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Gas Discoveries in Cyprus: The Limits of Russian Influence

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Offshore gas discoveries around Cyprus have brought several external actors to the region. Energy companies from the European Union, the United States and the Middle East acquired exploration rights and obtained stakes in projects of infrastructural development. While energy giants tied to these actors secured important shares in the currently developing Greek Cypriot gas industry, Russia is notably absent from the beneficiaries. The absence is particularly noteworthy as Russia has otherwise developed significant energy deals with other regional actors and exerts extensive economic influence over the Republic of Cyprus. This study seeks to examine why the Russian gas involvement did not materialise in Cyprus and why Moscow remained distant from the Greek Cypriot gas opportunities. It argues that not only systemic but also domestic factors constrained the expansion of Russian gas interests. To unpack the causes of this absence, the paper applies the theory and analytical framework of neoclassical realism and interprets foreign policy outcomes through the lenses of systemic and domestic variables. The study concludes that Moscow sacrificed its gas opportunities in Cyprus due to several structural and unit-level factors, including recognising Turkish interests in the island's energy disputes, protecting the regional stakes of national energy companies, and maintaining Russian positions in the Greek Cypriot financial sector.

Key Words: Russia, Cyprus, Eastern Mediterranean, geopolitics, natural gas, neoclassical realism

INTRODUCTION

Gas explorations in the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of Cyprus have been at the forefront of international attention since 2010. Although the global significance of the proven volume is limited, the

gas fields of Aphrodite, Calypso and Glaucus still possess considerable regional significance (Tzimitras 2019; Evaghorou 2020; Marketos 2021). Studies examining the geopolitical implications of this regional significance have reviewed several aspects and causes of energy disputes, the feasibility of multilateral partnerships and viability of export options (Gürel, Mullen, and Tzimitras 2013; Kirışci 2014; Tagliapietra 2014; Ellinas, Roberts, and Tzimitras 2016; Demiryol 2019; Ersoy 2019; Tziarras 2019a). In addition to regional stakeholders, the role of external actors has also been investigated, revealing prospects of European gas diversification, and analysing potential benefits and drawbacks of increasing US and Chinese influence (Mavroyiannis 2014; Tagliapietra 2016; Tsakiris 2018; Cropsey and Brown 2014; Özdemir 2020; Marketos 2021).

Beyond other regional and global actors, the literature has also detected an expanding Russian influence that has established a significant political, economic, and cultural presence in the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) (Melakopides 2016; Zavyalova et al. 2019; Mallinson, Kanevskiy, and Petasis 2020; Pritchett 2021; Stronski 2021). With an extensive and multisectoral influence, it could be assumed that Russia, a top supplier in the global gas market, also plays a prominent role in the emerging Greek Cypriot gas industry. The assumption may be further reinforced by Russia's regional involvements that have gained significant interests in the Egyptian, Lebanese, and Syrian offshore gas sectors. In contrast, however, Cyprus seems to be different from these examples, as in this case there was no significant Russian intervention in the currently developing gas industry. The literature has repeatedly drawn attention to the lack of bilateral gas cooperation and underlined the notable absence of Russian involvement (Paraschos 2013; Stergiou 2019; Evaghorou 2020).

This study seeks to investigate this anomaly by applying the theoretical and methodological framework of neoclassical realism. It attempts to understand the causes of the above-mentioned inconsistency and investigate the underlying causes of limited Russian involvement. It asks why Moscow has not developed close(r) gas cooperation with the ROC, despite having extensive influence over several sectors, including financial services and tourism. The paper



posits that a wide set of systemic and domestic factors constrained the implementation of classical and structural realist logics, which would have entailed a more extensive Russian involvement, with efforts to accumulate power potentials and control emerging competitors. To achieve its objectives, the study first selects the theoretical and methodological framework of neoclassical realism, which has been recently applied to understand both Greek Cypriot and Russian foreign policies (Kropatcheva 2012; Romanova 2012; Becker et al. 2016; Tziarras 2019a; Zachariades and Petrikkos 2020). The selection of the theoretical background is a critical stage of the investigation, as neoclassical realism can not only reveal systemic causes but also reflects on the intervention of domestic variables. Equipped with such a dual analytical focus, the paper then explores the global, regional, and local (Greek Cypriot) trends of Russian gas affairs. Systemic and unit-level findings are connected to foreign policy outcomes in the discussion section, wherein the paper seeks to identify correlations between empirical findings and policy choices. At the end, the paper seeks to draw conclusions by listing foreign policy implications.

[5]

THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL BACKGROUND

Energy deposits play important roles in the realist arguments, hence both classical and structural realists acknowledge their significance. They claim that control of energy is important for both exporting and importing states, as it increases their security and reduces the negative effects of anarchy. The classical realist approach considers energy deposits as potential sources of power maximisation and regards them as strategic supplies (Morgenthau 1948). As in the anarchic international system, the struggle for power and security is continuous, states, driven by the responsibility of national survival and the desire to dominate, seek to maximise the control of material capabilities, including energy resources (Česnakas 2010). Great Powers are particularly interested in controlling material resources as their motivations are defined by efforts of power maximisation and interest in covering the costs of their leading positions. Accord-

[6] ing to Robert Gilpin (1981, 156), '[a]lthough control over an international system provides economic benefits (revenues) to the dominant power or powers, domination also involves costs in manpower and material resources.' The structural realist explanation maintains this view, although it amplifies the influence and impact of systemic effects. It argues that the asymmetric distribution of capabilities differentiates between international actors, and thus energy abundance or absence may enhance or weaken states (Waltz 1979). While all states concentrate on natural resources, both classical and structural realists give special importance to great powers, from whom hegemonic energy policies are expected. According to the structural realist perception, newly discovered hydrocarbon deposits represent particular importance for hegemons, which 'have to make sure that if the pie is expanding, they are getting at least some portion of the increase' (Mearsheimer 2001, 52).

Consequently, the absence of hegemonic behaviour would certainly contradict the traditional realist arguments. As Česnakas (2010, 39) puts it, '[c]lassical realism cannot explain why states controlling great reserves of energy resources do not use them as tools for power expansion.' The literature explains the presence of such anomalies with human intervention. Högselius (2019, 81) believes that individuals in energy affairs maintain 'their own specific world views, agendas, visions, moods and desires' and 'do not necessarily follow any rational algorithms.' Among the theories dealing with human intervention, this paper employs the tenets of neoclassical realism.

While structural realism claims that systemic dynamics are enough to explain core developments of international relations, neoclassical realism argues that national power and systemic positions are translated to foreign policy outcomes through the lenses of domestic variables (Baylis, Smith, and Owens 2008). Rose (1998), who coined the term neoclassical realism, argues that foreign policies are not driven only by material capabilities and positions in the international hierarchy but also internal factors whose policy choices significantly influence states' behaviour. Their presence is highly influential as their interests, perceptions and motivations influence how



states react to systemic effects (Wohlforth 1993; Schweller 1998). As Zakaria demonstrates (1998), 'many states do not maximize their influence constantly,' as national leaders are often constrained by domestic pressures that force them to share available resources between the domestic and international spheres (Zakaria 1998, 83). An alternative approach was outlined by Schweller (2004) who believed that under balancing and consequent strategic mistakes are the results of decisions and failures of domestic actors extending from elite to society. In this sense, and regardless of the outcome, domestic variables are intervening units, linking systemic levels and material capabilities to internal factors of foreign policy choices. Although their footprint is significant, the presence of internal factors has not diminished the neorealist role of systemic level but rather produced an analytical framework in which foreign policy outcomes (dependent) are interpreted through the lenses of external (independent) and domestic (intervening) variables (Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell 2016). Moreover, neoclassical realism has not only bridged external and internal levels, but also the theories of foreign policy behaviour and international politics (Smith 2018). According to Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell (2016), contemporary neoclassical realism goes well beyond the original task of addressing foreign policy behaviours and has become a comprehensive theory of International Relations (IR).

[7]

Building on these theoretical arguments, the present paper seeks to understand how the neoclassical realist framework explains the limited Russian gas influence in Cyprus. In terms of hypothesis, it argues that *systemic and domestic variables both constrained the otherwise predictable Russian involvement in the Greek Cypriot gas affairs, thus forcing national stakeholders to stay away from the seemingly beneficial opportunities*. To test the hypothesis, the study applies the analytical framework established by Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell (2016, 33–98) and separates analysing sections at the systemic, the unit, and the levels of foreign policy outcomes. Within the systemic section, the paper also distinguishes between the global and regional levels of relative power distribution and systemic clarity. Relative distribution of power refers to the allocation and hierar-

chies of global and regional power capacities (pp. 34–8), in the case of the present study, it refers to Russia's positions in the global and regional geopolitics of natural gas. Systemic clarity concentrates on the threats and opportunities that influence Russian gas diplomacy [8] (pp. 46–52). Turning towards the unit level, the literature differentiates between various types of intervening variables (pp. 33–79). Among these, the factors of strategic culture, leader images¹ and domestic institutions are examined here. External and internal variables are connected in the section of Foreign Policy Outcomes which includes a discussion section as well. Since a multidimensional analysis is beyond the scope of the paper, it focuses mainly on the positions of the Russian gas sector, discussing other areas of bilateral relations only at the unit level.

THE GLOBAL LEVEL: RUSSIAN ROLE IN THE GEOPOLITICS OF NATURAL GAS

Russia's global positions in the *relative distribution of power* are greatly influenced by its vast gas reserves. Currently, Russia has the largest proven natural gas reserves in the world, representing about 20% of the global proved quantities in 2020 (BP 2021). These large deposits have provided a leading position in the gas market since the 1980s, with Russian supplies accounting for an average of 20% of global exports per annum between 2011 to 2020. Pipeline-based exports have traditionally been centred around the European² continent, which has purchased about 75% of total Russian gas exports during the 2010s (table 1). In the corresponding period, Russian export accounted for an average of 35% of annual European imports, with the largest negative swing in 2012 (29%) and the largest positive shift in 2017 (39%). All in all, between 2011 and 2020, Russian

¹ According to Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell (2016, 61–66), the term 'leader images' refers to the perceptions and beliefs of individual decision-makers.

² Geographical classifications are based on the territorial division of BP statistics, in this case, Europe refers to European members of the OECD plus Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Georgia, Gibraltar, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and Ukraine. For more information see BP (2021, 69).



TABLE 1 Natural Gas Export Volumes – Selected Indicators, 2011–2020 (bcm)

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Russian Gas Export to Non-European states	80.8	70.7	63.1	54.2	47.7
Russian Gas Export to Europe	140.6	130	162.4	147.7	159.8
Total Gas Export of Russia	221.4	200.7	225.5	201.9	207.5
Total European Gas Import	459.4	446.5	448.6	413.1	456.4
Total Global Gas Export	1025.4	1033.4	1035.9	997.2	1042.4
	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Russian Gas Export to Non-European states	39.0	41.5	47.3	48.1	53.2
Russian Gas Export to Europe	166.1	189.4	200.6	208.5	184.9
Total Gas Export of Russia	205.1	230.9	247.9	256.6	238.1
Total European Gas Import	472.2	489.1	550.4	591.1	561.9
Total Global Gas Export	1084.1	1134.1	1236.4	1286.6	1243.7

NOTES Adapted from BP (2012; 2013; 2014; 2015; 2016; 2017; 2018; 2019; 2020; 2021).

supply quantities to Europe grew by an annual average of 3.7%, their share of European import markets have increased by 6.4%, while the continent's total gas imports grew by an average of 2.5% per year (BP 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015; 2016; 2017; 2018; 2019; 2020; 2021).

Although modest gains can be viewed as positive developments, the share of Russian gas exports to non-European destinations has been on a declining trend and only slightly increased in 2020 (table 1). The reduction was associated with the recent gas discoveries in the post-Soviet space (e.g. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan), which was a traditional destination of Russian resources. Another reason is the emergence of new competitors. According to Kutcherov et al. (2020, 1), the 'silent revolution of shale gas' has reshaped the global gas market, leading to the emergence of new competitors, lowering prices, and the formation of new technologies and supply routes. Although Russia has increased its production capacity to respond to these challenges, the 2.4% growth rate between 2009 and 2019 was far below the US rate (table 2). In addition, new competitors such as Iran, Canada, Qatar, China and Australia have

[9]

TABLE 2 Market shares and Growth Rates in Global Gas Production: Selected Indicators

Country	Share of Global Production		Growth rate per annum	
	2019	2020	2008–2018	2009–2019
[10] USA	23.1	23.7	4.3	5.2
Russia	17.0	16.6	0.9	2.4
Iran	6.1	6.5	6.8	5.9
Qatar	4.5	4.4	8.3	6.4
China	4.5	5.0	7.2	7.5
Canada	4.3	4.3	0.7	0.9
Australia	3.8	3.7	12.1	11.9
Norway	2.9	2.9	2.0	1.0
Algeria	2.2	2.1	1.3	1.3
Malaysia	2.0	1.9	1.1	1.8
Indonesia	1.7	1.6	-0.3	-1.4
UAE	1.6	1.4	2.3	2.0
Egypt	1.6	1.5	0.3	0.7
Nigeria	1.2	1.3	3.9	7.8

NOTES Adapted from BP (2019, 34; 2020, 36).

also produced higher growth rates and developed effective LNG export technologies (Klare 2017, 35). In the case of the latter, Russia is also lagging behind, despite having increased its LNG exports by an annual growth rate of 19% between 2011 and 2019 and controlling around 8.3% of the global LNG exports in 2020 (Klare 2017, 35). All in all, Russian gas production represented about 18.5% of total global production in 2011, and 16.6% in 2020 (BP 2012; 2021).

Supply routes have also begun to change in the recent period due to the shale gas revolution, the spread of LNG technologies, the emergence of new consumers, diversification policies, and the destabilisation of traditional transfer regions. Russia's self-inflicted conflicts are also problematic in this respect, as, for example, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict makes the development of new pipeline links (e.g. TurkStream, Nord Stream 2) essential, and thus significantly affects Moscow's energy and foreign policies (Sziklai, Kóczy, and Csércsik 2020). A less Russia-dependent trend is the growth of



Asian gas consumption, which increases the importance of these markets and forces Moscow to gain stakes (Taghizadeh-Hesary et al. 2021). In this case, however, existing partnerships, emerging competitors, and the lack of export infrastructure are all hindering Russian efforts. Despite developing pipelines and using new LNG capacities, Russia still has a weak, though slightly growing market share in Asia. Between 2011 and 2020, Russia exported an average of 17 bcm of natural gas per year to the Asia-Pacific region, mainly in the form of LNG. Pipeline supplies have begun to play an increasingly important role with the interconnection of Russian (Power of Siberia) and Chinese (Heihe-Shanghai) pipelines and with the delivery of 0.3 bcm to China in 2019 and 3.9 bcm in 2020 (BP 2020; 2021; Liu and Xu 2021). In sum, Russia's share of the Asian market averaged around 5% during the last decade (BP 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015; 2016; 2017; 2018; 2019; 2020; 2021).

[11]

Turning to the components of *systemic clarity*, it can be stated that Russia's global gas positions may be reinforced by some ongoing trends, while also can be constrained by certain prevailing threats. When briefly summarizing global *opportunities*, it is again important to emphasize Russia's significant gas reserves, as both energy consumption and gas demand have slowly increased in recent years, hence favouring countries with large deposits. According to BP's statistics, global primary energy consumption grew by 1.9% between 2009 and 2019 (BP 2021). Natural gas has been playing an important role in enabling higher consumption, for example in 2019, about 36% of the additional demand was provided by new natural gas supplies (International Gas Union 2020). Covering large proportions of consumption growth, the share of natural gas in primary energy demand have also increased slowly in the previous decade, representing about 21% of total demand in 2010, 22% in 2015 and 23% in 2019 (International Energy Agency 2020a). According to the calculations of IEA, the slow expansion will continue in the future with around 1.7% of demand growth between 2019 and 2025 (International Energy Agency 2020b). According to the same source, Moscow will play a crucial part in supplying the demand growth, and its existing and new gas fields will solidify 'Russia's position as the

world's largest natural gas exporter' (International Energy Agency 2020b, 48).

[12] These Russian opportunities are significantly *threatened* by some global transformations. One of the most important threats is the emergence of new suppliers and newly discovered gas resources, which are reshaping the market and undermining the current positions of Russia (Grigas 2017). While Moscow's core competitors are still lagging behind, the proven reserves of Iran (32 tcm), Qatar (24.7 tcm) and Turkmenistan (19.5 tcm) indicate that large-scale explorations are providing more and more opportunities for competitors. At the same time, the increasing competition affected prices and developed two contrasting trends. The first trend was characterized by low prices and abundant resources, while the second was marked by high demand, relative scarcity and skyrocketing prices. The first trend, which represented the period between the mid-2010s and summer of 2021, affected Moscow particularly negatively, as the share of oil and gas production in the Russian economy has increased from 34% in 2010 to 38% in 2018 (Franco 2021). The second trend is unfolding since mid-2021 due to the Asian overtake of LNG supplies, relative scarcity in Europe and cuts of spot market top-up sales by Russia (Oxford Analytica 2021). The changes may benefit Moscow in the short run, but, at the same time, could force EU consumers to further diversify their supply sources. The possibility threatens Russian positions even in the mid-run, as adapting EU countries may further prioritise alternative suppliers and exploit the LNG potentials of emerging North American, Middle Eastern and Central Asian partners.

THE REGIONAL LEVEL: RUSSIAN ROLE IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN GAS DYNAMICS

Global positions indicate that Europe remained the most important market for Russian gas in the 2010s, though the role of alternative regions has begun to grow. These circumstances have also increased the importance of the Eastern Mediterranean where geopolitical re-configurations caused significant changes in the *relative distribution of power*. According to Tziarras (2019b, 5), recent regional dynamics



are characterized by energy discoveries, geopolitical antagonism, new imbalances of power, new security imperatives, and increasing interests of external powers. Russia plays an active role in all of these processes, although the extent of its influence fluctuates. Moscow takes proactive positions in regional security measures (e.g. military involvements), economic aspects (e.g. arms trade), and energy developments (Pritchett 2021; Stronski 2021). Among the various regional interests, hydrocarbon geopolitics play as important part as security aspects or economic factors. Considering the above-described global characteristics, gas discoveries are particularly sensitive issues for Moscow, providing opportunities and threats at the same time. Opportunities, by offering Moscow the possibility to participate in the currently developing projects, and threats, by endangering Russia's regional and European positions through the emergence of new competitors. According to Mamedov (2021, 100), Russia reacted to these controversial developments by surveilling and participating 'in the most promising energy exploration, production and export projects.' However, as will be presented in this section, these initiatives have produced mixed results, enhancing Moscow's energy influence in some regional countries while increasing fears of external interference in others. [13]

To continue with the exact details, Russian energy exports have traditionally been moderate in the Eastern Mediterranean region. Between 2011–2019, the largest recipient was Turkey, followed by Greece, purchasing an average of 12% of Russia's total exports in the 2010s (Gazprom 2019; 2020a). In the period between 2011–2019, Gazprom supplied a total of 23.1 bcm of natural gas to Greece, which was equivalent to 63% of the Greek gas consumption. Bilateral energy relations began to deteriorate in 2014, when oil exports to Greece fell sharply, partly due to EU sanctions against Moscow, and partly due to the drop of oil prices and abundance of supply sources (Kuznetsov et al. 2017; Pritchett 2021). Although the volume of gas imports has not fallen as steeply, from this period onwards Greece's goal to diversify gas supplies became more apparent. Moreover, Athens has repeatedly side-lined offers from Russian companies wishing to invest in the privatization of the Greek gas

TABLE 3 Value of mineral fuel* import from Russia in the Eastern Mediterranean, 2010–2019 (million USD)

Year	Greece	Turkey	Cyprus	Syria	Lebanon	Israel	Egypt
2010	3060	8440	826	229	196	768	92.6
[14] 2011	4380	7870	812	864	244	411	91.4
2012	5720	8720	1400	0.37	103	499	336
2013	6300	7330	1300	0.9	463	881	358
2014	3770	5700	482	5.86	637	1010	1170
2015	2280	4390	172	2.61	487	606	330
2016	1930	3810	168	1.51	236	580	215
2017	2590	5470	231	2.18	268	970	438
2018	3580	7990	457	1.81	116	2900	785
2019	3670	8600	522	1.15	308	631	339

NOTES * Harmonized commodity description and code: HS2, ID 527. Based on data from the Observatory of Economic Complexity (<https://oec.world>).

sector. Examples of rejection extend from Sintez bidding for DESFA (Public Gas Transmission System Operator), through Gazprom offering €2 billion for DEPA (Public Gas Corporation of Greece), to ELPE's (Hellenic Petroleum) privatization rules restricting the participation of Russian companies (Taylor 2012; EnergyPress 2018). Consequently, the last years of the previous decade were characterized by ambivalent Russian gas positions in the Greek market. Episodic achievements included the TurkStream pipeline beginning to flow Russian gas to Greece in January 2020, and Gazprom signing a long-term supply contract with Mytilineos in June 2020 (Gazprom 2020b; Tsovala 2020). Nevertheless, the impact of these agreements is greatly reduced by the opening of Gas Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria in 2020 and the development of an LNG terminal in Alexandroupolis, both of which will allow Greece to channel a significant amount of alternative gas resources (Dimitrov 2020).

Russian gas positions in Turkey seem to be more ideal, at least for the moment. Taking the 2011–2020 data, Turkey is by far the most important regional partner for Russian gas interests. During the period, Turkey purchased an average of 11.1% of total Russian gas exports, which amounted to an average of 24.3 bcm gas per year. This



volume represented 54% of all Turkish consumption, with a higher dependence at the beginning of the period (2011: 62%; 2012: 62%) and a much lower at the end (2019: 35%; 2020: 36%) (Gazprom 2019; 2020a; BP 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015; 2016; 2017; 2018; 2019; 2020; 2021). Turkey, apart from being a significant importer of Russian oil and contracting Rosatom to build the Akkuyu nuclear power plant, is also a crucial transit route (Winrow 2017). Among the gas pipelines heading to Turkey, Blue Stream and TurkStream deliver Russian gas with a current capacity of 47.5 bcm/year (Gazprom 2020a). The capacity could theoretically cover 100% of Turkey's annual average consumption (46.7 bcm). In practice, however, this amount will not be realized, as TurkStream will also supply other countries and Turkey aims to diversify its supply routes. In this respect, Ankara's options are enhanced by the Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum Pipeline, the Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline and the Tabriz–Ankara Pipeline, together representing a 55 bcm/year maximum transfer capacity. In addition to pipelines, growing LNG capacity also reduces the potential of Russian gas influence. Currently, three LNG terminals and floating units contribute to Turkey's gas diversification, whose role is illustrated by the fact that in 2019, Turkey imported 12.9 bcm LNG that was equivalent to 29% of its annual consumption (BP 2020). The trend has continued in 2020 when the country imported 14.8 bcm LNG covering about 32% of its annual consumption (BP 2021).

[15]

In the absence of direct pipeline links, Russian gas has a much lower market share in the rest of the Eastern Mediterranean. The only significant LNG exports in recent years have been delivered to Egypt, where Gazprom supplied a total of 6.8 bcm of gas in 2015–2016 (Gazprom 2020a). Furthermore, Rosneft also provided Egypt with a moderate amount of LNG purchased from international markets (Kazmin 2016; Soldatkin 2017). In addition to exploiting commercial opportunities, Russia has also been focusing on newly discovered gas fields. Russian efforts in this regard succeeded in December 2016, when ENI sold its 30% stake of the Shourouk Concession containing the giant Zohr gas field to Rosneft (ElBassoussy 2018). As Rosneft also owns 10% of the operating company, the Rus-

sian share can be considered significant in the concession, especially when taking into account that the Zohr field has already provided 68 mcm daily output in August 2019 (Kiselyova and Soldatkin 2019).

[16] Although with much less success, Russian companies have also shown interest in Israeli gas developments. This has been based on a close oil trade partnership that peaked around 2006 when Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States supplied about 88% of Israel's oil imports (Nurieva 2017). As illustrated in table 3, the level of Israeli oil dependency significantly declined over the following decade, yet the newly discovered gas fields still presented opportunities for Russian companies. Gazprom first targeted the Tamar field and sought to acquire shares in Isramco, which owns 29% of the gas field (Yeshayahou 2011). After unsuccessful attempts with Tamar, Gazprom turned towards the Leviathan field and attempted to secure shares in the production sector. Although President Vladimir Putin himself lobbied for the involvement of a Russian gas giant, the tender was eventually awarded to Woodside Energy of Australia in December 2012 (Baev 2014). Thus, the only stakes that the Russians could secure has been produced by Gazprom Marketing & Trading Switzerland, a Swiss subsidiary of Gazprom, which has successfully signed a long-term LNG purchase and sales contract in February 2013 (Nurieva 2017).

The limited Russian performance in Israel has been largely associated with Moscow's gains in Syria and Lebanon, as neither Tel Aviv nor its Western allies have been interested in supporting regional Russian advances by granting shares in the Israeli gas sector. Moscow's assistance to Bashar Al-Assad in the Syrian civil war was at least partly compensated in December 2013 when Syria has granted Soyuzneftegaz a 25-year concession to a 2190 km² area within its EEZ. Although the company dropped its plans due to security reasons, Damascus again granted exclusive exploration and production rights in Syrian territories for Russia in 2017 (Koduvayur and Everett 2019). Equipped with such comfortable positions, Russian-led exploration and/or production is scheduled to begin in 2023 (Salameh and Chedid 2020). Besides potential explorations and



proved Syrian reserves, the country's transit position is also crucial for Moscow. From the Russian point of view, Syria's importance is highly increased by its potentials to hinder onshore gas transfer from the Persian Gulf via Turkey to Europe (Koduvayur and Everett 2019).

[17]

The Russian presence in Syria is a rather effective steppingstone towards the slowly evolving Lebanese gas sector. The interconnection of Russian interests in both countries was demonstrated by Moscow's offer in June 2019 to mediate the Lebanese-Syrian maritime dispute, which could block future efforts of exploitation. Russian concerns in the matter are linked not only to Syrian but also to Lebanese gas positions: After a long and postponed tendering procedure, the Lebanese government awarded two exclusive petroleum licenses for the consortium of Total, Eni and Novatek in December 2017. Although the decision favoured mostly the French and Italian companies, Novatek still owns 20% of shares (Salameh and Chedid 2020). Russian companies are also expected to participate in the next licensing rounds, while also trying to obtain stakes in the construction and operation of gas infrastructure. Rosneft, for example, has reportedly competed in a public tender to operate floating storage and regasification unit that is expected to ease electricity shortages and then be used for transforming and utilizing domestic offshore resources (Rose and Brown 2019).

To summarise the regional overview, over the past decade, Russia has been an active stakeholder in the region's hydrocarbon geopolitics. Russian intentions were defined by the dual policies of either directly participating in the regional gas affairs or indirectly influencing them. Nevertheless, Eastern Mediterranean energy policies have undoubtedly functioned as eastward extensions of Russia's European gas interests. As Stergiou put it, 'Moscow tried to undertake pre-emptive action against everything that can undermine its hegemonic position as energy-provider to the European Markets and the countries of the Eastern Mediterranean' (Stergiou 2017, 106). These efforts have produced mixed results, but they have undoubtedly put Russia on the map of regional gas affairs. For Moscow, the two most important countries in the region are Syria and Turkey, the former

mainly for geopolitical and security reasons, the latter primarily but not exclusively for economic and energy considerations. In addition, both countries are important for geographical reasons, as they are positioned to hinder Europe's diversification efforts.

[18] Russia's central interest in preserving or enhancing its European gas positions has also influenced its attitude towards gas explorations in the Eastern Mediterranean. In this case, *opportunities* are mainly linked to the emerging gas market, as Russian gas giants may intervene and take significant slices from regional developments. The policy of involvement can be observed in almost all countries in the region, although Russian gas influence has larger impacts mainly in Greece, Turkey, Syria, Lebanon and Egypt. In these cases, developing the gas industry and infrastructure have provided several prospects for Russian companies scaling from technical tenders to business and financial opportunities. With such gains, and by using the Russian stronghold of Syria, Moscow expects to influence regional gas developments and counterbalance the interests of its competitors.

In the case of *regional threats*, it is important to distinguish between current and future risks. Assessing the current situation, it can be argued that the global significance of Eastern Mediterranean gas discoveries lags far behind the regional importance. Combined regional gas discoveries, including estimated ones (table 4), would represent fairly about 1.6% of total global reserves, compared to Russian proved reserves which make up around 20% of global reserves (BP 2021). With this volume, gas discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean could mostly threaten Russia's regional supplies and would be less competitive in the European market due to moderate supply quantities, technological and geological challenges, high construction costs and prices. The risk of losing Russia's regional position is also reduced by the fact that Turkey, Russia's largest gas partner in the area, has strained relations with most potential suppliers in the region, including Israel, Egypt and Cyprus. While this may change in the future, Russia's influential presence in Syria could easily prevent the establishment of onshore or offshore gas pipelines towards Turkey.



TABLE 4 Offshore Gas Fields and Discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean

Country	Gas field	Discovered quantities (bcm)
Egypt	Zohr	849.5
	West Nile Delta	141.5
	Nour	56.6
	Nooros	56.6
	Atoll	42.4
	Baltim	19.8
Israel	Leviathan	622.9
	Tamar	305.8
	Tanin	36.8
	Karish	28.3
	Mari-B	28.3
	Noa	5.6
Palestine	Gaza Marine	28.3
Cyprus	Aphrodite	~141.5
	Calypso	~181.2
	Glaucus	~141.5

[19]

NOTES Adapted from Bowlus (2020).

Whereas the current situation poses relatively few threats for Russia, the future is much more problematic. According to estimations, the combined reserves of the Levant, the Nile Delta and Herodotus basins contain at least 13 225 bcm of recoverable undiscovered gas, which would represent approximately 6.6% of global resources in 2019 (USGS 2010a; 2010b; Elia et al. 2016). While it is not viable to draw conclusions from undiscovered quantities, the estimations still demonstrate possible threats to Russian positions and underline the risks of establishing alternative Eastern Mediterranean supply routes to Europe. Finally, it should be noted that other energy sources may also undermine regional gas dreams. From these options nuclear energy may provide opportunities for Russia (e.g. construction of nuclear power plants by Rosatom in Akkuyu, Turkey and Dabaa, Egypt), however public demand for renewable and green energy resources may rather serve the interests of regional and local actors (Mehmet and Yorucu 2020).

THE UNIT LEVEL: INTERVENING VARIABLES

INFLUENCING RUSSIAN GAS POSITIONS IN CYPRUS

[20] Systemic contexts of Russian gas positions are greatly impacting Moscow's energy strategy towards Cyprus. Following the methodology of neoclassical realism, this section highlights those Russian domestic factors that influenced the Putin administration's decision-making about Cyprus.

The Kremlin's *strategic culture* towards Cyprus is rooted in the Cold War. Since the establishment of ROC, Russia endorsed the maintenance of an independent and demilitarised Cypriot state and considered any forms of Greek and Turkish presence on the island as attempts to secure a permanent NATO base (Stergiou 2007; Sakkas and Zhukova 2013; Maslova, Zabelin, and Muntyan 2019). After close political connections during the Cold War, bilateral cooperation slowly but steadily expanded during the 1990s when Moscow and Nicosia have developed a multichannel partnership based on dynamic diplomatic, economic and cultural ties. As the opening of the new era, the ROC formally recognised the Russian Federation in April 1992 and established high-level contacts during the visit of President George Vassiliou to Moscow in October 1992 (Krasnov, Solovieva-Oposhnynskaya, and Artiukh 2019). Between 1992 and 2000, bilateral trade value represented an average of 5% of the ROC's total trade volume per annum, compared to the period of 2010–2019 when Russia's average share decreased to 4% (Atlas of Economic Complexity, n. d.). Perhaps more importantly, the infamous double taxation treaty was signed in December 1998, allowing wealthy Russians to exploit Greek Cypriot offshore opportunities (Zavyalova et al. 2019). Suffering from the US arms embargos imposed in 1987, Nicosia also sought to cooperate with Moscow in the defence sector. Notable examples in these fields extend from contracting 41 Russian tanks with a value of 172 million USD in 1996 to ordering S-300 surface-to-air missile systems with a value of 230 million USD in 1997 (Krasnov, Solovieva-Oposhnynskaya, and Artiukh 2019; Stronksi 2021). Another driving force of cooperation was the protracted division of Cyprus, in which Russia usually adopted the rhetoric of Greek Cypriots and provided political support for them, particu-



larly in the UN Security Council. Russia's stance on protecting legal frameworks has also extended to other areas. Contrary to Turkish positions, Moscow upheld compliance with UN conventions on the law of the sea, thus seemingly supporting the interests of Nicosia in the Eastern Mediterranean maritime disputes. In return, the ROC [21] has proved to be tolerant towards Moscow's controversial foreign policy actions and was often accused of representing Russian interests in the EU (Leonard and Popescu 2007; Orenstein and Kelemen 2017; Stronski 2019). In addition, Western concerns have also been related to stationing requests and particularly to the continuing pressures on Greek Cypriots to allow the establishment of Russian military presence on the island. Although Nicosia has rejected these requests, Moscow has secured an anchoring deal that let Russian navy vessels to refuel and resupply at Greek Cypriot ports (Stergiou 2019).

These historical and contemporary dynamics outline the Russian strategic culture towards Cyprus. Both the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation viewed (and views) the island as an area of strategic importance, enabling Moscow to counterbalance NATO interests and promote its influence in the region (Maslova, Zabelin, and Muntyan 2019). Russia has therefore seen the island as a 'strategic cake' from which the Western (UK, US) and regional (Greece, Turkey) powers had already taken their slice in the 1960s and 1970s, and therefore, to maintain the regional balance of power, Russia has also a right to claim its share. Over the past decades, Russia has sought to legitimise this ambition in several ways, including seeking to become an official stakeholder of Cypriot peace negotiations or, like the UK, claiming basing areas. As the Western powers have categorically rejected a *de jure* representation in all cases, Russia has established sector-specific influences. During the Cold War, this was mainly linked to the communist party AKEL, while in the early 2000s it slowly spread to the financial sector (Sakkas and Zhukova 2013; Pritchett 2021).

Although Russia has established close cooperation with ROC at the beginning of the 21st century, it is crucial to underline that Moscow does not overestimate the significance of the island. As

[22] highlighted earlier, Turkey and Syria are the most important regional actors for Russia, and therefore it subordinates its interests in Cyprus to them. This can be seen, on the one hand, in the attitude towards the Cyprus conflict, in which Russia supports the Greek Cypriots rhetorically but in practice does not go against vital Turkish interests. On the other hand, it is also evident in Russia's attitude towards Cypriot gas developments, in which Moscow does not seek to oppose either Turkish or its own interests. To sum up, Russia's foreign policy in Cyprus reflects Moscow's global and regional strategy and it is based on maintaining (or establishing) the balance of power and enhancing multipolarity.

As the strategies of Russia's vital policy areas are firmly centralized, it is reasonable to claim that the previous section also reflects the Russian *leaders' perceptions* towards Cyprus. Russian presidents have traditionally maintained good relations with Greek Cypriot counterparts, largely due to the common Orthodox heritage and the fact that some of the Greek Cypriot leaders were educated in the Soviet Union or the Eastern Bloc (George Vassiliou, Demetris Christofias). This attitude is reflected in the frequency of high-level visits, with Russian and Greek Cypriot presidents meeting 13 times between 1991 and 2019 (Krasnov, Solovieva-Oposhnynskaya, and Artiukh 2019). Although this is less than the volume of EU summits involving Greek Cypriot leaders, it is much more than the number of meetings (1) between the US and Cyprus presidents. Moscow's greater interests indicate that Russian leaders attach considerable importance to developments in Cyprus.

However, this importance is limited and selective. Statements by President Putin and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov indicated that Russian leaders have three particularly important themes concerning Cyprus: multilateralism and strengthening the role of the UN in maintaining stability and peace; supporting basic principles of international law; and further enhancing of economic relations (Gotev 2015; Christou 2020; TASS 2020, 2021). While the selective application of these issues is itself indicative, it is important to note that Russia does not necessarily support Greek Cypriot positions on these three issues either. This became apparent in September



2020, when President Anastasiades asked for Russian assistance in the maritime disputes with Turkey, and though Moscow offered mediation, it avoided openly supporting the Greek Cypriot positions, rather promoting the search for compromise (TASS 2021).

These selective positions reveal that Russian leaders are essentially tying their Cyprus strategy to Turkey, and more precisely subordinating their support for Greek Cypriots to Russian interests in Turkey. In the minds of Moscow's leaders, the most important element of Greek Cypriot-Russian relations is therefore neither the settlement of the Cyprus conflict nor the emergence of Greek Cypriot gas production, both red flags for Turkey, rather the conservation of island-wide stability which also allows the preservation of Russian economic and strategic positions (Baev 2014).

While in the theoretical framework of Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell (2016) the perceptions of leaders (or 'leader images') refer to the beliefs and perceptions of individual decision-makers, domestic institutions cover wide ranges of state structures, informal institutions and processes affecting decisions of policymakers. When analysing the influence of Russian *domestic institutions* in Cyprus, the role of financial and energy sectors requires special attention. Both sectors include public, corporate, and mixed actors, and as a result of the formal and informal connections to government circles, these actors have an impact on Russian decision-making processes. The Russian financial sector has traditionally viewed the island as a key destination and an offshore haven. After the Greek Cypriot economic crisis (2013–2014) the European troika sought to end offshore opportunities as a condition to its €10 billion bailout, however, these sets of rationalization efforts have produced mixed results. According to the Central Bank of Russia (2021), the accumulated direct investments to Cyprus still amounted to 178 billion USD at beginning of 2021, representing about 40% of the total Russian outward investments. In the corresponding period, direct investments from Cyprus amounted to 156 billion USD, which constituted around 29% of the total direct investments in Russia. These figures show no significant divergence in the case of outward investments from Russia to Cyprus, but signal some negative changes in

[23]

the case of inward investments to Russia from Cyprus (figure 1 and figure 2).

[24] Compared to the statistics recorded before the Greek Cypriot economic crisis, investments originating from Cyprus represented an average of 34% of total investments in Russia between 2009–2013, while, in the same period, Russian investments to Cyprus amounted to an average of 37% of the total outward investments. The decreasing value of outbound Cypriot investments indicates that the comfortable Russian positions in the Greek Cypriot financial sector began to change, partly due to Western pressure on Nicosia, partly due to the Kremlin's monetary decisions to increase tax on dividends earned in offshore havens (Zavyalova et al. 2019; Tokarev 2021). The first results of these changes are already being felt in Cyprus. According to the Central Bank of Cyprus (2021), the value of deposits owned by non-EU citizens decreased from 21,5 billion EUR in 2012, to 11,8 billion EUR in 2014, and to 6,2 billion in August 2021. The outflow of non-EU capital is significant, though does not include those Russians who invested at least 2 million EUR in real estate and received Cypriot citizenship (Stronski 2021). According to Pritchett (2021), about half of the 3153 Cypriot 'golden passports' issued between 2013 and 2020 were granted to Russian citizens, thereby reinforcing the Russian minority that amounted to 5–6% of the total population in 2018 (Stergiou 2019).

Besides the financial sector, another traditionally lucrative business was energy, as electricity generation in Cyprus is mainly oil-based, with Russian sources playing a prominent role. Cyprus has traditionally been one the most dependent regional actors on Russian mineral fuel, with an average of 19% of its resources originating in Russia between 2010 and 2018. This situation has been challenged by the discovery of Cypriot gas on the one hand, and the expansion of Western energy interests in Cyprus on the other. As in the case of Greece, imports of Russian mineral fuels to ROC have also decreased since 2014, representing an average of 13% share between 2015 and 2018. While these losses will not knock out Russia's oil companies, they do signal that regional consumers may slowly but steadily replace oil imports with domestic gas resources.






FIGURE 1
Total Outward Direct Investments of Russia and the share of Cyprus and Germany, 2009-2021 (adapted from Central Bank of Russia 2021)

Gas Discoveries in Cyprus




FIGURE 2
Total Inward Direct Investments in Russia and the share of Cyprus and Germany, 2009-2021 (adapted from Central Bank of Russia 2021)

[26] Due to these developments, Russian decision-makers have been presented with two strategic choices regarding gas discoveries in Cyprus. The first is that Moscow gains influence in the Greek Cypriot gas industry, thereby obtaining further economic and political capital in the ROC but confronting Ankara's interests and risking positions in Turkey. The second is that Russia tries to maintain its economic and political positions in Cyprus but distances itself from the gas developments, thus keeping Ankara pleased by accepting losses in the Greek Cypriot energy sector. In terms of foreign policy choices, Russian leaders selected the second option, prioritising regional energy and strategic interests over potential power maximisation in Cyprus.

FOREIGN POLICY OUTCOMES AND DISCUSSION

The systemic and unit-level variables outlined above have determined foreign policy outcomes and defined Russian decisions over Greek Cypriot gas opportunities. These systemic and internal features contoured a particularly complex situation in which Russia's global and regional interests, as well as the concerns of certain unit-level factors, limited Moscow's ability to engage in the gas developments of Cyprus. Table 5 briefly summarises these developments and outlines some of the main Russian-related activities that have taken place since the discovery of gas in Cyprus.

The table 5 reveals that Russia was seeking to gain more prominent gas positions mainly before 2014. During this period, Novatek and Rosneft showed greater interests, although neither managed to take positions. The long-term absence of state-owned Gazprom is certainly indicative, as is the Turkish warning to expel all energy companies involved in the explorations in the disputed EEZ of Cyprus. Gazprom's attempts to obtain a drilling license in 2013 is a notable exception and an indication of short-term responses to rapidly emerging opportunities offered by the financial crisis of ROC. These attempts, however, cannot be regarded as long-term strategic goals. On the contrary, Gazprom remained distant from the Greek Cypriot gas developments in the long-term and allowed other Russian companies to participate in the upcoming licenc-



Gas Discoveries in Cyprus

TABLE 5 Key Events Linked to Russia in the Gas Developments of Cyprus

Event	Year
Cyprus completes its first licencing round – no Russian bid	2007
Russian navy nears gas drilling zone in the Cyprus EEZ	2011
Discovery of Aphrodite gas field by Nobel Energy in Block 12	2011
President Christofias expressed hopes that Russian companies would participate in the second licensing round of Cyprus	2012
Turkey warns it will shun firms involved in Cyprus oil and gas drillings	2012
Cyprus completes its second licencing round: Nicosia decided to award Consortium led by Total, Novatek and GPB Global Resources for the Block 9	2012
The Greek Cypriot government announced its decision to end talks with the French-Russian consortium over licencing rights of Block 9, choosing instead to start negotiations with ENI-KOGAS	2012
Greek Cypriot Parliamentary delegation arrived in Moscow: Russia claims it has a strategic interest in the energy developments of Eastern Mediterranean	2013
Itera owned by Rosneft attempts to negotiate with Cyprus Public Gas Company to supply gas for electricity production; negotiations fail	2013
Gazprom proposed to undertake the financial restructuring of Cyprus banks in exchange for exploration rights	2013
Cyprus' third licensing-round for blocks 6, 8 and 10 – no Russian bid	2016
Discovery of Calypso gas field by ENI in Block 6	2017
Russia warns Cyprus against allowing US military deployment on the island	2018
Discovery of Glaucus gas field by Exxon Mobil and Qatar Petroleum in Block 10	2019
Three consortia running for Cyprus LNG terminal construction – no Russian bid	2019
Novatek bid for supplying LNG to Cyprus	2019
Eni and Total have postponed exploratory drilling in Cyprus due to COVID-19	2020
Anastasiades calls Putin to help ease gas search tensions with Turkey	2020

NOTES Based on the archives of Reuters, Hürriyet and Cyprus Mail.

ing rounds. This behaviour demonstrates that Russia was pursuing mixed strategies until 2014, and while Gazprom's absence attempted to appease Ankara, Moscow still sought to maximise its power po-

tential through other companies. During this period, Russia followed the same tactics in Cyprus as in other states in the region and tried to obtain exploration and drilling rights.

[28] While before 2014 Russia was trying to take its share from Cypriot gas deposits, after 2014 it abandoned its balancing strategy. From this period onwards, Moscow distanced itself from all major opportunities and concentrated on consolidating its dominant role in the economic sector. It is important to note that Russia at the same time remained active in other regional theatres: Rosneft secured a 30% stake of Egyptian Zohr gas field in December 2016; Total, Eni and Novatek consortium obtained two Lebanese licenses in December 2017; while in the same year Damascus granted exclusive exploration and production rights for Russia. Perhaps more importantly Gazprom has received Ankara's permission to construct TurkStream Line 1 in 2016 and Line 2 in 2018 (Pinchuk 2016; Geropoulos 2018).

These activities indicate that the Russian strategy of gaining energy positions based on classical realist logic has only changed in the case of Cyprus. According to the findings of the present study, the policy shift may have occurred due to the following reasons:

- From 2014 onwards, the deteriorating Russian-EU relations and the uncertain fate of Nord Stream 2 have made the construction of TurkStream increasingly important for Russia. For this reason, Moscow was reluctant to oppose Ankara's ambitions in Cyprus and deliberately distanced itself from the otherwise low-profit Greek Cypriot gas opportunities.
- Russia has been considering its national and corporate energy interests and has not intended to assist and support the emergence of potential competitors with EU membership.
- Consequently, Russia did not protest excessively when its companies were side-lined in licensing tenders and, despite its heavy political and economic presence on the island, it has not clashed with the EU member ROC to further Russian gas interests.

These findings enable the study to test the hypothesis, which argued that the absence of Russian involvement in the Greek Cypriot



gas developments has not only been caused by systemic obstacles, but also by the interests of domestic variables. More precisely, the hypothesis argued that *systemic and domestic variables both constrained the otherwise predictable Russian involvement in the Greek Cypriot gas affairs, thus forcing national stakeholders to stay away from seemingly beneficial opportunities.* The analysis has shown that Russia's strategic choice to limit its role in the Greek Cypriot gas sector was indeed influenced by both systemic and unit-level factors. At the systemic level, the advancement of Russian gas interests in Cyprus has been constrained by variables of Russian-EU, Russian-US, Russian-Turkish and Turkish-Greek Cypriot relations, forming a sensitive geopolitical situation in which Moscow had to choose between its systemic and Cypriot interests. These systemic constraints were compounded by domestic variables. The attitude of the *strategic culture* proved to be a cornerstone in this respect, as it pragmatically subordinated Russian interests in Cyprus to those in Turkey. *Leader images* have amplified these tendencies and defined Cypriot gas opportunities along with Russian interpretations of the balance of power. Such interpretations seemed to consider Russian positions in the Greek Cypriot *financial sectors* as Moscow's spheres of interest, while they also appeared to recognise and respect realms of the Cyprus equilibrium dominated by other actors. This balancing policy, however, was not driven by cooperative attitudes, rather by ambitions to protect economic positions in Cyprus on the one hand, and safeguard regional interests of Russian *gas corporations* on the other. These corporations would have been able to gain important stakes in the gas developments of Cyprus and thus hold major economic and political positions in an EU member state. Nevertheless, the possibilities offered by Turkey far outweighed these potentials and reduced the relative value of Cypriot gas opportunities. All in all, the results confirmed arguments of the hypothesis and proved the influential impacts of systemic and domestic factors. Among these, both external and internal factors played important parts: systemic components laid down the foundations of external conditions, which were filtered by domestic units along with major strategic objectives. Thus, it is worth noting that the analysis has not only

[29]

demonstrated the analytical potential of neoclassical realism but also showed its ability to reform the traditional realist arguments and comprehend international politics as a mature theory of IR.

[30]

CONCLUSION

In the past decade, several new geopolitical factors have emerged in the Eastern Mediterranean. Among these, gas discoveries are particularly important because they can both benefit and harm regional and global actors. They can benefit if national energy consumption is supplemented with local gas resources, exports generate financial surpluses, and governments exploit discoveries as geopolitical gains. Nonetheless, they can also cause harm if benefits and profits are not distributed among regional actors and utilized only by a selected few. Due to such dichotomies, states adopt realist strategies and apply rational choice models to determine the ideal balance between domestic interests and potential systemic gains and risks.

Russia has used similar tactics to evaluate the costs and benefits of Greek Cypriot gas opportunities. Although the values of advantages and disadvantages have shifted several times over the past decade, possible benefits have never exceeded the potential costs. Moscow has therefore refrained from implementing the traditional realist logic in Cyprus and concentrated its power maximisation efforts on regional actors offering higher rewards. The process, however, was influenced not only by systemic factors but also domestic ones: potential national and corporate gains in Cyprus have been constrained domestically to secure more beneficial regional and European positions. The study, therefore, proved the significant impact of unit-level variables and confirmed the neoclassical realist position arguing that national power and systemic positions are translated to foreign policy outcomes through the lenses of domestic factors (Baylis, Smith, and Owens 2008).

It is important to note that the external and domestic parameters leading to these findings are far from being static. Consequently, Russia's priorities may change as new geopolitical factors emerge, forcing Moscow and Nicosia to develop closer energy ties. Possible geopolitical developments such as the discovery of new gas



reserves, the deterioration of Russian-Turkish relations or the commissioning of the East Med gas pipeline would certainly transform the components of regional equilibrium and raise Moscow's interests to rebalance by gaining stakes in the Greek Cypriot gas sector. To understand and interpret these developments, future research needs to pay more attention to Russia's role, as Moscow has not only returned to the region in recent years but has become an integral part of Eastern Mediterranean affairs.

[31]

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The Influence of the Mediterranean on Funeral Ceremonies and Funeral Music in Slovenian Coastal Areas

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The article describes contemporary funeral music practices in Primorska, a Mediterranean-bordering region in Slovenia. After a brief overview of the history of laments in the Mediterranean, the article focuses on the shape and musical accompaniment of modern funerals. It points out the influence of Mediterranean countries, especially Italy, on funerals in Primorska. It explains how the type of funeral ceremony and the choice of music are coloured by the presence of the sea, giving an account of the most common musical ensembles and repertoires of songs. It compares funerals of members of the Italian minority in Slovenia with funerals in Italian coastal regions. The research is based on ethnographic work and scientific literature, as well as articles on funeral ceremonies taken from daily newspapers, magazines and the internet. The fieldwork is based on research at cemeteries using the participatory observation method and semi-structured interviews. In Primorska, funerals accompanied by the scattering of ashes into the sea are becoming more frequent, as are songs with a maritime theme and songs in Italian. Although the choice of funeral music is very often individualized and there are more and more popular songs, classical music remains the choice of many people in Primorska and also Dalmatian songs are quite common. Traditional laments, which are present throughout Slovenia, are found at funerals less frequently.

Key Words: funeral, music, laments, Slovenian coast, southern Italy

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this article is to present contemporary funeral music practices in Slovenian coastal areas. After a brief overview of tra-

ditional laments in the Mediterranean, it focuses on the nature of funeral music in Slovenian coastal cemeteries today, comparing funeral ceremonies in Primorska with funerals in Italy, a neighbouring Mediterranean country.

[40] The main argument advanced in this article is that music at funerals in various Slovenian regions also reflects their geographical, cultural and dialectological diversity, so that funeral music in the Primorska region would be expected to reflect the presence of the Mediterranean. The article explains how the type of funeral ceremony and the choice of music are coloured by the presence of the sea, giving an account of the most common musical ensembles and songs together with a description of the more unusual musical practices. Mention is made of the funerals of members of the Italian minority in Slovenia as well as of funerals in Italian coastal regions.

The research is based on ethnographic work carried out between 2014 and 2020, scientific literature and articles on funeral ceremonies taken from daily newspapers, magazines and the Internet. The fieldwork is based on research at cemeteries using the participatory observation method and semi-structured interviews with musicians performing at funerals, directors of funeral companies and clients who order funeral ceremonies.

The article also describes the changes that have taken place in funeral music in Slovenian coastal regions over a period of six years. The article is partly based on the author's doctoral thesis on music at funeral ceremonies in today's Slovenia, but it also introduces new aspects of the topic in the light of Mediterranean studies.

MUSIC AT FUNERAL RITUALS IN THE
MEDITERRANEAN IN THE PAST – RITUAL
MOURNING AND LAMENTS

Although mourning is not always associated with funeral customs, as it is also characteristic of other rites of passage, such as marriage, laments are most often associated with death and mourning. Laments are known all over the world. Weeping over the departed together with the spontaneous creation of laments was also typical for Slovenia. As Amy de la Bretèque points out, 'laments are among



those rare forms found all over the world that, regardless of the ethnographic context, have much in common' (2013 in Kölbl 2017, 89).

The history of mourning is long; in Europe, the first mourning was documented in antiquity. Marcello Sorce Keller describes the poetry genre in classical Greece (which, like all ancient Greek poetry, contained music) as *epikedeion*, a funereal mourning and a hymn to the deceased; these songs were sung next to the corpse, while *thrènos* were songs in memory of the deceased (Sorce Keller 2013, 3). A sung ritual mourning is also mentioned by Homer in the Iliad in connection with the farewell to Hector (Homer 2017, 256). Among the Romans, *nenia* (lat. *nenia*) was 'a mourning song, sung by paid women (mourners, weeping over the deceased) in the presence of the corpse and at funerals' (Verbinc 1979, 479).

[41]

Terseglav writes that laments were a tribute to the deceased, performed in public by the deceased's relatives, acquaintances and friends or by hired professional mourners. The improvisation of laments took place according to certain conventions and required the glorification of the deceased (Terseglav 1987, 95). Sorce Keller writes that the representation of grief over death had a cathartic, therapeutic effect on the relatives of the deceased and at the same time aroused empathy in other members of the community. The same author points out that mourning is not regarded as music in traditional Mediterranean cultures, as it is said to be inappropriate to sing in the presence of the dead. A lament is just a lament and nothing else, or it is an emotional speech (Sorce Keller 2013, 7).

Sorce Keller (2013, 2) maintains that all nations have their special type of lament, each with its own established metrical form. It is characteristic of all of them, however, that they are mostly longer, with epic, rhythmic forms and, on account of the emotions involved, they are lyrical. Laments consisted, at least in the Mediterranean area, of only a few tones – less than five – and were not strophic in character, which would seem to confirm their origin in antiquity.

As Terseglav writes (1987, 95), in the Mediterranean area, especially in southern Italy, Corsica and Romania, laments were performed by hired professional women mourners. In Corsica, where

hired mourners were called *voceratrici*, a distinction was made between two types of lament: *lamenti* were performed at deaths from natural causes, and *voceri* at violent deaths.

[42] In his autobiography, the conductor Riccardo Muti recalls that in his childhood (he was born in 1941) so-called *prefiche* still existed in the south of Italy. These were women who went to the homes of the dead and recited a kind of *laudatio funebris*, for which they were paid (Muti 2017, 17–18).

The most famous and probably the last of them was a woman named Giustina ‘del Camposanto,’ who is still remembered by the conductor; she was dressed all in black. In 1958, E. De Martino wrote in a book on death and ritual mourning that in the province of Lucania it was no longer hired professionals but female relatives of the deceased who took part in the mourning for the deceased. Professional mourners, *prefiche*, were present at funerals until recently. At the time this book was written, however, hiring professional mourners was already considered shameful, and villages accused each other of still practising this tradition (De Martino 1977, 79).

Also in Slovenia, especially in the border areas of Istria, Resia, Prekmurje and Bela Krajina, there was a tradition of mourning a corpse with a special loud mourning ‘with selected pathetic words, which sometimes sounds like a sad song’ – as is written in *Narodopisje Slovencev* (Breznik 1944, 310). This was called ‘narekovanje,’ ‘narek’ or ‘narekanje’ (dictation): ‘Every woman composes these words in her own way, according to momentary impressions, as her sad heart *dictates* ...’ (Ložar 1944, 310). Zmaga Kumer discovered that ‘although we Slovenes are generally reluctant to express our emotions, a loud, improvised, half-singing mourning for the deceased took place at some funerals as an expression of the painful suffering of the family at its loss’ (Kumer 2003, 26).

In her research into ‘naricanje’ in Croatia, Grozdana Marošević concludes that with changing attitudes about death and the expression of emotions, ‘naricanje’ is no longer regarded as normal social behaviour, ‘loud’ weeping in the presence of others having been replaced by ‘quiet’ intimate sobbing, with free improvisation increasingly favoured in place of the now-defunct practice



of 'naricanje.' Also, attitudes towards professional female mourners changed around the middle of the twentieth century, when a mourning was more frequently performed by female members of the family of the deceased (Marošević 2005, 44–45).

According to Helena Ložar Podlogar (1999 in Brun and Remic 1999, 22) how 'narokanje,' 'narekovanje' or 'naricanje' was practiced in front of the house and in the cemetery, and less often a few days after the funeral. This consisted of a mourning with loud weeping and moaning, during which the good deeds performed by the deceased were praised and advice offered for his journey to the after-life. It was a kind of singing recitation that sometimes even turned into a song and was practised especially by women. Even more often, women mourners were hired and paid for their services.

[43]

Zmaga Kumer wrote and thus preserved from oblivion two songs of mourning for the deceased at funerals from the Slovenian villages of Koštabona and Krkavče in Istria (Kumer 2003, 149). She also wrote an example of the so-called *slověsa* (i.e., special songs typically performed in the case of violent deaths) from the Istrian village of Sveti Peter. The lyrics of the poem tell of the murder of a girl by a jealous suitor (Kumer 2003, 212–213).

Today, so-called 'narekanje' no longer exists; instead, funeral rites in Slovenia are associated with certain traditional mourning songs, which have become funeral laments *par excellence*. In the following part of this article, I will also investigate whether these songs are still commonly sung at funerals on the Slovenian coast, or whether funeral music practices are changing to such an extent that their use is steadily decreasing.

MUSIC AT FUNERALS IN SLOVENIAN COASTAL AREAS

A funeral ritual in the Slovenian coastal area is usually divided into three parts, depending on the position of the mourners. The first part takes place in front of the mortuary, where the coffin or the urn is placed and the mourners come to convey their condolences to the relatives of the deceased. Music may be played or not in this introductory part, but not necessarily, involving recorded music on a

[44]



FIGURE 1 The Solinarka Boat During its Journey from the Pier in Ankaran to the Open Sea, Where the Ashes Are to Be Scattered

CD or USB key or a live performance by a musician. The second part of the ritual consists in moving from the mortuary to the graveside. This part usually takes place in silence or starts with recorded music which can be heard as long as it is within the range of the microphones (bearing in mind that the grave may be relatively far away from the mortuary). At the graveside, music is usually performed as soon as the funeral procession arrives, after which speeches may be said or read. If the funeral is of a religious nature, the word is given to a priest, who blesses the grave. The speeches may be followed by more music. Burial usually takes place in silence and often another musical piece is played at the very end of the ritual. In Slovenian coastal areas, there is also a funeral ritual that takes place on a boat, after which the ashes are scattered into the sea.

At Koper's central cemetery I spoke to the head of the funeral services, Marko Ugrin, who told me that their cemetery belongs to Marjetica Koper (which is the former Komunala Koper) and includes another forty-five cemeteries in the surrounding villages. The services they offer also include the scattering of ashes into the sea. According to the website Pogrebi.info, a funeral ceremony with a boat that takes up to thirty people on board begins at the pier in Valdoltra. It moves out to a specific point on the sea about two miles from Debeli Rtič, where the scattering takes place. According to the website, the boat makes another round after the scattering ceremony



and bids farewell to the deceased with a siren salute.¹ According to Elvina Babajić Muratagić from the Velenje family company, which specialises in the international transport of the deceased, many requests for the scattering of ashes at sea are received from Austria and Hungary, which have no coastline (Kališnik 2020). Musicians can also take part in this type of funeral at the request of relatives.

[45]

Up until the year 2016, some 450 funerals took place, of which about 70% involved inhumation by cremation, while only a decade ago 50% involved coffins and 50% cremated ashes. In 2020, we were told, an estimated 20–25% of the funerals they handled involved the scattering of ashes into the sea. According to Ugrin, Istrians remain quite traditional in their handling of funeral ceremonies. Even the use of a white dove at funerals (which is a common practice in other Slovenian cemeteries, especially in the Ljubljana region, where the dove flies away in memory of the deceased person) is still not chosen as an option, even when offered gratuitously (M. Ugrin, personal communication, 5 October 2016).

THE TRADITIONAL CHOICE OF MUSIC:
MALE CHOIRS AND TRUMPET

We asked whether Istrians were also traditional in their choice of music. The cemetery has no contracts with musicians; as Ugrin says, ‘many people would like to have music at a funeral, and the musi-

¹ The passage to the land of the dead is often associated with the crossing of water. In Greek mythology, the ferryman Charon transported souls into the underworld along the Acheron River. According to Slavonic legend, the afterlife is also separated from the living world by water. Most authors associate this myth with burial or cremation in boats or ships. As Mirjam Mencej (1995, 3) states, scholars do not agree on whether the Slavs inherited this myth and ritual from the ancient Greeks, from the Scandinavians (who were familiar with burial rites in ships) or whether it was autochthonous. The author herself is inclined to believe that the Slavs did not take this belief from other nations, as it extends throughout almost the entire world, both among Indo-European peoples and in Egyptian and Mesopotamian folklore traditions, Indonesia, Melanesia and shamans (Mencej 1995, 6). Slovenians also imagined that the world of the dead lay beyond water (Šmitek 2004, 34). Some researchers even believe that the etymology of the word *navje* (according to the *Slovar slovenskega knjižnega jezika* (1997) in the mythological sense ‘residence of the dead’ or the ancient word for the cemetery) is related to the Latin *navis* (ship).

[46] cians would like to have contracts with the funeral company, but the Koper funeral company is unable to give contracts to all the musicians available,' so contracts are awarded based on bids on the commercial market. At the cemetery's reception office, relatives² can contact musicians who play at funerals and then arrange things directly with them. According to Ugrin, relatives mostly hire musicians they already know. The list of musicians includes four male singing quartets, one sextet and one mixed quartet with musical instruments. In addition to this, they offer also 'Silence/Silenzio' with trumpet players, a trombone, one soloist singer and a solo clarinetist, Neven Stipanov.

Ugrin told me that in addition to classic funeral laments – of which he stated there were admittedly very few – Dalmatian songs are quite common at funerals. Dalmatian songs are often chosen for the funerals of younger persons, while traditional laments³ are more common for the elderly (A. Pucer, telephone conversation, 30 December 2020). The head of the cemetery also said that church choirs often sing at funerals in rural coastal cemeteries (A. Pucer, personal conversation, 7 October 2016). Funerals in villages are mostly religious and last up to two and a half hours, as the funeral procession may spend up to half an hour walking and the service also includes a mass in the church⁴ (M. Ugrin, personal conversation, 5 October 2016).

Music at funerals in various regions of Slovenia also reflects the local characteristics of individual areas. In Primorska, for instance, songs with a maritime theme are also performed, as well as songs in Italian, the language of the Italian minority in that area.

The repertoire of music is similar in all parts of Slovenia, espe-

² Usually, there are relatives of the deceased to organize a funeral, but sometimes friends or an institution can indeed help with the organization or, rarely, they can take over the entire organization.

³ These are mostly folk songs that are familiar elsewhere in Slovenia as well, such as 'Lipa' and 'Vsi so venci.'

⁴ In other parts of Slovenia also, funerals in rural areas are usually different from those in urban areas and are frequently religious, one of the most popular songs at church funerals in Slovenia being the hymn 'Nearer, my God, to Thee.'



cially that involving standard laments and the ‘Silence’ on the trumpet, but I noticed some peculiarities in the Primorska region. The choice of music at funerals depends primarily on whether it is a religious or civil funeral, on the deceased’s political beliefs and his musical preferences, and also on whether it is the funeral of a younger person. If the deceased also performed music, for example as a musician in a wind band or as a singer in a choir, the ensemble in which he was active will play for him at his or her funeral.

[47]

THE MODERN TREND TOWARDS
INDIVIDUALISED FUNERALS

As the head of the Koper funeral service told me in my field research, ‘90 per cent of people arrange funerals for others, not for themselves.’ According to him, funerals with cultural supplements, such as music and speeches, are not typical of big European cities, ‘there being only a limited number.’ He also pointed out that funerals abroad were often much shorter.⁵

According to Louis-Vincent Thomas (1985, 107), a French anthropologist, sociologist and ethnologist who has worked extensively on the anthropology of death and death-accompanying rituals, in the modern Western world, funeral rites follow a pattern based on practicality, the governing considerations being speed and price, i.e., to dispose of the dead person’s remains as quickly and cheaply as possible. Thomas (1985) also asked whether in our modern technically orientated society the process of disposing of the dead will ultimately come to be treated completely without symbolism. At the time of

⁵ These practices are also related to the fact that nowadays people strongly discourage and even reject any mention or occurrence of death around them, as evidenced in the writings of the Russian author Dmitry Sokolov-Mitrich (2015, 16). He writes that people are willing to pay anything to keep death out of their world. We would not keep the dead person in our home until the funeral at any cost, we would not wash him and we would not read a prayer over his head. The shorter the path from the deathbed to the grave, the better, says the author, as the ‘last path’ has turned into a mere sanitary procedure. Relatives spend half an hour in a special, dedicated space, then it’s the turn of the next occupant. If the deceased was religious, he at least rests a while in the church, but otherwise he is taken directly to the cemetery.

[48] his reflections, funeral ceremonies differing from established practices were rare. Cremation was not yet widespread: according to the author, in 1983 the proportion of cremations in France, for example, was only 2%. The author therefore at that time called for the development of a new symbolism for the funeral rituals of the future, so that funerals would lose their dull and neutral character and become more personalised.

Exactly thirty-five years later this is now the trend with modern funerals; the criterion applied in their organization being to 'tailor the funeral to the man.' In modern times, with the predominance of cremation, the practice of scattering ashes on a meadow, into the sea or in the mountains became increasingly common and with new forms of burial such as diamond burials (when the deceased's ashes are transformed into a diamond by special laboratory procedures),⁶ the nature of funeral ceremonies and the presence of musical accompaniment may change.

With the emergence of the modern trend towards personalised or 'bespoke funerals,' traditional funerals accompanied by music are becoming unconventional. Music at funerals is not necessarily limited to traditional laments; it can be a different kind of music that best suits the character of the deceased or is somehow related to him, so the range and nature of the music chosen and the kind of musical ensembles have become very wide. During my fieldwork in Slovenian cemeteries, I found out that this practice is already quite common.

MODERN TRENDS OF THE MUSIC AT FUNERALS:
FROM DALMATIAN SONGS TO POP MUSIC

During my research in 2020, the head of the funeral service noted that the choice of music had changed somewhat in recent years, now being 'a more open attitude towards funeral music.' According to him, there is more and more modern music, which means popular songs, mostly in English. There is also a lot of rock music, for example (M. Ugrin, telephone conversation, 22 December 2020).

⁶This custom is also to be found in Slovenia.



The kind of music that the deceased liked to listen to is often performed at funerals. In December 2020, for example, a funeral was held at Koper cemetery with recorded house music, as in a discotheque. The deceased was relatively young, being aged about forty. According to the head of the Koper funeral service, ‘people abroad are not familiar with all this pomp involving flowers, candles, speeches, music, etc., which is why many people who come from outside, for instance from Trieste, are surprised by funeral ceremonies in our country.’ (M. Ugrin, personal communication, 22 December 2016). [49]

Writing about funeral ceremonies at St Anna cemetery in Trieste, Marta Gregorčič (1999, 168–9), states that there is a great lack of space in this cemetery, which is reflected in the so-called serial graves of strangers connected only by their identical date of death and the lack of time reflected in the burial rites. The funeral ceremony lasts only two minutes, relatives accompanying the coffin from the chapel to the grave without speeches and other cultural embellishments. According to the author’s field research, a church funeral, including the priest’s farewell words, lasts on average only 3.48 minutes (p. 169).

According to the results of my field research, music at funerals throughout Slovenia still consists of (mostly male) singing groups and solo trumpets at the end of the funeral, which traditionally play the ‘Silence.’ Today, this practice is increasingly complemented by a different range of music, such as exclusively female vocal and vocal/instrumental ensembles and solo singers. Instrumental music is often played at funerals by flute, violin, guitar or clarinet; theoretically, all instruments are possible, but in practice they occur less frequently. At religious funerals, the funeral is also accompanied by an organ during the church ceremony.

PERFORMERS AND REPERTOIRE

Singer and clarinetist Neven Stipanov from Piran, who performs at various cemeteries in the coastal region, told me more about the repertoire in Piran and other cemeteries in Primorska. He also sang several times on a boat while ashes were scattered at sea. He says

[50] he feels the different atmosphere of individual cemeteries. His performance at funerals began when he was asked to do it by acquaintances, and then at home he was encouraged to offer his services to the cemeteries. At first, he was quite embarrassed to perform at funerals 'because of the proximity of death,' but after about a year he became used to it. His repertoire includes various musical genres, from classical, folk and film to popular music. He prefers to suggest a classical music repertoire to his clients to derive the greatest benefit from his voice. Sometimes, in addition to singing, he plays the clarinet. He often plays 'Silence' on the clarinet instead of the trumpet, as well as sometimes the black spiritual 'Amazing Grace' or the film song 'Over the Rainbow' (composed by Harold Arlen with lyrics by Yip Harburg).

He found that, in general, people often don't care what is sung but 'just want something to be sung,' though some people have specific wishes about the repertoire. For example, at the funeral of a lady of French descent, at the request of relatives, he sang 'Les feuilles mortes' (written by Jacques Prévert and set to music by Joseph Kosma) and, at the funeral of a 104-year-old fisherman, a composition by the Trieste musician Publius Carniel with the lyrics of Raymond Cornet's 'Trieste dormi.' At the scattering of ashes at sea, he especially remembered one funeral at which he sang 'O sole mio' and 'Rose rosse,' a song performed by the Italian singer Massimo Ranieri (lyrics by Giancarlo Bigazzi to music by Enrico Polito). For this occasion, the relatives asked him to be dressed completely in white, and their choice of music did not include sad songs.

Among the songs he has sung at funerals, he also mentions 'Smile' from Chaplin's film *Modern Times* and the theme from Chaplin's film *Limelight*, which he played on the clarinet. He noticed that the *klapa* song 'Da te mogu pismom zvati,' which people like to request, or, for example, Oliver Dragojević's⁷ songs, are also very popular. He sang, among other things, Dragojević's 'My beautiful angel.'

⁷ At the funeral of Oliver Dragojević on 31 July 2018, when he was transported by catamaran from Split to his native Vela Luka on Korčula, and the next day his songs were sung in the cemetery (Grgič 2018).



He also sang, for example, the song 'Dok palme njišu grane,' originally performed by the Dubrovnik Troubadours. The popular songs he sang included 'You Raise Me Up' by Josh Groban or 'Lahko noč, Piran' by Anika Horvat. He has also performed a lot of classical music, including the famous aria 'Nessun dorma' from Puccini's opera 'Turandot.' He has also received applause, like at a concert, after performing Händel's aria 'Lascia ch'io pianga.'⁸ However, relatives usually thank him and offer their praise by word of mouth or by text message after the funeral (N. Stipanov, personal conversation, 10 October 2016 and 28 December 2020).

[51]

The interviewee mentioned that sometimes clients express a wish for 'a taste of the sea' when choosing music. For example, he often sings the famous 'Con te partirò' (music by Francesco Sartori with lyrics by Lucia Quarantotta, performed by Andrea Bocelli).

At funerals of members of the Italian minority, he often performs songs in Italian, such as 'Signore delle cime.' The Istrian songs requested include 'Va all'ombra Nineta,' the folk song 'Bella Istriana mia,' and he has also sung an old Italian folk song from Piran with a humorous text in the local dialect, 'Se passi per di qua.' At one of the funerals of a member of the Italian community, which he recalled especially because of the huge number of people present, he sang only 'Lacrimosa' from Mozart's Requiem. He noted that members of the Italian minority were very fond of Schubert's 'Ave Maria,' which he performs frequently. 'It stays in their memory, probably because it is in Latin and because it has such a beautiful melody' (N. Stipanov, telephone conversation, 28 December 2020).

He observed that at the funerals of persons who are not from the Italian minority, those attending sometimes request a song in Slovene because they wish to please other relatives who will be coming, but they often say that they do not want standard Slovene folk laments,⁹ because they're 'too depressing' (N. Stipanov, telephone

⁸ 'Lascia ch'io pianga' is a soprano aria from the second act of Händel's opera 'Rinaldo,' in which the captured Almirena laments her fate. As a metaphor for human suffering, this aria can also be performed in a funeral context.

⁹ According to the results of my field research, 'Lipa' and 'Gozdič je že zelen' are the

[52] conversation, 28 December 2020). He noticed that clients often emphasise that they do not want too many sad, 'depressing' songs, as this would make them even sadder in an already difficult situation. Perhaps this characteristic can also be somehow related to the temperament of people from Primorska, in which the influence of the Mediterranean climate could be observed.

The table 1 lists songs from the repertoire of individual ensembles that were active in Primorska in 2016. The songs are classified into Slovenian folk songs, religious laments,¹⁰ partisan mourning songs, Orthodox songs and Dalmatian songs; this is the ranking given in their offer by the singers from the ensemble 7 Plus Quartet. Under the list of songs in their offer, the members of the quartet wrote: 'This is only a part of the repertoire of our quartet which is most often used at funerals. At relatives' request, we can also sing something else suitable for such events, but the wishes should be communicated in time so that we can learn the song.' It should be emphasised that this is only the terminology of the ensembles and not objective scientific terminology. The practice of transferring songs into a popular folk repertoire was also encountered.

The soloist Marjetka Popovski classified the songs she offered in her repertoire into folk songs according to the theme (i.e., the sea, flowers, mountains, rivers, birds, love and wine), patriotic songs, laments, partisan songs, old songs about the Virgin Mary, Dalmatian songs and *sevdalinka*. She offers a varied choice, which can be 'greatly expanded upon agreement.' This singer, who sings to guitar accompaniment, also offers her services as a writer and reader of speeches.

All ensembles can offer Istrian folk songs; part of the repertoire are Dalmatian songs, especially those related to the sea and fishermen. The selection available at funeral ceremonies therefore also re-

most frequently performed laments in Slovenia, together with 'Vsi so venci vejli,' 'Kje so tiste stezice,' 'Po jezeru' and 'Hodil sem.'

¹⁰ 'Ave Maria' is listed under religious laments. Neven Stipanov told me that when he suggests this song, relatives' initial reaction is often to say no because it is supposed to be a hymn. But when he explains that it is a beautiful song that talks about life, they agree (N. Stipanov, personal conversation, 10 October 2016).



The Influence of the Mediterranean on Funeral Ceremonies

TABLE 1 Songs from the Repertoire of the Ensembles That Were Active in Primorska in 2016

Category	Title	(1)	(2)	(3)
Slovenian folk songs	Gozdič je že zelen	•	•	•
	Spavaj mirno	•	•	
	Kam odhajaš, dragi oče	•	•	
	Vigred se povrne	•		
	Polje, kdo bo tebe ljubil	•	•	
	Na poljani	•		
	V tihi noči	•		
	Kje so tiste stezice	•	•	•
	Temna noč	•	•	
	Da te ni	•	•	
	Vsi so venci vejli	•	•	
	Vse najlepše rožice	•		
	Lipa zelenela je	•	•	•
	Gor čez Izaro			•
	Teče mi vodica			•
	Slovensko dekle			•
	Tiha luna			•
	Oblaček mili moj			•
	Zrešlo je žito			•
	Zakrivljeno palico v roki			•
	Eno drevce mi je zraslo			•
	Mrzel veter tebe žene			•
	Zabučale gore			•
Oljki	•			
Solinar	•			

[53]

Continued on the next page

flects the characteristics of the Primorska region: olive growing and fishing, as well as songs in Italian.

RECORDED MUSIC

Until 2016, it was very rare for relatives to bring music on a CD or USB key, and, before October 2016, no funerals were held with

TABLE 1 *Continued from the previous page*

Category	Title	(1)	(2)	(3)
[54] Religious laments	Tiho lučka gori	•		
	Nearer, My God, to Thee	•	•	
	Jaz sem vstajenje	•		
	Nad zvezdami	•	•	
	Signore delle cime	•		
	Usliši nas gospod	•		
	V nebesih sem doma	•		
	Ave Maria	•		
	Molim te ponižno	•		
	Gospod je moja luč	•		
	Pridite na pomoč, svetniki božji	•		
Blagor mu	•			
Partisan laments	Smrt v Brdih	•		
	Počiva jezero v tihoti	•	•	•
	Prečuden cvet	•	•	
	Na oknu glej obrazek bled	•	•	•
	Kaj ti je deklica	•		
	Bella ciao	•		•
	Bilečanka	•		

Continued on the next page

recorded music. The research proved unable to determine precisely what percentage of funerals were held with live music, but on 5 October 2016, for instance, two funerals were performed without music and one with it.

Four years later, in December 2020, this practice changed. The head of the funeral service told me that they hold many funerals where relatives bring recorded music on a USB key. According to his estimation, in about 30% of the funerals where music is played,¹¹ the music is recorded, while 70% is live. In reply to the question whether

¹¹ The absence of music at some funerals may be due to several factors, such as cost or the fact that the funeral is for a Muslim, there being no music at this type of funeral.



The Influence of the Mediterranean on Funeral Ceremonies

TABLE 1 *Continued from the previous page*

Category	Title	(1)	(2)	(3)
Orthodox hymns	Gospod pomiluj	•	•	
	Tebe pojem	•		
	Otče nas	•		
Dalmatian songs	Tiha noč	•	•	•
	Daleko mi je biser Jadrana	•	•	
	Ribari	•		
	Ružo moja crvena	•	•	
	Ribar plite	•	•	•
	Ako si pošla spat	•		
	Maslina je neobrana	•		
	Da te mogu pismom zvati			•
Country music	V dolini tihi			•

[55]

NOTES Column headings are as follows: (1) Quartet '7 Plus,' (2) Quartet 'Riba,' (3) Marjetka Popovski.

the smaller percentage of live music might be because of the Covid epidemic, Ugrin replied that there are no problems with that at the moment, since singers can sing around ten metres away from the relatives. Relatives opt mainly for singers, but also for trumpets, although other instruments and ensembles appear only very rarely.

In addition to the central cemetery, Piran cemetery also includes three village cemeteries (Nova vas, Sv. Peter and Padna). As Aljoša Pucer told me in 2016, in Piran only 'once in ten years' did it happen that relatives brought recorded music on a USB because the cemetery did not have the appropriate equipment for playing it, only a speaker for speeches (personal communication, 7 October 2016), but in an interview in 2020, the same person told me that in order to meet public demand they now have the equipment to play recorded music from a USB key. However, relatives rarely want recorded music (telephone conversation, 30 December 2020).

WIND BANDS

Wind bands are rarely found in cemeteries, although one is available at the cemetery in Nova Gorica. As I learned from the local author-

ities there, when requesting a funeral service, relatives can, if they wish, contact some leaders of choirs and groups of musicians and then come to an agreement with them themselves. The wind band plays at a funeral when the deceased was also a musician (Komunala [56] Nova Gorica, personal communication, 20 October 2016).

A wind band also played in the cemetery in Piran, when, on 31 December 2014, a musician, trumpet professor and conductor of the Piran Youth Wind Orchestra, 80-year-old Umberto Radojkovič, was buried. He had conducted the Piran Wind Orchestra for twenty years and did not want flowers at his funeral, but preferred financial contributions for the orchestra. His funeral was attended by many of the deceased's musician colleagues, professors and former students as well as the Youth Wind Orchestra, which played Štrucl's mourning march 'Rožmarin.' Another composition performed by the orchestra was an expression of the character of the deceased. He was of a cheerful disposition, and the music played was Štrucl's march 'Pozdravljena, Slovenija.' As his explicit last wish, a quartet of horns played at his graveside 'Glejte, že sonce zahaja' and Beethoven's laments 'Drei Equale WoO 30 in D minor.'

In Slovenia, a wind band, the official state orchestra, known as the Police Orchestra, plays mostly at state funerals and ceremonies of national mourning. The custom of having wind bands at funerals is an age-old tradition typical of southern Italy.

SOUTHERN ITALY AND SICILY: A TRADITION OF WIND BANDS AND FUNERAL PROCESSIONS

The old tradition of wind bands playing funeral marches during the major street processions on Good Friday before Easter is very familiar in Southern Italy. Mauro Sclafani, an academic oboist from Sicily, said that one of the most important processions in Sicily is the so-called procession of the Mysteries (Tartaro n. d.). In Sicily, it is mainly linked with the city of Trapani, but it also extends beyond Sicily (M. Sclafani, personal communication, 19 December 2020). According to Wikipedia (2020), the procession of the Mysteries takes place between Good Friday and Saturday through the main streets of the city and is held to represent the Via crucis. The tradition is said



to be about four centuries old and dates back to the time of Spanish rule in Sicily when it was developed from Andalusian traditions.

In his autobiography the famous conductor Riccardo Muti describes the 'music world' he knew from his childhood in the Apulian town of Molfetta: 'I grew up in the fantasy world of Good Friday, "Povera Rosa" and funeral marches from Molfetta' (Muti 2017, 25). 'Povera Rosa' is probably the most famous funeral march and is performed by a wind band in the streets during the Good Friday procession. The repertoire of funeral marches played by bands is extremely rich. According to the website enumerating the most common funeral marches in Trapani, the composers of the marches are frequently local musicians, but popular arrangements of other works by European composers are also played, such as an adaptation of Chopin's sonata; often, however, the composer of the march is unknown. In addition to performing funeral marches, music of various other kinds is performed at funerals in Sicily and southern Italy. At church services, the songs that find most favour in Sicily include Marco Frisina's 'Eccomi,' 'Il Signore è mio pastore' and 'Chi ci separerà,' written for choir and orchestra or choir and organ. A popular composer of sacred music performed during a funeral service is also Giuseppe Liberto (M. Sclafani, personal communication, 19 December 2020).

[57]

As can be seen from the traditions described above, traditional funeral music in southern Italy and Sicily is very different from that encountered in the southwestern coastal part of Slovenia. In southern Italy, funeral music is associated with old religious traditions and the playing of funeral marches, this being unknown in the coastal area of Slovenia and beyond. During my field research, I learnt that the presence of bands was more frequent in decades past (for example, the performance of the Railway Band at the Žale cemetery in Ljubljana) and nowadays it is reserved for use at official and state funerals. The band may sometimes play at a funeral by way of an exception, usually if the deceased person had also been a member of a band. Here again, we encounter the trend towards individualized funerals or 'funerals tailored to the man' in order to reflect the deceased's profession or interests.

CONCLUSIONS

[58] Modern funeral rituals have undergone numerous changes, some of which are reflected through music or in some cases have their origins in music. According to field research, there is also a new kind of modern burial in Primorska, involving the scattering of ashes into the sea. The lyrics of the songs performed at funerals are sometimes related to the sea; there are more songs in Italian and also Istrian folk songs in the dialect spoken by the Italian minority in coastal places – songs that are not to be found elsewhere in Slovenia. Traditional Slovenian laments about the sea and fishing are encountered but are less common. As elsewhere in Slovenia, the choice of funeral music is very often individualised and reflects the wishes of relatives, as well as the deceased's religious and political beliefs, age, character, profession, hobbies and interests. Thus, popular music, especially in English, is increasingly present at funerals in the Primorska region. We even found disco music at the funeral of a younger deceased person. Traditional laments, which are present throughout Slovenia (such as 'Lipa' and 'Vsi so venci vejli'), are still found in the repertoire of funeral music, but less frequently. It is interesting to note that sometimes people in Primorska describe these laments as being 'too depressing' and say that they would merely add to their grief; I did not find this curiosity elsewhere in Slovenia. Perhaps this is related to the character of the people living along the Mediterranean, which also influences the choice of funeral music.

Classical music remains the choice of many people in Primorska; popular compositions include Schubert's 'Ave Maria' and arias from operas, which are mostly in Italian and are often (but not exclusively) chosen by members of the Italian minority. Standard ensembles at funerals in Primorska are still singers and a trumpet at the end, but sometimes solo singers appear, occasionally also other instruments such as the clarinet, guitar or flute. There is more and more recorded music, which is used mainly in the Koper cemetery.

If we compare funeral music in the Slovenian coastal areas with funeral music in the neighbouring Mediterranean country of Italy, great differences can be seen. In nearby Trieste, funerals are extremely short, without any cultural additions, which is in stark con-



trast to the average funeral in our country. The presence of wind bands is also completely different from practices at Slovenian funerals. Wind bands playing in processions are familiar from southern Italy; they are a unique tradition with a long history but have had no influence on Slovenian funeral music and are not related to it. [59]

It would be interesting in further studies to give special attention to investigating how the Mediterranean influences the character of the people and thus their choice of funeral music; how do these choices differ from the funeral music popular in the northern countries? In addition, it would be interesting to observe further the dynamics of the changes. As was evident from the case of funeral music in Koper, changes became apparent in a relatively short period of four years.

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Externalisation of EU Borders through Cooperation with Libya: Italy as a Gateway to the European Dream

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This article argues that cooperation between Italy and Libya with EU support, have accelerated and deepened especially after the migration crisis in 2015. The introduction of Italy–Libya Memorandum of Understanding (2017) to cope with the challenge of irregular migration has externalized the EU's borders and contributed to transformation of the Mediterranean Sea into *limes*. The conceptual and analytical framework of the article is based on territorial implications of Europeanisation of migration and particularly the concept of *limes* which refers to drawing a line to maintain a distinction between stability and order within and disorder outside (Walters 2004). The article focuses on Italy, which is one of the countries most affected by the crisis as it is located on the EU's external Mediterranean border. The study draws on semi-structured, in-depth, face-to-face interviews conducted in Italy in the first half of 2019 with the members of the Chamber of Deputies from various political parties, sea rescue NGO representatives in Italy, a representative from UNHCR Italy, and a mayor from southern Italy. The interviews reveal various metaphors and narratives such as 'Italy has been left alone' because of solidarity crisis in the EU and 'Italy as a gateway to Europe' for analysing Italy's role in externalizing EU borders and migration management through cooperation with Libya.

Key Words: irregular migration, Italy, Libya, European Union, Mediterranean, sea rescue NGOs

INTRODUCTION

[62] Ever since the so-called migration crisis (2015), security concerns have been increasingly prioritised in the EU, especially regarding regional threats identified in migration, trafficking, and terrorism. An increasingly securitised discourse has strongly influenced conceptualizations of borders, with emphasis increasingly being put on creating a border of control and exclusion (Browning and Joenniemi 2007, 24; Moreno-Lax 2018). There is a rising move towards ‘militarization of EU borders,’ rather than a humanitarian approach to save people’s lives (Irrera 2016, 27). Both member states and the EU itself have intensified this securitization following the migration crisis and the rise of populist radical right tendencies. For example, member states have reduced their Search and Rescue (SAR) capacity. The resulting increase in migrant death rates has made the Mediterranean the deadliest frontier worldwide (European Parliament 2021, 80).

On the other hand, the solidarity crisis within the EU has accelerated the externalisation of the EU border control and migration management a trend spearheaded by countries situated on the external EU border such as Italy. Europe’s eastern border control has also been externalised towards Turkey, particularly after the March 2016 EU–Turkey Statement, or so-called ‘refugee deal’ which was followed by the cooperation between Italy and Libya (2017), and Spain’s collaboration with Morocco (Armilli 2017, 144) to decrease irregular migration flows towards Europe. Further comparative research is needed to analyse how the EU has constructed complex, multiple borders by externalizing its borders and migration management. This study aims to contribute to existing literature by focusing on the case of Italy and the collaboration with Libya which was supported by the EU as well. Cooperation between Italy and Libya began long before the migration crisis. Since the late 1990s, Italy has promoted bilateral cooperation with Libya, with whom it shares a colonial history and close economic ties, including through several formal and informal agreements. Since the 1990s, this cooperation has been informal and secretive regarding the details of the agreements (Klepp 2010, 4). Since 2000, several agreements were made with



Libya, and also Tunisia, to strengthen their capacity to patrol their coasts (Cuttitta 2018, 30). In 2000, Italy and Libya signed an agreement to fight terrorism, organised crime, drug trafficking, and illegal migration (Hamood 2008, 32). Although Libya was perceived as a 'rogue state,' further important bilateral agreements were signed in 2003 and 2004 that introduced several crucial areas of close cooperation (Klepp 2010, 4). In 2004, Italy provided Libya with training and equipment to assist with border management (Hamood 2008, 32).

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After the economic and the migration crises, 'Italy has been left alone' became one of the most dominant and frequently used frames of Italian political elites, both in the government and the opposition. This further strengthened Italy's cooperation with Libya, which has been increasingly supported by the EU.

In recent years, the EU's and Italy's approaches to the externalisation of EU borders and to migration management have increasingly converged. However, this has eliminated asylum procedures for many asylum seekers, who were pushed back to Libya. This was most visible when leader of the Lega, Matteo Salvini, was Minister of the Interior, when the fieldwork of this study was conducted. Throughout Salvini's tenure as Interior Minister, migrants rescued at sea from sinking dinghies had to wait many days aboard NGO ships before being granted access to a harbour and disembark. Those who are pushed back or pulled back to Libya or in detention centres, frequently face human rights violations.

This study focused on Italy because it is one of the countries most affected by the EU's migration crisis as it is located on the EU's external Mediterranean border. As one of the main gateways to the 'European dream,' Italy is one of the main actors contributing to the externalisation of EU borders. By collaborating with neighbouring countries, particularly Libya, Italy transfers some of its border management responsibilities in order to prevent further irregular migration flows.

Because of the solidarity crisis within the EU after the migration crisis, the external border countries of the EU faced with bigger challenges. Since the crisis developed, the perception that 'Italy has been abandoned' has become a common narrative in Italy. As

[64] one of the main first entrance points to the Schengen area, Italy has to deal with many asylum applications under the Dublin Convention. The EU's 'solidarity crisis' has accelerated cooperation between Italy and Libya, with EU support, despite extensive human rights abuses in Libya. This cooperation has enabled the EU to externalise its borders which has led to thousands of migrants drowning in the Mediterranean Sea.

The externalisation of migration management and EU borders is analysed by focusing on the case of Italy and the cooperation with Libya. The first section provides the conceptual and analytical framework, based on Walters' (2004) 'territorial implications of Europeanisation of migration' and particularly the concept of *limes*. The second section presents the methodology, while the third discusses the historical background and challenges of cooperation regarding irregular migration between Italy and Libya, and the EU and Libya. It also explains how this has externalized EU borders and migration management. The final section draws on semi-structured, in-depth, face-to-face elite and expert interviews conducted in Rome in the first half of 2019 with members of the Chamber of Deputies in Italy, sea rescue NGO representatives in Italy, a representative from UNHCR Italy, and a mayor from southern Italy. The resulting narratives are used to explain Italy's role in externalizing EU borders and discuss the challenges of cooperation between Italy and Libya, especially regarding human rights.

CONCEPTUAL AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK:
THE CONSTRUCTION OF LIMES IN THE
MEDITERRANEAN SEA THROUGH COOPERATION
BETWEEN ITALY AND LIBYA

European politicians have increasingly emphasised the need for a geopolitical vision of (EU)rope (Bialasiewicz et al. 2009, 79). Individual EU member states are influenced by national political, geopolitical cultures and visions of Europe, as is evident in the way particular member states focus on different neighbourhoods. France and Italy, for instance, see the Mediterranean as Europe's primary space of intervention (Rupnik 2007; cited by Bialasiewicz et al. 2009, 79).



Critical studies on security and borders theorise contemporary borders by emphasizing their increasingly mobile and de-territorialised re-spatialisation beyond national territories (Walters 2004; Rumford 2006). The resulting 'transportable border politics' is reflected in the outsourcing of migration policies to third countries, new techniques of mobility control, and surveillance mechanisms (Bialasiewicz et al. 2009).

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The cross-border policing of people and counterterrorism projects have reshaped Europe's borders (Walters 2006, 142). During the 1990s, the predominant concept used to define EU borders was *Fortress Europe* which was constructed towards outsiders. It has become much harder to enter the Schengen area while several parts of the EU external borders have been externalised. This changed after the Schengen agreement was incorporated into the Amsterdam Treaty: internal borders were harmonised while the EU's external borders became *fuzzy* because they produced intermediate spaces between inside and outside. This development enabled EU policies to be exported beyond its member states (Christiansen and Tonra 2000, 390–3).

According to Huntington (1993; cited by Christiansen and Tonra 2000, 401), the Mediterranean Sea is a key fault line in a 'clash of civilisations.' The Mediterranean's northern states define themselves as European. They share modern industrial and service-based economies, secular political traditions, and liberal-democratic governmental structures. They also share a Mediterranean identity within a broader European identity. In contrast, despite sharing more cultural identifiers than their northern neighbours, the states and peoples from the south of the Mediterranean have a much weaker collective identity (Christiansen and Tonra 2000, 401–2).

The EU's Euro-Med initiative made the Mediterranean a new version of *Mare Nostrum*, with the EU playing the role of the ancient Romans (Tunander 1997; cited by Christiansen and Tonra 2000, 411). However, this has been harshly challenged especially since the migration crisis.

There has been 'securitisation of migration' (Huysmans 2000) which accelerated after the migration crisis. The distinctions be-

[66] tween external and internal security have become blurred: border defences have been thickened through the creation of buffer zones and there has been an increasing use of military technologies for border enforcement. Moreover, there is 'layered border inspection/policing approaches that move customs and immigration inspection activities away from the territorial border' (Bialasiewicz 2012, 844) which has led to externalisation of borders. As Bialasiewicz (2012, 845) notes, Frontex, which is the external border control agency of the EU, has become the most visible actor in the EU's increasingly exclusionary border control.

In his discussion of the 'multiplicity and plurality of borders,' Walters (2004, 674–6) argues that the form and function of Europe's borders have been transformed. He focuses on the 'territorial implications of the Europeanisation of migration.' He perceives *Fortress Europe* as an alternative for the fear of *Sieve Europe*, 'open to all manner of transnational threats.' For Walters (2004, 678), the geostrategic moment refers to 'instrumentalization of territory for the purposes of governing one or more of new security issues,' such as human trafficking, asylum, and terrorism. He emphasises that geostrategies can offer a more nuanced version of the production of geopolitical space in Europe than concepts like *fuzzy borders* or *Fortress Europe*.

Walters (2004, 679–82) considers several geostrategies of EU borders. The *networked (non)border* achieves effective frontier control through cooperation between state agencies on both sides of the frontier. *March* implies a buffer zone between powers to protect the interior, such as Central and East European countries. The *colonial frontier* refers to the way the EU's complex borders include asymmetric power relations whereby centre is perceived as the 'repository and arbitrator of what is proper' (Walters 2004, 683–8). Finally, Walters (2004, 690–1) suggests another border type derived from imperial history: *limes*. This refers to a border between a power and its outside, between the 'empire and the barbarians, or cosmos and chaos.' *Limes* draws a line to maintain a distinction between 'stability and order within and disorder, nomadism, barbarism outside.' Thus, EU borders have become much more complex, especially af-



ter the migration crisis due to their externalisation and increasing collaboration with neighbouring countries.

The geostrategy of the *colonial frontier* perceives it as open to expansion, whereas the *limes* presupposes a more permanent frontier. Like the *colonial frontier*, the *limes* creates a hierarchy between inside and outside, and institutionalises asymmetric relations between unequal powers. The *colonial frontier* aims to incorporate the outside into the inside whereas the *limes* precludes further expansion and preserves what the empire has achieved (Walters 2004, 691). Thus, in the case of *limes* rather than incorporation of outside, exclusion of outside is maintained while transferring some responsibilities of border control and migration management.

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According to Walters (2004, 691), the Romans considered the Mediterranean as *Mare Nostrum* (centre of the civilised world) whereas ‘the area of Europe where the *limes* materialise more than anywhere today is its Mediterranean frontier.’ Walters (2004, 692) claims that ‘the *limes* constitute the European community as a gated community.’ *Limes* refer to ‘an edge, fringe or limit,’ as in Europe’s Mediterranean frontier (Karadağ 2019). Walters (2004, 693) suggests that further empirical work is needed to determine whether arrangements like police partnerships are attempts to extend control beyond the frontier. Based on this analytical and conceptual framework, this article focuses on the EU-supported collaboration between Italy and Libya in response to irregular migration across the Mediterranean Sea. It argues that this has contributed to the construction of *limes* in the Mediterranean Sea between the ‘cosmos’ of Europe and the ‘chaos’ of the South, with Italy perceived as a gateway to the European dream.

Although EU enlargement has lost momentum, further enlargements to the East may still occur in the longer term. In contrast, there is no prospect of enlargement to the south. Rather, the EU’s approach to its southern neighbourhood, which it considers as a region of multiple security challenges, is driven by a strategy of ‘containment in the face of a world that is viewed as profoundly alien’ (Walters 2004, 692).

Whereas the EU’s eastern neighbourhood’s Europeanness is less

questioned, that of the south is much more contested, leading to a rather static view of the EU's southern borders. This in turn has contributed to the construction of the *limes* in the Mediterranean (Browning and Joenniemi 2007, 25).

[68] To exemplify the notion of *limes*, Walters (2004) discusses the wall financed jointly by the EU and Spain to prevent irregular migration from Moroccan mainland to the Spanish enclave cities of Ceuta and Melilla. Walters (2004) argues that the EU's borders reflect dynamism and plurality. In the case of Italy, the EU has externalised its borders and shifted responsibilities onto neighbouring countries like Libya to contain irregular migration. As a result, *limes* has been constructed in the Mediterranean Sea.

More specifically, the 'out-sourcing of migration management to African states,' particularly Libya, is a crucial example of 'out-sourcing and off-shoring of Europe's border work' (Bialasiewicz 2012, 848–52). As Bialasiewicz (2012, 847) argues, 'Europe's neighbours are becoming Europe's policemen, with the Mediterranean as the primary site for externalising European governance and a laboratory for finding various solutions for policing EU borders.'

As Walters (2004, 693) argues, 'at the EU's Southern frontier, the geostrategy of *limes* seems to be dominant' even before the migration crisis. Carrera and Cortinovis (2019) criticise the 'contained mobility paradigm,' achieved by increasing criminalisation of sea rescue NGOs, EU member states' gradual operational disengagement from SAR activities, and Italy's delegation of containment tasks to Libyan Coast Guard, supported by the EU. This article argues that the EU's externalisation of its borders and migration management has deepened as a consequence of the 'migration crisis' and the EU's 'solidarity crisis.' The main narrative in Italy of 'having been left alone' has accelerated and deepened its cooperation with Libya which has been supported by the EU as well. This in turn has led to construction of *limes* in the Mediterranean between a peaceful and prosperous Europe and a chaotic South.

METHODOLOGY

For this study data was collected through 18 semi-structured, in-depth, face-to-face elite and expert interviews conducted in Rome



in March 2019. The interviewees included politicians from Italy's Chamber of Deputies from various political parties, sea rescue NGO representatives in Italy, a mayor from southern Italy, and a representative from UNHCR Italy. Except for the Five Star Movement (M5S) deputy, all the politicians were from opposition parties at that time. Interview requests with several members of other governing parties were rejected. Thus, the interviews mostly reflect a critical approach to Italian and EU migration policies, and Italy's collaboration with Libya.

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To analyse the interviews, the metaphors and frames that the interviewees frequently used to evaluate Italy's migration policy, how its abandonment led to deepening cooperation with Libya and the humanitarian challenges of this collaboration are analysed.

Frame analysis was introduced by Goffman (1974). Verloo (2005, 20) defines a policy frame as an organizing principle that transforms fragmentary information into a structured problem in which a solution is implicitly or explicitly included. Actors usually make intentional decisions and choose between the available competing frames to pursue their goals ('strategic framing'). The types of actors can be compared based on the frames they employ (Dombos and Zentai 2012, 5–13). Issue frames can be articulated by both state and non-state actors, as dominant state frames or contesting non-governmental frames (Dombos and Zentai 2012, 5–6).

This article analyzed the frames of mostly opposition parties and sea rescue NGO representatives who focus on the humanitarian challenges of the collaboration with Libya. Sea rescue NGO representatives were included in the study because they closely observe the situation in the Mediterranean Sea. Thus, they can evaluate the humanitarian impacts of Italy's collaboration with Libya and the construction of *limes* in the Mediterranean's north and south.

EXTERNALISATION OF EU BORDERS
AND MIGRATION MANAGEMENT TOWARDS LIBYA
AND THE ROLE OF ITALY

While Libya was previously more of a destination country for migrants from Arab and Sub-Saharan countries, it has become a transit country for irregular immigrants trying to reach Italy as a first step

[70] to achieving the European dream. Migrants arrive in Libya from many war-torn countries, such as Sudan and Somalia. However, Libya lacks the administrative and legal system to identify or protect refugees (Klepp 2010, 3–4). The migratory journeys before the Mediterranean crossings are also highly risky, often involving crossing remote terrain like the Sahara Desert and residing in countries like Libya (Missing Migrants Project 2021).

Libya's increasing importance as the main jumping-off point for entry into Europe by sea has created a sense of urgency in the EU. In response, it has tried to prevent irregular arrivals from Libya and deepened EU–Libya cooperation, including by partially exporting border management responsibilities. A central aim is to strengthen these countries' migration management capacities, particularly regarding border control (Hamood 2008, 19–20) to decrease irregular migration to Europe.

In June 2005, the Council announced an *ad hoc* dialogue and cooperation with Libya on migration issues based on respect for human rights. However, Libya is not a signatory to the 1951 Geneva Convention or its 1967 Protocol. Faced with the choice of remaining in Libya or risking the Mediterranean crossing to Europe, many people have chosen the latter (Hamood 2008, 20–5) to realise their 'European dream,' which represents their only hope for survival and a better future. On the other hand, in 2005 Italy's Interior Ministry announced that Italy and Libya planned to create joint teams to tackle smuggling. Without signing a readmission agreement, they agreed verbally on returns. This has allowed Italy to restrict entry into its territory while carrying out mass deportations, especially since 2004, when many irregular immigrants arrived in Lampedusa. However, the way these deportations were carried out violates Italy's national and international obligations, particularly regarding the right to seek asylum and *non-refoulement*. After being returned to Libya, some migrants were detained without access to UNHCR while facing the risk of torture and ill-treatment in detention centres. Others were sent back to their countries of origin, where they are also at risk of human rights violations. Italy has nevertheless financed charter flights to repatriate irregular immigrants from Libya



to their countries of origin. It has also financed the construction of camps for these immigrants in Libya (Hamood 2008, 32–3). According to Klepp (2010, 5–8), implementation of these cooperation programs has actually eliminated rather than externalised the asylum system in Libya.

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After the first Frontex Technical Assistance Mission to Libya in June 2007, Italy and Libya signed several bilateral agreements to create joint patrols along Libya's coast. This allowed Italian coastguard vessels to operate in Libyan waters. In 2008, Italy and Libya signed the Treaty of Friendship, Partnership, and Cooperation, perceived as a crucial step towards reconciliation. Its provisions included bilateral efforts to combat illegal migration, facilitated by joint sea patrols launched in December 2007. In May 2009, during the Berlusconi government, Italy's parliament approved legislation making irregular migration punishable by a fine and detention. It also authorised deportation of migrants through a push-back policy (Bialasiewicz 2012, 852–3). As Bialasiewicz (2012, 858) emphasises, the 2007 and 2009 bilateral treaties focused on collaboration in the fight against terrorism, organised crime and irregular migration.

Italy's external border controls were conducted under the *Constant Vigilance* operation. This involved patrolling the Strait of Sicily after 2004 and then the *Mare Nostrum* operation which focused on SAR between October 2013 and November 2014. Subsequently, Frontex launched the *Triton* operation, which focused on external border control rather than SAR activities. After 700 migrants died during a rescue operation carried out by a commercial vessel, Italy launched a new military operation, *Eunavfor Med Sophia*, to fight smuggling networks and prevent boats leaving Libya (Cuttitta 2018, 7).

EU and Libya's cooperation on migration and border management started in 2013 with the establishment of the EU Border Assistance Mission to Libya (EUBAM), designed to develop a border management framework (European Parliament 2021, 129). Most EU actions since the migration crisis have focused on increasing border controls and 'externalising migration management outside of the European territory,' particularly to Turkey, Libya, and Morocco

[72] (Gattinara 2017, 320). Frontex has also supported cooperation programmes with Libya to patrol Libyan waters and return irregular migrants to Libya (Klepp 2010, 7). At the Valletta Summit of 2015, there was a push for further externalising border and migration control in response to the humanitarian crisis (Perkowski 2016, 333).

On 2 February 2017, the Italy-Libya Memorandum of Understanding was signed to provide patrol boats for the Libyan Coast Guard. Italy's government focused on 'equipping the Libyan Coast Guard to make pull-back operations to Libya.' However, this resulted in drownings and *refoulement* to Libya's detention centres in violation of international law (Maccanico 2019).

In February 2017, EU leaders agreed on new measures to reduce irregular arrivals along the central Mediterranean route. They committed to increasing cooperation with Libya and tackling migrant smugglers on the basis of the Malta Declaration. In November 2017, the EU established a joint migration task force with the African Union and the UN which aimed to pool efforts and enhance cooperation in response to migration challenges in Africa, particularly Libya (European Council 2021).

In August 2017, the EU-trained Libyan Coast Guard claimed responsibility over a large SAR region, warning NGOs against entering the area without authorization. However, Libya still lacks capabilities to conduct effective SAR operations. The 27 August 2017 meeting in Paris between Italy, Germany, France, and Spain called for other EU member states, particularly those bordering the Mediterranean, to support Italian attempts to externalise migration management by funding countries in the Sahel region and Libyan municipalities. Efforts to monitor and restrict maritime rescuers formed part of a wider EU strategy to rely on the Libyan Coast Guard to deter migrants from crossing the central Mediterranean Sea. Although this policy may have helped reduce crossings, the humanitarian results have been highly questionable (Cusumano 2019, 113).

Carrera and Cortinovis (2019) argue that EU and Italian support for Libya through funding, training, and equipment increased the Libyan Coast Guard's capacity to conduct unlawful operations at sea,



enabled the Libyan authorities to establish a Libyan SAR region, and set up a Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC). The European Commission also indirectly supported these activities through the EU Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF).

After cooperating with the Libyan Coast Guard, Libya's SAR was combined with anti-smuggling operations, which reduced crossings via the central Mediterranean (Ghezelbash et al. 2018, 319). By cooperating with Libya, both Italy and the EU allowed Libya's anti-migration policies to become harsher (Klepp 2010, 13). Meanwhile, Malta also agreed with Libya to cooperate on intercepting and returning migrants to Libya (European Parliament 2021, 130). [73]

A long-time country of emigration, Italy has in recent decades become a major destination country for irregular immigrants arriving by boat. These 'boat people' have been constructed as a threat to national security (Armilli 2017, 141), especially since Lega's leader, Matteo Salvini, became Minister of Interior in 2018.

At the European Summit of June 2018, EU leaders called for further measures to reduce illegal migration across the central Mediterranean. They agreed to step up efforts to stop migrant smugglers operating out of Libya, continue to support Italy and other frontline EU countries, increase their support for the Libyan coastguard, improve reception conditions, increase voluntary return to countries of origin of migrants in Libya, and enhance cooperation with other countries of origin and transit, and on resettlement. In July 2019, the EU approved five new migration-related programmes in North Africa. These were adopted under the EUTF, established in November 2015 to address the root causes of forced displacement and irregular migration. The EU's actions in Libya focused on training of the coast guard, protecting, assisting migrants and refugees, supporting local communities, and improving border management. They were funded through the EUTF for Africa (European Council 2021).

The main tool for supporting migration-related actions in Libya is EUTF's North of Africa Section. Libya is the main beneficiary of the EUTF North Africa, with a total funding of €455 million so far (European Commission 2021). This exemplifies the EU's support of externalizing its borders and migration management through col-

TABLE 1 Irregular Migration in the Mediterranean

Year	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Arrivals	1,032,408	373,652	185,139	141,472	123,663	94,950
Dead and missing	3,771	5,096	3,139	2,270	1,335	1,166

[74]

NOTES Based on data from UNHCR (<https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean>). The data includes sea arrivals to Italy, Cyprus, and Malta, and both sea and land arrivals to Greece and Spain, including the Canary Islands. Data are up to 31 December 2020 for all countries except Cyprus, for which the last available data is up to 31 August 2020.

laboration with Libya, and the construction of *limes* in the Mediterranean Sea, especially after the migration crisis.

Both the EU's and Italy's restrictive migration policies have abolished the rights of many asylum seekers through push-back policies and a transfer of responsibilities to Libya (Caponio and Cappiali 2018, 125–6). With the effect of these externalisation policies, you may see in table 1 that there has been a decline in the number of arrivals to EU member states in the Mediterranean after the peak in 2015. Despite reduced numbers of crossings since the Covid-19 pandemic erupted in 2020, many people have died in the Mediterranean while trying to reach Europe. From January to September 2021, for example, an estimated 1,369 migrants drowned (Statista 2021).

Thus, this collaboration with Libya is particularly challenging in terms of human rights because those sent back, have no chance to apply for asylum and may be put in detention centres where they can face human rights abuses. As a result, through externalisation of borders towards Libya, *limes* have been constructed in the Mediterranean Sea.

ANALYSIS OF THE INTERVIEWS

The EU's Solidarity Crisis: 'Italy Has Been Left Alone'

The EU has faced a solidarity crisis, especially since the migration crisis. All the interviewees criticised the EU's migration policy and found it ineffective. Because of the lack of solidarity among member states, Italy and the other external border countries have been left alone. Many interviewees argued that the Dublin Regulation has to



be revised, although some have noted that this would be extremely difficult because of resistance by some member states that believe maintaining the *status quo* is much better for their national interests.

Interviewee 4, a Democratic Party (PD) deputy, argued that ‘for many years Italy has been left alone in managing the migrant flows.’ He added that there had been some attempts to revise the Dublin Regulation. However, the former Italian government (M5S-Lega) had avoided this. He noted that Lega was absent during many meetings in Brussels when reform of the Dublin Regulation was debated. The political elites from the opposition parties claimed that although Lega’s main rhetoric was anti-immigrant and claimed that ‘Italy has been left alone’ after the migration crisis, Lega did not push for revision of the Dublin Regulation. Thus, the interviewees emphasised contradictions, particularly in Lega’s attitudes towards migration.

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Interviewee 17, a M5S deputy, argued that ‘Italy was left alone to face this emergency’ when EU members should have faced this problem together to find a solution. He stated that ‘our goal is working together, cooperating with other member states about the revision of the Dublin Regulation.’ He added that ‘we have to improve the humanitarian corridors by new bilateral agreements with home countries. We have to invest in those countries.’

Most of the interviewees criticised the lack of solidarity between member states, which put great pressure on those countries like Italy, situated on the EU’s external borders. Interviewee 10, a mayor from southern Italy, stated that ‘although this sensitive subject should be addressed by all EU member states, actually only Mediterranean states address this issue [...] We have been left to our fate.’ Although the mayor was critical about the EU’s solidarity crisis, he also criticised the Italian government’s policies. Specifically, those managing Italy’s migration policy were giving a weird message. As he put it, the government claim that ‘there are no more landings, no more dead, our ports are closed and the Mediterranean Sea has become a calm sea. But the truth is different, our ports are open, and people are still dying.’ He continued,

[76] We are welcoming, we will help people who are in danger, but we need the intervention of central institutions [...] We had seven landings in 2019, almost 300 landings in 2018. The only thing that changes is the number of immigrants. In the past, there were 80–100 immigrants on a boat, today there are 12–15 on a boat. Immigrants continue to land.

Thus, due to their location on the EU's external borders, Mediterranean states like Italy were much more affected by the migration and solidarity crises that have accelerated and deepened the EU's externalisation of borders, which has led to the construction of the *limes* in the Mediterranean Sea.

Some of the interviewees from the political elites criticised the EU migration policy because of its perception of immigration as an 'emergency phenomenon' rather than a 'structural problem.' Interviewee 7, a PD deputy, argued that the EU's migration policy had failed because 'they consider migration only as an emergency phenomenon.' She argued instead that the Dublin Regulation must be revised to include a new Common European Asylum System based on solidarity. As she put it, 'we have to introduce structural policies to solve this issue, not only in Italy but also in their home countries.' The European Commission proposed a new Migration Pact in 2020, however, it cannot introduce equal solidarity within the EU. Rather, it encouraged shifting responsibilities to neighbouring countries by externalising migration management. Thus, the EU has been continuing its trend of externalising borders to deal with the challenge of irregular migration.

Interviewee 15, a PD deputy, who also believed that Europe's migration policy had failed, argued that the EU should face this challenge cohesively, on the basis of co-responsibility. He stated that 'neither Italy nor Greece and Spain should be left alone. The entire Mediterranean front was left alone.' Interviewee 6, an Italian Left deputy, noted that 'if we close one border another one opens. The Libyan route towards Italy was closed, then the Moroccan route to Spain was opened.' Thus, the failure of the EU's migration policy and the solidarity crisis led to the emergence of the frame that 'Italy has



been left alone,' which intensified the externalisation of its borders. This in turn created various complex, multiple, and fuzzy EU borders that led to the construction of *limes* in the Mediterranean, while new routes are emerging, such as the recent conflicts and pushbacks of irregular migrants in the border between Poland and Belarus.

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Italy as a 'Gateway to Europe'

Some interviewees discussed Italy's position as a transit country to other European countries as a 'gateway to Europe.' They emphasised the importance of providing channels for legal migration to contribute to Italian and European economies. According to Interviewee 7 from Open Arms, 'we [Italy] are a transit country for immigrants who want to reach other countries.' Interviewee 14, a deputy from PD, argued that everyone was so sad about the young child, Aylan Kurdi, who was found dead on the shore near Bodrum, Turkey, in 2015, yet nothing has changed. She added, 'we can establish legal channels of entry for economic migrants across Europe, not only in Italy. Italy is not the final destination. It is the gateway to Europe.' Thus, irregular immigrants who enter Italy from Libya but originate from various countries, usually see Italy as a transit country, the main 'gateway to the European dream.' In response, Italy has further externalised its borders towards Libya.

Some interviewees suggested introducing humanitarian corridors and an inclusive migration policy that includes collaboration with and investment in origin countries. Interviewee 14, a deputy from PD, claimed that most arrivals are economic migrants, added that 'If they aren't refugees, the other countries don't want them and they stay here [...] We have to sign readmission agreements [...] I think that humanitarian air corridors may be a solution.'

Interviewee 4, from UNHCR Italy, argued that some hot spots have been introduced in the south of Italy in cities like Lampedusa, Trapani, Pozzallo, and Taranto. However, he did not think this can be the only solution to irregular migrant flows. Rather, an inclusive policy that includes the immigrants' home countries is required. Thus, Italy and the EU must start a dialogue with African countries. This may include 'the revival of humanitarian corridors' and

[78] allowing asylum seekers to leave their countries without ‘starting a journey of hope.’ Interviewee 6, a deputy from PD, argued that asylum, relocation, and family unification must be accelerated, and legal channels of arrival for working migrants and asylum seekers must be created. Thus, the interviewees, mostly belonging to opposition parties, suggested further collaboration with origin countries in Africa and called for legal channels for migration, rather than shifting responsibilities towards Libya, which is not ready to deal with this challenge legally or administratively.

*Contradictions of Italy’s Migration Policy:
Instrumentalization of Migration by Lega*

Most of the opposition party interviewees criticised dichotomies in Italy’s migration policies. Interviewee 16, a PD deputy, argued that ‘our current immigration policy is a closed-door policy.’ Some interviewees from opposition parties claimed that Italy’s M5S-Lega government did not really want to solve migration issue. Interviewee 11, a PD deputy, argued that ‘the idea of considering “migrants as invaders” is ridiculous [...] We must manage these flows [...] Our government is still stoking fears of immigrants.’ He claimed that ‘they are not doing anything to solve that issue [...] because they do not want to solve that issue.’ Thus, they claimed that Lega was instrumentalising the migration issue. Interviewee 6, a deputy from PD, argued that the Lega-M5S government always complained that European policies abandoned Italy, yet ‘they chose to stay away from global and European meetings, which are useful to deal with this abandonment.’ The Lega-M5S government, particularly Lega, whose leader Matteo Salvini, was its Minister of Interior, claimed that the EU had abandoned Italy. However, they did not attend regional and global meetings on migration that could help resolve the issue.

Although the interviewees criticised the migration policy of the Italian government at the time, Interviewee 14, a deputy from PD, who was from one of the opposition parties claimed that if only external border countries in the EU accept these immigrants, the resulting chaos could destroy Italy’s welfare system. Predicting huge irregular migrant flows in the coming years, she argued that African



migrants mostly come from other countries than Libya after transiting in other African countries that had signed the Geneva Convention.

Regarding solutions for migration, some interviewees suggested collaboration with European and global actors while others called for further support and investment in origin countries. Interviewee 4, from UNHCR Italy, argued that the only solution to irregular migration was dialogue between these European and global actors. Interviewee 16, from one of the governing parties (M5S), argued that ‘if we want to prevent people being involved in dangerous journeys, we have to improve their economic conditions in the home countries.’ Interviewee 5 called for enhanced legal channels and family unification so that people no longer have to rely on smugglers and dangerous journeys to save their lives. He emphasised that ‘it is necessary to ensure an asylum system that must be fair, efficient and well managed.’ Thus, some of the interviewees’ solutions to deal with irregular migration included more collaboration and multi-level governance at local, national, European, and global levels, and greater investment in origin countries rather than externalisation of EU borders and migration management.

[79]

*Externalisation of EU Borders through Cooperation with Libya
and the Construction of Limes in the Mediterranean*

Most interviewees mentioned Italy’s closed-door migration policy. Interviewee 4 from UNHCR Italy argued that it was following the trend in both Europe and globally:

They try preventing people arriving on Italian shores. This could only be achieved by intensive diplomatic activity with Libya and other origin countries. We should provide them with economic opportunities and logistical support.

He also claimed that the agreement between the Italian government and Al Sarraj in Libya in 2017 reaffirmed the need to ensure the intervention of the Libyan Coast Guard in its SAR zones.

Interviewee 13, a deputy from Forza Italia noted that, Italy is

aware that Libya has not signed international conventions protecting the rights of the refugees. However, it is crucial for Italy to have Libya as a negotiating partner. This agreement was reached under a left-wing government but confirmed by a right-wing government.

[80] Thus, in recent decades, different governments have consistently collaborated with Libya to cope with the challenge of irregular migration. However, the closed-door policy and externalisation of migration became more visible and prioritised when Salvini was Ministry of Interior.

Some interviewees mentioned that the agreement between Italy and Libya was inspired by the ‘refugee deal’ between Turkey and the EU (2016). The UNHCR Italy and sea rescue NGO representatives were particularly critical about externalisation of borders through cooperation with Libya. Interviewee 7, from Open Arms, claimed that ‘the agreement between Libya and Italy was inspired by the deal between Turkey and the EU.’ Interviewee 8, from SOS Meditteranee, argued that there are widely documented cases of violence, abuse of immigrants, and very poor conditions in Libyan detention centres, whereas Syrians in Turkey have been given temporary protection inspired by the EU directives and regulations.

Interviewee 18, from Sea-Eye, was also worried by collaboration between Italy and Libya:

Italy and the EU in general are handing over their responsibilities to Libya. For the Italian Coast Guard, it is illegal to bring people back to Libya, so they let Libyans do the job and no one will punish them for forcing people to stay in an insecure country.

Thus, several sea rescue NGO representatives from various countries but active in Italy perceived the cooperation between Italy and Libya as similar to the refugee deal between the EU and Turkey. However, they were more critical about externalisation of borders and migration management to Libya. They expressed critical frames based on humanitarian concerns that potential refugees may be sent back to Libya without access to proper asylum procedures. This collaboration has shifted responsibility for migration management



to Libya and the construction of the *limes* in the Mediterranean.

Interviewee 5, from UNHCR Italy, argued that improving the Libyan Coast Guard is not sufficient. While transferring SAR operations has reduced the number of sea crossings, the proportion of drownings to arrivals has increased. UNHCR Italy representative does not believe that Libya is a safe disembarkation point, adding that 'we recommend that after SAR operations people should not be sent back to Libya.' Thus, both UNHCR Italy and sea rescue NGO representatives emphasised the humanitarian challenges of Italy-Libya cooperation in migration and used critical frames about push-backs to Libya.

[81]

Interviewee 2, from Doctors without Borders in Italy, added that containment of arrivals has been achieved through externalisation policies that have substantially reduced flows. He claimed that main goal of the agreement between Libya and Italy is containing departures. Interviewee 1, from the Italian headquarter of Proactiva Open Arms, argued that 'we are making deals with an illiberal state where human rights are systematically violated. It is a government which does not have stability' while 'we [Italians] are contributing to the system, giving money, patrol boats, training these people.' Interviewee 1, argued that the Italian government has not found a solution at a European level so they try to keep people in Libya. She claimed that people stuck in Libyan detention camps are tortured, abused, or raped. Thus, since Italy was abandoned while the migration issue remains unsolved at European level, Italy has tried, with the EU's help, to restrict and contain irregular migration in Libya to prevent further flows to Italy which is mostly perceived by irregular migrants as a gateway to the European dream. Some interviewees from opposition parties were also critical about the deal between Italy and Libya.

According to Interviewee 11, a deputy from PD, 'the deal between Turkey and the EU is very different from the deal that we signed with Libya. Libya doesn't have a stable government and it has reaped financial benefits from immigration.' He added that 'we made a deal with Libyan government of Al Sarraj as a political partner [...] only because they were recognised by the UN as Libya's legitimate repre-

sentative.' He had doubts about the agreement, especially because of human rights violations in Libya.

[82] Interviewee 9, a deputy of Più-Europa, claimed that there are Italian vessels based in Tripoli supporting the Libyan Coast Guard. He added that his party had called for a Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry to clarify the effects of the Italian government's policies.

Some opposition party and NGO interviewees noted the inhuman conditions in Libyan detention camps. Interviewee 11, a deputy from PD, claimed that the camps had opened many years ago before being legitimised by Berlusconi's government in 2011 and financed by a partnership with Ghaddafi. Interviewee 14, a deputy from PD, argued that moving the border far away does not work. She added that 'the investment shouldn't be made by giving money to Libyans to stop migrants in detention camps. These agreements should be made with home countries, such as Nigeria or Tunisia.' Thus, rather than collaborating with Libya, some of the interviewees called for collaboration with origin countries in Africa. Interviewee 6, a deputy from PD, claimed that the idea of hotspots in third countries like Libya is wrong because, rather than externalisation, it means abolishing the asylum process for those people.

Interviewee 4, from UNHCR Italy, claimed that after the 2017 agreement between Italian Prime Minister Gentiloni and Libya's former Prime Minister Al Serraj, Italy provided logistical support to the Libyan Coast Guard. However, many experts criticised systematic violations of human rights in Libyan detention camps. Interviewee 6, from Open Arms, claimed that the agreement between Italy and Libya reached by the Interior Minister of the previous government was unacceptable because this allowed Matteo Salvini to introduce even harsher migration policies. He noted that Libya never ratified fundamental conventions and cannot ensure their implementation because there is no stable government. Nevertheless, 'we gave money and means to the Libyan Coast Guard.' He added that if migrants are sent back to Libya, they may be tortured at detention centres, as revealed by an investigation by the TV programme *Piazza Pulita*.

Few interviewees supported cooperation between Italy and Libya.



However, rather than push-backs, they recommended focusing on cooperation to improve human rights conditions there. Interviewee 15, a deputy from PD, suggested that Italy should help improve human rights conditions in Libya with the support of international entities. Interviewee 10, a mayor from southern Italy, suggested that 'we have to cooperate with all states which are on the Mediterranean [...] Italy left Libya alone for many years.' Thus, there is a continuity in Italy's migration policy in terms of cooperation with Libya, which has intensified in recent years since the migration crisis. This collaboration has been supported by the EU. The externalisation of borders and keeping irregular migrants in Libya have contributed to the construction of *limes* in the Mediterranean which cannot stop irregular migration flows from Libya to Italy, moreover, humanitarian disasters in the Mediterranean Sea are still going on.

[83]

CONCLUSION

The security paradigm that perceives migrants as a threat usually prevails over legal obligations to protect human rights, even in the EU, despite supposedly being a 'normative power' (Manners 2002). The EU has moved towards a restrictive migration policy and the social construction of migration as a security question. Metaphors such as an 'invasion' or 'flood' of immigrants portray them as a serious threat to EU welfare system. In short, the Europeanization of migration policy has 'securitised migration by integrating migration policy into an internal security framework' (Huysmans 2000, 751–70).

It seems that the security component will predominate in the EU for the foreseeable future. For example, EU–Libya cooperation prioritises border control and surveillance, which has led to externalisation of EU borders and containment of irregular immigrants in Libya, which has led to the construction of *limes* in the Mediterranean. Immigrants will probably continue trying to make dangerous journeys to Europe across the Mediterranean despite risking their lives (Hamood 2008, 33–8). This sort of journeys have persisted albeit in a lesser proportion during the Covid-19 pandemic.

As Carrera and Cortinovis (2019) suggest, the EU needs to stop

[84] funding migration management-driven training and capacity building on SAR and border maritime surveillance in unsafe third countries such as Libya. Instead, as Carrera and Cortinovis (2019) argue, the EU could establish an EU SAR fund to encourage a coordinated SAR response to strengthen disembarkation capacities, reception capacities, and domestic asylum systems of member states. The spirit of solidarity within the EU must prevail to safeguard the EU's compatibility with its norms and principles.

During the Covid-19 pandemic, despite reduced global mobility, the role of neighbouring countries of the EU in containing irregular migration has even risen, as reflected in the new Migration Pact (European Commission 2020) put forward by the European Commission. This new pact aims to balance fair sharing of responsibility and solidarity in order to rebuild trust between member states and confidence in the EU's capacity of migration management. However, there is still an emphasis on ways of improving cooperation with the countries of origin and transit. Thus, the pact still focuses on externalising protection obligations and containment of asylum seekers and migrants in transit countries. According to the pact, the 'EU will seek to promote tailor-made and mutually beneficial partnerships with third countries.' These will help address challenges such as smuggling while the EU and its member states will use various tools to support cooperation with third countries on readmission. The pact also focuses on external border control, stating that the European Border and Coast Guard standing corps, scheduled for deployment from 1 January 2021, will provide increased support. In terms of legal migration opportunities, the Commission will launch Talent Partnerships with key non-EU countries, compatible with the EU's labour and skills needs.

According to a report from the EP's Policy Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs (European Parliament 2021, 159-160), the New Migration Pact considers rescue as an exception to the general rule of containment of irregular migration. However, it conflicts with SAR Conventions. Thus, push-backs may be normalised as a migration management technique, regardless of their human rights implications. The report also criticises making migra-



tion management the main priority of EU funding mechanisms due to misuse of development (Consolidated Version of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union 2012, Article 208) and humanitarian aid (Consolidated Version of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union 2012, Article 214). This falls short of the EU's legal obligation to promote fundamental rights when acting externally (Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union 2012, Articles 2, 21; Consolidated Version of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union 2012, Article 205). This is binding on all EU institutions, agencies, and member states when implementing EU law (Article 51 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 2012). It also risks undermining foreign policy coherence and may lead to mistrust by external partners, thereby damaging the EU's ability to address the root causes of migration and build relationships based on equal partnerships.

[85]

According to EP report (European Parliament 2021, 155–8), prepared by the Policy Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs, the EU's approach focuses on the fight against irregular migration while giving limited consideration to the rights of migrants, including those of forcibly displaced persons in need of international protection. The EU has provided financial and material support to border management projects in neighbouring countries like Libya and Turkey. The report notes that informal arrangements, such as the one between Italy and Libya, and financial instruments (EUTFA) pose risks to the EU legal system by challenging judicial and democratic accountability. The report recommends that, in accordance with the right to good administration and the European Ombudsman's recommendations, the EP should insist that all agreements with third countries and all EU external actions only be implemented following a comprehensive compliance check. In addition, EU external development and humanitarian funding should not depend on cooperation on migration containment because this contradicts the aim of development aid and humanitarian assistance by undermining human rights. The EP should also contest the legality of funding measures that fail to comply with development cooperation and humanitarian aid policy objectives (Consoli-

[86] dated Version of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union 2012, Article 263). Finally, the European Commission should provide a complete, public overview of EU funding to third countries in migration management at the EP's behest. Thus, especially from the EP there has been an increasing number of critiques about migration management and external border control of the EU, particularly on externalisation of border control and migration management.

As a result, opportunities for legal migration to the EU have to be extensively improved to overcome the challenges of irregular migration. To overcome the challenges in the Mediterranean, primarily solidarity within the EU has to be achieved and efficient multi-level governance mechanisms have to be introduced. These should include local, national, European, and global approaches to identify effective solutions to migration management. While cooperation with origin and transit countries can be improved, this should not mean push-backs, externalisation of EU borders, or shifting responsibilities to the neighbouring countries which caused construction of the *limes* in the Mediterranean. Actually, that means widening the gap between the northern and southern Mediterranean which may cause much deeper socio-economic challenges in the longer term. Rather, there should be more socio-economic investment in Africa and new channels for legal migration have to be introduced throughout Africa, not just from Libya. Without structural transformations and reforms in the field of European and global migration and asylum policies, all countries located on the EU's external borders will be seen as a gateway to the European dream. The pandemic has dramatically widened the socio-economic gap between North and South, thereby significantly increasing *pull factors* towards Europe. Even when one route may be closed, another one is found by irregular migrants which was reflected in the recent tragic incidents in the border between Poland and Belarus (Tondo 2021).

Although the Mediterranean Sea has no visible border fence like that between Morocco and Ceuta and Melilla, *limes* has been constructed across the Mediterranean Sea due to Italy's collaboration with Libya, which has externalised EU borders to contain irregular immigrants in Libya. While *limes* may reduce migration flows to Eu-



rope over the short or medium term, it cannot solve Europe's long-term security challenges and further challenge the EU as a 'normative power.' Moreover, it has caused severe human rights abuses and the loss of thousands of lives in the Mediterranean Sea.

[87]

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The Mediterranean as a Factor of Enrolment in Music Programmes of Individual Musical Instruments in Music Schools: A Case Study of Slovenia

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The main objective of the paper is to present the Mediterranean region as a factor in enrolling in the programme of music and musical instruments in elementary music schools. For the purpose of the paper, we have obtained data from the Ministry of Education, Science and Sport of the Republic of Slovenia on the number of enrolment places of music students and their allocation by a single musical instrument. We compared the data by individual statistical regions and identified the characteristics of the Mediterranean region. The empirical data was analysed using methods for descriptive statistics. The Mediterranean region in Slovenia has 5.6% of all inhabitants in Slovenia. There are two music schools (the national average is 5.8 ± 4.1), in which programmes' 8.3%

of 6 to 18-year-old pupils from the statistical region are enrolled. Woodwind and brass instrument groups are better represented than the Slovenian average, while singing is the least represented music group compared to the regional average at the national level. After enrolment in musical instrument programmes in the Mediterranean region, piano, recorder, trumpet, trombone, tube, and percussions deviate positively from the Slovenian average. Music schools in the Mediterranean region in Slovenia reflect the specific interest of the inhabitants for musical education in this region. A Mediterranean cultural environment in Slovenia encourages students to enrol in numerous musical groups of various genres during and after completing their music education. Despite the differences found in the choice of instrument and participation in group activities in the fields of music and dance (dance programmes, orchestral groups, choral groups), which can only be partially explained by specific regional cultural differences, we must emphasise the importance of formal and informal music education for children, which should be a guide for planning social/national activities in the field of children's education and development.

Key Words: music, Mediterranean, music education, primary schools, children, culture, Slovenia

INTRODUCTION

In Slovenia, music education has always had an important role in shaping cultural identity. Music education plays an important role in the realization of goals set for artistic education (Sicherl-Kafol and Denac 2010). The Law about Music Schools in Slovenia (Zakon o glasbenih šolah (ZGla-UPB1) 2006) defines the goals and tasks of education in music school as: (1) discovering and developing musical and dance talent, (2) co-creation of personalities and planned improvement of the musical education of the population, (3) gaining relevant knowledge and gaining experience to start performing in amateur instrumental ensembles, orchestras, choirs and dance groups, (4) acquiring knowledge for further music and dance education, (5) enabling artistic experience and expression, enabling the personal development of students in accordance with their abilities



and the laws of development, (6) education for common cultural and civilizational values stemming from the European tradition, (7) education for mutual tolerance, respect for difference and cooperation with others, (8) concern for the transmission of national and universal heritage and (9) the development of national consciousness, education for a multicultural society, while developing and preserving one's own cultural and natural heritage. [93]

Slovenia is divided into 12 statistical regions: Pomurje, Podravska, Koroška, Savinjska, Zasavje, Posavska, South-Eastern Slovenia (SE Slovenia), Primorsko-Notranjska, Osrednjeslovenska, Goriška, Gorenjska and Obalno-Kraška (Mediterranean region). Despite being a small country, among statistical regions in Slovenia, there are important differences in economic characteristics, which are mainly attributed to their location, infrastructure, and access to the labour market. The Mediterranean region is also the only statistical region in Slovenia that has access to the sea (Kukanja 2019).

In many European countries, music education is integrated into school systems in terms of content, program and organization. As such, it is flexible and receptive to the positive experiences of related European music education systems, as well as new ideas in the interdisciplinary field of music education (García and Dogani 2011). The Slovenian public education system enables young people to participate in the music education program within music schools in addition to general education in primary and secondary schools. The involvement of music schools in the national education system is a special value (Rotar Pance 2019). The music school enables those students who show the necessary talent at the entrance exams to be included in the music or dance programme of primary education. It provides the individual with the possibility of optimal development of their abilities and specific talents and enables the systematic acquisition of knowledge (*Bela knjiga o vzgoji in izobraževanju v Republiki Sloveniji* 2011).

The development of playing techniques/singing and theoretical knowledge should always be placed in the framework of integrated musical development. In addition to acquiring certain professional knowledge and musical skills, young musicians have to develop spe-

[94] cific motor skills related to playing and singing in an extremely important period of development, which are difficult to compensate for in the later period due to developmental laws. In educational work, music education is connected with other educational factors, while in professional work, it must be coordinated with secondary and higher music schools and professional organizations (*Bela knjiga o vzgoji in izobraževanju v Republiki Sloveniji* 2011).

Slovenia is characterised by great geographical and cultural diversity (Urbanc, Šmid Hribar and Kumer 2020). It is located 'at the intersection and interweaving of four major European natural geographical landscape units: the Alpine, Dinaric, Pannonian and Mediterranean worlds and four historical, ethnological, linguistic, religious, in short, cultural spaces: Germanic, Romance, Hungarian and Slavic' (Urbanc 2002, 5). The cultural influences of Slovenia's neighbouring regions are also evident in the musical culture of the region, which is closest to each specific cultural influence (Terseglav 1999). Our work aims to evaluate the characteristics of the Mediterranean region as a factor for enrolment in music programmes for individual musical instruments in music schools by comparing the Mediterranean region with other regions of Slovenia. We are aware that there are many different universal, but also specific cultural influences and other relevant factors that determine preferences for choosing an instrument and participating in different forms of music-making in groups. In this paper, therefore, we will only attempt to identify the differences using official statistics on student participation in individual and group music programmes/courses.

METHODOLOGY

Research Plan

The general aim of the study was to emphasise the characteristics of the Mediterranean region on music education, especially on enrolment in music programmes of individual musical instruments and group musical courses, choirs and orchestras, which are a part of the programme in music schools. We use the data, which are publicly availed, namely the statistical data for population and regions (see <https://www.stat.si>). We specifically requested the Ministry of Edu-



cation, Science and Sport of the Republic of Slovenia for the data about Music education and schools. The last statistical data were available for 1.7.2020, while the last data about students in the music education system were available for the study year of 2020/2021 (from September 2020 onwards).

[95]

Research Methods

The descriptive study design was used. We arranged data for the population and region. We separately arranged data for music schools, programmes, and students after individual music instruments and music groups. We compared different regions by the size and number of inhabitants after representation of students' enrolment in individual and group music programmes/courses.

Analysing Process

We entered the data into Microsoft Excel, where we edited it. The empirical data was analysed with IBM SPSS Statistics 26.0 using methods for descriptive statistics (frequencies, arithmetic mean and standard deviation). The data is presented as arithmetic mean \pm standard deviation (AS \pm SD) and as a proportion (%).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The Mediterranean region accounts for 5.6% of all inhabitants in Slovenia. 12.9% of all inhabitants in Slovenia are between 6 and 18 years old. However, in the Mediterranean region, 12.0% of all inhabitants are between 6 and 18 years old, while the average for the region in Slovenia is 12.7 ± 0.7 . In the Mediterranean region, there are 2 music schools, both public, in which 5.5% of all pupils in Slovenia attending music education are enrolled. In Slovenia, 7.8% of all pupils aged 6 to 18 are enrolled in music education. The average for the national region is $8.9 \pm 2.0\%$, while in the Mediterranean region 8.3% of pupils aged 6 to 18 are included in music education (table 1).

In the Mediterranean region, 5.5% of all Slovenian students attend music classes. Of them, 11.5% play one of the instruments from the plucked string instruments, 33.2% play one of the instruments from the keyboard group, 14.0% play one of the instruments

TABLE 1 Number of Students

Statistical region	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Slovenia*	100	12.9	70	54	100	100	7.8
Gorenjska	9.9	13.7	7	5	8.7	8.4	6.5
Goriška	5.6	12.9	4	4	6.2	6.2	8.6
SE Slovenia	6.9	13.4	5	5	7.6	7.6	8.1
Koroška	3.4	12.4	4	3	4.1	3.8	9.9
Mediterranean region	5.6	12.0	2	2	5.5	5.5	8.3
Osrednjeslovenska	26.4	13.4	18	9	23.7	20.1	6.7
Podravska	15.5	11.9	6	4	12.0	10.6	6.5
Pomurska	5.4	11.6	6	4	6.2	5.1	9.8
Posavska	3.6	12.6	4	4	5.7	5.7	12.4
Primorsko-notranjska	2.5	13.2	3	3	3.9	3.9	11.7
Savinjska	12.3	13.1	7	7	12.9	12.9	8.0
Zasavska	2.7	12.3	4	4	3.5	3.5	10.6
M	8.3	12.7	5.8	3.2	8.3	7.8	8.9
SD	7.0	0.7	4.1	1.9	5.7	4.8	2.0

NOTES Column headings are as follows: (1) percentage of all inhabitants, (2) percentage of inhabitants aged 6–18 years, (3) number of all music schools, (4) number of public music schools, (5) percentage of students in all music schools, (6) percentage of students in public music schools, (7) percentage of 6–18-years-old students in Slovenia included in music school program. * $n = 2100126$, as of 1 July 2020.

from the strings, 2.3% enrol in singing, 24.1% play one of the instruments from the woodwind group, 5.0% play one of the instruments from the percussions group and 9.9% play one of the instruments from the brass group (table 2). In Slovenia, the most represented group of musical instruments is keyboard instruments, followed by woodwind instruments. The groups of keyboard instruments, woodwinds, percussion instruments and brass instruments are better represented in the Mediterranean region than in the average of the national region, while strings and especially singing are the musical groups (of instruments) that are less represented than in the average of the national region.

Table 3 represents the enrolment in singular music instruments on national level as well as on region average. On national level,



The Mediterranean as a Factor of Enrolment

TABLE 2 Percentage of Students in Slovenia According to the Type of Instrument and Region

Statistical region	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Slovenia*	100	13.5	33.3	15.8	4.3	21.8	4.3	6.9
Gorenjska	8.7	13.2	29.8	16.3	4.4	25.1	4.1	7.1
Goriška	6.2	15.0	32.6	15.7	5.4	21.0	3.5	6.8
SE Slovenia	7.6	12.5	28.1	20.8	4.8	20.8	4.8	8.2
Koroška	4.1	13.1	35.7	12.6	0.8	23.0	8.0	6.8
Mediterranean region	5.5	11.5	33.2	14.0	2.3	24.1	5.0	9.9
Osrednjeslovenska	23.7	11.3	33.5	20.2	4.8	23.2	2.3	4.8
Podravska	12.0	13.8	41.4	10.7	4.5	18.7	4.3	6.6
Pomurska	6.2	15.1	34.2	12.0	4.6	19.8	7.0	7.3
Posavska	5.7	17.3	26.0	16.1	5.4	21.4	4.8	8.9
Primorsko-notranjska	3.9	12.3	36.5	16.3	4.8	18.4	4.8	7.0
Savinjska	12.9	16.9	32.3	12.7	3.6	21.0	5.7	7.9
Zasavska	3.5	12.1	32.0	15.2	4.2	25.4	3.6	7.4
M	8.3	13.7	32.9	15.2	4.1	21.8	4.8	7.4
SD	5.7	0.2	4.0	3.1	1.3	2.3	1.5	1.3

NOTES Column headings are as follows: (1) of students in music schools according to region, (2) plucked string instruments, (3) keyboards, (4) strings, (5) singing, (6) woodwind, (7) percussion, (8) brass. * $n = 2100126$, as of 1 July 2020.

piano (24.1%), guitar (11.6%) violin (11.4%) and flute (9.3%) are the music instruments with the majority of children enrolled. The same pattern is evident in Mediterranean region (piano 27.2%, guitar 10.2%, violin 9.9% and flute 8.7%). However, on region average, the Mediterranean region differ from other regions. Namely in harp (1.3% vs. 0.7%), piano (27.2% vs. 23.4%), double bass (0.7% vs. 0.6%), recorder (6.1% vs. 3.0%), clarinet (5.1% vs. 5.0%), saxophone (3.7% vs. 3.6%), horn (0.9% vs. 0.6%), trumpet (5.1% vs. 4.1%), trombone (1.8% vs. 1.2%), tuba (1.5% vs. 0.4%) and percussions (5.0% vs. 4.8%) there are more students included than on region average. Singing is the music programme, in which there are much less students included in Mediterranean region than on region average (2.3% vs. 4.1%).

Table 4 shows that 56.6% ($n = 11951$) of all students in mu-

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TABLE 3 Percentage of Students in Slovenia According to Single Music Instrument and Region

Statistical region	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)
Slovenia*	0.7	11.6	0.9	0.3	24.1	0.7	7.1	1.4	11.4	0.5	3.3	0.5	4.3	3.1	9.3	0.5	5.0	0.3	3.6	0.6	3.9	1.2	0.3	0.9	4.3
Gorenjska	1.2	11.3	0.7	0.0	20.9	1.1	7.6	0.2	10.3	1.6	3.6	0.7	4.4	4.4	11.0	0.5	5.1	0.6	3.4	0.6	4.1	1.4	0.3	0.7	4.1
Goriška	1.4	12.6	0.7	0.3	24.9	0.8	7.0	0.0	10.6	0.3	3.9	0.8	5.4	3.1	7.7	1.3	4.6	0.5	3.9	0.9	3.8	1.2	0.4	0.5	3.5
SE Slovenija	0.0	10.5	0.5	1.6	18.3	0.3	7.1	2.4	14.6	0.8	4.6	0.8	4.8	1.6	7.2	1.1	5.4	0.4	5.1	0.9	4.8	1.3	0.3	0.9	4.8
Koroška	1.1	10.2	1.7	0.0	24.3	0.1	5.5	5.7	10.0	0.0	2.0	0.7	0.8	4.6	9.4	0.0	4.8	0.0	4.1	0.2	4.0	0.1	0.5	2.0	8.0
Mediterranean region	1.3	10.2	0.0	0.0	27.2	0.0	6.1	0.0	9.9	0.3	3.1	0.7	2.3	6.1	8.7	0.5	5.1	0.0	3.7	0.9	5.1	1.8	1.5	0.6	5.0
Ostrednjeslovenska	0.6	10.1	0.6	0.0	26.3	0.9	6.0	0.3	14.4	0.6	4.8	0.5	4.8	4.5	9.3	0.7	4.7	0.4	3.6	0.5	2.9	0.8	0.2	0.4	2.3
Podravska	0.7	12.6	0.5	0.0	30.4	0.5	10.0	0.4	8.6	0.2	1.7	0.2	4.5	1.7	8.9	0.2	4.5	0.1	3.3	0.6	4.0	1.1	0.1	0.8	4.3
Pomurska	0.0	15.1	0.0	0.0	21.7	0.5	9.7	2.4	9.9	0.0	1.8	0.2	4.6	1.2	10.3	0.0	4.7	0.0	3.5	0.4	4.0	1.8	0.3	0.8	7.0
Posavska	0.7	12.2	2.9	1.5	15.7	0.5	6.4	3.4	11.1	0.3	3.8	0.8	5.4	1.8	8.3	0.3	6.6	0.8	3.6	0.8	4.2	1.8	0.3	1.7	4.8
Primorsko-notranjska	0.0	12.3	0.0	0.0	24.9	0.2	6.5	4.9	11.3	0.9	3.7	0.5	4.8	2.6	8.0	0.2	4.6	0.0	2.9	0.5	4.4	0.4	0.1	1.6	4.8
Savinjska	1.2	13.0	2.1	0.5	23.5	1.0	5.8	1.9	9.4	0.6	1.9	0.8	3.6	1.1	10.2	0.7	5.4	0.1	3.4	0.6	3.9	1.5	0.2	1.6	5.7
Zasavska	0.0	11.6	0.5	0.0	21.5	0.5	8.2	1.8	12.0	0.4	2.8	0.0	4.2	3.8	13.8	0.0	4.7	0.0	3.1	0.5	4.2	1.5	0.5	0.7	3.6
M	0.7	11.8	0.9	0.3	23.4	0.5	7.2	1.9	11.1	0.5	3.2	0.6	4.1	3.0	9.4	0.5	5.0	0.2	3.6	0.6	4.1	1.2	0.4	1.0	4.8
SD	0.5	1.4	0.9	0.6	3.8	0.3	1.4	1.9	1.8	0.4	1.0	0.3	1.3	1.6	1.7	0.4	0.6	0.3	0.5	0.2	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.4	1.5

NOTES Column headings are as follows: (1) harp, (2) guitar, (3) zither, (4) tambourine, (5) piano, (6) organ, (7) accordion, (8) diatonic accordion, (9) violin, (10) viola, (11) cello, (12) double bass, (13) vocal/singing, (14) recorder, (15) flute, (16) oboe, (17) clarinet, (18) bassoon, (19) saxophone, (20) horn, (21) trumpet, (22) trombone, (23) tuba, (24) other conical instruments, (25) percussion. *n = 2100126, as of 1 July 2020.

The Mediterranean as a Factor of Enrolment

TABLE 4 Percentage of Students in Slovenia Included in Group Forms of Music vs. Region

Statistical region	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Slovenia*	118.2	20.6	48.9	12.4	100
Gorenjska	10.2	11.9	8.5	7.1	9.3
Goriška	7.2	4.6	6.1	1.8	5.4
SE Slovenija	7.0	0.9	9.1	8.5	7.0
Koroška	4.1	1.2	4.5	5.0	3.8
Mediterranean region	4.2	3.4	4.6	2.0	4.0
Osrednjeslovenska	26.9	19.2	22.7	42.9	25.2
Podravska	11.7	18.8	9.6	8.9	11.8
Pomurska	4.3	9.1	6.1	5.6	6.3
Posavska	4.7	7.9	8.3	3.7	7.0
Primorsko-notranjska	5.2	2.2	3.7	1.8	3.4
Savinjska	10.9	9.6	13.7	9.4	11.8
Zasavska	3.6	11.1	3.3	3.3	5.0
M	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.3
SD	6.5	6.3	5.4	11.2	6.0

NOTES Column headings are as follows: (1) preschool music education, (2) dance programmes, (3) orchestra groups, (4) choir groups, (5) total. **n* = 2100126, as of 1 July 2020.

music education are involved in group forms of ensemble music programmes/lessons in Slovenia. The majority of pupils attending group forms of ensemble music programmes at national level are included in orchestra groups (48.9%), followed by pre-school music lessons (18.2%). Students in the Mediterranean region are less involved in group forms of music instruction at the national level compared to the regional average, namely 4.2% in preschool music education (region average 8.3%), 3.4% in dance programmes (region average 8.3%), 4.6% in orchestra groups (region average 8.3%) and 2.0 in choir groups (region average 8.3%).

Experts (Cupi and Cupi 2020; Hennessy 2000) in music pedagogical practice have been warning for many years about the neglect of singing activities in music schools. It is only in recent years that it has been established in certain Slovenian regions that more atten-

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tion is being paid to singing. Unfortunately, according to statistics, the Mediterranean region does not follow the mentioned trends. Exceptions have been identified that successfully show quality vocal groups within certain music schools, but the success of these is based only on individuals and their competencies. Systematically, however, the singing field is not yet properly regulated. As the results show, the situation is much better in other Slovenian regions. Field experts note that the reason for the decline in singing activity in the Mediterranean region is, among other things, the strong influence of audio-visual media from Italy in the 1980s, which then drastically reduced the number of choirs in schools and elsewhere. Similar influences of the audio-visual media on singing activities were noted also in other parts of the European region (Balčytis 2009). Another reason for the decline in singing activity, which is still relevant today, is the technological development and the emergence of many sound carriers, which shape most children and adolescents into passive listeners. We believe that experts who decide on the future of music education in Slovenia will follow more advanced curricula from abroad, which withdraw ICT from music classrooms and prescribe the performance of live music in the form of singing and playing instruments.

On the other hand, according to the national system of elementary music education in Slovenia, choirs are not fully part of the compulsory curriculum of music schools; choirs are only part of the compulsory curriculum of large music schools. The size of the music school, therefore, determines the number of funded choirs per school. In regular primary schools, however, choirs are an integral part of the curriculum. Choral culture is therefore nurtured and developed not only at the music school level but especially at the primary school level, making choral culture accessible to a wider children audience. Music schools also cultivate choral singing among younger pupils within the framework of an above-standard programme not financed by the Ministry of Education, Science and Sport of the Republic of Slovenia. The data presented in table 4 therefore only partially reflects the development of choral singing in the regions. Singing activity is a part of Music Theory and Solfege-



gio curricula, in which (a prima vista) singing plays an integral part in acquiring musical abilities, skills and knowledge (Zadnik 2019).

Music and dance education in Slovenia has played an important role in shaping and preserving Slovenia's cultural identity in all social, political, and educational contexts (Rotar Pance 2019). Along with the solid vertical of Slovenian music education, various forms of informal music and dance activities and education are expanding and enriching. All this makes an important contribution to the development of a key competence of lifelong learning: cultural awareness and expression (European Union 2017; Rotar Pance 2019).

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We have noted several differences between the Mediterranean region and other Slovenian regions. The most important finding is that the Mediterranean region is among the last three regions in terms of the percentage of children and youth aged 6 to 18 who receive music education. Music education is not compulsory and thus represents a leisure activity for children, young people, and their parents. A review of the literature (Kropej 2007) indicates differences in the implementation of physical and sporting activities between Slovenian regions, which could partly explain the differences in the proportion of children or adolescents of a given age who choose one (music school) or another (recreational or competitive) sport. However, the question of why the choice of music school as a leisure activity is less widespread in the Mediterranean region (also in comparison with sports and physical activities) requires further research, especially in the form of cultural representations of the role of music in the development of children and young people.

CONCLUSION

Choosing the instrument that a child will play in music school is an important decision. It is influenced by several factors such as the child's interest and motivation, their physical development and strength, the development of musical abilities, the influence of the surroundings and more. In any case, it is the interest that most often decides on the choice, but we should not ignore the fact that physically weak children will not be able to master certain instruments, as well as untampered instruments those who have problems with au-

ditory recognition. In addition to the environment, the choice is also influenced by the number of admissions for a certain instrument at a certain music school.

[102] Attending music school has a significant impact on the development of every child. Continuous learning of a particular instrument has, in addition to the development of the musical and artistic field, also a strong influence on the overall development. The active involvement of children in the process of music education in the context of music schools undoubtedly marks strongly their childhood. By singing, playing, and listening to music, they experience and reproduce music, as well as express themselves and communicate. The Slovenian music education system is very well organised and formally well-arranged. One could say that it is based on a long and established tradition, still, at the same time, it faces many new challenges, some of which are pointed out below. In specialised music education the main efforts are focused on: quality application of the curriculum, testing and evaluating the current models of teaching and learning, experimental introduction of new teaching and learning models, quality undergraduate, postgraduate and life-long training of music teachers, development and use of new textbooks based on modern didactic orientations (Denac 2012). Music is a form of human expression through activity. It contributes to a school curriculum by offering a distinctive way of learning where seeing, feeling, hearing, thinking, and creating are combined in a powerful form of visual, aural and tactile affective communication. Through the music, students working both cooperatively and individually have opportunities to research, identify and discuss issues; to provide insights, opinions, solutions, and resolutions; and to reflect on, appreciate and evaluate artwork. Music is a powerful medium for the exploration of the human condition, our society and our world (Holcar 2012).

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Tangible Benefits and People's Bonding in International Film Production: The Case of Films Shot in Crete

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Since the late 1940s more than forty foreign films have been partially or fully shot on the Greek island of Crete. This article focuses on five of these films: Jules Dassin's *Celui qui doit mourir* (1957), Ella Lemhagen's *Tsatsiki, morsan och polisen* (1999), Costa-Gavras's *Eden à l'Ouest* (2009), Çagan Irmak's *Dedemin İnsanları* (2011), and Hossein Amini's *The Two Faces of January* (2014). The article examines the effects of these productions on Cretans, their foreign producers and filmmakers, and their audiences around the world. As the research shows, these productions had many material benefits for locals and foreign producers alike and were equally important in bringing people from different backgrounds together and creating transnational bonds. Moreover, having been made within an international context, most of these films told stories of mutual respect and tolerance, thus becoming crucial in promoting international solidarity and advancing transnational cinema as a powerful vehicle for social awareness.

Key Words: film locations, transnational cinema, European cinema, film coproductions, international cooperation

INTRODUCTION

In late 2010s, under the initiative of the national Hellenic Film Office, numerous administrative regions in Greece launched local Film

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Offices to promote their territories as desirable shooting locations and to assist foreign filmmakers hoping to film there. The enthusiasm with which the Greek media covered this news stemmed from what observation and scholarly analyses have shown: international film productions have a positive impact on the host country's foreign exchange inflow, job creation, and film industry (Athanasiadis et al. 2014, 16–17); and through their distribution, such films contribute to the worldwide popularity of a place and its value as a tourist destination (Beeton 2006; Hudson and Ritchie 2006). For example, *Braveheart* (Mel Gibson, 1995) and *The Lord of the Rings* trilogy (Peter Jackson, 2001–2003) brought a significant increase in visitor numbers to Scotland and New Zealand, respectively (Seaton and Hay 1998, 230; McArthur 2003, 131; Croy 2004). In Greece, productions such as *Never on Sunday* (Jules Dassin, 1960), *Alexis Zorbas* (Michael Cacoyannis, 1964), *Captain Corelli's Mandolin* (John Madden, 2001), and *Mamma Mia!* (Phyllida Lloyd, 2008) have likewise resulted in a rise in the number of tourists (Hudson and Ritchie 2006; Moira, Mylonopoulos, and Kontoudaki 2009, 11–12; Assadourian 2011, 24; Giannouklidi 2017).

The benefits of 'film-induced tourism' notwithstanding, throughout the post-Second World War period, foreign productions in Greece have been profitable for the national economy. According to a 1964 official report, every international production shot in Greece brought about US\$1.000.000 foreign exchange inflow (€7.217.764 today's currency, inflation rate considered) (Ipoepitropi 1964, 9–10); in the 2010s it was estimated that a large foreign production (€25 million expenditure in Greece) can increase the Greek Gross Domestic Product by €39 million (Athanasiadis et al. 2014, 21).

These findings help us formulate more detailed questions: What are the precise material benefits of international film productions for local communities, film companies, crews, and organisations (e.g., gains from employment, accommodation rentals, and business activity)? What are the benefits for foreign producers and filmmakers who choose a Greek place as a shooting location? What are some of the non-economic effects, in terms of the residents' and filmmakers' experiences and relationships? How does international



productions' multicultural character relate to the films' narratives?

This research addresses these questions by using films shot on the island of Crete as a case study. Crete has attracted many foreign film crews throughout the post-Second World War period, thus allowing us to observe data over a range of years. In particular, since the late 1940s more than forty foreign features, short films, and documentaries have been partially or fully shot in Crete. This article focuses on five feature-length foreign dramas which were critically and/or commercially successful: *Celui qui doit mourir* (Jules Dassin, 1957), *Tsatsiki, morsan och polisen* (*Tsatsiki, Mum and the Policeman*, Ella Lemhagen, 1999), *Eden à l'Ouest* (*Eden is West*, Costa-Gavras, 2009), *Dedemin İnsanları* (*My Grandfather's People*, Çagan Irmak, 2011), and *The Two Faces of January* (Hossein Amini, 2014).

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METHODOLOGY

In examining these productions, this study adopts Hudson and Ritchie's (2006) approach to *Captain Corelli's Mandolin*, shot on the island of Kefalonia, while expanding on Komi's research (2019) on Walt Disney's *The Moon-Spinners* (James Neilson, 1964), filmed in Crete's Elounda region. This article uses the case study methodology (with Crete as a filming location for foreign films) because, in Hudson and Ritchie's (2006, 262) words, 'case research is specifically welcome in new situations where little is known about the phenomenon,' as it offers 'depth and comprehensiveness' for understanding it, enabling 'inductive and rich description.' Also following Hudson and Ritchie, the study utilises a 'multi-method approach' (2006, 262). The article relies on primary sources such as archival material and the local, national, and international press of the time of the films' creations, thus bringing to light data on wages, production plans, filming procedures, and film costs. It draws on secondary sources, including film history studies and film business analyses that help to situate the making of the films within their production framework. Moreover, it makes use of information derived from oral and written interviews that the research team conducted between October 2020 and June 2021 with participants in these productions, including Cretans who worked or played in the

[108] films, local entrepreneurs, Cretan film companies that collaborated with the foreign firms, and film personnel and talent. These interviews proved invaluable not only for discussing numerical data and business activities but also for revealing non-material benefits such as the participants' acquisition of work experience as well as their attitudes, feelings, and memories of the filmmaking.

Analysing information of these sources showed that international film projects have numerous benefits for local economies and foreign producers alike. They offer local people jobs and vocational experience and revitalize local economies. They help foreign filmmakers to make lucrative deals while ensuring a diverse natural landscape and authentic architecture for their films. International productions have also proven valuable in bringing people from different backgrounds together and creating transnational bonds. Moreover, having been made within a transnational context, most of these films tell stories emphasizing mutual respect and tolerance, thus becoming crucial in promoting international solidarity.

CHOOSING CRETE AS FILM LOCATION

Celui qui doit mourir was shot in Crete, although its plot is not set there. Twenty minutes of the 90-minute long *Tsatsiki, morsan och polisen* take place in an unnamed Greek coastal village. The last six minutes of *Dedemin İnsanları* were shot in parts of Crete that are different from those that the plot mentions. About half of *Eden à l'Ouest* was shot in Crete but the narrative never identifies the island. Only in *The Two Faces of January* does the plot justify specific parts of Crete as shooting locations. In all other cases, certain locations or even Crete itself were chosen because they offered the landscapes or architecture that the filmmakers wanted or because the film company had been able to negotiate a lucrative deal.

The plot of Nikos Kazantzakis's novel *O Christos xanastavronetai* (*Christ Crucified*, written in 1948), upon which Dassin's *Celui qui doit mourir* is based, is set in Ottoman Anatolia of the early 1920s, in the fictional Turkish-ruled Greek village Lykovrysi, where every seven years during the Holy Week the villagers revive the Passion of Christ. Dassin's film adaptation, *Celui qui doit mourir*, retains some



of the novel's place names (e.g., Sarakina), but it does not name Ottoman Anatolia, leaving the setting of the plot rather ambiguous. Because the film was shot in Crete, some critics erroneously describe the plot as set there; in fact, Crete is never mentioned in the diegesis nor was it the first location scouted for the production.

[109]

Celui qui doit mourir was produced by Henri Bérard, the general director of Indus Films and CEO of Prima (Maeyer 1964–5, 208), who had already collaborated with Dassin in *Du rififi chez les hommes* (aka *Rififi*, 1955). To raise the 250 million francs initially needed for *Celui qui doit mourir* (Dassin 1956a), Bérard partnered with the French Filmsonor and Cinétel and the Italian DaMa Cinematografica, at a time when Franco-Italian coproductions were flourishing (Betz 2009, 75–78; Crisp 1993, 79–83). Dassin, Melina Mercouri – the film's Greek female lead and Dassin's companion – and the novel's author, the Cretan Kazantzakis, wished to have the film shot in Crete ('Eis to perithorion tis zois' 1955a; 'Skinai tis tainias *Christos Xanastavronetai* tha giristoun stin Kriti' 1955; 'Ai gnomai diastavronontai' 1955; Dassin 1955c); however, because of financial and legal issues, including Dassin's temporary inability to leave France as a blacklisted American director, Bérard and Dassin considered shooting the film in Provence and Corsica (Dassin 1955a). When the French government gave Dassin the *titre de voyage* and he could travel abroad, other places seemed better shooting choices, including Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia (Dassin 1955b), most likely because they could more easily suggest a Turkish-ruled territory.

In Greece, there was prolonged location scouting in different territories (Pelion, Nafplion, and Thessaloniki) ('Eis to perithorion tis zois' 1955b; Prosperos 1955),¹ before Crete was selected. In addition to the nice weather, the natural light, the diverse landscape, and the authentic architecture, which one could find in many Mediterranean areas, Crete also offered much-needed local support and fiscal benefits. The foreign production team could count on the as-

¹ Pelion was preferred by Damaskinos-Michailidis ('Kinimatografistika neotera' 1955), a Greek film company with which the foreigners planned to cooperate, something that did not materialize.

[110]

sistance of the locals, who ardently wanted to have their compatriot's Kazantzakis novel filmed on their land and contribute to the success of this project. In addition, prominent intellectuals, artists, politicians, and officials were eager to facilitate shooting on their island ('Kerdizei edafos i ipothesis' 1955; 'Peri to girisma tis tainias' 1955; 'Mia kali eidisis' 1955; 'To flegon zitima' 1955; Dassin 1955c; O Akroatis 1956). Moreover, at a time when most Cretans, especially in rural areas, were struggling financially (Settas 1963), the prospect of reaping economic benefits from a collaboration with foreigners enhanced the locals' eagerness to support the making of *Celui qui doit mourir* in their area. To attract the foreign producers, local trade unions and associations offered such favourable prices that Dassin found shooting in Crete less expensive than in any other country, a vital factor in the producers' final decision to select the island ('To flegon zitima' 1955). Among the villages (Ano Viannos, Garazo, Kalo Chorio, Kritsa, Krasi, Krousonas, and Mochos) that competed to host the project, the winner was Kritsa, one of the oldest and most traditional, semi-mountainous villages of Eastern Crete, that Dassin particularly liked because of 'its style, character, and structural authenticity' ('Giro apo tin pragmatopoiisi enos film' 1956).

Tsatsiki, morsan och polisen is based on Moni Nilsson-Brännström's first two books about the boy Tsatsiki, *Tsatsiki och morsan* (*Tsatsiki and Mom*, 1995) and *Tsatsiki och farsan* (*Tsatsiki and Dad*, 1996). Tsatsiki is the son of a Swedish single mother. He yearns to travel to Greece to meet his father, whom he has never seen before, a dream he eventually fulfils. In Nilsson-Brännström's books, the home of Tsatsiki's father is an unspecified Greek coastal area, which in *Tsatsiki, morsan och polisen* becomes the unnamed village that the boy and his mother visit close to the film's end.

Based on Swedish children's books and mostly shot in Sweden by Lemhagen, *Tsatsiki, morsan och polisen* is considered a Swedish film. The film is a coproduction involving Swedish, Norwegian, Danish, and Icelandic companies. Adopting the usual practices of coproduction and TV involvement in film projects in 1990s Scandinavian cinema (Stenport 2010, 326; Hedling 2010, 338) – and European cinema more broadly (Rivi 2007) – *Tsatsiki, morsan och polisen* brought to-



gether Sweden's Felicia Film AB, Film i Väst, and TV 1000; Norway's Norsk Film AS; Denmark's Per Holst Film AIS and Danmarks Radio; and Iceland's national television channel Ríkisútvarpið-Sjónvarp. It was also supported by Eurimages, from which it was awarded €228.674 (Council of Europe 1998), and the Swedish Film Institute. [111]

To find the right Greek locations, the producers contacted an Athenian-based company, Stefi Productions, which suggested Michalis Giannakakis, an experienced filmmaker from Siteia in Eastern Crete, who assumed the post of assistant director of the Greek crew. Giannakakis showed to the filmmakers various locations around the island who eventually chose the small coastal village of Pacheia Ammos (M. Giannakakis, telephone conversation with P. Mini, 11 May 2021). Its wide, long beach and central road lined with coffee shops and taverns offered a ready-made set, where most scenes could be conveniently filmed within walking distance. Equally important was the fact that Pacheia Ammos was (and to a large extent is still) not a popular tourist destination, even among many Greeks. Because Pacheia Ammos was not crowded even during tourist season, filming could easily be done over the summer. In addition, Pacheia Ammos retained the desired sense of village authenticity, thus allowing key messages of the fictional characters' trip to Crete to come through, what Marklund (2010, 88-89) describes, building a relationship to the foreign place 'different . . . than just being an outsider' and wishing to understand a culture 'from another perspective than that of the tourist.'

Without having tourists to accommodate, the residents of Pacheia Ammos were particularly receptive to having the film shot in their area and their possible participation in it. Moreover, Pacheia Ammos offered local talent. Indeed, composer of traditional Cretan music and lyre player Nikolaos Papadakis, a native to the island, played traditional music for *Tsatsiki, morsan och polisen* along with his music ensemble (Manolis Liapakis, Nikos Mastorakis, Giannis Xanthakis, and Giorgos Mavroeidis). Local Greek rhythms imbue the film with an extra aura of authenticity and complement the score's pop music, predominant in the film since Tsatsiki's mother is a pop band singer.

[112]

The architecture and topography were major factors in the selection of shooting places in Crete in *Dedemin İnsanları*. Irmak's film focuses on an elderly Turkish man living in a small town on Turkey's Western (Aegean) coast, who as a small boy had been forced to immigrate from Crete to Ismir, Turkey, during the population exchange between Turkey and Greece. He died in the 1970s, never having seen his home in Crete again. About twenty years later – towards the film's end – his grandson embarks on the trip to his grandfather's birthplace that the old man had always wanted to take. The protagonist's home is located in Rethymno in North-Central Crete. The Turkish team wished to work in Spinalonga (Bitsakakis 2020), the small, uninhabited island in the Gulf of Elounda in the North-Eastern side of the island, which had formerly been used as a leper colony. Spinalonga, where the Greek TV adaptation of Victoria Hislop's novel *The Island* (2007) was being made at the time, evoked the atmosphere of old Crete that the Turkish producers wanted. Budgetary concerns convinced the foreign producers to choose Fres, a village in Western Crete, at the foothills of the White Mountains, which proved ideal.² With a large main square accessible from four directions, its local shops, and well-preserved traditional buildings and coffee houses, Fres suggested Cretan life of the past (Konstas and Maridakis 2013), thus offering the filmmakers a natural, inexpensive plateau. In addition, thanks to its advantageous topography, Fres had already hosted four Greek film productions (*Pilala*, 2004, Theo Papadoulakis; *Uranya*, 2006, Kostas Kapakas; *Proti fora nonos*, 2007, Olga Malea; and *To gamilio party*, 2008, Christine Crokos);³ as a result, its inhabitants and authorities knew what was expected.

The traditional architecture, along with the natural landscape, plot requirements, and economic concerns played a key role in the staging of *The Two Faces of January*. A British-French-American co-production among Working Title Films, StudioCanal, and Timnick

² Some filming took place in nearby places, the village of Vamos and Almyrida beach.

³ Because of the numerous films shot there, locals have nicknamed their village 'Freliwood' (Konstas and Maridakis 2013).



<p align="center">"Two Faces of January" Zeus Pictures Ltd "Two Faces Of January" Location Manager: Greece: Yorgo Stathopoulos / Tel: +30 6947 900871 / E: yorgostat@gmail.com</p>	
<p align="center">Schedule for Tech Recce in Crete (DAY 3) Recce Date: Friday September 21st 2012</p>	
<p>Recce Attendees: Hissia Anni, Hollyn Brown, Tom Blomberg, John Lopez, Caroline Hewitt, Cass Marks, Alex Chelios, Zoe Langlois, Michael Caplan, Patrick Bolla, Alex Bilby, Andrew Pyke, Lisa McQuinn, Domenico Capon, Muffin Green, Marco Zylinski, Mark Clayton, Benny Harzer, Carl Scharhan, Ray Bennett, Andy Bilby, Michael Wright, Stuart Leachley, Jerry Panayiotou, George Tsiak, George Mavrou, Dennis Zikas, Arnelis Schindler, Dimitrios Papadakis, Yorgo Stathopoulos, Alexinos Nikolau, Theodor Thomaidis, Victoria Triposki, Pavlos Foukakis, Manolis Lenevelis, Andreas Tsamakis, Gianna Dieringer, Vassil Gitis, George Petralias, Anastros Vastaras</p>	
08.00	Recce Begins at Mosque Square
08.00-10.00	<p>Script Reference: EXT STREET/SQUARE/PHONE BOOTH/HARBOUR - CHANIA Sc. 91, 98, 111, 112, 118, 119 Location: Mosque Square, Old Town Chania</p>
5min	Walk time to next location
10.05-10.30	<p>Script Reference: EXT CAFÉ ASTER / SQUARE HERAKLIO Sc. 142, 143, 144 Location: Taverna "Takis", Old Town Chania</p>
10 min	Walk time to next location
10.40-11.00	<p>Script Reference: EXT. VIEW FROM THE TAXI Sc. 110 Location: In front of Walls of Maritime Museum Old Town Chania</p>
1 min	Walk time to next location
11.00-11.45	<p>Script Reference: EXT. RESTAURANT Sc. 93 Location: "Alcañea" Hotel, Old Town Chania</p>
5 minutes	Walk time to next location
11.50-12.15	<p>Script Reference: EXT STREET/ OLD TOWN HERAKLIO Sc. 60 Location: Donkey Alley, Odos Moschon, Old Town Chania</p>
1min	Walk time to next location
12.15-13.00	<p>Script Reference: EXT HOTEL/ OLD TOWN/ HERAKLIO Sc. 61 Location: "Hotel Contessa", Old Town Chania</p>
10min	Walk time to next location
13.10-13.45	<p>Script Reference: BAR/ OLD TOWN/ CHANIA Sc. 108, 109 Location: Maharradika Area Corner of Sifolia & Malchise</p>
10 min	Walk time to LUNCH
13.55-14.40	LUNCH
5 min	Walk time to next location
14.45-15.15	<p>Script Reference: EXT. CITY WALLS/ STREETS/ BAR Sc. 105, 104, 107 Location: Narrow Alley, Corner of Gerasimos & Parados Roussou Vordouba Old Town Chania</p>
30 min	Travel time to next location
15.45-17.00	<p>Script Reference: EXT. BUS/ RETHYMNON STOP Sc. 79, 80, 81, 82, 83a, 84, 85, 86 Location: Agia Triada Monastery Akrotiri, Chania</p>
5 minutes	Travel time to next location
17.05-17.45	<p>Script Reference: BACK OF THE BUS/ FRONT OF THE BUS Sc. 88, 89 Location: Rd btw Agia Triada Monastery & Gouverneto Monastery, Akrotiri Chania</p>
30min	Travel time to next location
18.15-20.15	<p>Script Reference: PROMENADE/TAVERNA/NIGHTCLUB/BEACH Sc. 72, 73a, 74, 62pt1, 62pt2, 63, 65, 66 Location: 67, 68, 69, 70, 113 Tabakaria, Chalepa Chania</p>
20.15-2045	<p>Script Reference: TAXI/ STREETS OF CHANIA Sc. 113 Location: Chalepa Area</p>
20.45	Recce Ends and possible dinner at Chalepa

[113]

FIGURE 1 *The Two Faces of January*; Tech Recce Schedule (courtesy of Indigo View)

Films/Mirage Enterprises, *The Two Faces of January* transfers to the big screen Patricia Highsmith's eponymous 1964 novel. The film focuses on a con man and his wife who while on vacation in Greece in the 1960s meet a tour guide who proves equally cunning. Following the novel's plot, shooting on Greek locations was achieved in Athens and Crete.⁴ The Cretan scenes were carried out in the archaeological site of the Knossos Palace in Heraklion and in the prefecture of Chania: the Old Town of Chania, the Chalepa and Akrotiri districts (as seen in the reconnaissance schedule, figure 1), and Kallikratis village of the Sfakia area situated in the White Mountains. Because of Heraklion's contemporary urban landscape and the extra cost of setting up shop there, the Old Town of Chania stood in as both Chania

⁴ It was also shot in London's Ealing Studios and on location in Istanbul, Turkey. An 85-minute behind-the-scenes documentary of the production, *Two Faces... Behind the Scenes* (<https://vimeo.com/82471067>), gives a good idea of the filming. The work in Crete is covered from 17:50 to 59:50; the scenes set in Heraklion town were shot in Chania.

[114] and Heraklion (D. Xenakis, interviewed by N. Tsagarakis, 30 October 2020; V. Trzeciak, interviewed by N. Tsagarakis, 23 May 2021). ‘The city of Chania,’ Amini (2014) said, ‘was a revelation. I never imagined we’d find somewhere that still had so much of its 1960s charm and atmosphere intact. My brilliant production crew did a fantastic job of recreating the city in 1962, but much of what we used was already there.’ For the landscape, he stated: ‘The rugged hills and cliffs of the island are unique and even though we looked for alternatives in other countries, nothing matched the sheer beauty and savagery of the White Mountains of Crete.’ Furthermore, Amini’s conception of adapting *The Two Faces of January* was linked to his own experiences. As he has stated, apart from being a thriller, *The Two Faces of January* is ‘also my attempt to capture the magic and power that Greece has exerted on me since I was a child [...]. I took my children on holiday to Athens and Crete and it was there that I started to dream about adapting Patricia Highsmith’s Greek set thriller [...] into a film’ (Amini 2014).

Personal reasons were partly responsible for Costa-Gavras’s decision to film some parts of *Eden à l’Ouest* in Greece. The film tells the story of an undocumented young immigrant of unknown nationality who comes ashore on a Greek coastal area before continuing his odyssey to Western Europe until Paris. Originally from Greece, Costa-Gavras maintained strong connections with the Greek state, its people, and film organisations. Thus, the contribution of Greek entities to the making of – a French, Greek, and Italian coproduction⁵ – was essential, primarily that of Odeon SA, one of Greece’s most powerful production and distribution companies, but also CL Productions, the Greek Film Centre (which contributed €500.000) (Venardou 2009), Hellenic Radio & Television, the Greek National Tourist Office and Ministry of Culture, Finos Film, Nova, and East Media Services. The film’s major producing company was the French KG Productions (co-owned by Costa-Gavras and the film’s producer Michèle Ray Gavras), and Pathé, France 3 Cinéma, Canal Plus,

⁵ By adopting the co-production system, Costa-Gavras could raise the film’s budget, which eventually reached about €11.000.000 (Jimeno Aranda 2014, 1114).



CinéCinéma, and La Région Île-de-France also contributed. The Italian Novo RPI and Medusa Film played a supporting role.

Although Crete is unnamed in the film's plot, selecting it for the shooting was, as Costa-Gavras stated, an easy choice due to the quality of its tourist resorts, where the onscreen odyssey of the protagonist begins. 'Crete – and especially the hotels where the filming takes place – represent exactly what the film depicts,' Costa-Gavras said (Tsagarakis 2008). In addition, the Cretans' hospitality and assistance (Tsagarakis 2008) and, as Christina Katsiadakis, one of the film's assistant production managers, explained, the diverse landscape were crucial in the selection of this island (C. Katsiadakis, email correspondence with K. Komi, 1 April 2021).

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BENEFITS FOR THE LOCALS

Along with fulfilling the foreign producers' plans and priorities, all five productions brought about immediate and sometimes long-term gains to the local communities, in proportion to the size of each film crew and the time it spent in each area.

Shot in Kritsa and some nearby areas,⁶ *Celui qui doit mourir* took four months to complete. During that period at least 800 locals ('800 Kritikoi xanastavrosan ton Christon' 1957) – some sources bring the number to 1,200 or 1,500 ('Ta theatrika nea' 1956a; Pili-chos 1956) – worked as extras; adults received daily compensation of 40 to 60 drachmas (€12 to €18 today's currency, inflation rate considered) (Arnaoutaki 1956), at a time when the minimum daily wage in Greece was 37 drachmas for male and 29 drachmas for female workers ('Ergatika-Ipallilika' 1955). Children received 20 drachmas, and 2 drachmas were given for each animal used in the production (Arnaoutaki 1956).⁷ In total, the extras received an estimated 1,200,000

⁶ Seli Ampelou, Profitis Ilias, Theologos, Nikithianos, and Agios Nikolaos. A few interior scenes were filmed in Paris ('Ta theatrika nea' 1956c).

⁷ According to another source of that time, the foreign producers offered much higher salaries than those proposed by the president and the community council of Mochos (one of the candidate villages for filming), who regarded the success of the project as more important than any monetary returns ('Peri to girisma tis tainias' 1955). A much later source defines the daily compensation in Kritsa as 40

[116]

drachmas (€17.300 today's currency, inflation rate considered). Another 1.200.0000 drachmas were spent on salaries for Greek actors and for the construction of the sets and other facilities (Pilichos 1956).⁸ For these works, many locals were hired as builders, carpenters, woodworkers, painters, blacksmiths, locksmiths, and drivers. In mid-1956, for example, a newspaper reported that 45 carpenters and woodworkers, 20 builders, and 15 painters were needed ('Ena istorikis simasias gegonos' 1956). These workers improved their skills as they had to use unfamiliar materials and new techniques and meet unprecedented demand (Skoulikaris 2013, 3).

Equally important were the benefits for local businesses. For the four months of shooting, a hotel (Lato) in Agios Nikolaos – the only tourist hotel in town – accommodated the film's 80-member crew. In the same town, two women opened a club-restaurant named Rifi, after Dassin's previous film, to cater to the crew ([Grammatikakis] 1956). In addition to the film crew, the area was enlivened by Greek and foreign journalists as well as tourists attracted by the filming ('Metaxi mas' 1956; 'Me liges grammes' 1956). In her interview for this study, Maria Klontza, who ran a soft drink shop with her husband in Kritsa, recalled the unprecedented flow of people and impressive profits for their business that allowed her family to buy state property in Agios Nikolaos (M. Klontza, interviewed by K. Komi, 30 May 2021). According to another resident of Kritsa, the film's making invigorated the village's economy thanks to the general development resulting from 'either the activity in the construction sector or the quantitative and qualitative upgrade of the market' (Skoulikaris 2013, 4).⁹ The film's making even improved daily life in Kritsa over the long term, since the square and the sets, con-

drachmas for men, 20 for women, and 10 for children (Skoulikaris 2013, 2). The film's contemporaneous sources should be considered more reliable on the issue of payments.

⁸ Overall, 80 million francs (€1.730.730 today's currency, inflation rate considered) out of the film's final total budget of 320 million francs (about €6.923.000, inflation rate considered) were spent in Crete.

⁹ According to the same local, this development even helped to reduce economic migration from Kritsa (Skoulikaris 2013, 4).



structed there for the film, were left standing to the benefit of the local community ('Ta theatrika nea' 1956b). For years to come, people from all over Crete visited Kritsa and the surroundings to see where Kazantzakis's novel had been filmed (Dimopoulos and Kiriakidis 2000, 61). The film was also mentioned in travel guides to Crete, thus promoting Kritsa and its environs as a travel destination (e.g. Bowman 1969, 291). Moreover, *Celui qui doit mourir* contributed to the reputation of the Agios Nikolaos region as a desirable shooting destination; in less than a decade, such productions as the BBC biblical series *Paul of Tarsus* (Joy Harrington, 1960) and the Disney romantic thriller *The Moon-Spinners* were filmed there.

[117]

Although made many decades later in Crete's tourist destinations instead of in a small, isolated village, such as Kritsa, *Eden à l'Ouest* and *The Two Faces of January* brought similar benefits. Both films' shooting in Crete lasted about one month.¹⁰ *Eden à l'Ouest* was primarily filmed at Hersonissos's 5-star Aldemar Royal Mare Hotel, a member of the major hotel chain Aldemar Resorts.¹¹ The management of Aldemar Royal Mare Hotel and the film's producers were in contact a year beforehand to arrange the shooting at the hotel's outdoor areas and the accommodation of the film's crew and cast (V. Fragoulakis, Aldemar Royal Mare Hotel's commercial manager, and E. Kapsokefalou, the hotel's front office manager in 2008, email correspondence with K. Komi, 3 June 2021). Most of the 40-member crew stayed in this hotel, and others were accommodated in other hotels of the Aldemar Resorts Group: Knossos Royal and Cretan Village. In total, one hundred rooms were booked for the film's crew and cast, and a few more for Costa-Gavras's visiting friends (V. Fragoulakis, and E. Kapsokefalou, email correspondence with K. Komi, 3 June 2021; C. Katsiadakis, email correspondence with K. Komi, 1 April 2021; E. Restaki, interviewed by K. Komi, 17 May 2021).

¹⁰ Costa-Gavras began shooting on 13 May 2008 at Vai and ended on 14 June 2008 (E. Restaki, location manager and assistant production manager of the film, interviewed by K. Komi, 17 May 2021). *The Two Faces of January* was shot in the fall of 2012.

¹¹ Additional shooting took place at 'Out of the Blue' Capsis Elite Resort, Amirandes Grecotel Boutique Resort, and Porto Elounda De Luxe Resort.

[118]



FIGURE 2 Costa-Gavras and Two Cretan Children (Manolis Psychogioudakis and Konstantina Chamalaki) Holding Small Roles in *Eden à l'Ouest* During the Film's Making in Mochos, 2008 (photo courtesy of Proodos – Cultural and Folklore Association of Mochos)

Some members of the production team stayed in smaller hotels in Annisaras and Vai. In addition, approximately 300 people were hired as extras with a daily salary of about €50 (E. Restaki, interviewed by K. Komi, 17 May 2021; V. Trzeciak, casting assistant, interviewed by K. Komi, 23 May 2021; L. Valasakis, telephone conversation and email correspondence with K. Komi, 27 May 2021),¹² when the minimum daily wage in Greece was about €32 (Ipourgeio 2008). Others were employed as actors for small parts (figure 2) and as technicians, carpenters, blacksmiths, electricians, drivers, carriers, and caterers, while local artists worked in the film crew (for instance as location managers, assistant production managers, or casting assistants).

The Two Faces of January is a good example of the revitalisation of a local community even before and after the filming. As the unit production manager of the film Dimitris Xenakis of Indigo View, a local

¹² According to Restaki and Trzeciak, the extras who appeared in the nude, in the scene where the protagonist comes ashore, were paid €150 per day.



production company based in Chania, explained (D. Xenakis, interviewed by N. Tsagarakis, 30 October 2020), the filming was preceded by about a month of preparation and followed by two to three weeks for restoration. Indigo View's total budget was around 2 million US dollars, which were poured into the local economy to hire technicians, craftspeople, and locals as background actors and to cover accommodation, catering, and transportation services. Among craftspeople, many were carpenters hired to build the sets. They came not only from Chania but also from Lasithi at the other edge of Crete, where Indigo View had previously produced *The Island*. In addition to Indigo View, two other Cretan companies were involved, Fixer (in Chania) and Tola films (in Archanes, Heraklion). Their role was crucial in assisting with location scouting, recruiting, and casting extras, providing crew, and arranging accommodation.

[119]

Both Xenakis of Indigo View and Trzeciak of Tola Films (V. Trzeciak, interviewed by N. Tsagarakis, 23 May 2021) stressed that the local community and economy were reinvigorated by such a massive production and that apart from the financial rewards, *The Two Faces of January* helped to put Chania on the map of international film locations and raise the local standards of expertise on industry services and technical know-how. Similarly, many participants in the production of *Eden à l'Ouest*, interviewed for this research, corroborated that through Costa-Gavras's film local talent gained valuable experience and opportunities to display their skills, something that helped their professional career in the long run. Another long-lasting effect of Costa-Gavras's production concerned the publicity of the hotels where staging took place. News of the filming, which was reported in the media for almost six months, benefitted the hotel's brand awareness,¹³ with the Aldemar management observing a positive impact on its resorts' target clientele, especially in the French market (V. Fragoulakis and E. Kapsokefalou, email correspondence with K. Komi, 3 June 2021).

Since Pacheia Ammos offered a ready-made plateau for *Tsatsiki*,

¹³ See *Eden à l'Ouest – Tournage du nouveau film de Costa Gavras*, aired in France in October 2008 at CinéCinéma.

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morsan och polisen, the employment of local craftspersons was not a benefit. Nevertheless, residents were hired as extras – for some scenes of up to 50 people – or in small roles. Furthermore, about twenty Greek technicians participated in the film crew under the direction of Giannakakis, who had prepared all aspects of the production beforehand (e.g., casting and teaching the locals their roles). Another 20 people comprised the foreign crew. As a result, for the three weeks of filming in Pacheia Ammos, about 40 people rented rooms in the village and filled the area’s shops and taverns (M. Giannakakis, telephone conversation with P. Mini, 11 May 2021). After the film’s making, Pacheia Ammos enjoyed additional benefits. Thanks to its non-touristic character and its scenic appropriateness as well as the collaborative way in which *Tsatsiki, morsan och polisen* proceeded, this village became the setting of the Cretan scenes in the second film in the *Tsatsiki* series, *Tsatsiki – Vänner för alltid* (*Tsatsiki – Friend for Ever*, 2001, Eddie Thomas Petersen). In the 15 minutes’ screening time in Crete in this 82-minute-long film, the locals now played bigger roles, a village elder played *Tsatsiki*’s grandfather, and key talent from the first *Tsatsiki*, including assistant director Giannakakis and composer Papadakis, were hired. Promotional international articles on the village still describe its peaceful environment and mention that *Tsatsiki, morsan och polisen* had been shot there (e.g. Hoffmann 2019). This film’s making also benefited other sites in Crete. In 2015 the third instalment of the *Tsatsiki* series, *Tsatsiki, farsan och olivkriget* (*Tsatsiki, Dad, and the Olive War*, Lisa James-Larsson), was filmed in Sfakia and Loutro of the Chania region, hiring more than 450 local extras and fuelling the hotel business in the area (‘Efcharistirio xenodochon ton Chanion me aformi tin tainia sta Sfakia’ 2015).

Compared to *Celui qui doit mourir*, *Eden à l’Ouest*, *The Two Faces of January*, and *Tsatsiki, morsan och polisen*, the immediate rewards of *Dedemin İnsanları* were not significant given that filming was completed within a day. Still, the rewards were not negligible. As seen in the shoot’s details provided by Dimitris Xenakis (figure 3) (D. Xenakis, email correspondence with P. Mini, 13 January 2021), the scenes in Fres required 25 extras, 3 people in small roles, and the use



FRES VILLAGE SQUARE	EXT/DAY
1st CAFE SHOP	EXT/DAY
2nd CAFE SHOP	EXT/DAY
MOTORBIKE RENTAL STORE	EXT/DAY
EARTH ROADS	EXT/DAY
PENSION	INT/NIGHT

ACTOR	FIGURANS	AKSESUAR/EKİPMAN:
USHAN ÇAKIR	CAFE SHOP OWNER	6 PROPS MOTORBIKE
	1 MAN WITH A DIALOG	OZAN'S MOTORBIKE
	MOTORBIKE STORE OWNER	
	20 MEN FIGURANS	
	5 WOMEN FIGURANS	

FIGURE 3
 Extracts of the ‘Shooting Details’ of *Dedemin İnsanları* in Crete (courtesy of Indigo View)

TURKİSH CREW	GREEK CREW
1-YÖNETMEN (S.1)	ŞARİOT OPERATOR
2-YAPIMCI (S.2)	2 LIGHTING ASİSTANT
3-GÖRÜNTÜ YÖNETMENİ (S.3)	MAKE-UP
4-SANAT YÖNETMENİ (S.4)	STADYCAM OPERATOR
5-FOCUS PULLER(D.1)	3 SET PEOPLE
6-KAMERA ASİSTANI (D.1)	1 ART DIRECTOR ASİSTANT
7-YÖNETMEN YARDIMCISI 1 (D.2)	TEA GIRL
8-SANAT YÖNETMENİ YARDIMCISI (S.5)	PRODUCTION CREW
9-SES OPERATÖRÜ (S.6)	
10-BOOMER (D.2)	
11-AKTÖR (S.7)	

of two coffee shops, a motorbike rental store, a pension, and external locations (the village square and earth roads). Each coffee shop was rented at a daily price of about €300; the villagers sitting around as extras received a daily salary of about €40 each, and all shops that remained closed during the film work were compensated with about €100 per day (D. Xenakis, telephone conversation with P. Mini, 13 January 2021).¹⁴ We can fully appreciate the benefits from one day of shooting if we consider the following. For such a short filming time, an 11-member foreign crew arrived in the area (the director and his assistant, the producer, the director of photography with an assistant, the designer and an assistant, a camera operator, a sound operator, a boomer, and an actor), who needed accommodation for three nights,¹⁵ while at least 12 Greek people were employed to work

¹⁴ In addition, a Greek actress, Eirini Inglesi, played the current owner of the grandfather’s Cretan house.

¹⁵ As Fres did not have accommodation facilities at the time, they stayed in a hotel

[122] in the crew (figure 3). In addition, far-reaching benefits came for the Greek line producers and, through them, other talents. As Xenakis explained, the bond created between the local firm Indigo View and Turkish executive producer Esi Gülce led to common film projects; and through Indigo View's intervention, Anastasia Tsilimbiou, the Greek actress who had played in *The Island*, was cast in the major role of Young Kösem Sultan in the hit Turkish TV series *Muhteşem Yüzyıl: Kösem* (*The Magnificent Century: Kösem*, 2015, 2017).¹⁶

LOCAL INTANGIBLE REWARDS

Material gains aside, the making of all these films brought about a reward that we rarely consider: bonds among people of different places and backgrounds. One should treat with caution oral testimonies and *a posteriori* accounts of feelings; yet, the fondness with which the participants in these productions in different roles and positions talk about their experiences indicates that transnational film productions create a basis for sincere human interaction.

Celui qui doit mourir is a representative case. Although language and cultural differences initially caused some misunderstanding and tension between locals and foreigners (Bérard 1956; Skoulikaris 2013, 2), all participants gradually formed warm relationships that lasted for decades.¹⁷ Dassin's letter to Kritsa's people at the end of the shooting reveals the prevailing climate during the film's making (Dassin 1956b):

Together we created a film, which I hope is worth seeing. We worked very hard [...]. From the beginning, I believed that I did not have subordinates in my work but partners [...]. I made a lot of friends in Kritsa, and that is why it is difficult to leave them. Many of our team cried when they left. Someone even said something that represents us all, 'I'm leaving part of myself here.' [...]

(Irida Hotel) in Chania (D. Xenakis, telephone conversation with P. Mini, 13 January 2021).

¹⁶ Gülce was *Muhteşem Yüzyıl: Kösem*'s line producer.

¹⁷ See Dassin's interview in Fredy Germanos's 1977 TV show *Ekpompes pou agapisa* (<https://archive.ert.gr/73502/>).



'So, goodbye until we meet again, my Kritsa friends.' I will be looking for you and will be thinking of you always. I am happy to have lived here with you.

Years later Dassin described his work in Kritsa: 'I still remember that time as the happiest of my life. Happiness had to do with the whole atmosphere, with all the locals who worked on the film. I have memories that still overwhelm me, and I love this village more than any other in the world' (Dimopoulos and Kiriakidis 2000, 61, 71). [123]

The experience was equally gratifying for Kritsa's people. According to Chrisanthi Katapoti, who played one of Panagiotaros's daughters in *Celui qui doit mourir*, the film's four-month making looked like a celebration (C. Katapoti, telephone conversation with K. Komi, 3 June 2021). All villagers participated by either working in the production or watching the work. Subsequently, various neighbourhoods in Kritsa were named after characters and places in the film (e.g., Ladas's place, Sarakina) and in 1982 the village unanimously appointed Dassin and Mercouri honorary citizens (Skoulikaris 2013, 11). Today – 65 years later – the locals still share stories of the film-making,¹⁸ traces from the film's set remain in Kritsa (figure 4), and the walls of its public buildings are decorated with photographs of the filming (figure 5).

A similar atmosphere is conveyed by the participants in *Tsatsiki, morsan och polisen*. Assistant director Giannakakis and musician Papadakis describe the foreign producers as excellent collaborators, recall the locals' enthusiasm and 'positive energy,' and compare the filming to a *panigiri* (the Greek word for the folk fair). They explain how they all became 'co-villagers,' with the locals opening their homes to offer the crew whatever they needed, and how the last day of work culminated in a huge celebration (M. Giannakakis, telephone conversation with P. Mini, 11 May 2021; C. Papadakis, in-

¹⁸ People who participated in the film or lived in Kritsa in 1956, remember fondly Dassin, Merkouri, and the time when their village was transformed into a studio (C. Varda, E Tziris, and M. Klontza interviewed by K. Komi, 30 May 2021, and C. Katapoti, telephone conversation with K. Komi, 3 June 2021).

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FIGURE 4

Remnants of the Set for *Celui qui doit mourir* in Kritsa: Ladas's Place (photo by Katerina Komi)



FIGURE 5

A Photograph Decorating the Walls of the 'Lato' Cultural, Educational and Developmental Association of Kritsa Shows Jules Dassin and Inhabitants of Kritsa Working as Extras During the Making of *Celui qui doit mourir* (photo courtesy by 'Lato' Cultural, Educational and Developmental Association of Kritsa)



interviewed by N. Tsagarakis, 1 June 2021). Making the second film in the *Tsatsiki* series in Pacheia Ammos confirms the amicable climate that characterised the work on the first.

For the director of *The Two Faces of January*, Chania turned out his 'favourite location outside of filming.' As Amini (2014) described, 'After filming we'd [our crew would] disperse to different bars and restaurants and enjoy the city all over again. Despite spending over a month there, many of the crew have since returned for their holidays.' The climate in Fres for *Dedemin İnsanları* was particularly emotional. By narrating the story of an old Turkish-Cretan, who longed



to see his childhood home in Crete, and of his grandson who made the trip the old man could not, Ismak told the story of his grandfather and his first trip to Crete; thus, filming in Fres allowed him to visit this island once more. He said: 'It is all very intense for me. I feel I know the people, the places, everything' (Doumanis 2011). The film, Irmak emphasised, 'is about the friendship between Greeks and Turks,' something captured in the conditions under which the work proceeded in Fres.

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BONDS ACROSS COUNTRIES AND TIMES

Implemented through the collaboration between Turks and Greeks at the production level, *Dedemin İnsanları* puts in effect the ideas of people's partnership and of questioning the borders separating them on the level of the story as well. The film transcends many symbolic barriers: between nations, languages, genders, classes, and social groups, with the first among them being the barriers between Greeks and Turks. Humanitarian issues are also at the core of *Tsatsiki, morsan och polisen* and *Eden à l'Ouest*, making them suitable for promoting worldwide solidarity and equality.

Dedemin İnsanları has enjoyed special screenings in Greece designed to advance Greek-Turkish friendship: from showings in programs organised under the auspices of the Turkish Embassy in Greece ('Evdomada tourkikou kinimatografou' 2014; 'Oi anthropoi tou pappou mou taxidevoun se Chania kai Irakleio' 2015) to presentations in primary school events (Ramos 2013). Outside of Greece, this film has been selected to represent modern Turkish cinema and culture in festivals and events in many countries, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Germany, Italy, Jordan, Mongolia, Morocco, Slovakia, Spain, Ukraine, and the United States. It has also received the Kemal Sunal Culture and Art Award of 2012 for best film, among other awards.¹⁹

In *Tsatsiki, morsan och polisen*, when Tsatsiki travels to Crete, he finds out that his father is a haggard fisherman, not the hand-

¹⁹ For the awards of *Dedemin İnsanları*, see https://m.imdb.com/title/tt2150209/awards?ref_=tt_ql_sm.

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some, muscular octopus catcher that his mother had described. After his initial disappointment, Tsatsiki feels a bond with his father beyond stereotypes. Such an experience does not concern only Tsatsiki. Life in Sweden brings in close contact people of different lifestyles and backgrounds, making them develop feelings of sincere mutual understanding and respect. Touching upon such issues, in addition to its huge commercial success, *Tsatsiki, morsan och polisen* was awarded numerous prizes for best film for children or young people.²⁰ It was shown in festivals and events – mostly for young audiences – in more than 20 cities worldwide (e.g. Hanoi, Antwerp, Berlin, Bern, Bruges, Copenhagen, Creil, Cote d' Ivoire, Freiburg, Hyderabad, Paris, Poznan, Toulouse, Varese, and Zlin) and used to promote cultural collaboration. To give two examples, in 2008 it was included in the Ciné Nordica week in Paris, organised by the Saga Nordica organisation which works for cultural exchanges between France and the Nordic countries; in November 2009, the Swedish Embassy in Vietnam selected it as one of the five films for the 'Defending Difference' event in Hanoi, Vietnam, celebrating '40 years of friendship' between Vietnam and Sweden.²¹ Moreover, due to its emphasis on a single-mother family and relationships among people of various backgrounds, *Tsatsiki, morsan och polisen* has been mentioned in many pamphlets and projects on appropriate films for school screenings and discussions of issues such as new types of families, friendship, and tolerance (Havran, Sauvage, and Walther 2002).

²⁰ It has been awarded the 1999 Guldbaggevännare Prize for Sweden's best film; the 1999 Children's Film Prize of the Nordic Film Institutes; the Crystal Bear from the Young People's Jury at the Children's Film Festival of the 2000 Berlinale; the Poznań Silver Goats Best Foreign Feature Movie at Poznań's 18th Ale Kino! International Young Audience Film Festival; the 2000 Euro Kids Network Award; the Golden Plaque in Critics Jury Award at the 12th International Children's Film Festival in Hyderabad, India, and other prizes. See, indicatively, <https://www.svenskfilmdatabas.se/en/item/?type=film&itemid=40615#awards> and https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0171851/awards?ref_=tt_ql_sm.

²¹ See <http://hanoigrapevine.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/swedish-film-program-20094.pdf>.



Through the story of the undocumented immigrant, *Eden à l'Ouest* refers to the plight of millions who flee their countries to reach the West, only to find out that their western destination is a guarded fortress, a Paradise for only some selected few; Costa-Gavras criticises this contemporary situation, advancing instead the need for understanding and equality. Through a strong distribution system, system, *Eden à l'Ouest* was shown in numerous countries, carrying messages of respect to other cultures and of fair multiculturalism. It premiered at the 59th Berlin International Film Festival of 2009, where it represented France, Greece, and Italy, as the closing night film, an acknowledgement of its suitability to signal the end of a festival which since the late 1990s 'has developed into a place of intercultural exchange and a platform for the critical cinematic exploration of social issues' ('The Berlinale: A Constantly Evolving Festival' 2021).

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Later in 2009, *Eden à l'Ouest* opened the London Human Rights Watch Film Festival, which through its organiser – Human Rights Watch – 'strives to expose human oppression worldwide and to promote human rights' (Wong 2011, 174, 176). Since then, the film has travelled to many festivals²² and was presented at events raising awareness about refugees, migrants, and human rights such as the 2009 Human Rights Watch International Film Festival in New York; the 2009 UNHCR Refugee Film Festival in Tokyo; the 2009 Events on Migration of the Pancyprian Federation of Women's Organisations, in Limassol, Cyprus; the 2011 International Crime and Pun-

²² For example, in 2009 it was screened at the French Film Festival, Tokyo-Osaka; the EuroCine27, Brussels; the Mar del Plata International Film Festival, Argentina; the Busan International Film Festival, South Korea; the Melbourne Film Festival, Australia; the Pula Film Festival, Croatia; the Cinemania Francophone Film Festival in Montreal; the Festival del Cinema Europeo, Lecce; the Traverse City Film Festival, Michigan; the St George Bank Brisbane International Film Festival, Australia; the Mumbai International Film Festival, India; the Griechische Filmwoche, Munich; and the Bursa International Silk Road Film Festival in Turkey. It has been awarded the Critics Award at the 2009 ColCoa Film Festival/City of Lights, City of Angels, Los Angeles, and the Critics Award and Special Jury Award at the 2009 Mostra de Valencia in Spain.

[128] ishment Film Festival in Istanbul; and social spaces and squats in Athens. Like *Tsatsiki*, *morsan och polisen*, *Eden à l'Ouest* has been also used as an educational tool in various countries (e.g., France, Greece, Italy, and Spain), engaging students in discussions about xenophobia, prejudice, immigration, diversity, and European politics.

CONCLUSION

Presenting these films in international contexts that promote understanding and respect comes as a corollary of film production procedures that themselves were based on partnership and collaborative work. The foreign films shot in Crete, which have been examined for this study, evince that international film productions can deliver important tangible benefits to both foreign producers and locals and form strong bonds that participants will cherish for a long time. These films bring financial gains for the participants and the hosting communities in addition to technical expertise, familiarisation with international standards of work, and promotion of the shooting locations. They offer foreign producers and filmmakers geographical and architectural authenticity and diversity in addition to fiscal advantages. As the research shows, no less important is the cultural exchange between locals and foreign crews, which leaves behind fond memories, friendships, and professional partnerships. Furthermore, these films may contribute to the mitigation of cultural and historical stereotypes, even while crafting the values of empathy and solidarity into a cinematic narrative.

No doubt, this research has inherent limitations. From the more than 40 foreign productions shot in Crete, it focuses on five, and among hundreds of people participating in the productions, it interviewed 13. In addition, it discusses more productions of the last three decades, for which it was more practical to collect data from local participants. Furthermore, it processes information only from organisations, businesses, and people who were willing to share their experiences and knowledge. Despite these limitations, local and state organisations can use these findings to promote and enhance international film encounters. They could organise transnational film events, emphasising the relationship between the cul-



tural bonds depicted on screen and those created in the course of filming. Organisations could bring the films' international participants back together to discuss past experiences and make future plans. Moreover, interested parties can support more research case studies that may bring to light a greater number of fortuitous film encounters across countries and cultures, reinforcing the conclusion that transnational film collaborations have the potential to unite people. In this sense, the recent initiative of the Hellenic Film Office and the work of local Film Offices across Greece, whose outcomes have already become apparent even during the restrictions of the COVID-19 pandemic, with the attraction of several foreign productions in many areas of the country, may further inform us on the tangible and non-material importance of international film productions for both local communities and global audiences.

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Résumés

Découvertes de gaz à Chypre : les limites de l'influence russe

PÉTER KACZIBA

Les découvertes de gaz offshore autour de Chypre ont amené plusieurs acteurs externes dans la région. Des sociétés énergétiques de l'Union européenne, des États-Unis et du Moyen-Orient ont acquis des droits d'exploration et de participation dans des projets de développement d'infrastructure. Alors que les géants de l'énergie liés à ces acteurs ont obtenu des parts importantes dans l'industrie gazière chypriote grecque en développement, la Russie est notamment absente des bénéficiaires. L'absence frappe particulièrement car la Russie a, par ailleurs, développé d'importants accords énergétiques avec d'autres acteurs régionaux et exerce une influence économique considérable sur la République de Chypre. Cette étude cherche à examiner pourquoi l'implication gazière russe ne s'est pas matérialisée à Chypre et pourquoi Moscou est restée loin des opportunités gazières chypriotes grecques. L'idée avancée ici est que non seulement des facteurs systémiques mais aussi nationaux ont entravé l'expansion des intérêts gaziers russes. Pour débattre les causes de cette absence, l'article applique la théorie et le cadre analytique du réalisme néo-classique et interprète les résultats de la politique étrangère à travers le prisme des variables systémiques et nationales. L'étude conclut que Moscou a sacrifié ses opportunités gazières à Chypre en raison de plusieurs facteurs structurels et de facteurs au niveau de l'unité, notamment la reconnaissance des intérêts turcs dans les différends énergétiques de l'île, la protection des enjeux régionaux des sociétés énergétiques nationales et le maintien des positions russes dans le secteur financier chypriote grec.

Mots clés : Russie, Chypre, Méditerranée orientale, géopolitique, gaz naturel, réalisme néoclassique

IJEMS 14 (2): 3–38

L'influence de la Méditerranée sur les cérémonies funéraires et la musique funéraire dans les zones côtières slovènes

ANITA PRELOVŠEK

L'article décrit les pratiques musicales funéraires contemporaines dans la région de Primorska, zone du littoral slovène bordant la Méditerranée.

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Après un bref aperçu de l'histoire des complaintes funèbres en Méditerranée, l'article s'intéresse à la forme et à l'accompagnement musical des funérailles modernes. Il souligne l'influence des pays méditerranéens, en particulier l'Italie, sur les funérailles dans la région Primorska. Il explique comment le type de cérémonie funéraire et le choix de la musique sont teintés par la présence de la mer, en rendant compte des ensembles musicaux et des répertoires de chansons les plus courants. Il compare les funérailles des membres de la minorité italienne en Slovénie avec les funérailles dans les régions côtières italiennes. La recherche s'appuie sur des travaux ethnographiques et sur la littérature scientifique, ainsi que sur des articles de presse et internet traitant le sujet des cérémonies funéraires. Les études sur le terrain se basent sur des recherches dans les cimetières en utilisant la méthode d'observation participative et d'interviews semi-structurées. Dans la région Primorska, les funérailles accompagnées de la dispersion des cendres cinéraires en mer sont de plus en plus fréquentes, tout comme les chansons à thème maritime et les chansons en langue italienne. Bien que le choix de la musique funéraire soit très souvent individualisé et qu'il y ait de plus en plus de chansons populaires, la musique classique reste encore le choix de beaucoup de personnes dans cette région et aussi les chansons dalmates sont assez courantes. Les complaintes funèbres traditionnelles, présentes dans toute la Slovénie, se retrouvent moins fréquemment lors des funérailles.

Mots clés : funérailles, musique, complaintes funèbres, littoral slovène, sud de l'Italie

IJEMS 14 (2): 39–60

Externalisation des frontières de l'UE par la coopération avec la Libye : l'Italie comme porte d'entrée du rêve européen

SELÇEN ÖNER ET MATTIA CIRINO

Cet article soutient que la coopération entre l'Italie et la Libye, avec le soutien de l'UE, s'est accélérée et approfondie, en particulier après la crise migratoire (2015). Surtout avec l'introduction du protocole d'accord Italie-Libye (2017) pour lutter contre la migration irrégulière, cette alliance a externalisé les frontières de l'UE et transformé la mer Méditerranée en limes. Le cadre conceptuel et analytique est basé sur les implications territoriales de Walters (2004) de l'eupéanisation de la migration et en particulier sur la notion de limes qui se réfère à tracer une ligne pour maintenir une distinction entre la stabilité et l'ordre à l'intérieur et le désordre



à l'extérieur. L'article se concentre sur l'Italie, qui est l'un des pays les plus touchés par la crise car il est situé sur la frontière extérieure méditerranéenne de l'UE. L'étude s'appuie sur des interviews semi-structurées approfondies et menées face-à-face en Italie au premier semestre 2019 avec des membres de la Chambre des députés de différents partis politiques, des représentants d'ONG de sauvetage en mer en Italie, un représentant de UNHCR Italie, et un maire du sud de l'Italie. Les entretiens révèlent diverses métaphores et récits tels que « l'Italie a été laissée seule » à cause de la crise de solidarité dans l'UE et « l'Italie comme porte d'entrée vers l'Europe » dont le but est d'analyser le rôle de l'Italie dans l'externalisation des frontières de l'UE par le biais de la coopération avec la Libye.

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Mots clés : migration irrégulière, Italie, Libye, Union européenne, Méditerranée, ONG de sauvetage en mer

IJEMS 14 (2): 61–89

La Méditerranée comme facteur d'inscription dans les programmes de musique d'instruments de musique individuels dans les écoles de musique : une étude de cas sur la Slovénie

MATEJ PLEVNIK, MITJA GERŽEVIČ, IVAN LEŠNIK, IZTOK BABNIK ET KATARINA BABNIK

L'objectif principal de l'article est de présenter la région méditerranéenne comme facteur dans l'inscription au programme de musique et d'instruments de musique dans les écoles élémentaires de musique. Pour les besoins de cette recherche, nous avons obtenu des données du ministère de l'Éducation, des Sciences et des Sports de la République de Slovénie concernant le nombre de places d'inscription des étudiants en musique par rapport à l'attribution d'un seul instrument musical. Nous avons comparé les données par régions statistiques individuelles et nous avons identifié les caractéristiques de la région méditerranéenne. Les données empiriques ont été analysées à l'aide de méthodes de statistiques descriptives. La région méditerranéenne en Slovénie compte 5,6% de tous les habitants de Slovénie. Il existe deux écoles de musique (la moyenne nationale étant $5,8 \pm 4,1$), où sont inscrits aux programmes 8,3% des élèves de 6 à 18 ans de la région prise en compte dans la statistique. Les instruments à vent et cuivres y sont mieux représentés que dans la moyenne slovène,

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tandis que le chant est le moins choisi par rapport à la moyenne régionale au niveau national. Après l'inscription dans des programmes d'instruments de musique dans la région méditerranéenne, le piano, la flûte à bec, la trompette, le trombone, le tube et les percussions s'écartent positivement de la moyenne slovène. Les écoles de musique de la région méditerranéenne en Slovénie reflètent l'intérêt spécifique des habitants pour l'éducation musicale dans cette région. Un environnement culturel méditerranéen en Slovénie encourage les étudiants à s'inscrire dans de nombreux groupes musicaux de divers genres pendant et après avoir terminé leurs études en musique. Malgré les différences constatées dans le choix de l'instrument et de la participation à des activités de groupe dans les domaines de la musique et de la danse (programmes de danse, groupes de chorales et d'orchestre), qui ne s'expliquent que partiellement par des spécificités culturelles régionales, il faut souligner l'importance de l'éducation musicale formelle et informelle pour les enfants, qui devrait être un guide pour la planification des activités sociales/nationales dans le domaine de l'éducation et du développement des enfants.

Mots clés : musique, Méditerranée, éducation musicale, écoles primaires, enfants, culture, Slovénie

IJEMS 14 (2): 91–103

Avantages tangibles et liens entre les personnes dans la production cinématographique internationale : le cas des films tournés en Crète

KATERINA KOMI, PANAYIOTA MINI ET NIKOS TSAGARAKIS

Depuis la fin des années 1940, plus de quarante films étrangers ont été partiellement ou entièrement tournés sur l'île grecque de Crète. Cet article porte sur cinq de ces films : Celui qui doit mourir de Jules Dassin (1957), Tsatsiki, morsan och polisen d'Ella Lemhagen (1999), Eden à l'Ouest de Costa-Gavras (2009), Dedemin İnsanları de Çagan Irmak (2011), et Les Deux visages de janvier de Hossein Amini (2014). L'article examine les effets de ces productions sur les Crétois, leurs producteurs et cinéastes étrangers et leurs publics à travers le monde. Comme le montre notre recherche, ces productions présentaient de nombreux avantages matériels pour les producteurs locaux et étrangers et étaient tout aussi importantes pour rassembler des personnes d'horizons différents et créer des liens transnationaux. De plus, ayant été réalisés dans un contexte international, la plupart de ces films racontaient des histoires de respect



mutuel et de tolérance, devenant ainsi cruciaux pour promouvoir la solidarité internationale et faire avancer le cinéma transnational comme un puissant vecteur de prise de conscience sociale.

Mots clés : lieux de tournage, cinéma transnational, cinéma européen, co-productions cinématographiques, coopération internationale

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Povzetki

Odkritja plina na Cipru: Meje ruskega vpliva

PÉTER KACZIBA

Odkritja plina na morju okoli Cipra so v regijo pripeljala več zunanjih akterjev. Energetska podjetja iz Evropske unije, ZDA in Bližnjega vzhoda so pridobile pravice do raziskovanja in deleže v projektih infrastrukturnega razvoja. Medtem ko so si energetske velikani, povezani s temi akterji, zagotovili pomembne deleže v trenutno razvijajoči se plinski industriji na grškem delu Cipra, je vidno, da med upravičenci ni Rusije. Odsotnost je še posebej omembe vredna, saj je Rusija sicer razvila pomembne energetske posle z drugimi regionalnimi akterji in ima obsežen gospodarski vpliv na Republiko Ciper. Namen te študije je preučiti, zakaj se ruska vpletenost v industrijo plina na Cipru ni uresničila in zakaj Moskva ni pokazala zanimanja za tovrstne priložnosti na grškem delu Cipra. Študija trdi, da za to niso krivi le sistemski, ampak tudi domači dejavniki, ki so omejili širitev interesov ruskega plina. Vzroki za to odsotnost so bili proučeni s pomočjo teorije in analitičnega okvirja neoklasičnega realizma, študija pa interpretira tudi zunanjepolitične izide z vidika sistemskih in domačih spremenljivk. Študija ugotavlja, da je Moskva žrtvovala svoje priložnosti povezane s plinsko industrijo na Cipru zaradi več strukturnih dejavnikov in dejavnikov na ravni enot, vključno s priznavanjem turških interesov v energetskih sporih na otoku, zaščito regionalnih deležev nacionalnih energetskih podjetij in ohranjanjem ruskih položajev v finančnem sektorju grškega dela Cipra.

Ključne besede: Rusija, Ciper, vzhodno Sredozemlje, geopolitika, zemeljski plin, neoklasični realizem

IJEMS 14 (2): 3–38

Vpliv Sredozemlja na pogrebne slovesnosti in pogrebno glasbo na slovenskem obalnem območju

ANITA PRELOVŠEK

Članek opisuje sodobne pogrebne glasbene prakse na Primorskem, ki predstavlja sredozemsko obmejno regijo v Sloveniji. Po kratkem pregledu zgodovine žalovanja v Sredozemlju, se članek osredotoča na obliko in glasbeno spremljavo sodobnih pogrebov. Izpostavlja vpliv sredozemskih

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držav na pogrebe na Primorskem, predvsem vpliv Italije. Pojasnjuje, kako vrsto pogrebne slovesnosti in izbiro glasbe obarva prisotnost morja, podaja prikaz najpogostejših glasbenih zasedb in repertoarjev pesmi. Primerja pogrebe pripadnikov italijanske manjšine v Sloveniji s pogrebi v italijanskih obalnih regijah. Raziskava temelji na etnografskem delu in znanstveni literaturi ter člankih o pogrebnih obredih, vzetih iz dnevnih časopisov, revij in interneta. Terensko delo temelji na raziskavah na pokopališčih z uporabo metode participativnega opazovanja in pol strukturiranih intervjujev. Na Primorskem so vse pogostejši pogrebi, ki jih spremlja raztros pepela v morje, prav tako pesmi z morsko tematiko in pesmi v italijanščini. Čeprav je izbira pogrebne glasbe zelo pogosto individualizirana in je vse več priljubljenih pesmi, klasična glasba še vedno ostaja izbira mnogih Primorcev in tudi dalmatinske pesmi so precej pogoste. Redkeje najdemo na pogrebih tradicionalne žalostinke, ki so prisotne po vsej Sloveniji.

Ključne besede: pogreb, glasba, žalostinke, slovenska obala, južna Italija
IJEMS 14 (2): 39–60

Eksternalizacija meja EU kot rezultat sodelovanja z Libijo: Italija kot vrata do evropskih sanj

SELÇEN ÖNER AND MATTIA CIRINO

Ta članek navaja, da se je sodelovanje med Italijo in Libijo s podporo EU pospešilo in poglobilo zlasti po migracijski krizi (2015). Zlasti z uvedbo memoranduma o soglasju med Italijo in Libijo (2017) za boj proti nezakonitim migracijam je eksternaliziral meje EU in spremenil Sredozemsko morje v varovano mejo. Konceptualni in analitični okvir temelji na Waltersovih (2004) teritorialnih implikacijah evropeizacije migracij in zlasti konceptu mej, ki se nanaša na potegovanje meje za ohranjanje razlike med stabilnostjo in redom znotraj in neredom zunaj. Članek se osredotoča na Italijo, ki je ena izmed držav, ki jih je kriza najbolj prizadela, saj se nahaja na zunanji sredozemski meji EU. Študija temelji na pol strukturiranih, poglobljenih, osebnih intervjujev, opravljenih v Italiji v prvi polovici leta 2019 s člani poslanske zbornice različnih političnih strank, predstavniki nevladnih organizacij za reševanje na morju v Italiji, predstavnikom UNHCR (Urad visokega komisarja Združenih narodov za begunce) Italije in županom iz južne Italije. Intervjuji razkrivajo različne metafore in pripovedi, kot sta »Italija je ostala sama« zaradi solidarnostne krize v



EU in »Italija kot vrata v Evropo« za analizo vloge Italije pri eksternalizaciji meja EU s sodelovanjem z Libijo.

Ključne besede: nezakonite migracije, Italija, Libija, Evropska unija, Sredozemlje, nevladne organizacije za reševanje na morju

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Sredozemlje kot dejavnik za vpis v glasbene programe posameznih glasbil v glasbenih šolah:

Študija primera Slovenije

MATEJ PLEVNİK, MITJA GERŽEVIČ, IVAN LEŠNIK,
IZTOK BABNIK IN KATARINA BABNIK

Glavni cilj prispevka je predstaviti sredozemsko regijo kot dejavnik pri vpisu v program glasbe in glasbil v osnovne glasbene šole. Za namen prispevka smo pridobili od Ministrstva za izobraževanje, znanost in šport Republike Slovenije podatke o številu vpisnih mest študentov glasbe in njihovi razporeditvi po posameznem glasbilu. Primerjali smo podatke po posameznih statističnih regijah in opredelili značilnosti sredozemske regije. Empirične podatke smo analizirali z metodami za deskriptivno statistiko. Sredozemska regija v Sloveniji ima 5,6 % vseh prebivalcev Slovenije. Obstajata dve glasbeni šoli (državno povprečje je $5,8 \pm 4,1$), v katere je vpisanih 8,3 % učencev, starih od 6 do 18 let, iz statistične regije. Pihala in trobila so bolj zastopana od slovenskega povprečja, petje pa je najmanj zastopano v primerjavi z regionalnim povprečjem na državni ravni. Po vpisu v programe glasbenih inštrumentov v sredozemski regiji klavir, kljunasta flavta, trobenta, pozavna, tuba in tolkala pozitivno odstopajo od slovenskega povprečja. Glasbene šole v Sredozemlju v Sloveniji odražajo poseben interes prebivalcev za glasbeno vzgojo v tej regiji. Sredozemsko kulturno okolje v Sloveniji spodbuja študente k vpisu v številne glasbene skupine različnih zvrsti med in po končanem glasbenem izobraževanju. Kljub razlikam pri izbiri inštrumentov in udeležbi v skupinskih dejavnostih na področju glasbe in plesa (plesni programi, orkestri, zbori), ki jih je mogoče le delno razložiti s specifičnimi regionalnimi kulturnimi razlikami, moramo poudariti pomen formalne in neformalne glasbene vzgoje za otroke, ki bi morala biti vodilo za načrtovanje družbenih/nacionalnih dejavnosti na področju izobraževanja in razvoja otrok.

Ključne besede: glasba, Sredozemlje, glasbena vzgoja, osnovne šole, otroci, kultura, Slovenija

IJEMS 14 (2): 91–103

Oprijemljive koristi in povezovanje ljudi v mednarodni filmski produkciji: primer filmov, posnetih na Kreti

KATERINA KOMI, PANAYIOTA MINI IN NIKOS TSAGARAKIS

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Od poznih 40-ih let je bilo na grškem otoku Kreta delno ali v celoti posnetih več kot štirideset tujih filmov. Ta članek se osredotoča na pet od teh filmov: *Celui qui doit mourir* (Jules Dassin, 1957), *Tsatsiki, morsan och polisen* (Ella Lemhagen, 1999), *Eden à l'Ouest* (Costa-Gavras, 2009), *De-demin İnsanları* (Çagan Irmak, 2011), in *The Two Faces of January* (Hossein Amini, 2014). Članek obravnava učinke omenjenih produkcij na prebivalce Krete, njihove tuje producente in filmske ustvarjalce ter njihovo občinstvo po vsem svetu. Kot kažejo raziskave, so imele te produkcije številne materialne koristi tako za domačine kot tuje proizvajalce in so bile enako pomembne pri povezovanju ljudi iz različnih okolij in ustvarjanju transnacionalnih obveznic. Poleg tega je večina teh filmov, ki so bili posneti v mednarodnem kontekstu, pripovedovalo zgodbe o medsebojnem spoštovanju in strpnosti ter tako postala ključnega pomena pri spodbujanju mednarodne solidarnosti in napredovanju transnacionalne kinematografije kot močnega nosilca družbene zavesti.

Ključne besede: filmske lokacije, transnacionalni kino, evropski kino, filmske koprodukcije, mednarodno sodelovanje

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ملخصات

اكتشافات الغاز في قبرص: حدود النفوذ الروسي بيتر كاكزيبا

جلبت اكتشافات الغاز البحرية حول قبرص العديد من الجهات الفاعلة الخارجية إلى المنطقة. حصلت شركات الطاقة من الاتحاد الأوروبي والولايات المتحدة والشرق الأوسط على حقوق التنقيب وحصلت على حصص في مشاريع تطوير البنية التحتية. في حين أن عمالقة الطاقة المرتبطين بهذه الجهات الفاعلة حصلوا على حصص مهمة في صناعة الغاز القبرصية اليونانية النامية حالياً، فإن روسيا غائبة بشكل ملحوظ عن المستفيدين. الغياب جدير بالملاحظة بشكل خاص لأن روسيا طورت صفقات طاقة مهمة مع لاعبين إقليميين آخرين وتمارس نفوذاً اقتصادياً واسع النطاق على جمهورية قبرص. تسعى هذه الدراسة إلى فحص سبب عدم حدوث تورط الغاز الروسي في قبرص ولماذا ظلت موسكو بعيدة عن فرص الغاز القبرصي اليوناني. وتجادل بأن العوامل النظامية وكذلك المحلية أيضاً قيدت توسع مصالح الغاز الروسي. لفك أسباب هذا الغياب، تطبق الورقة النظرية والإطار التحليلي للواقعية الكلاسيكية الجديدة وتفسر نتائج السياسة الخارجية من خلال عدسات المتغيرات النظامية والمحلية. وخلصت الدراسة إلى أن موسكو ضحت بفرص الغاز في قبرص بسبب عدة عوامل هيكلية وعلى مستوى الوحدة، بما في ذلك الاعتراف بالمصالح التركية في نزاعات الطاقة بالجزيرة، وحماية الحصص الإقليمية لشركات الطاقة الوطنية، والحفاظ على المراكز الروسية في القطاع المالي القبرصي اليوناني. **الكلمات المفتاحية:** روسيا، قبرص، شرق البحر الأبيض المتوسط، الجغرافيا السياسية، الغاز الطبيعي، الواقعية الكلاسيكية الجديدة

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تأثير البحر الأبيض المتوسط على مراسم الجنازة وموسيقى الجنازة في المناطق الساحلية السلوفينية أنيتا بريلوفشيك

يصف المقال ممارسات الموسيقى الجنائزية المعاصرة في بريمورسكا، وهي منطقة تقع على حدود البحر الأبيض المتوسط في سلوفينيا. بعد لمحة موجزة عن تاريخ الرثاء في البحر الأبيض المتوسط، تركز المقالة على الشكل والمرافقة الموسيقية للجنازات الحديثة. ويشير إلى تأثير دول البحر الأبيض المتوسط، وخاصة إيطاليا، على الجنازات في بريمورسكا. يشرح كيف يتم تلوين نوع مراسم الجنازة واختيار الموسيقى من خلال وجود البحر، ويعطي سرداً للمجموعات الموسيقية وذخيرة

الأغاني الأكثر شيوعاً. ويقارن جنازات أعضاء الأقلية الإيطالية في سلوفينيا بالجنازات في المناطق الساحلية الإيطالية. يعتمد البحث على العمل الإثنوغرافي والأدب العلمي، بالإضافة إلى مقالات عن مراسم الجنازة مأخوذة من الصحف اليومية والمجلات والإنترنت. يعتمد العمل الميداني على البحث في المقابر باستخدام طريقة الملاحظة التشاركية والمقابلات شبه المنظمة. في بريمورسكا، أصبحت الجنازات المصحوبة بنثر الرماد في البحر أكثر تواتراً، وكذلك الأغاني ذات الطابع البحري والأغاني الإيطالية. على الرغم من أن اختيار موسيقى الجنازة غالباً ما يكون فردياً وهناك المزيد والمزيد من الأغاني الشعبية، لا تزال الموسيقى الكلاسيكية هي اختيار العديد من الأشخاص في بريمورسكا، كما أن الأغاني الدلماسية شائعة جداً. تم العثور على التراث التقليدي، الموجود في جميع أنحاء سلوفينيا، في الجنازات بشكل أقل تواتراً.

الكلمات المفتاحية: جنازة، موسيقى، رثاء، الساحل السلوفيني، جنوب إيطاليا

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إضفاء الطابع الخارجي على حدود الاتحاد الأوروبي من خلال التعاون مع ليبيا: إيطاليا بوابة الحلم الأوروبي سيلسين أونر وماتيا سيرينو

يناقش هذا المقال أن التعاون بين إيطاليا وليبيا بدعم من الاتحاد الأوروبي قد تسارع وتعمق خاصة بعد أزمة الهجرة (2015). خاصة مع تقديم مذكرة التفاهم بين إيطاليا وليبيا (2017) لمكافحة الهجرة غير النظامية، فقد نقلت حدود الاتحاد الأوروبي إلى الخارج وحولت البحر الأبيض المتوسط إلى "ليمس". يعتمد الإطار المفاهيمي والتحليلي على الآثار الإقليمية لأزمة الهجرة التي نشرها والترز (2004) وخاصة مفهوم الجبر "ليمس" الذي يشير إلى رسم خط للحفاظ على التمييز بين الاستقرار والنظام الداخلي والفوضى في الخارج. يركز المقال على إيطاليا، وهي إحدى الدول الأكثر تضرراً من الأزمة حيث تقع على الحدود الخارجية للاتحاد الأوروبي على البحر الأبيض المتوسط. تعتمد الدراسة على مقابلات شبه منظمة ومتعمقة وجهاً لوجه أجريت في إيطاليا في النصف الأول من عام 2019 مع أعضاء مجلس النواب من مختلف الأحزاب السياسية وممثلي المنظمات غير الحكومية للإنقاذ البحري في إيطاليا وممثل من المفوضية السامية للأمم المتحدة لشؤون اللاجئين في إيطاليا، وعمدة من جنوب إيطاليا. تكشف المقابلات استعارات وروايات مختلفة مثل "ثُركت إيطاليا وشأنها" بسبب أزمة التضامن في الاتحاد الأوروبي و "إيطاليا كجوبة

لأوروبا" لتحليل دور إيطاليا في إضفاء الطابع الخارجي على حدود الاتحاد الأوروبي من خلال التعاون مع ليبيا.
الكلمات المفتاحية: الهجرة غير النظامية، إيطاليا، ليبيا، الاتحاد الأوروبي، البحر الأبيض المتوسط ، المنظمات غير الحكومية للإنقاذ البحري

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البحر الأبيض المتوسط كعامل من عوامل التسجيل في برامج الموسيقى للآلات الموسيقية الفردية في مدارس الموسيقى: دراسة حالة لسولوفينيا ماتيچ بلفنيك ، ميتيا جيرجيفيتش ، إيفان ليشنيك ، إزتوك بابنيك ، وكاترينا بابنيك

الهدف الرئيسي من الورقة هو تقديم منطقة البحر الأبيض المتوسط كعامل في التسجيل في برنامج الموسيقى والآلات الموسيقية في مدارس الموسيقى الابتدائية. لغرض البحث، حصلنا على بيانات من وزارة التعليم والعلوم والرياضة في جمهورية سلوفينيا حول عدد أماكن تسجيل طلاب الموسيقى وتخصيصهم بواسطة آلة موسيقية واحدة. قارنا البيانات حسب المناطق الإحصائية الفردية وحددنا خصائص منطقة البحر الأبيض المتوسط. تم تحليل البيانات التجريبية باستخدام طرق الإحصاء الوصفي. يبلغ عدد سكان منطقة البحر الأبيض المتوسط في سلوفينيا 5.6% من مجموع السكان في سلوفينيا. هناك مدرستان للموسيقى (المعدل الوطني هو ± 5.8 4.1) ، حيث يتم تسجيل 8.3% من التلاميذ الذين تتراوح أعمارهم بين 6 و 18 عاماً من المنطقة الإحصائية في البرامج. يتم تمثيل مجموعات آلات النفخ الخشبية والنحاسية بشكل أفضل من المتوسط السلوفيني ، في حين أن الغناء هو أقل مجموعة موسيقية تمثيلاً مقارنة بالمعدل الإقليمي على المستوى الوطني. بعد التسجيل في برامج الآلات الموسيقية في منطقة البحر الأبيض المتوسط ، ينحرف البيانو والمسجل والبوق والترومبون والأنبوب والإيقاعات بشكل إيجابي عن المتوسط السلوفيني. تعكس مدارس الموسيقى في منطقة البحر الأبيض المتوسط في سلوفينيا الاهتمام الخاص للسكان بالتعليم الموسيقي في هذه المنطقة. تشجع البيئة الثقافية المتوسطة في سلوفينيا الطلاب على الالتحاق بالعديد من المجموعات الموسيقية من مختلف الأنواع أثناء وبعد إكمال تعليمهم الموسيقي. على الرغم من الاختلافات الموجودة في اختيار الأداة والمشاركة في الأنشطة الجماعية في مجالات الموسيقى والرقص (برامج الرقص، مجموعات الأوركسترا، مجموعات الكورال) ،

والتي لا يمكن تفسيرها جزئياً إلا من خلال اختلافات ثقافية إقليمية محددة ، يجب التأكيد على أهمية التربية الموسيقية الرسمية وغير الرسمية للأطفال ، والتي يجب أن تكون دليلاً لتخطيط الأنشطة الاجتماعية / الوطنية في مجال تعليم الأطفال وتنميتهم **الكلمات المفتاحية:** الموسيقى، البحر الأبيض المتوسط ، التربية الموسيقية، المدارس الابتدائية، الأطفال، الثقافة، سلوفينيا

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الفوائد الملموسة وترباط الناس في الإنتاج السينمائي الدولي: حالة الأفلام التي تم تصويرها في جزيرة كريت كاترينا كومي وبانايوتا ميني ونيكوس تساغاراكييس

منذ أواخر الأربعينيات من القرن الماضي، تم تصوير أكثر من أربعين فيلماً أجنبياً جزئياً أو كلياً في جزيرة كريت اليونانية. تركز هذه المقالة على خمسة من هذه الأفلام:

Jules Dassin's *Celui qui doit mourir* (1957) ، Ella Lemhagen's *Tsatsiki, morsan och polisen* (1999) ، Costa-Gavras's *Eden à l'Ouest* (2009) ، Çagan Irmak's *Dedemin İnsanları* (2011) و Hossein Amini's *The Two Faces of January* (2014).

يبحث المقال في آثار هذه الإنتاجات على سكان كريت، ومنتجهم وصانعي الأفلام الأجانب، وعلى جماهيرهم في جميع أنحاء العالم. كما يظهر البحث، كان لهذه المنتجات العديد من الفوائد المادية للسكان المحليين والمنتجين الأجانب على حد سواء، كما كانت لها نفس الأهمية في جمع الأشخاص من خلفيات مختلفة معاً وإنشاء روابط عبر وطنية. علاوة على ذلك، بعد أن تم إنتاجها في سياق دولي، تروي معظم هذه الأفلام قصصاً من الاحترام المتبادل والتسامح، وبالتالي أصبحت حاسمة في تعزيز التضامن الدولي والنهوض بالسينما العابرة للحدود كوسيلة قوية للوعي الاجتماعي.

الكلمات المفتاحية: مواقع الأفلام، السينما العابرة للحدود، السينما الأوروبية، الإنتاج المشترك للأفلام، التعاون الدولي

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Mountains and sea, movement and stillness, limitlessness and boundaries.
Krk Island, Croatia, 2021, photograph by Anton Vučajnk



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