the aforementioned technical and structural support, under the aegis of UN agencies like the UNDP, UNICEF or UN Women, UNSMIL implemented numerous development projects such as immunisation campaigns, women empowerment initiatives and assisting internally displaced persons and their needs. Overall, the UN has achieved some success, however due to limited resources and in chaotic security environment, stabilisation programmes can hardly succeed. The main takeaway of the UN's intervention in Libya is that without a basic security there is no chance for development.



Table 2.1: SSR Field Activities by IGOs in Libya

Time period	Activity	UN		NATO		EU	
		IGOs own concept	real activity in Libya	IGOs own concept	real activity in Libya	IGOs own concept	real activity in Libya
2011-2014	Special post-conflict programmes	primary	active	secondary	not active	primary	active
2014-2017			active		not active		not active
2017-2019			active		not active		not active
2011-2014	Gender & Security	secondary	active	secondary	not active	secondary	not active
2014-2017			active		not active		not active
2017-2019			active		not active		not active
2011-2014	Civil Society & Media Capacity Building	secondary	active	secondary	not active	secondary	active
2014-2017			active		not active		active
2017-2019			active		not active		not active
2011-2014	Judicial & Legal Reform	primary	active	-	not active	primary	not active
2014-2017			active		not active		not active
2017-2019			active		not active		not active
2011-2014	Police Reform	primary	active	secondary	not active	primary	not active
2014-2017			active		not active		active
2017-2019			active		not active		active



2011-2014	Border Service Reform	secondary	active	primary	not active	primary	active
2014-2017			active		not active		active
2017-2019			not active		not active		active
2011-2014	Intelligence Reform	secondary	not active	secondary	not active	-	not active
2014-2017			not active		not active		not active
2017-2019			not active		active		not active
2011-2014	Defence Reform	secondary	active	secondary	not active	primary	not active
2014-2017			not active		not active		not active
2017-2019			not active		active		not active
2011-2014	Good Governance of the Security Sector	secondary	active	secondary	not active	secondary	active
2014-2017			active		not active		active
2017-2019			active		active		active

Source: Author's own elaboration.



Consequently, following our comparison of the IGOs' stated SSR objectives and their effective implementation in Libya, it can be stated that only a fraction of the planned SSR programmes have actually been delivered despite the commitments contained in the IGO's SSR frameworks. Furthermore, in spite of the 10-year-long international cooperation and development programmes and some partially successful tasks, the SSR attempts were unsuccessful, leaving Libya in lasting chaos. In order to visualize the differences of theory and practice we decided to complement Table 2 about SSR field activities of international organizations (Table 2.1). As our results show it is mostly the UN that – at least – takes on SSR activities in Libya, even though results would have been more tangible had the Libyan situation been more stable. NATO participated actively in the military intervention, but ever since the fall of the regime its Libyan involvement has been merely rhetorical. We find the EU's involvement somewhere in the middle between the UN and NATO. As the most directly affected IGO the EU might have been more effective in the Libyan SSR had the member states' diverging interests not hindered progress. Regarding the EU it needs to be highlighted that the Union took on programmes and projects that are closely related to the Union's security. When we take into consideration the SSR concepts of the IGOs we need to highlight that even though the EU and NATO are officially engaged in the Libyan SSR they are not actively carrying out those activities that they consider of primary importance.

Reading: Left columns represent SSR activities based on the auto-definitions of the IGO-s, while right columns represent their actual activities in Libya. The triple division of right columns represent top-down the three periods analysed (2011-2014, 2014-2017, 2017-2019). "Primary" in bold in the left column represent the main SSR activity of the respective IGOs by their own-definition. Secondary in bold in the left column means that the respective IGO can carry out that specific activity as part of their SSR, but according to their own definition, it is not the most important. Dash in the left column means that the IGO does not offer to carry out that specific activity as part of its SSR. "Active" in the right column means that the

respective SSR is actively engaged in that activity in Libya, while “not active” means that even though the respective IGO offers to carry out that specific activity as part of its SSR definition, it does not do so in Libya.

REFERENCES

- Al Arabiya. ‘2011, Qatar admits it had boots on the ground in Libya; NTC seeks further NATO help.’ *Al Arabiya*, Accessed 26 January 2021, <https://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/10/26/173833.html>.
- Al Jazeera. 2017. ‘Haftar: Libya’s UN-backed government’s mandate obsolete.’ Accessed 26 January 2021, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/12/haftar-libya-backed-government-mandate-obsolete-171218064242570.html>.
- Al Jazeera. 2014. ‘Libyans mourn rights activist amid turmoil.’ Accessed 26 January 2021, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/06/libyans-mourn-rights-activist-amid-turmoil-2014626161436740827.html>.
- Albrecht, P. and Stepputat, F. 2015. ‘The Rise and Fall of Security Sector Reform in Development.’ In *Handbook of International Security and Development*, ed. P. Jackson, 150–164. Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Alboni, R. 2017. ‘A Hard Diplomatic Transition in Libya: What Response from the EU and the 5+5 Dialogue?’ In *Conflict in Libya: A Multidimensional Crisis. State of Play and Paths towards a Sustainable Peace*, eds. Alboni, R., Salem, H. B., El Sagezli, M., Dias, A. and Nabli, B. European Institute of the Mediterranean, Policy Studies 2: 34-46.
- Aal-Shadeedi, H., van Veen, E. and Harchaoui, J. 2020. “One thousand and one failings – Security sector stabilisation and development in Libya.” CRU Report. Accessed 20 February 2021, <https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2020-04/one-thousand-and-one-failings.pdf>.
- Badi, E., Eljarh, M. and Farid, M. 2018. “At a Glance: Libya’s Transformation 2011-2018 Power, Legitimacy and the Economy.” *Democracy Reporting International*. Accessed 26 January 2021, <https://democracy-reporting.org/libya-political-transformation-timeline/>.
- Boeke, S. and Zijdewijn, J. R. 2016. *Transitioning From Military Interventions To Long-Term Counter-Terrorism Policy – The Case of Libya (2011-2016)*, Leiden University, Institute of Security and Global Affairs.

- Brockmeier, S., Stuenkel, O., and Tourinho, M. 2015. "The Impact of the Libya Intervention Debates on Norms of Protection." *Global Society*, 30 (1): 113-133.
- Butler, J. 2014. "Responsibility for Regime Change." *Columbia Law Review*, 114:3., William & Mary Law School Research Paper No. 09-367.
- Cadalanu, G. 2018. "Jens Stoltenberg: 'Libia, la NATO pronta ad aiutare l'Italia'." *La Repubblica*, Accessed 26 January 2021, https://rep.repubblica.it/pwa/intervista/2018/06/23/news/jens-stoltenberg_la_nato_e_pronta_ad_aiutare_la_libia_ma_sarebbe_bene_che_l_italia_avesse_un_ruolo_-199845625/.
- Carati, A. 2017. "Responsibility to protect, NATO and the problem of who should intervene: reassessing the intervention in Libya." *Global Change, Peace & Security*, 29(3): 293-309.
- Christensen, G.H., Ruohomäki J. and Rodt, A.P. 2018. "The European Union Border Assistance Mission in Libya – successes, shortcomings and lessons identified." *Royal Danish Defence College*.
- European Commission. "Commission Implementing Decision of 29.10.2019 on the special measure 2019 in favour of Libya, including one action to be carried on in 2020, financed by the general budget of the European Union.
- Council Decision. 2016. *Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/993 of 20 June 2016 amending Decision (CFSP) 2015/778 on a European Union military operation in the Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED operation SOPHIA)*.
- Council Decision. 2019. *Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/535 of 29 March 2019 amending Decision (CFSP) 2015/778 on a European Union military operation in the Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED operation SOPHIA)*.
- Council of the European Union. 2005. "EU Concept for ESDP Support to Security Sector Reform."
- Daalder H. I. and Stavridis, G. J. 2012. "NATO's Victory in Libya: The Right Way to Run an Intervention." *Atlantic Council*. Accessed 15 January 2021, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/natos-victory-in-libya-the-right-way-to-run-an-intervention/>.
- Democracy Reporting International. "At a Glance: Libya's Transformation 2011-2018, An Interactive Overview." Accessed 15 January 2021, <https://democracy-reporting.org/libya-political-transformation-timeline/>.
- Denney, L. 2015. "Operationalizing the Security-development Nexus: Security Sector Reform and its Implications." in *Handbook of*

- International Security and Development*, ed. Jackson, P., 135–149. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Duffield, M. 2010. “The Liberal Way of Development and the Development–Security Impasse: Exploring the Global Life-Chance Divide.” *Security Dialogue* 41(1): 53–76.
- Eckhard, S. 2016. “*The Challenges and Lessons Learned in Supporting Security Sector Reform*.” Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
- Eljarh, M. 2018. “The Libyan Crisis: Internal Barriers to Conflict Resolution and the Role of Multilateral Cooperation.” in: *The Search for Stability in Libya OSCE’s Role between Internal Obstacles and External Challenges*, edited by Dessì, A. and Greco, A. 47–64. Rome: IAI Research Studies.
- Eljarh, M.. 2014. “Libya’s Islamists Go for Broke.” *Foreign Policy*. Accessed 15 January 2021, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/07/22/libyas-islamists-go-for-broke/>.
- Elumami, A. 2019. “Libya holds municipal elections in first vote for five years.” *Reuters*. Accessed 5 January 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-election/libya-holds-municipal-elections-in-first-vote-for-five-years-idUSKCN1RB002>
- Eriksson, M. “A Fratricidal Libya: Making Sense of a Conflict Complex.” *Journal Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 27,5, 1–24.
- Eriksson, M. and Bohman, E. 2018. “The Second Libyan Civil War. Security Developments During 2016-2017.” Swedish Defence Research Agency.
- European Commission. 2013. *EU’s response to the “Arab Spring”: The State-of-Play after Two Years.*, 08 February 2013. Accessed 12 January 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_13_81.
- European Commission. 2016. *Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council. Elements for an EU-wide strategic framework to support security sector reform, 5.7.2016, JOIN(2016) 31 final.*
- European Commission. 2018. Regulation of the European parliament and of the Council for establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument.
- European Council. 2013. *Council Decision 2013/233/CFSP of 22 May 2013, on the European Union Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya.* Accessed 21 April 2020, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/celex_32013d0233_en_txt.pdf.
- European Council. 2016a. Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Elements for an EU-wide Strategic Framework for Supporting Security Sector Reform (SSR).

- European Council. 2016b. Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/207 of 15 February 2016 amending Decision 2013/233/CFSP on the European Union Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya).
- European Council. 2016c. Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/1339 of 4 August 2016 amending and extending Decision 2013/233/CFSP on the European Union Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya).
- European Council. 2017. Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/1342 of 17 July 2017 amending and extending Decision 2013/233/CFSP on the European Union Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya).
- European Council. 2019a. EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia: mandate extended until 30 September 2019. 29/03/2019.
- European Council. 2019b. EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia: mandate extended until 31 March 2020.
- European External Action Service. 2019. *EU Integrated Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya) Factsheet*. Accessed 15 January 2021, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/20190319_eubam_libya_factsheet_march_2019_en.pdf.
- European Union - Libya relations Brussels. 2019. "European External Action Service, Factsheet on the relations between Libya and the European Union." Accessed 15 January 2021, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/19163/eu-libya-relations_en.
- Fabbrini, S. 2014. "The European Union and the Libyan crisis." *International Politics* 51, 2, 177–195.
- Fetouri, M. 2018. "The UN is failing Libya every step of the way." *Middle East Monitor*, <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20180920-the-un-is-failing-libya-every-step-of-the-way/>.
- Filípková, L. and Kužvart, J. 2013. "Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Libya - Assessment of the Situation and Evaluation of Perspectives for the Czech Republic and NATO."
- Fitzgerald, M. and Toaldo, M. 2017. "A quick guide to Libya's main players." *European Council on Foreign Relations*.
- Fluri, P. and Lunn, S. 2007. "NATO, EU and the Challenge of Defence and Security Sector Reform" Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) / NATO Parliamentary Assembly.
- Gaub, F. 2013. "The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Libya: Reviewing Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR" *Strategic Studies Institute*. US Army War College.

- Gaub, F. 2014. "The EU and Libya and the Art of the Possible", *The International Spectator* 49(3): 40–53.
- Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance. *SSR Overview*. International Security Sector Advisory Team.
- Ghasem, S. 2018. "Interviewing Nicola de Santis, NATO's Head of Middle East and North Africa Section." *NATO Association of Canada*. Accessed 15 January 2021, <http://www.natoassociation.ca/interviewing-nicola-de-santis-head-of-middle-east-and-north-africa-section/>.
- Hagmann, T, and Péclard D. 2008. 'Negotiating Statehood: Dynamics of Power and Domination in Africa', *Development and Change*, 41(4): 539–562.
- Hensell, S. and Gerdes, F. 2012. "Elites and International Actors in Post-War Societies: The Limits of Intervention." *International Peacekeeping* 19(2): 154–169.
- Herbst, J. 2000. *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- IECEU. 2017. "The Libya Review Revision 2.0." Accessed 15 January 2021, http://www.ieceu-project.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/IECEU_D3.4_Libya_review.pdf.
- OECD. 2016. "OECD Development Policy Papers, No. 3: Improving Security and Justice Programming in Fragile Situations: Better Political Engagement, More Change Management."
- International Crisis Group. 2016. "The Libyan Political Agreement: Time for a Reset." Accessed 5 January 2021, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/libya/libyan-political-agreement-time-reset>.
- Jackson, P. 2015. *Handbook of International Security and Development*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Jebnoun, N. 2015. "Beyond the mayhem: debating key dilemmas in Libya's state building." *Taylor and Francis Online* 20(5): 832–864.
- Joffé, G. 2020. "Where does Libya go now?" *The Journal of North African Studies* 25(1): 1–7.
- Kasapoğlu, C. 2019. "Why and How NATO Should Adapt to a New Mediterranean Security Environment." *SWP Comment*. Accessed 20 January 2021, https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2019C15_kpu.pdf.
- Koenig, N., 2011. "The EU and the Libyan crisis - in quest of coherence?" *The International Spectator*. 46(4): 11–30.
- Laessing, U. and al-Warfalli, A. 2019. "Libyan rivals agree on need for national election: U.N." *Reuters*. Accessed 15 January 2021,

- <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security/libyan-rivals-agree-on-need-for-national-election-u-n-idUSKCN1QH1BM>.
- Lamont, K. C. 2016. "Contested Governance: Understanding Justice Interventions in Post-Qadhafi Libya." *Taylor and Francis Online*, 10(3): 382-399. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2016.1199479>.
- Law, D. 2013. *Intergovernmental Organisations and Their Role in Security Sector Reform*. Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance. Accessed 15 January 2021, https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/DCAF_YB_2007_FINAL.pdf.
- "Libya's conflict." 2019. *Strategic Comments* 25(5): 10 – 25.
- Loschi, C. and Russo, A. 2020. "Whose Enemy at the Gates? Border Management in the Context of EU Crisis Response in Libya and Ukraine".
- Marsai, V. 2014. "A líbiai válság elmúlt két és fél éve európai szemszögből." *Nemzet és Biztonság* 3: 82–104.
- McFate, S. 2008. "Securing the Future: A Primer on Security Sector Reform in Conflict Countries." *United States Institute of Peace*.
- Michaels, H. J. 2014. "Able but not Willing. A Critical Assessment of NATO's Libya Intervention." In Engelbrekt, K. and Mohlin, M. (eds.) *The NATO Intervention in Libya, Lessons Learned from the Campaign*, 17-40. New York: Routledge.
- Mikai, B. 2013. "Libya's Turbulent Transition: The Pressing Need for Security Sector Reform." *Project on Middle East Democracy*.
- Molnár, A and Vecsey, M. 2020. "Geographical characteristics of CSDP missions and operations tackling the migration crisis in the Central Mediterranean Route" *Hungarian Geographical Bulletin*.
- Nasr, G. 2013. "Benghazi so far: A View From Inside The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL)." *UN in the Arab World*.
- NATO. 2014. NATO reaffirms commitment to assist Libya at the Rome Conference.
- NATO. 2014. Wales Summit Declaration. Accessed 15 January 2021, www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm.
- NATO. 2016a. "NATO Secretary General and Libyan Foreign Minister discuss how NATO can support Libya." Accessed 15 January 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_132583.htm?selectedLocale=en.
- NATO. 2016b. "NATO Secretary General welcomes the Libyan Presidential Council's arrival in Tripoli." Accessed 15 January 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_129653.htm?selectedLocale=en.



- NATO. 2016c. "Warsaw Summit Communiqué." Accessed 15 January 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm#outside-nato.
- NATO. n.d. "Operation Sea Guardian, Allied Maritime Command." Accessed 15 January 2021, <https://mc.nato.int/missions/operation-sea-guardian>.
- Neretnieks, K. and Kaljurand, R. 2007. "Security Sector Reform: A Nordic-Baltic agenda."
- OECD. 2008. *The OECD DAC Handbook on Security Sector Reform*.
- OECD Development Assistance Committee. 2005. "Security System Reform and Governance." *DAC Guidelines and Reference Series*, Paris.
- Overbeck, M. 2014. "European debates during the Libya crisis of 2011: shared identity, divergent action." *European Security* 23(4): 583–600.
- Pack, J., Mezran, K. and Eljarh, M. 2014. "Libya's Faustian Bargains: Breaking the Appeasement Cycle." *The Atlantic Council*. Accessed 15 January 2021, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Libyas_Faustian_Bargains.pdf.
- Profazio, U. 2019. "Libya's Chaos: In Search of a Security Strategy." *Italian Institute for International Political Studies*.
- Raineri, L. 2019. "Security and informality in Libya: militarisation without military?" *Conflict, Security & Development* 19(6): 583–602.
- Samuels, D. 2007. "A Conversation with Colin Powell." *The Atlantic*. Accessed 15 January 2021, <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/04/a-conversation-with-colin-powell/305873/>.
- Sawani, M. Y. 2012. "Post-Qadhafi Libya: interactive dynamics and the political future." *Contemporary Arab Affairs* 5(1): 1–26.
- Schnabel, A. 2012. "The Security-development Discourse and the Role of SSR as a Development Instrument," in Schnabel, A. and Farr, V. (eds.): *Back to the Roots: Security Sector Reform and Development*, 29–76. Berlin: LIT Verlag.
- Schnabel, A. 2015. "Security Sector Reform as a Manifestation of the Security-development Nexus? Towards Building SSR theory." In ed. Jackson P.: *Handbook of International Security and Development*, 115–134. Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Schroeder, U. C. and Chappuis, F. 2014. "New Perspectives on Security Sector Reform: The Role of Local Agency and Domestic Politics" *International Peacekeeping* 21(2): 133–148.
- Sengupta, K. 2011. "Security fears as UN ends Libya military mandate." *The Independent*. Accessed 15 January 2021, <https://>

www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/security-fears-as-un-ends-libya-military-mandate-2376888.html.

Sivan, G. 2018. "Interviewing Nicola de Santis, NATO's Head of Middle East and North Africa Section, NATO Association of Canada." Accessed 15 January 2021, <http://natoassociation.ca/interviewing-nicola-de-santis-head-of-middle-east-and-north-africa-section/>.

Soudan, F. 2020. "'There is no military solution to the conflict in Libya' – UN Sec-Gen António Guterres." *The Africa Report*. Accessed 22 February 2021, <https://www.theafricareport.com/23047/there-is-no-military-solution-to-the-conflict-in-libya-un-sec-gen-antonio-guterres/>.

Spear, J. and Williams, P.D. (eds.) 2012. *Security and Development in Global Politics. A Critical Comparison*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.

Stavridis, S. 2014. "EU incoherence and inconsistency over Libya": evidence to the contrary." *Cahiers de la Méditerranée* 89, 159–179.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. "UN Arms embargo on Libya." Accessed 15 February 2021, https://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/un_arms_embargoes/libya/libya_2011.

Talbot, F. and Denehy, D. 2018. "Is it time for municipal elections in Libya?" *Italian Institute for International Political Studies*. Accessed 12 January 2021, <https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/it-time-municipal-elections-libya-21779>.

Tansey, O. 2009. *Regime-Building: Democratization and International Administration*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

The Fund for Peace. 2011. "The Failed States Index 2011." Accessed 15 January 2021, https://www.pucsp.br/ecopolitica/downloads/failed_states_index_2011.pdf.

The Fund for Peace. 2012. "The Failed States Index 2012." Accessed 15 January 2021, <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/cfsir1210-failedstatesindex2012-06p.pdf>.

The Fund for Peace. 2013. "The Failed States Index 2013." Accessed 15 January 2021, <https://fundforpeace.org/2013/06/24/failed-states-index-2013-the-book/>.

The Fund for Peace. 2014. "The Fragile States Index 2014." Accessed 15 January 2021, <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/182267/cfsir1423-fragilestatesindex2014-06d.pdf>.

The Fund for Peace. 2015. "The Fragile States Index 2015." Accessed 15 January 2021, <https://fundforpeace.org/2015/06/17/fragile-states-index-2015-the-book/>.



- The Fund for Peace. 2016. "The Fragile States Index 2016." Accessed 15 January 2021, <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/fragilestatesindex-2016.pdf>.
- The Fund for Peace. 2020. "The Fragile States Index 2020." Accessed 15 January 2021, <https://fragilestatesindex.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/fsi2020-report.pdf>.
- The Libyan Republic. The Interim Transitional National Council. 2011. "Founding statement of the Interim Transitional National Council." Accessed 15 January 2021, <https://web.archive.org/web/20110310051658/http://ntclibya.org/english/founding-statement-of-the-interim-transitional-national-council/>.
- United Nations Development Programme. 2014. "UNDP FACT Sheet: Libya Police Support Project". Accessed 15 January 2021, <https://www.ly.undp.org/content/libya/en/home/operations/projects/closed-projects/police-support-project.html>.
- United Nations Development Programme. 2018. "Support to Central Committee for Municipal Council Elections 2018-2020." Accessed 15 January 2021, <https://www.ly.undp.org/content/libya/en/home/projects/Central-Committee-for-Municipal-Elections.html>.
- United Nations Peacekeeping website. Security Sector Reform. Accessed 15 January 2021, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/security-sector-reform>.
- United Nations Security Council Report 1970. 2011. Accessed 15 January 2021, <http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/2B57BBA2-07D9-4C35-B45EEED275080E87/0/N1124558.pdf>.
- United Nations Security Council. 2016b. "S/2016/182 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya." Accessed 15 January 2021, <https://unsmil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/N1604043.pdf>.
- United Nations Security Council. 2018a. "S/2018/140 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya." Accessed 15 January 2021, <https://unsmil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/n1803952.pdf>.
- United Nations Security Council. 2012a. "S/2012/129 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya." Accessed 15 January 2021, <https://unsmil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/SGRepor01March2012.pdf>.
- United Nations Security Council. 2012b. "S/2012/675 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya." Accessed 15 January 2021, <https://unsmil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/SGReport30August2012.pdf>.

- United Nations Security Council. 2014. *United Nations Security Council Resolution, S/RES/2151 24/04/2014*.
- United Nations Security Council. 2014b: "S/2014/653 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya." Accessed 15 January 2021, <https://unsmil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/Libya%20Report%20final%205%20Sept.%20%281%29.pdf>.
- United Nations Security Council. 2016a. "S/2016/1011 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya." Accessed 15 January 2021, https://unsmil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/un_sg_report_on_unsmil_01_december_2016.pdf.
- United Nations Security Council. 2018b. "S/2018/429 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya." Accessed 15 January 2021, <https://unsmil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/n1812844.pdf>.
- United Nations Support Mission in Libya. "The list of UN bodies operating in Libya." Accessed 25 February 2021, <https://unsmil.unmissions.org/un-libya>.
- United Nations. 2008. "A/62/659-S/2008/39 Report of the Secretary-General." Accessed 23 January 2021, <https://www.refworld.org/docid/47b1c33a2.html>
- United Nations. 2017. *United Nations Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform*.
- Von Weitershausen, I., Schäfer, D. and Wessels, W. 2020. "A 'Primus Inter Pares' in EU Foreign Policy? –German Leadership in the European Council during the Libyan and Ukrainian Crises." *German Politics*, 29, 1, 42-58, DOI: 10.1080/09644008.2019.1583328
- Wilson Center. 2017. "NATO to Join Anti-ISIS Coalition." Accessed 23 January 2021, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/nato-to-join-anti-isis-coalition>.
- Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. 2018. "A Roadmap to Sustainable Peace in Libya: A Feminist Approach towards Achieving Peace and Security in the Face of Patriarchy, Militarism, and Fundamentalism." Accessed 9 February 2021, https://www.wilpf.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/WILPF_Libya_Policy_Brief_Web.pdf.