

International Journal of Euro-Mediterranean Studies

VOLUME 15 | 2022 | NUMBER 1

Authoritarian Resilience and Political Transformation
in the Arab World: Lessons from the Arab Spring 2.0

László Csicsmann and Erzsébet N. Rózsa

From the United Cyprus Republic to Two-State Solution

Mehmet Direkli

The EU's Missions and Operations from the Central
Mediterranean to West Africa in the Context
of the Migration Crisis

Anna Molnár and Mariann Vecsey

The Spanish Campaigns against the Kingdom of Tlemcen's
Cities and the Resistance Movements from 1516 to 1530

Meshal Alenezi

Smoothing Egyptian Households' Consumption:
The Role of Credit Channel

Omneia A. Helmy, Mona E. Fayed, and Nadine A. Dessouky

*Unequal Europe: Regional Integration and the Rise
of European Inequality* by Jason Besckfield

Csaba Lakócai



International Journal of Euro-Mediterranean Studies

ISSN 1855-3362 (printed)

ISSN 2232-6022 (online)

The aim of the International Journal of Euro-Mediterranean Studies is to promote intercultural dialogue and exchanges between societies, develop human resources, and to assure greater mutual understanding in the Euro-Mediterranean region.

L'objectif de la revue internationale d'études Euro-Méditerranéennes est de promouvoir le dialogue interculturel et les échanges entre les sociétés, développer les ressources humaines et assurer une compréhension mutuelle de qualité au sein de la région euro-méditerranéenne.

Namen Mednarodne revije za evro-mediteranske študije je spodbujanje medkulturnega dialoga in izmenjav, razvoj človeških virov in zagotavljanje boljšega medsebojnega razumevanja v evro-mediteranski regiji.

IJEMS is indexed in Scopus, International Bibliography of the Social Sciences, Directory of Open Access Journals, Index Islamicus, OCLC, and Summon by Serial Solutions.

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

Abdelhamid El-Zoheiry, *Euro-Mediterranean University, Slovenia*

MANAGING EDITOR

Jerneja Penca, *Euro-Mediterranean University, Slovenia,*
editor.ijems@emuni.si

ASSOCIATE EDITORS

Barbara Gornik, *Science and Research Centre Koper, Slovenia*

Karim Moustaghfir, *Al Akhawayn University, Morocco*

Chahir Zaki, *Cairo University, Egypt*

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

Abeer Refky, *Arab Academy for Science, Technology and Maritime Transport, Egypt*

Francesco Martinico, *University of Catania, Italy*

Mona Esam Othman Fayed, *University of Cairo, Egypt*

Claudio Cressati, *University of Udine, Italy*

Lola Bañon Castellón, *University of Valencia, Spain*

Nataša Urošević, *Juraj Dobrila University of Pula, Croatia*

Boštjan Udovič, *University of Ljubljana, Slovenia*

Maysoun Ibrahim, *Palestinian Syndicate for Information Sciences and Technology, Palestine*

Péter Kacziba, *University of Pécs, Hungary*

Lotfi Ben Romdhane, *University of Sousse, Tunisia*

Mejjad Nezha, *University Hassan II of Casablanca, Morocco*



International Journal of Euro-Mediterranean Studies *Table of Contents*

- 3 Authoritarian Resilience and Political Transformation
in the Arab World: Lessons from the Arab Spring 2.0
László Csicsmann and Erzsébet N. Rózsa
- 31 From the United Cyprus Republic to Two-State Solution
Mehmet Direkli
- 55 The EU's Missions and Operations from the Central
Mediterranean to West Africa in the Context
of the Migration Crisis
Anna Molnár and Mariann Vecsey
- 83 The Spanish Campaigns against the Kingdom of Tlemcen's
Cities and the Resistance Movements from 1516 to 1530
Meshal Alenezi
- 105 Smoothing Egyptian Households' Consumption:
The Role of Credit Channel
Omneia A. Helmy, Mona E. Fayed, and Nadine A. Dessouky
- 137 *Unequal Europe: Regional Integration and the Rise
of European Inequality* by Jason Besckfield
Csaba Lakócai
- 141 Résumés
- 145 Povzetki
- 149 ملخصات

INFORMATION FOR AUTHORS
Manuscripts are accepted on the understanding that they are original and not under simultaneous consideration by any other publication. Submitted manuscripts may be subject to checks in order to detect instances of plagiarism. All manuscripts are double-blind peer reviewed. Manuscripts should be prepared following *The Chicago Manual of Style*. For submissions and detailed instructions about the style and content of papers, please see <https://ijems.emuni.si>.

COPYRIGHT NOTICE

The *International Journal of Euro-Mediterranean Studies* is an Open Access Journal distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. Copyright for all articles published in IJEMS is held by individual authors.
No author fees are charged.



PUBLISHED BY
Euro-Mediterranean University
Trevisini Palace
Kidričevo nabrežje 2
SI-6330 Piran, Slovenia

<https://ijems.emuni.si>
ijems@emuni.si

Print run: 200. Printed in Slovenia
by Demat d.o.o., Ljubljana

Mednarodna revija za evro-mediteranske študije je namenjena mednarodni znanstveni in strokovni javnosti; izhaja v angleščini s povzetki v slovenščini, francoščini in arabščini. Revija je brezplačna.



Authoritarian Resilience and Political Transformation in the Arab World: Lessons from the Arab Spring 2.0

LÁSZLÓ CSICSMANN

Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary

laszlo.csicsmann@uni-corvinus.hu

ERZSÉBET N. RÓZSA

National University of Public Service, Hungary

nroza.erszebet@gmail.com

In 2019, a renewed protest wave in the Arab World has drawn the attention of scholars to the profound challenges of theorizing the political transition process. This article pays particular attention to the different theoretical discourses and previous experience of the 2011 wave of protests. The 2019 wave of protests mainly reached the rentier republics, where the old social contract had collapsed, and a transition had started. This paper argues that the political transformation of the region has not ended yet, and the recent protest wave is part of the emergence of neo-authoritarian regimes. This study addresses the divergent trajectories of political transformation in the countries impacted by the second wave of protests. Namely, the research asks, which factors and mechanisms explain the different results of the process? Why did discontent in the four countries – Algeria, Sudan, Lebanon and Iraq – not erupt in 2011, but in 2019 only? The study considers four explanatory factors (regime type, the role of armed forces, the collapse of the social contract, and sectarianism) to analyse select cases (Algeria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Sudan) from the recent upheavals of 2019. The theory of adaptive authoritarianism is applied to the four cases, finding that the initial political context significantly determines the outcome of the protests.

Key Words: Middle East and North Africa, authoritarian upgrading, adaptive authoritarianism, Arab Spring, non-democratic regimes, rentierism

 <https://emuni.si/ISSN/2232-6022/15.3-30.pdf>

THE FAILURE OF THEORIZING ARAB POLITICS

[4] The Middle East region has been witnessing waves of political unrest since the states of the region achieved independence in the mid-20th century. With eight monarchies and 'life-long' leaders even in the secular Arab states, the question of regime stability is central for political scientists concerned with theorising the political processes making these regimes resilient to change. And, in the same vein, when the 2011 protests turned into the Arab Spring, much was written about the inapplicability of existing political theories to explain the recent developments in the region. The decade of the Arab Spring, however, has provided a fertile ground for experts to analyse how unpredictable – based on theories developed over political processes elsewhere in the world – the political changes of the region still are. Thus, the question is if a theory of the Arab political processes can be framed.

Historically, three different explanatory paradigms have emerged with the claim to offer an indigenous explanation for the direction of the transformation processes in the Arab World:

- 1 *The school of 'Arab exceptionalism'* of the 1980s and 1990s, rooted in the debate between general social scientists and Area Studies experts-called the 'Area Studies Controversy' (Bank and Busse 2021) – claims that the region has escaped the global waves of democratization. Area studies experts argue that Middle Eastern politics is embedded in a unique cultural and historical setting, thus the general theories of Political Science and International Relations are unable to explain the contemporary tendencies (Tessler, Nachtwey, and Dressel 1999). Eva Bellin goes even further when she argues that the engagement of Arab regimes with global political trends in the 1990s was characterized by a 'dual resistance' to economic and political reform (Bellin 2004). Nevertheless, this thesis of Arab exceptionalism has been challenged by the waves of Arab protests confirming that Arab political regimes are not exempt from political turmoil and unrest. Relying on the 'regime survival strategy' by Arab ruling elites as described by Korany,



Brynen, and Noble (1998) could not maintain authoritarian stability anymore.

2 *Democratization theory*, drawn up over the successful transitions in Latin-America and Central Europe in the 1990s, held that an uprising against an authoritarian regime marks the beginning of a democratic transformation (Hinnebusch 2015, 205–6). Yet, in the 2011 Middle Eastern political transformation only one country took on a path towards democratization: Tunisia, which has characteristics distinctly different from those of the other Arab states, such as a homogenous society, a French speaking elite, the role of a national trade union in mobilizing the population, an apolitical armed forces and self-constraining political actors, especially the Islamists (Zoubir 2015). It is also noted that the Tunisian model is very fragile (as yet) and it cannot be considered a consolidated democracy with most of the old elite in the same positions as under Ben Ali (Gallien and Werenfels 2019). Consequently, democratization as yet cannot be considered an irreversible process.¹

[5]

3 Heydemann and Leenders (2011) in their *post-democratization discourse* – established the theory before the Arab Spring – present a process of adaptation and learning, which explains how the protesters and the ruling elites adapt to the changing political context. Stacher defines adaptation [by the political elites] as a ‘political change that adjusts a state to changes in its environment [...] without giving up power or sacrificing the cohesion of elites’ (Stacher 2012, 22). Adaptation, therefore, takes authoritarian stability for granted, and consequently, Middle Eastern political regimes are resilient (authoritarian resilience) to political pressure both from the bottom-up and from the outside (Hinnebusch 2015, 205–6). However, this process of adaptation-called by Heydemann

¹ In July 2021, Tunisia has witnessed a renewed political crisis with the dismissal of the government by the President. At the time of writing, it is impossible to characterize the Tunisian system as a fully-fledged democracy.

[6]

authoritarian upgrading (Heydemann 2007) – by the so-called post-populist republics and non-oil monarchies (Jordan and Morocco) indicates that a ‘learning process’ has taken place. In the 1990s, new forms of control over the population and political opposition emerged: control of civil society, new methods of settlement of political disputes, the use of selective economic reforms, control over new communication channels (social media), as well as a new type of international relations concerned with enhancing relations with non-Western states (Heydemann 2007).

Nevertheless, although this authoritarian upgrading has contributed to the stability of the authoritarian regimes, it fails to explain why and how some regimes have lost control leading to the 2011/2019 events. Also, the authoritarian upgrading theory focuses on the regimes per se, while leaves the response of the societies unaccounted for. The present paper aims at building its argument largely on the concept of *adaptive authoritarianism* as it helps to explain the differences in the outcomes of different transformation processes taking place in the different Arab states.

The recent protest waves (2019 and after) in the Arab World are analysed using 4 case studies with the aim to answer the question if this transformation has been completed yet, or if we will witness a new process of transformation or persistent political change. The paper argues that the protest wave of 2019 could not be considered as an Arab Spring 2.0, but instead that these protests are happening in the larger context of the transition from old type of authoritarian regimes to a new type of authoritarian setting. To this end the factors which could explain the differences in the results of the transformation are identified, pointing out how divergent the outcomes of the 2019 protest wave are, with an emphasis on the structural reforms of the political system.

Four cases have been selected-Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon and Sudan-in which not only protests have taken place, but prominent leaders of the countries were ousted from power. In Algeria and Sudan the long-ruling authoritarian Presidents were forced to leave, while



in Iraq and Lebanon the quasi-democratically elected Prime Ministers left the political arena. However, while each case has unique, context-related features, distinguishing different regime/transformation types in the region, they prove that the region is still in the process of a systemic, regional and internal transformation, and the so-called Arab Spring has not ended yet. [7]

The general context of the 2019 demonstrations and following events thus fit into the systemic, regional and internal process of transformation, which is characterized and defined by both internal and external factors. While the relevance of the latter cannot be underestimated, the present paper focuses on the internal factors of the transition process, such as the ‘point of departure’ of the protests’ – i.e. the domestic political context-the role of the armed forces, the collapse of the ‘unsocial social contract, and the role of sectarianism. First, the four explanatory factors are analysed from a theoretical perspective comparing the 2011 and 2019 protest waves in the Middle East. Then the four case studies will be compared on the basis of the unique features of the political systems of the second wave of protests.

THE ‘POINT OF DEPARTURE’ OF THE PROTESTS:
THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONTEXT

Previous studies on transitology/democratic transition emerging during the end of the Cold War introduced different explanations of ‘authoritarian breakdown,’ but regarding the Middle East even the question if an authoritarian breakdown has happened in the four selected cases can be valid, proving (again) that the democratic transition theory could not be applied directly. One of the contributions to the literature is the finding that authoritarian breakdown does not necessarily lead to democracy, but can lead to authoritarian transition too. Stacher even warns the scholars against applying the concept of authoritarian breakdown on the cases of the Arab Uprisings (Stacher 2015, 260–1). Thus, this paper argues that the evolution of the majority of the Arab political regimes should be understood rather as a transformation process from an old to a new type of authoritarian regime, and not as a regime change.

TABLE 1 Typology of the Arab Regimes

State type	Oil/gas rich states (rentier economies)	Oil/gas poor states (non-rentier economies)
Republics	Algeria, Libya, Iraq	Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, Syria, Palestine, Lebanon
Monarchies	Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates	Jordan, Morocco

[8]

NOTES Prepared on the basis of Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds (2015, 60).

When analysing this process, the old authoritarian regimes offer themselves as a logical ‘point of departure.’ Recent studies on the Arab protest wave of 2011 confirm that the starting point of the protests, along with certain other factors, could explain the outcomes (Hinnebusch 2015; Stepan and Linz 2013). However, since consolidation of a democracy – based on historical experience – usually takes about fifty years to complete on average, the transition initiated by the Arab Spring can be still in the beginning phase.

Regime typology may help to identify the differences in the region when trying to answer why discontent in the four countries – Algeria, Sudan, Lebanon and Iraq – did not erupt in 2011, but in 2019 only. Based on the two-fold regime typology (monarchy/republic, rentier state/non-rentier state, table 1) we can state that the first wave of the Arab Spring – threatening regime stability – started in the ‘non-rentier republics’ (except for Libya) (Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 2015, 60). The 2019 Arab demonstrations hit the republics again, but while in 2011 events were mostly unfolding in non-rentier economies, in 2019 Algeria and Iraq, two rentier states, were also affected. The other two states, Lebanon and, following its split from South Sudan in 2011, Sudan are poor in oil reserves, i. e. are not rentier economies.

On the basis of the above, however, it may also be cautiously concluded that the monarchical character provides more resilience to a country than rentierism. Though the discussion of the monarchies would exceed the scope of this paper, it is noteworthy that both in 2011 and in 2019 the Arab Uprisings struck the republics in the first place, while monarchies have proved more resilient to the



demonstrations. This *monarchical exceptionalism*, subject to many academic debates (Yom 2012), was explained by the fact that most of the monarchies are rentier economies,² where state budgets are derived mostly from incomes from oil and gas trade, making welfare expenditure possible and contributing to the maintenance of the social contract. Yet, the examples of Algeria and Iraq contradict this proposition. [9]

Furthermore, this two-fold regime-typology (monarchy/republic, rentier state/non-rentier state) still cannot answer the question why exactly these countries were affected: (a) not all monarchies are rentier states (Jordan, Morocco); (b) there are Arab republics, which are rentier economies themselves (Algeria, Libya); and (c) even states with much smaller budgets raised their public spending significantly in 2011 to quiet demands for reform. Therefore, neither state type, nor rentierism in itself explains monarchical exceptionalism.

DIVERSE TRAJECTORIES DURING THE FIRST WAVE AND SECOND WAVE OF PROTESTS

The transformation of the political regimes induced by the first wave of the Arab Spring has produced different outcomes, mostly determined by the characteristics of the political system:

- Egypt is the example of a *re-arrangement* in the sense that the Sisi regime is again built on the dominance of the armed forces.
- Tunisia is the only example of a *successful democratic transition* as yet.³
- As the result of weakening state structures, a '*state vacuum*' and civil war has evolved in three countries: Yemen, Syria and Libya (Gaub 2017a).

² Out of the eight Arab monarchies six (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman) are rentier economies, while Morocco and Jordan are not or semi-rentier ones depending on the type of definition used.

³ In Tunisia a recent political crisis has emerged in 2021, which questioned the successful democratic transition. However, at the time of writing, the outcome of this political crisis has yet to be seen.

[10]

- In the other Arab states there have been *democratic-looking political reforms* related to the hybrid political regimes, however, in the context of the basically authoritarian structures *no meaningful transformation* has taken place. This implies that these countries could potentially look forward to further transformation.

In the context of the 2019 developments the same four scenarios can be observed:

- Algeria and Sudan, both termed as ‘military regimes,’ had all the *indications of a possible Egypt-like transition* (Kamrava 1998).
- Lebanon, with its confessional state model, was considered a proto-democracy (Kamrava 1998) with the *expectations of a democratic transition*.
- Iraq – at least for certain periods – showed *weakening state structures and ‘state vacuum.’*
- The rest of the Arab countries went on with the *democratic-looking hybrid political regimes with no meaningful transformation* in their basically authoritarian structures (with the potential of further transformation remaining).

GENERAL FEATURES OF THE 2019 PROTEST WAVE

The above conclusions seem to support the presumption that the 2019 demonstrations fit into the transformation started in 2010–2011 and in themselves they cannot be considered a structurally new series of events. A further analysis helps to uncover the parallels in spite of the differences in the political events unfolding in the four countries – Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon and Sudan – including the similarities to those in 2011.

- 1 Although both in 2011 and in 2019 there were only some Arab states experiencing demonstrations on such a scale that a transformation started in the political system, the question is why – in both 2011 and in 2019 – it was these countries. In the four 2019 Arab Spring countries a further question can



be raised: *Why not in 2011 and why in 2019?* One significant characteristic stands out: all the four had *experienced armed conflicts* in the previous decades, the sense of which is still alive even if the younger generations have no personal memories thereof. In the Lebanese civil war (1975–1990) more than one hundred thousand people died, and in 2006 the country faced a short war with Israel. In Sudan, the civil war had two phases (1955–1972, 1983–2005), following which South Sudan broke away in 2011. In Algeria, following the 1989 elections a bloody civil war broke out, which went on until 2002, with the number of the dead in the tens of thousands. In Iraq, following the 2003 American-led intervention an armed uprising evolved, followed by – after the withdrawal of the US troops – the quick appearance and expansion of the Islamic State. Consequently, civil war conditions and the memories thereof in all four countries played a significant restraining role and partly explain why the population was not mobilized in 2011 (Dunne 2020, 184–5).

[11]

- 2 Further similarities/differences of the four states – based on *economic and social data* – are included in table 2. The differing parameters prove that neither the demonstrations nor their outcomes can be deduced from the social problems alone. Three out of the four countries are medium-income states, while Sudan is one of the least developed states in the Arab World.
- 3 An important conclusion of the 2011, and even more so the 2019, demonstrations has been the theory of *adaptive authoritarianism*, which states that in the course of demonstrations and the state response, a two-direction socialization (‘learning’) process is taking place (Heydemann and Leenders 2011). On the one hand, Arab political leaders are following the political processes in their region closely, preparing a cost-benefit analysis, learning the techniques with which demonstrations can be stopped/prevented, and elaborating their policies accordingly. In 2011 both Muammar Qaddafi and Bashar al-Assad came to the conclusion that if they fight back, they

TABLE 2 Main Data of the four Arab States in 2020

Countries	Algeria	Iraq	Lebanon	Sudan
population (million)	43	39	5.5	45.6
GDP per capita (USD)	15,200	16,700	19,600	4,300
Poverty (%)	23.0	23.0	28.6	46.5
Unemployment (%)	11.7	16	9.7	19.6
Unemployment among 15–24 year old youth (%)	39.3	25.6	n.a.	n.a.
Urbanization rate (%)	73.7	70.9	88.9	35.3
Literacy among the population above 15 (%)	81.4	50.1	95.1	60.7

NOTES Based on data from from The World Factbook (<https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/>).

may remain in power. The international reaction to the external – NATO – intervention in Libya in March 2011 made Assad conclude that the possibility of a similar measure in Syria is of a very low probability. Consequently, the Assad regime used a higher level of force against the demonstrators. The countries, which introduced political reforms (see above) are also cases in point. On the other hand, the demonstrators also have undergone a learning process and used experience in other countries to help their cause at home. In April 2019 this was evident in the parallelly unfolding events in Algeria and Sudan. Algerian President Bouteflika resigned on April 2, which induced the Sudanese demonstrators to demand the resignation of President Bashir, who was finally ousted from office by the army on April 11. In the Sudanese case not only were the demonstrators following the Algerian example, but also the armed forces, which probably contributed to the swift departure of the President.

THE ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES

Theories on political change underline that a political regime responds to political turmoil with the use of force. However, as historical examples prove, if the level of repression reaches an unprece-



dened level it may force a regime change. It is also often argued that should a political reform be launched by the military in the shadow of an existing political and/or economic influence, the new civilian government – taking over from the military – tries to curb the privileges of the military often leading to a counter-response (Huntington 1991, 238) (see the Egyptian transition after 2011).

[13]

The role of the armed forces in the MENA has been the subject of many analyses due to their specific relationship with power, politics and economy, and their embeddedness in society (Abul-Magd 2017). Since most Arab countries fought wars of independence and/or the military elites were directing the modernization of the country and/or were experiencing wars and cease-fires, the military always had a high prestige and was considered part of the *raison d'état*. Thus, the military's participation in and 'contribution' to the transition itself was crucial (Hinnebusch 2012). Nevertheless, in many countries the tradition of tribal armed groups and/or militias has produced parallel armed forces, which, according to the changing political situation, were recurrently incorporated in the armed forces of the state.

In the 2011 Arab Spring demonstrations the military's participation was decisive during the events, though with different patterns (Barany 2011):

- The army supported the demonstrators (Egypt, Tunisia).
- The army (and the paramilitary forces) were split over the demonstrations (Libya, Yemen).
- The army stood against the demonstrators (Syria, Bahrain).

In the 2019 demonstrations, however, besides the regular army paramilitary forces had also to be taken into account. As noted above, with the memories of civil wars, the population in all four countries rejected the use of force in any form and wanted to avoid further civil war. In Algeria and Sudan, in order to ensure regime survival, the military helped remove President Bouteflika and President al-Bashir from office. While in Iraq and Lebanon, where paramilitary forces were closely related to, or even forming part of political actors, the army had no significant role.

THE COLLAPSE OF THE 'UNSOCIAL' SOCIAL
CONTRACT

[14]

Scholars often frame the Arab Spring as a consequence of the increasing socio-economic challenges faced by citizens resulting in the collapse of the previous unwritten social contract due to the spill-over effect of the global financial crisis in 2008. Amirah El-Haddad argues that after the failure of the neoliberal reforms of the 1980s, regimes supported the crony capitalists of their countries in order to strengthen regime cohesion (El-Haddad 2020). Thus, the emerging social contracts, which have been challenged by the recent unrests, are rather 'unsocial.' Yet, the waves of demonstrations in 2010/2011, as well as in 2019, were not the first in the history of the Middle East and North Africa. The manifold crises of the region – political, economic and social – first became manifest in the 'bread riots' in the 1970's in reaction to the economic liberalization measures taken by the regional governments. The liberalization interfered with and demanded to put an end to the system of high state subsidies provided under the social contract, wherein the low level of political freedom was compensated by the low prices of basic food and fuel. While ruling elites through the region could thus consolidate their power, the Arab Spring in 2011 was a clear signal that the social contract formerly providing the basis of this authoritarian stability has come to a breaking point (Silva, Levin, and Morgandi 2012). This, however, raises the question if a new social contract will be established, and if so, on what basis. The 'new' regimes established in the follow-up to the Arab Spring were established on a new/renewed social contract. It is yet to be seen how long and how much stability these can provide to the new ruling elites.⁴

THE ROLE OF SECTARIANISM IN MIDDLE EASTERN
POLITICS

Recent events in the Middle East and North Africa could be described from two different perspectives. One school says that behind

⁴With the outbreak of the Russian-Ukraine war food security related issues have a profound impact on this renewed social contract.



each political issue religious identity plays the most important role; while another approach argues that sectarianism does not play a role in the recent political transformation. Valbjørn's (2020) third perspective establishes a connection between sectarianism and Middle Eastern political developments.

[15]

Though sectarian politics should not be neglected in our analysis of the post-Arab Spring transitions, it seems that the protests' narratives – both in 2011 and in 2019 – were mainly built along nationalist lines rejecting any superficial division of the state.

In the following, the above analysed elements of the transformation process will serve as the basis for comparison.

Algeria

In Algeria, the type of regime as well as its political setting was largely defined by the War of Independence (1954–1962). The consequent state model – a rentier republic – was built on the dominance of the armed forces, a one-party rule (FLN, *Front de Libération Nationale* – reflecting the memory of the struggle for independence) and a strong president. The model was first challenged in 1988 by the 'bread riots,' which initiated a regime survival strategy from the ruling elites. The consequent consolidation of the military-based model could cautiously be considered as a forerunner to the later (post-2011) *Egypt-like re-arrangements*. Yet, the introduction of political reforms, including the 1989 modification of the constitution terminating the political monopoly of the FLN, provides an early case of *adaptive authoritarianism*. Though the diversification of the political scene in itself posed a challenge, the results in the June 1990 municipal elections – with the newly established Islamist party, the *Front Islamique du Salut* (FIS) receiving 55% of the votes – confirmed the erosion of the legacy of the political model rooted in the War of Independence as well as the shift in the identity of the public. Following the FIS lead in the 1991 parliamentary elections, however, the armed forces intervened, the second round was cancelled, and the military – claiming national interests – took over power. The ensuing bloody civil war from 1992 was terminated by the presidency of Abdel Aziz Bouteflika (1999–2019) (Bouandel 2016). In the long

process of regime consolidation President Bouteflika had not only become the symbol of the post-civil-war consolidation and reconciliation, but of the Algerian case of adaptive authoritarianism.

[16] Partly due to the heritage of the War of Independence and in other part due to its role in the democratization process of the 1990s, the perception of the armed forces within the society is still positive. In spite of the atrocities in the civil war, it has not only maintained its popularity, but also increased its political influence: in the 'informal distribution of power' (among the president, the civilian political actors, the intelligence and the military) symbolized by the election of President Bouteflika, the military has emerged as the most powerful political actor, controlling the president and the political parties from behind. Although Bouteflika tried to gain control by playing out the armed forces and the intelligence against each other, following Bouteflika's stroke in 2013, the military took the upper hand and used the President as a puppet to preserve the results of the national consolidation. Consequently, after Bouteflika's ousting from power in April 2019 Saleh became the *de facto* political leader of Algeria until his sudden death in December 2019. The new president Abdelqadir Bensaleh was also proposed by the army, in a way resembling the Egyptian model of re-establishing military-backed rule. Thus, the Algerian armed forces, while rejecting the use of force, introduced a transition controlled from above. Nevertheless, this top-down controlled approach has not proved credible to the public, especially with the awareness of the consequences of the Egyptian authoritarian re-organization (Boubekeur 2020).

Although in 2011 – parallel to the unfolding Arab Spring in Algeria's direct and wider neighbourhood – there were demonstrations in the big cities, the memories of the armed conflicts as well as the increase of the social benefits by the regime prevented further manifestations of public frustration. However, the erosion of the President's legitimacy, the global economic crisis followed by the drop in oil prices in the mid-2010s and the cutback of state budget expenditures meant an end to the social contract 'established' in 1999 (Bartu 2020a, 10). The change in the demography – a new genera-



tion has grown up since the end of the civil war – means that the memory of living amid an armed conflict is not a restraining force anymore. This combination of political, economic and social changes made the context ripe for the demonstrations which started when in 2019 it was announced that President Bouteflika would run (for the fifth time) in the presidential elections planned for 2020, which the demonstrations finally succeeded in preventing. [17]

Sudan

Sudan's political system, due to the protracted North-South civil war (1955–1972), was also defined by the role of the armed forces. Though the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement closed down the first phase of the civil war, in 1983 the second phase started, which was terminated by the bloodless military coup in 1989 led by Brigadier General Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir. The ensuing military dictatorship maintained by the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation lasted until 1993. From 1993, in a move that can be interpreted as an adaptation process by the regime in general and Bashir in particular, the military dictatorship gave way to a civilian government, wherein Bashir took office as a civilian president heading the National Congress Party. 'Civilianization' was complemented with a top-down Islamization process in alliance with Hassan al-Turabi, widely considered the theoretical father of the Sudanese Islamic revolution. In the process, the *sharia* was introduced (Collins 2008, 185–7). The thirty years of the Bashir regime established a political system based on the equilibrium of the Islamists and the armed forces, balancing the rival armed groups and satisfying the Khartoum economic elites (Tossell 2020).

This balancing act and regime stability, however, were seriously challenged: the uprisings in the South and the war in Darfur (2004–2006) indicated the deep splits in the Sudanese society, especially between Arabs and non-Arabs. The atrocities committed during the fighting led to an international arrest warrant against Bashir by the International Criminal Court in 2009, making him the first president sentenced in office (Duursma-Müller 2019).

The break-away of South Sudan shook the legitimacy of the

[18] regime not only due to the loss of territory, but also by the loss of a significant portion of its oil wealth and arable land, on which the Sudanese ‘social contract’ was based. The armed conflict with South Sudan in 2012–2013 was a last effort to restore previous order and avoid the need to adapt to the new situation.

The deterioration of the Sudanese economy had a huge role in the outbreak of the December 2018 demonstrations. Due to the worsening of everyday life conditions, not only the public but also the business elites previously supporting Bashir turned against the President. While demonstrations were already held in 2012–2013, mostly by young people demanding political and economic reforms, then the armed forces brutally suppressed them (Tossell 2020, 4). Yet, in 2018–2019 the armed forces were split as to their reaction to the demonstrations, and it was the paramilitary *Rapid Support Forces* (RSF)⁵ that were shooting at the demonstrators and committing mass rapes to prevent active female participation, as the regular armed forces rejected the use of force against the demonstrators. Consequently, although in February 2019 Bashir promised reforms to the demonstrators, this proved too little too late, and in April – in a move to maintain the regime – the armed forces removed him from office.

Lebanon

The confessional political system of Lebanon built on a careful balance of the different confessions and clans faced a crisis in 1975 when this balance came to be so seriously challenged by the shifts in the demographic composition of the country that it led to a bloody civil war. The Taif Agreement of 1990 – closing down the civil war – in itself was as an attempt at adaptation: as the confessional system was maintained, the new *sectarian bargain* (Mackey 2008, 138–40) changed the ratios. It split the 128 parliamentary mandates equally between the Christians and the Muslims while preserving the precious concession-based division of power in effect since 1943. Conse-

⁵ The RSF has grown out from the *Janjaweed* militias, who committed grave atrocities against the non-Arab population in Darfur in 2004.



quently, this new sectarian bargain was not much more than a (partial) re-arrangement of the state model.

An eventual indigenous adaptation of the confessional system to the changing demographic dynamics, however, was challenged by the Syrian presence (1976–2005) and political interference. Although following the murder of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005, Syrian troops had to leave Lebanon (Salloukh 2010, 134–40), relations with Syria dictated – from the outside – an element forcing further political adaptation.

[19]

Following the 2005 Cedar Revolution the Lebanese political spectrum was split into two: those Syria-friendly and those opposing Syrian engagement, while also maintaining the underlying sectarian divisions. The *March 8 Alliance* – which is close to the Assad regime – includes Shiite Hezbollah, has tried to fill the vacuum produced by the Cedar Revolution. The second – more genuine Lebanese group – is the Saad Hariri led, anti-Syrian *March 14 Movement* which consists of the Future Movement (popular among Sunni Muslims), the Lebanese Forces, the Kataib Party, the so-called Independence Movement, and Maronite Christians as well. The Qatar-mediated Doha Agreement in 2008 paved the way to a national unity government, yet the national dialogue initiated by former Commander of the Armed Forces Michel Suleyman failed to settle the struggle among the political parties and within the political elites (Hajjar 2009, 270–2).

The nation-wide demonstrations clearly signalled that a new phase started where the very essence of the confessional system was overruled by the people: in the 2011 people were demonstrating sectarianism with the slogan of ‘bread, knowledge and no to sectarianism’ – clearly reflecting a new stage in the Lebanese public identity, where economic concerns are/may prove more important than sectarian community relations. The Arab Spring and the Syrian civil war, however, put a rein on Lebanese public mobilization. Thus, it seemed that under the pressure of external developments, the system has re-consolidated itself. Yet, in 2015⁶ nation-wide

⁶ In the summer of 2015 in Naama, a place designated for garbage disposal the lo-

[20] demonstrations started again – over the *garbage crisis*, again a non-sectarian, non-ideological issue. Regular power cuts, increasing unemployment and the corruption of the political elites added to public frustration. Demonstrations, however, stopped in September–October without any meaningful solution to public concerns (Carmen 2019).

Yet again, on October 17, 2019 new nation-wide demonstrations broke out in reaction to new taxes – especially those on the otherwise free Facebook, Facetime, and WhatsApp calls – announced by the government. The *WhatsApp crisis* added to the public anger and frustration over the natural catastrophes hitting several parts of the countryside, forcing people and communities to leave their homes. As a result of the demonstrations Prime Minister Saad Hariri had to resign on October 29, but the demonstrators were openly demanding the exit of the whole of the political elite.

In all these political struggles, however, the Lebanese army notably remains usually neutral and does not interfere in politics or political rivalries. The country has had no military coups, and although there are ‘parallel armed forces’ controlled by non-state/semi-state actors, including Hezbollah, the military itself is the symbol of national unity. It is the only institution which can be considered independent, popular and free from sectarianism, a general characteristic of Lebanese society (Gaub 2017b, 119–29). Consequently, in the October 2019 demonstrations the armed forces were not perceived as a tool of the elites, but, to the contrary, as an actor standing up to corruption. This duality of the regular army and the non-state/semi-state militias was manifest in the ‘handling’ of the demonstrations: while in some places the military defended the demonstrators against the armed wings of the non-state/semi-state actor Hezbollah, in Beirut in some cases they used force to prevent street blockades.

cals closed the road leading to the disposal site in front of trucks carrying public garbage. Local demonstrations soon spread to the capital and mobilized the public – without any relevance to sectarian or ideological belongings – dissatisfied with government activities to handle the crisis. The so-called HIRAK demonstrations took some one hundred thousand people to the streets in August.



Iraq

The political transition following the 2003 Iraq War was completed by the 2005 constitution: the new federal system seemed to establish a democratic distribution of power among the main ethno-sectarian groups: the Sunni Arabs, the Shiite Arabs and the Kurds. However, with the memories of the past and foreign (American) troops on the ground, the new political system has come to be characterized by the so-called *muhassasa*, i.e. the division of the main state offices according to the ethno-religious affiliations, thus resembling the Lebanese confessional system. Yet, due to historical reasons, territory had a much closer relationship to the ethnic-religious communities than in Lebanon, thus any internal conflict was threatening with the break-up of the Iraqi state (Mansour 2019, 7; Abdullah 2018).

[21]

At the same time, the new constitution and the federal system strengthened the indigenous development of the Kurdish Autonomous Territory. The referendum on independence on September 25, 2017 (Mustafa 2021) could not achieve its aim, and besides losing practically all international support (gained by the Kurdish *peshmerga* fighting the Islamic State), it poisoned the relationship between the central Iraqi government and the Kurdish Regional Government.

The estrangement of the Sunni Arabs and the Kurdish referendum clearly reflected the crisis of the ‘democratic’ political order imposed from the outside and the ethno-religious model established after 2003. High unemployment, failing economic conditions and corruption resulted in the break-up of both the Shiite and the Kurdish alliances with intra-sectarian debates and clashes. The two new political groupings – *Binaa* and *Islah* – were organized across ethno-religious fault lines, on the basis of political considerations: *Binaa* supported close connections with Iran and a strong state; the *Islah* election coalition rejected Iranian or any other external influence (Mansour 2019, 11). The 2018 parliamentary elections proved that public concern was centred much more on corruption, the failure of government policies, power shortages or water management than on ethno-sectarian issues (yet again similarly to Lebanon).

[22] However, the political and economic marginalization of the Sunni Arab population, the moves by the Shiite majority Maliki government against Sunni politicians, and the sporadic clashes with the Iraqi armed forces produced a vacuum⁷ in the Sunni Arab territories, which paved the way in 2014 to the appearance and expansion of the Islamic State, resulting in a *quasi*-civil war ending only in 2018–2019. Although the new Iraqi armed forces – trained by the US military – were also mostly organized on the ethno-sectarian basis into parallel units, the failure to defend the country against the expansion of the Islamic State (Gaub 2017b, 102–9) resulted in the emergence of the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) in the fight. These seemed to overstep sectarian divides by including not only Shiite militias, but Sunni Arab forces as well. Although in a new wave of ‘army-building’ they were legally integrated into the regular army in 2016, they are still operating independently.

This political trend of stepping over ethnic-religious fault lines has become increasingly manifest: while pre-2015 demonstrations were usually organized on a sectarian basis, from 2015 onwards public frustration was expressed independently from sectarian affiliations⁸ (Mansour 2019). The fall of the oil prices and the turn-up of the budgetary balance added to the break-down of public services and the decrease of water resources, which led to the outbreak of public unrest in Southern Iraq. By 2019 great cities were also scenes of mass demonstrations over the worsening living conditions, corruption and governmental incompetence. Demonstrators were rejecting the *muhassasa* system and demanded the departure from power of the post-2003 elites. Although the government announced a 13-point plan to terminate poverty, create jobs and improve living conditions, it was seen as too late, especially as the demonstrations and the reaction of the armed forces, including some of the PMUs,

⁷ Academic literature does not consider Iraq a ‘failed state,’ but speaks of a ‘state vacuum’ meaning that the state can only partially fulfill its tasks, some state functions are performed by non-state actors (Gaub 2017a).

⁸ In Shiite populated Basra demonstrations were taking place against the Nouri al-Maliki led Shiite political elites, and blamed the incompetence of their own Shiite leaders for the Islamic State expansion.



turned violent. In consequence, on November 29 Prime Minister Abdul Mahdi resigned (Bartu 2020b).

CONCLUSIONS

Following the decline of Arab nationalism in the 1960s–1970s the Arab Spring brought a kind of Arab renaissance in 2011, which, however, was complemented with ‘local’ Arab nationalisms, where loyalty and national identity was attached to the territorial states. Both in 2011 and in 2019 demonstrations were organized on a ‘national’ basis, rejecting ethnic and religious divisions. Although it can be claimed that ‘nationalism’ had been there before, at least in Algeria and Iraq – albeit in different forms and for different reasons – it had failed in Sudan with the break-away of South Sudan, while Lebanon, with its confessional state model, had so far been exempt from it. Yet, in post-2003 Iraq and in 2019 Lebanon demonstrators seemed not only ready for but were demanding the departure of the whole of the political elite, with whom they identified the political system. The fact that in both cases this model was imposed upon the countries from the outside, added to the crisis. Thus, the question in both states was if the ethno-sectarian structures can be renewed or an entirely different model – probably along ‘nationalist’ lines – would be established.

Nevertheless, though in all four states the political mainstream has moved from sectarian thinking towards issue-based politics. Protesters used to call for replacing the old political elites with a new one, however in itself it does not mean the end to the sectarian division of power.

The removal of the leaders – a demand in the 2011 demonstrations – in 2019 was also significant, yet, it did not mean either the fall of the regime or a drastic change in the political elites. Though neither of the cases in question can be considered a one-person dictatorship. While in Algeria and Sudan a ‘life-long leader’ was ousted from office, in Iraq and Lebanon there had been changes in the person of the leader in the preceding two decades.

Comparing the role of the armed forces in the four states, in Sudan and Algeria the military controlled (and even initiated) the tran-

[24] sition in a top-down approach, while in Lebanon and Iraq – for different reasons – they did not have a role in the political process. In another characteristic of the events, while in Algeria and Lebanon the use of force was not significant, in Sudan (the Khartoum massacre) and in Iraq the transition left many dead.

Thus, the 2019 demonstrations – especially taking into consideration the 2011 result – offer some general conclusions:

- The dissolution of the authoritarian regimes in general has not taken place. Instead, a kind of re-arrangement happened.
- The ethno-sectarian model seems to be overtaken by a ‘national’ understanding of the state.
- The political regimes are (still) in transition.
- The outcome of the transition depends on several factors, but the form it takes is difficult to forecast.
- While the macroeconomic indicators for the region are not worse than those of other regions, the transformation has negatively influenced the chances of the development of the MENA.

Following the 2011 and 2019 demonstrations, transition processes were defined to a great extent by the balance of power among the regime, the armed forces and the demonstrators. Based on their relative strength, two ways of transition can be identified: where the armed forces were dominating the political scene, a military-controlled top-down transition took place, while in case of a relative balance among the actors a negotiated transition could be expected, which, however, was still no guarantee of democratization in spite of the presence of civilians.

In Algeria and Sudan, with the starting point similar to that of Egypt, an Egypt-like transition started to unfold: the armed forces in defence of the state turned to the use of force to ensure survival (Stacher 2015) and took over political control and consolidated the system based on the primacy of the army (Dunne 2020, 187). In Lebanon and Iraq, where the political processes were defined more by the ethno-sectarian context than by the armed forces, protracted political debates started. This was aggravated by the fact that in



2019, while demonstrators were protesting without ideological considerations or a charismatic leader similar to 2011, their declared aim was the expulsion of the whole of the political elite and the change of the political system.

In sum, the 2019 demonstrations are not the beginning of a new era, but fit into the transformation started in the 2010/2011. Neither the *democratization theory* nor the *post-democratization discourse* is sufficient to describe the political processes undergoing in the region. The analysis found that demonstrations cannot be deduced from poor macroeconomic conditions alone, other factors have also been at play. In none of the four states were authoritarian regimes totally dissolved, their protracted transition has been taking place instead. It should also be noted that in all four the political regime is built on a weak state, which is favourable to the use of force (and to external influence). [25]

Adaptive authoritarianism, already manifest in 2011, was especially relevant in the handling of the 2019 demonstrations: the regime, the armed forces and the demonstrators have all undergone a socialization process, which brought along the more refined uses of force. The masses in the streets seem to have decision on their future in hand, however the reality is far from that. The survival capabilities of the regimes seem unlimited, and even among the conditions of a war economy they are able to re-produce the business and political elites interested in the maintenance and survival of the system.

Despite some common features of the regimes involved in this 2019 protest wave, this paper argues that each country has its own system to be transformed (see table 3). We can reach the conclusion that during the transformation process the initial political context is the factor, which most significantly determines the outcome of the reorganization of the system.

Having analysed the similarities and differences among the four states, the paper has reached the conclusion that the most plausible explanatory factor of transformation is the type of the initial political system. An authoritarian breakdown does not necessarily lead to democracy, but on the contrary, it may result in an authori-

TABLE 3 Comparative Analysis of the Four Cases

Country	Explanatory factors			
	Point of departure	The role of the armed forces	Collapse of the social contract	Ethno-sectarian tensions
[26] Algeria	Military regime	Refrain from repression, Egypt is the role model	Crisis of rentierism	Algerian national values propagated
Iraq	Muhassasa system	Paramilitary forces (PMU) play a significant role	Mismanagement of the government, lack of electricity	Crisis of the muhassasa system, protests not organized along sectarian lines
Lebanon	Confessional system	Neutral army, symbol of national unity	Garbage crisis, whatsapp tax	Crisis of the confessional system, protests not organized along sectarian lines
Sudan	Military regime	Khartoum massacre, Egypt is the role model	Loss of the hydro-carbon rich South Sudan	Sudanese national values propagated

tarian transformation, which is the case with most of the countries affected either by the first or second wave of the protests. Certain geopolitical and historical factors could explain why protests have erupted in 2019 only in some countries in the Arab World.

The corona virus pandemic put the regimes to a further test of the social contract, when it led to limits on public life. However, it gave a boost to the political networks and networking in the virtual sphere. Although the eventual expressions of public frustration are difficult to forecast, some tendencies – sometimes even contradicting each other – can be pointed out.

Rentier states, Algeria and Iraq, highly dependent on oil and gas incomes, are further exposed to the significant drop of global prices, which will have an impact on current state budgets, increasing the



very same concerns that led to the 2019 demonstrations. Sudan with the break-away of South Sudan lost its hydrocarbon resources and ceased to be a rentier state. Thus, the rentier economic character exposes a vulnerability – practically outside the competence of the state or the regime – yet, with serious consequences for both. While Lebanon does not fall in this category, the re-start of the demonstrations and further instability may be expected, as public expenditure and state subventions will have to be cut. The pandemic crisis, not well handled, can further aggravate social unrest and erode regime stability (Pack and Mason 2020). [27]

On the other hand, in case of crises like these, citizens are more dependent on state authorities including the armed forces, which practically unites the state and the population against the unknown external adversary. The measures introduced to fight the pandemic, at the same time as putting constraints on the constitution, such as the state of emergency, may provide additional legal tools to the elites in power in order to marginalize opponents without the use of force.

REFERENCES

- Abdullah, S. 2018. 'After 1S, Iraq's Major Challenge is Corruption.' *Fikra Forum*, 2 August. <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/after-is-iraqs-major-challenge-is-corruption>.
- Abul-Magd, Z. 2017. *Militarizing the Nation: The Army, Business, and Revolution in Egypt*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Bank, A., and J. Busse. 2021. 'MENA Political Science Research a Decade after the Arab Uprisings: Facing the Facts on Tremolous Grounds.' *Mediterranean Politics* 26 (5): 539–69.
- Barany, Z. 2011. 'Comparing the Arab Revolts: The Role of the Military.' *Journal of Democracy* 22 (4): 28–39.
- Bartu, P. 2020a. 'The New Arab Uprisings: How the 2019 Trajectory Differs from the 2011 Legacy? (Part 1).' Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, 5 January. <https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2020/01/arab-uprisings-2019-trajectory-differs-2011-legacy-part-1-200105102004189.html>.
- . 2020b. 'The New Arab Uprisings: How the 2019 Trajectory Differs from the 2011 Legacy? (Part 2).' Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, 13 January. <https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/new-arab-uprisings-how-2019-trajectory-differs-2011-legacy-part-2>.

- Bellin, E. 2004. 'The Political-Economic Conundrum: The Affinity of Economic and Political Reform in the Middle East and North Africa.' Carnegie Papers 53, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C.
- Brownlee, J., T. Masoud, and A. Reynolds. 2015. *The Arab Spring: Pathways of Repression and Reform*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Boubekeur, A. 2020. 'Demonstration Effect: How the Hirak Protest Movement is Reshaping Algerian Politics.' Policy Brief, February, European Council on Foreign Relations.
- Bouandel, Y. 2016. 'The Arab Spring and Algeria's Exceptionalism.' Paper presented at the Scientific Cooperations 2nd International Conference on Social Sciences, Istanbul, 2–3 April.
- Carmen, G. 2019. 'Co-Optation, Counter-Narratives, and Repression: Protesting Lebanon's Sectarian Power-Sharing Regime.' *Middle East Journal* 73 (1): 9–29.
- Collins, R. O. 2008. *A History of Modern Sudan*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Dunne, M. 2020. 'Fear and Learning in the Arab Uprisings.' *Journal of Democracy* 31 (1): 182–97.
- Duursma, A., and T. R. Müller. 2019. 'The ICC Indictment against al-Bashir and Its Repercussions for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Operations in Darfur.' *Third World Quarterly* 40 (5): 890–907.
- El-Haddad, A. 2020. 'Redefining the Social Contract in the Wake of the Arab Spring: The Experiences of the Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia.' *World Development* 127:1–22.
- Gallien, M., and I. Werenfels. 2019. 'Is Tunisia Really Democratising?' *SWP Comment*, no. 13.
- Gaub, F. 2017a. 'State Vacuums and Non-State Actors in the Middle East and North Africa.' In *The Frailty of Authority. Borders, Non-State Actors, and Power Vacuums in a Changing Middle East*, edited by L. Kamel, 51–66. Rome: New-Med Research Network, Istituto Affari Internazionali.
- . 2017b. *Guardians of the Arab State: When Militaries Intervene in Politics, from Iraq to Mauritania?* London: Hurst.
- Hajjar, S. G. 2009. 'The Convoluted and Diminished Lebanese Democracy.' *Democracy and Security* 5 (3): 261–76.
- Heydemann, S. 2007. 'Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World.' Analysis Paper 13, The Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Washington, D.C. <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/10arabworld.pdf>
- Heydemann, S., and R. Leenders. 2011. 'Authoritarian Learning and Authoritarian Resilience: Regime Responses to the "Arab Awakening."' *Globalizations* 8 (5): 647–53.
- Hinnebusch, R. 2015. 'Introduction: Understanding the Consequences of



- the Arab Uprisings: Starting Points and Divergent Trajectories.' *Democratization* 22 (2): 205–17.
- . 2012. 'The Middle East Regional System.' In *The Foreign Policies of Middle East States*, edited by R. Hinnebusch and A. Ehteshami, 29–54. Boulder, CO, and London: Lynne Rienner.
- Huntington, S. P. 1991. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Kamrava, M. 1998. 'Non-Democratic States and Political Liberalisation in the Middle East: A Structural Analysis.' *Third World Quarterly* 19 (1): 63–85.
- Korany, B., R. Brynen, and P. Noble, eds. 1998. *Political Liberalization & Democratization in the Arab World*. Boulder, CO, and London: Lynne Rienner.
- Mackey, S. 2008. *Mirror of the Arab World: Lebanon in Conflict*. New York and London: W. W. Norton.
- Mansour, R. 2019. 'Challenges to the Post-2003 Political Order in Iraq.' UI Paper 8/2019, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm.
- Mustafa, S. D. 2021. 'Iraqi Kurdistan Independence Referendum: Political Parties, Opportunity, and Timing.' *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 48 (5): 890–907.
- Pack, J. Mason, N. 2020. 'Could Coronavirus Lead to an Arab Spring 2.0?' Middle East Institute, 25 March. <https://www.mei.edu/publications/could-coronavirus-lead-arab-spring-20>.
- Salloukh, B. F. 2010. 'Democracy in Lebanon: The Primacy of the Sectarian System.' In *The Struggle Over Democracy in the Middle East: Regional Politics and External Policies*, edited by N. J. Brown and E. E. Shahin, 134–50. London and New York: Routledge.
- Silva, J., V. Levin, and M. Morgandi 2012. 'Inclusion and Resilience: The Way Forward for Social Safety Nets in the Middle East and North Africa.' MENA Development Report, The World Bank, Washington, DC.
- Stacher, J. 2015. 'Fragmenting States, New Regimes: Militarized State Violence and Transition in the Middle East.' *Democratization* 22 (2): 259–75.
- . 2012. *Adaptable Autocrats: Regime Power in Egypt and Syria*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Stepan, A., and J. J. Linz. 2013. 'Democratization Theory and The "Arab Spring."' *Journal of Democracy* 24 (2): 15–30.
- Tessler, M., J. Nachtwey, and A. Dressel, eds. 1999. *Area Studies and Social Science: Strategies for Understanding Middle East Politics*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
- Tossell, J. 2020. 'Consolidating Sudan's Transition: A Question of Legitimacy.' CRU Policy Brief, February, Netherlands Institute of International Affairs, Clingendael.

Valbjørn, M. 2020. 'Sectarian Identity Politics and Middle East International Relations in the First Post-Arab Uprisings Decade.' In *Sectarianism and International Relations*, 18–23. POMEPS Studies 38. https://pomeps.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/POMEPS_Studies_38_Web-rev.pdf.

[30]

Zoubir, Y. 2015. 'The Democratic Transition in Tunisia: A Success Story in the Making.' *Accord*, 11 April. <https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/democratic-transition-tunisia/>.

Yom, S. L. 2012. 'Understanding the Resilience of Monarchy During the Arab Spring.' *Foreign Policy Research Institute*, 27 April. <https://www.fpri.org/article/2012/04/understanding-the-resilience-of-monarchy-during-the-arab-spring>.



From the United Cyprus Republic to Two-State Solution

MEHMET DIREKLI

Cyprus International University
mdirekli@ciu.edu.tr

In November 2002, former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan proposed a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem consisting of a federation of two largely independent states. The four-times revised plan was submitted on 24 April 2004 to both communities in separate referendums for voting. The Turkish Cypriots accepted the plan with 65 percent of the votes, whereas the Greek Cypriots rejected it with a proportion of 76 percent of the votes. In this framework, this work first aims to examine the political context and causes of the rejection of the Annan Plan V, and then to examine Turkey's new policy for changing the status quo, which started after the last presidential elections in North Cyprus in 2020. This study also focuses on whether the political reasons for the rejection of the Annan Plan are still valid in today's Cyprus negotiations. Finally, this paper examines if a bi-communal and bi-zonal structure is acceptable to Cypriots, as well as the role of the European Union in the current negotiations. According to the facts and findings about the political rejection of the Annan Plan, this research shows that those reasons do still affect the Cyprus negotiations.

Key Words: Annan Plan V, balance of threat, Cyprus issue, federalism, two-state solution

 <https://emuni.si/ISSN/2232-6022/15.31-53.pdf>

INTRODUCTION

Cyprus is the homeland to two different communities made up of Greeks and Turks. After more than 300 years of Turkish domination (Ottoman rule), the island came under British rule in 1878, with sovereignty officially passing to England in 1923. British colonial administration of the island lasted until the bi-communal Re-

[32] public of Cyprus, which was established in 1960 with international agreements signed by England, Turkey, Greece, Greek Cypriots, and Turkish Cypriots. After independence, Turkish Cypriots withdrew in 1963 from the island's administration. In 1974, political tensions between Greek and Turkish Cypriots were escalating violently, and as a result of the Greek military junta's support of the Greek ultra-nationalist coup for Enosis in Cyprus, Turkey launched a military operation on the island. Turkey's intervention caused the emergence of a political order under the rule of Turks in the north of the island. In 1983, after Turkey recognized the independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which is the de facto administration declared by the Turkish Cypriot community, it addresses the Republic of Cyprus as the Greek Cypriot Administration. On 13 May 1984, the Security Council of the UN (United Nations) defined the proclamation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as a separatist movement with its decision numbered 550 (United Nations 1984). Today, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is a de facto independent republic, which is not recognized by any country other than Turkey. The north of the island is considered to belong to the Republic of Cyprus de jure.

The first talks between two sides on the island began in 1968. These negotiations, in which the Turkish thesis was presented as local autonomy, lasted until the end of 1971. During the 1972–1974 period, negotiations continued with the participation of experts from Greece and Turkey. These negotiations ended with the coup of 15 July 1974. Until today, many UN special representatives have been appointed to the island and the negotiations have been carried out under the leadership of the UN. The most important point reached between these negotiations is that the 5th version of the Annan Plan was put to a simultaneous referendum on both sides of the island.

It would not be wrong to say that the 5th Annan Plan – the final version of the plan presented for referendum that was formed as a result of mediation efforts initiated in 1997 by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan (1997–2006) – was a comprehensive result of all relevant UN Initiatives from 1974 until that time (Direkli 2016). In essence, the plan included as its basis the Framework and Ten Points Agree-



ments, Cuéllar's Proposals and Boutros-Ghali's Set of Ideas.¹ However, the plan fundamentally differed from all of the preceding UN Initiatives on one vital issue. Each of the previous UN plans was only a draft or framework of principles for the foundation of a detailed final document to be developed in the future; none offered any guarantee of accord. The fifth version of the Annan Plan presented for referendum, on the other hand, was an extensive plan that was ready for implementation starting from the first day and included a federal republic and founding states. The plan, titled 'The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem,' comprised 182 main pages, an appendix of 131 completed codes, and an additional 9000 of 'cooperation agreements' and 1134 'treaties and instruments' (United Nations 2004). On April 24 2004, in answering the question, 'Do you approve the Foundation Agreement with all its Annexes, as well as

[33]

¹ The parties adopted on February 1977 a fundamental agreement providing for an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal federal republic. Respective territorial jurisdiction would be determined by economic viability and land ownership. The central government would be given powers to ensure the unity of the state, and the issues of freedom of movement and settlement, property issues and other matters would be settled at a later stage. A ten-point initiative in May 1979 was agreed, reaffirming the 1977 agreement and adding provisions for the demilitarisation of the island, the recognition of the necessity to settle the status of Varosha as well as all territorial and constitutional aspects, the promotion of confidence-building measures, the respect for human rights, and a commitment to refrain from destabilising activities and actions. The parties later disagreed on the status of Varosha and on the concept of bi-communality and the agreements were never implemented. Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar proposed in 1986 a Draft Framework Agreement which envisaged the creation of an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal state in Cyprus, going beyond the 1977 agreement by beginning to define the federal government's powers. Also novel was the concept of a 'bi-zonal' state, acknowledging the geographical separation of the communities. Greek Cypriots were unhappy as it did not address the withdrawal of the Turkish forces or the repatriation of Turkish settlers, and contained no guarantees that freedom of movement, settlement and right to property would be respected. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali introduced a new 'Set of Ideas' for a draft settlement, further expanding the previous concepts and proposing a secular, bi-zonal, bi-communal federal republic composed of two politically equal states, to be submitted to both communities for referendum. The Council endorsed the plan in resolution 750. However, the 1992 talks were not successful (United Nations 1992).

[34] the constitution of the Greek Cypriot/Turkish Cypriot State and the provisions as to the laws to be in force, to bring into being a new state of affairs in which Cyprus joins the European Union united?' ('The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem' 2004) the citizens of the Republic of Cyprus and Turkish Republic of North Cyprus sealed the fates of both the 5th Annan Plan and the island in general. According to the referendum results, approximately 76 per cent of Greek Cypriots voted 'no' and 24 per cent voted 'yes,' while approximately 65 per cent of Turkish Cypriots voted 'yes' and 35 per cent voted 'no.' Due to the Greek Cypriot disapproval of the Foundation Agreement, the 5th Annan Plan was declared null and void, and there were no legally binding results to the referendum.

If the plan had been accepted in the referendum, it would be an immediately functional model with its constitution. The Annan Plan V also had a provision section, which could largely guarantee the transition period ('The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem' 2004, Foundation Agreement, Annex IX, Article 1ff). According to this, the agreement was to be put to a referendum, and enter into force after mutual approval; if the founding agreement were to be evaluated after other referendums, or if one of the guarantor powers did not sign the new state plan for Cyprus by 29 April 2004, the agreement would become null and void and would not create any legal ties (Foundation Agreement, Annex IX, Article 1-2). With the entry into force of the Founding Agreement, a declaration would also be made by the Republic of Cyprus to the EU (European Union) within the framework of Cyprus's accession to the EU, in which the new state of Cyprus would be presented and the commitment regarding the present obligations would be expressed (Foundation Agreement, Annex IX, Article 6). The presidents of the states would demand from the EU to approve the founding agreement, confirm its compliance with EU directives and demand special measures for the treatment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. They would also demand the legally binding registration of this state and request legal validity and security guarantees within the framework of the EU directives (Foundation Agreement, Annex IX, Article 6).



The Annan Plan V envisaged the establishment of a new state on the part of the two founding states. Between the founding states and the central state, a relationship would be established like in Switzerland with the cantons. The main structure was to be that of the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots forming a common, independent and single state. The indivisibility of the international identity of a federal system was the foundation of Annan Plan V and was established constitutionally. By indivisible, it is meant here that none of the parties can withdraw from this agreement or join part or all of the island to its own state. And this means that none of the parties could pull the other party under its own rule. This partnership should, of course, receive all legitimations from the principles of law and have a two-part unitary structure. Accordingly, the UCR (United Cyprus Republic) would draw its power from the constitutional arrangements and present a single identity in the EU. The founding states, on the other hand, would be able to apply their own powers, excluding those constitutionally provided, in their own territory. The plan refers to the Belgium system and emphasizes that the founding states must act jointly in their relations with the central state. This would be of great importance especially for the execution of the EU criteria and the harmonious cooperation among the founding states.

[35]

In this context, after the details of the Annan Plan are given, the reasons for the rejection of the plan will be discussed in light of the data content analysis and expert interviews. Then the latest situation in today's Cyprus negotiations will be discussed with a secondary literature review. Instead of collecting empirical primary data, this work is based on existing material, which is analyzed and used in the context of the research question. The data corpus is retrieved from the primary (protocols, interviews, reports) and secondary (monographs, newspapers, magazines) literature and journalistic reports.

THEORETICAL FRAME

The main parameter of the Cyprus problem, which has persisted since 1963, is power sharing. It is possible to frame the power shar-

[36] ing only from a realistic point of view. The fact that the island of Cyprus is situated in a very important geopolitical and geostrategic location has grabbed the attention of hegemonic powers since the start of the problem. In addition, the fact that Makarios, the first president of the Republic of Cyprus, followed a non-aligned policy towards NATO, further complicated the beginning of the problem. The fact that the Republic of Cyprus perceives Turkey as a threat and pursues a policy of balance against this threat has made realism essential in order to place the problem of Cyprus in a theoretical framework. In particular, the concept of balance of threat in realism is the basic theoretical framework of this study.

Balance of Threat

Interstate and international systems are being threatened because of the ever-destructive nature of power (Morgenthau 1963). This in turn brings with it the need for security. Balance of power is not a mechanism that operates by itself or automatically (Claude 1962, 48). These states try to achieve their goals by appropriating, maintaining, increasing or even demonstrating power, and in this sense, power is exploited in the international system as a general concept (Morgenthau 1963). Consequently, while international law is a part of the system, it is not effective in mediation and decision-making due to its lack of enforcement.

If the threatening state has some advantages from the perspective of military power, political influence, natural resources and geographical location, it can bring a fear to the threatened state. This is a fear of the enemy, because not all states go into balancing activities, but only to those who are threatened. However, this is not a superiority in the sense of armed conflict. From a military point of view, a weak country can use political pressure in the international system to transform this disadvantage into an advantage. According to the theory of Walt, a state behaves according to its perception of the behaviour of its enemy or competitor (Walt 1985). A weak state must therefore find some form of shelter. This danger forces the state to attach itself to the strong states or to put it in other words, start bandwagoning. In his theory, Walt (1985) examined what the weak state needs protection against, and the answer is danger. This means



that a state is looking for security from its perceived threat. According to Walt (1988, 282), there are some variables in the perceptions of danger of a weak state:

The accumulated, that is, military power of the other side, their economic and political capacity, the geographical proximity of the threat, the threat of sovereignty, a malicious threat, that is an aggressive threat. [37]

The cost of the instruments for the continuation of one's own policy is of great importance. A state will aim to minimize costs and maximize profits in its policy to defeat another threatening state. The choice of the impact instrument is directly related to this cost calculation. Certainly, a weak state will set the economic cost potentials to a minimum and select and use the best instruments to realize the maximum profit potential.

Looking at the Cyprus problem, following a significant defeat after the invasion of 74, the Greek Cypriots both received a de facto divided land and were, so to speak, always in danger of from the threat of Turkish military power. This accumulated power of Turkey, perceived as a threat, its benefits, and the island's geographical and historical significance for Turkey, consequently made the EU the most important ally at the time of the Annan Plan negotiations. The Greek Cypriots failed to align the balance of power on the island according to global power relations. The Greek Cypriots, who were unsuccessful in their attempts to join with Greece, then perceived EU accession as a new opportunity and desired to build the balance of power against Turkey in their own interests as part of this strategic partnership. The Greek Cypriot leaders, as official representatives during the negotiations and the referendum on Annan Plan V, emphasized their interests and saw the government's benefit in rejecting a UN arbitration award. Since the UN has no assertive power in today's international system, state interests and the balance of power can only be established through international organizations such as NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and the EU. A partnership without a punitive central authority, which can intervene in case of infringement, is never safe and conflict is never

excluded. States must rely on their own power to survive under such anarchic circumstances. For this reason, states always strive to maximize security, and increased security requires a relative increase in power. Consequently, states try to obtain relative gains rather than absolute gains (Kolasi 2013).

[38] It is assumed that states fundamentally depend on individual absolute profits. From this perspective, a partnership can continue as long as it produces an absolute profit without any concerns about relative profits or losses. States are seen as rational actors seeking to maximize their own interests. However, it must be considered whether the states are influenced by the disadvantages of the counterparty or not. In summary, a state's willingness to compromise on its sovereignty and commitment to partnership does not represent a loss of interest. Finally, Annan Plan V was based on experience gleaned from years of UN negotiations. As a conclusion to the Annan Plan, which is intensively examined in the present work, it can be seen that the plan showed the interdependencies. Additionally, the asymmetrical structure of the plan was significantly associated with federalist elements. Another important aspect of the plan, namely the cooperation of the founding states, was also indispensable for the survival of a federative system. While granting the plan could have produced gains for both sides, the Greek Cypriots, with the support of their government, rejected the plan and favoured relative gains as a result of their sole EU accession. The European Union accepted the accession of Cyprus, thus integrating a complex problem into its territory, even though the 'acquis communautaire' could initially be implemented only in the south of the island.²

POLITICAL REASONS BEHIND THE REJECTION
OF THE ANNAN PLAN V BY GREEK CYPRIOTS

Power Distribution and Loss of Power

At the centre of the UN negotiations on the Cyprus problem lies the difficulty of the separation of powers in the federal system of

² Expert interview with Günter Verheugen (Former Commissioner of the EU), Vienna, 4 October 2012.



states. The UN formula in Annan Plan V (a state system with two politically equal societies) was constantly leaning on the 1977 framework agreements and 1979 ten-point agreements. All UN decisions under these two agreements confirmed the need for a constitutionally determined two-territorial federation.³ The federal solution also would have brought with it political equality. However, the Greek Cypriots prefer a unitary state and the continuation of the Republic of Cyprus, whereas the Turkish Cypriots prefer a two-state system, which would give the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus an international identity. If the solution is a federal state, the Greek Cypriots prefer a more centrally administered state (Interpeace 2011).

[39]

Ultimately, as they represent the majority on the island, the Greek Cypriots also want to uphold this principle of majority voting and government. What is forgotten or not taken into account here is the fact that without the full participation of the Turkish Cypriots, there will be no solution and even if a majority solution is adopted, this system will not be sustainable. A certain majority of Greek Cypriots do not want to accept the loss of the status quo in Cyprus and do not share their right to exist, which has now been strengthened via EU accession. For this reason, Annan's vice-presidential system has been rejected by the Greek Cypriots. Handing over this chair to a Turkish Cypriot would not be easy to accept after the extended period of confrontation. The separation of powers, which take its ability from rules and constitutions regarding the rule of law, should be clear in deeply fragmented and hostile societies (Lijphart 2002). In cases of uncertainty, such separation of powers arrangements may entail the blockage of governance (Roeder and Rothchild, 2005).

The opposition of the Greek Cypriots to the principle of separation of power under the Annan Plan V is also understandable. Fol-

³ 'Reaffirms in particular is resolution 367 of 12 March 1975 as well as its support for the 1977 and 1979 High Level Agreements between the leaders of the two communities in which they pledged to establish a bi-communal Federal Republic of Cyprus that will safeguard independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignment, and exclude union in whole or in part with any other country and any form of partition or secession' (United Nations 1990).

[40] lowing the presidency principle of 1960, the federal state of the Annan Plan V, which was compiled according to the Swiss model,⁴ was considered a foreign concept to Greek Cypriots. Even the doubt over the vice-presidential system became a reason to oppose the separation of powers. Interpeace poll showed that under a federal system, the Greek Cypriots were concerned about leaving leadership to a single person; if a Turkish Cypriot became vice president, albeit for a short time, they would obtain sovereignty over the whole island which would be seen as danger, illustrating the perceived difficulty of partnering with the Turks (Interpeace 2011). The plan eventually provided for a clear, balanced separation of powers. As has often been observed since the 1974 invasion, the main problems have always been power and authority. While the Greeks have demanded a strong central authority, the Turks prefer a soft federation.

The Greek Cypriot state had a functionalist posture in 1974 and was widely recognized as such. Over time, the dominant position of this state has been favoured, where the continuation of this state and the strengthening of the Republic of Cyprus on the island has overtaken all organisations for peace and unity. According to Tasos Papadopoulos, the main reason for the Cypriots' rejection of the plan was the repeal of the Republic of Cyprus and the virgin birth of a new state (Politis 2005).

The Republic of Cyprus is internationally accepted as the sole representative of the island. On this basis, and always exercising this comfort, the Greek Cypriots have always rejected the division of justifiable sovereignty. Accordingly, the Greek Cypriots alone wanted to accept some elaborations on the 1960 plan. Thus, the existing leadership should be constitutionally legitimized and this structure should produce a unified state system. The reason why the Greek Cypriots rejected Annan Plan V was that the plan did not take this factor into account.

Today's 'Republic of Cyprus' is a state in which power is held by a central government. But with the Federal Government provided by the Annan Plan V, this central power would be evenly transferred

⁴ A cantonal federal system.



to the founding states. This explains why the Greek Cypriots did not want to separate or share their sovereignty. Thus, the Greek Cypriots have not shared their sovereignty and have continued as a recognized state in the form of the Republic of Cyprus under their own leadership, while showing that they will not accept two separate leaderships and that the central state must control the entire island. [41] Of course, behind this lies the fact that the Cypriot identity is not yet firmly established, the parties do not trust each other, and the two sides have no emotional connection. However, the main cause of disagreement is that they do not want power or authority to be shared.

According to the concerns of the Greek Cypriots, one must understand the idea that if a federal system were adopted, Turkish Cypriots would ultimately use this new position to end the partnership and establish a new state, which would then be internationally recognized. However, this would be unacceptable for the Annan Plan. The plan ruled this possibility out constitutionally, because after the founding agreement of the plan, which has already been mentioned several times, it would be impossible. According to the new state created by the agreement, any unilateral changes and, in particular, the partial or total union of Cyprus with another state or any form of division or separation are prohibited and none of the contractual provisions may conflict with its interpretation. This article is followed by a phrase from the second article, which states that ‘the United Republic of Cyprus, its indissoluble partnership structure,’ which offers a clear meaning with its bold words (‘The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem’ 2004). Since the plan was a result of 40 years of negotiations, it also had compulsory provisions that would force the solution. However, the proponents of the plan did not explain the impossibility of separation to the Greek Cypriots sufficiently well.

*Presidency of Tassos Papadopoulos and EU Membership
of the Republic of Cyprus*

For a politician who wanted to retain sole power, equal status in a presidential council among other Cypriot council members, as pro-

[42] vided for by Annan Plan V, was not particularly desirable.⁵ It was of course of greater benefit for Papadopoulos to be a president of a globally recognized Cyprus, which is a member of the EU instead of being a temporary president in a United Cyprus. In a society in which the presidency represents the highest political authority, collective governance cannot be accepted as a principle. The island has never really produced a statesman. Makarios, Papadopoulos, Denktas and Küçük were always only national leaders. Glafkos Klerides alone may perhaps be considered an exception. Considering his support of the Annan Plan, one can say that he not only acted in the interests of one particular ethnic group, but the entire island's population, and this kind of politics is the position of a statesman (Kızılyürek 2007). Klerides, in his lead role in the negotiations for Cyprus's accession to the EU in 2003, declared that if he were to be re-elected, he would only perform his duties as leader for a period of 16 months. This period would end in May 2004. The aim of Klerides was to convince the Cypriot people of the merits of the Annan Plan during this time and thus to go to a referendum (2007). Nevertheless, Papadopoulos won the elections with the support of AKEL (Anorthotiko Komma Ergazomenou Laou – The Progressive Party of Working People). His victory was not just a change of government, but the Cyprus policy towards the Annan plan would subsequently change.⁶ He intended to use the new and complex nature of the plan to instil an instinctive mistrust in the people and to prevent any resolution of the Cyprus conflict after joining the EU. After Papadopoulos was elected president and appointed leader of the negotiations, he explained these issues in a press conference as follows (Press and Information Office 2003):

The adoption of the present Annan plan does not mean initiative,

⁵ 'I have taken over a country that is internationally recognized, I will not hand over a country that has nothing to say on the international scene and that needs protection, all of which is based on empty and erring illusions and a bottomless illusion that the Turks have their say to hold.' Papadopoulos's statement in *Politis* (2005).

⁶ Expert interview with Alvaro de Soto (Former Negotiator and Special Advisor of the UN on Cyprus), Firenze, 25 September 2013.



it means accepting the occupation and the invasion, we do not have the right to accept it, we cannot share debt with Cyprus, we do not have the right Legality of our state.

Deciphering these expressions shows that under the leadership of the right-wing national front, the Greek Cypriots would under no circumstance share their power. If the de facto division after the Turkish intervention was solved by a mediator and this solution brought about the division of power, then this national movement in the south and north of Cyprus would be best way to present the deadlock (or status quo) as the best solution. Finally, the supporters of the status quo in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus defended that after the intervention of 1974, the best solution would be to recognize the division of the island and convince the international community. In short, both sides refused to share their rule with the opposite side. This is the main reason for the hopelessness in the Cyprus problem and was also the main reason for the rejection of the Annan Plan V. It was not possible to find a solution because the Greek Cypriots did not want to give up the Republic of Cyprus. They rejected the Annan Plan V because they did not want to relinquish the Republic of Cyprus. As a result of EU accession, without resolving the island conflict, they attempted to maintain a balance of power and exert pressure on Turkey.⁷ [43]

AKEL's Position

The fact that a party with such a political position engaged in such political manoeuvring prior to the referendum on Annan Plan V in 2004 and called on the people to reject the plan completely transformed the referendum process into a counter-front. One of the main reasons for this transformation, which contradicts political history, is the long-awaited desire to take the lead. In fact, it would not have been surprising to see AKEL become a follower of the plan.

⁷ Expert interview with Katie Klerides (Former MP for Nicosia district and daughter of Glafkos Klerides, who was former President of Republic Cyprus), Nicosia, 4 September 2013.

[44] However, AKEL's political change, which began with the postponement of the referendum deadline ten days before the referendum, was a great surprise to everyone. This party had maintained the closest contact with the Turks during this time and had already internalized the principle of a two-dimensional social federation, thus making it one of the main proponents of the Greek Cypriots. As mentioned earlier, AKEL's desire to postpone the referendum was a sign that the plan was going to be rejected. Of course, at that time it was impossible to change the date of the referendum.

The real reason for this change was the fact that AKEL did not believe that they would be included in the governing coalition. During this era, AKEL had assumed various important positions in the government and for the first time saw the opportunity for a president to emerge from within its own ranks. Evidence for this comes from the election of 2008, in which Demetris Christofias, who was the General Secretary of AKEL and served as the sixth President of Cyprus from 2008 to 2013, clearly defeated Papadopoulos. This represented the greatest opportunity in AKEL's history, and an endorsement of the 2004 Annan Plan V would likely have made this success impossible. AKEL had always opposed Klerides and with its disgruntled attitude towards the plan, it was again against Klerides. Klerides' party DISY (Dimokratikos Synagermos – The Democratic Rally) was originally founded by the bourgeoisie, the central right-wing and Western-oriented class of Greek Cypriots. It was very difficult for AKEL as a communist/socialist party to campaign for the referendum together with a party from the opposite side of the spectrum. Another reason for the rejection of the plan was that AKEL and its followers, along with Papadopoulos, regarded the Annan Plan as a work of the great powers. Taking into account their relations with Moscow, one can also assume that Russia influenced AKEL with its veto in the UN Security Council. Annan presented his report of 16 April 2004, to the UN Security Council on April 19 (United Nations 2004). The report dealt with the conditions for the functioning of the proposed solution. As expected, above all, DIKO (Dimokratikó Kómma – The Democratic Party) and AKEL and the then-government had implemented all measures to ensure that this



report would not be accepted by the Security Council. While France and China initially took the position of the Republic of Cyprus, they were convinced after the efforts of the EU Member States and the US of the opposite; however, Russia alone, despite the commitment of all other members of the UN Security Council, vetoed the report. Russian UN Ambassador Gennady Gatilov said three days before the referendum on the UN peace plan planned in both parts of Cyprus that such a resolution was premature (*Der Spiegel* 2004). Another important point that needs to be highlighted here is the visit of the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Cyprus, Yorgos Yakovou of AKEL, to Moscow shortly before the referendum. The statement made by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov after this meeting is indicative of Russia's concerns. Lavrov explained that the EU's accession to the Republic of Cyprus would harm Russian entrepreneurs, and large transfers of funds could be made through the off-shore system in Cyprus, and that money could return to Moscow through fake companies, which could cause major problems (*Politis* 2005).

[45]

This information is a testament to the economic crisis in the Republic of Cyprus in 2012. *Der Spiegel* published in its 45th issue in 2012 a highly detailed analysis of the economic crisis in Cyprus. According to the investigation, over 50,000 Russians were living in the Republic of Cyprus with a Greek Cypriot passport, the Russian mafia was extremely influential in Cyprus, and the Russians were implementing their money laundering activities with the knowledge of the government within the borders of the Republic of Cyprus. In 2011 alone, \$80 billion was laundered and more than 150 shell companies were active in the tax haven of the Republic of Cyprus. This money would later be used by Greek banks in the purchase of treasury securities which led to the crisis in 2012 and these securities defaulted during the same economic crisis (*Der Spiegel* 2012).

AKEL, with its short-term rejection of the plan, introduced the term 'soft no' into the history of politics in Cyprus. AKEL tried to explain that her 'no' was opposite to the 'no' of the other parties and actually with this 'no', a 'yes' was also involved. For many years, AKEL defended that a federal system would be the solution to the

problems in Cyprus, which led to widespread disapproval of the plan and a desire to preserve the status quo.⁸

[46] FROM THE UNITED CYPRUS REPUBLIC
TO TWO-STATE SOLUTION

UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres announced that the Turkish and Greek Cypriot leaders could not meet on a sufficient common ground on the solution of the Cyprus problem during the talks held in Geneva on 27–29 April 2021 (BBC News 2021). Despite international pressure, the Turkish side is expected to engage in a long-term struggle for a ‘two-state solution.’ After the meetings, which are seen as a turning point, it is predicted that the Greek Cypriot and Greek governments will try to frame the issue in terms of a Turkey–EU problem, and the Turkish side will engage in a long-term struggle for a their two-state solution despite international pressure. The meetings in 5+1 format hosted by Guterres brought together the President of Cyprus, Nikos Anastasiadis, and the Turkish Cypriot leader, Ersin Tatar, and the foreign ministers of the 3 guarantor countries: Nikos Dendias from Greece, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu from Turkey, and Dominic Raab from the United Kingdom. The fact that Guterres noted that there was not enough common ground between the parties at the Geneva meeting, which took place 4 years after the UN’s last attempt for a solution, caused the parties to focus on the policies to be followed in the future. The UN Secretary General announced that he called the parties for another meeting to prevent the table from falling apart completely, but the statements made by the Greek and Turkish sides revealed that it was not possible to start official negotiations.

Guterres (United Nations 2020) states in his latest report submitted to the Security Council that he will carry on with his efforts:

Three years have now passed since the intensive talks at Crans-Montana, making it more challenging to resume negotiations. As

⁸ Expert interview with Alvaro de Soto (Former Negotiator and Special Advisor of the UN on Cyprus), Firenze, 25 September 2013.



I stated following our Berlin meeting, I will continue to extend my efforts to achieve terms of reference to serve as a consensus starting point for phased, meaningful and result-oriented negotiations at the earliest feasible opportunity. In this regard, I committed to explore with the Turkish Cypriot leader and the Greek Cypriot leader and with the guarantor powers the possibility of convening an informal five-plus-United Nations meeting at an appropriate stage. I underscore the point that this time must be different.

[47]

Unlike the previous talks, the Turkish Cypriot side and Turkey came to the table with a new plan outside the UN parameters. Noting that the negotiations for a bi-communal federation for 53 years have not yielded results, and that the Greek Cypriots do not favour any formula that includes sharing power with the Turks, as seen in 2004 and 2017, Tatar gave Guterres a 6-point road map.

He embodied the two-state solution plan, which was refused directly by the Greek Cypriots. Turkey maintains that only a negotiated settlement based on dialogue and diplomacy can be sustainable. As regards the way ahead, Turkey acts with a vision of working on new ideas and settlement models and believes that no time should be wasted with open-ended negotiations without a specific goal, based on vague documents, as in the past. According to Tatar, there are two peoples, two democracies and two states on the island. Negotiations towards settlement of the Cyprus issue and any desired goal should be built on this reality. With this understanding, Turkey considers that it is time to negotiate two-state settlement. Within this framework, the convening of the informal 5+UN meeting with the participation of the two sides on the Island and the guarantor states is supported. Turkey and Turkish Cypriots argue that, since the Greek Cypriots do not accept the political equality and also the effective participation of the Turkish Cypriots within the governance of Cyprus, then there's no alternative excluding that of the two-sovereign states (*Cyprus Mail* 2021). According to the Republic of Turkey, in the peace talks between Turks and Greeks in Cyprus carried out for decades under the leadership

of the United Nations (UN), the solution of a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation has been worked on so far. However, these talks were fruitless.

[48] This method neither entails nor needs the consent of the Greek Cypriot community, which forms eighty per cent of the population. It is accomplished with the passage of time, and it is expedited by the evidenced inability of the Greek Cypriot leaders to draw up a transparent and effective strategic arrangement for the uniting of Cyprus, which convinces the international community that they are able to settle for the Turkish Cypriot community as political equals having effective participation in governance.

In light of the above, what options does the Greek Cypriot community have? First, all creative ideas can be immediately abandoned and Guterres' framework and any agreed convergence for 2017 can be unconditionally accepted (when everyone seems to confirm that a mutually acceptable solution was within reach). The recommendation to seek and implement confidence-building measures can be abandoned immediately. In addition to these, some new openings can be made in economic issues. A good example of this action step would be the rapid establishment of an independent body for the management of Cypriot hydrocarbons, in which the Turkish Cypriots would also participate and in which the decision-making would depend on a positive vote (in combination with a procedure jointly accepted for the dissolution of possible deadlocks) (Panayiotides 2021).

Second, the adoption of the two-state solution, which, presumably, the other party will gladly accept in all of this. This implies the case of the recognition of sovereignty. In such a case, the final and irreversible partition of Cyprus will take place immediately with some territorial adjustments (such as the return of the fenced part of Famagusta), but also with the granting of the right to the Greek Cypriots to request the assimilation of the Greek Cypriot part of Cyprus in Greece, a process that will be relatively easy to achieve as Greece is a full member of the European Union and the laws of the two countries are already fully harmonized (Panayiotides 2021).



RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

The summit in New York on September, as expected, did not lead to the start of formal negotiations, but revealed the UN's determination and roadmap for the reinvigoration of a new process. The international community has already shown that it will not abandon Cypriots by throwing the towel over the Cyprus issue, with the clear statements and behaviours of the UN Security Council-supported Secretary General. Added to this is a narrowed action plan, the details of which are yet unknown. Until the UN Secretary-General's statement and perhaps a new Security Council resolution, it is unlikely that we will know more details. However, the insistence of the international community on a new process can be understood from the statements made by the two high-level representatives of both communities before or after the New York meeting.

[49]

After the meeting with Tatar and Guterres, President Anastasiadis said he expected an announcement the next day on the appointment of an envoy on the Cypriot issue. No announcement was made. Reports suggested that while the Cyprus government wanted the appointment of a responsible representative to the UN Security Council, the Turkish side wanted a special envoy, such as Jane Holl Lute, who recently resigned, because it would be under the authority of the secretary general. Ironically, the last two UN special representatives, Alexander Downer and Espen Barth Eide, had been attacked by Anastasiadis and left on bad terms with their government.

There were also questions about what this envoy's mission would be. Tatar wanted them to limit themselves to dealing with specific issues as confidence-building measures and good neighbourliness, in line with his two-state goal, while Anastasiadis wanted them to facilitate the resumption of talks, presumably for a federal settlement. So why did Anastasiadis expect the UNSG to make an announcement, given the gap between him and Tatar, regarding the mission of representative/envoy? Had he misunderstood what was said at the meeting? The big question is, why should Guterres appoint an envoy/representative when the two sides cannot agree on what their mission will be?

[50] Perhaps the Cyprus government's fear is that the UNSG's failure to name anyone will mark the beginning of the end of the UN's involvement in Cyprus. If Guterres decides that there is no point in having a representative, the next step could be to shut down the UN mission and withdraw the peacekeepers. There would be no justification for the presence of the UN when there is no possibility of the two sides reaching an agreement. It should come as no surprise if the UN decides to end its mission in Cyprus after more than 50 years of failed peace efforts (*Cyprus Mail* 2021).

Today there is another chance, certainly a crucial and possibly the final chance, for Turkey to become a European country, although no longer an EU member, at least for the coming years. This depends on how the EU negotiates (Cicicoğlu 2022). The EU will not give up on Turkey because it is important as an economic partner but also crucial in terms of refugee flows. Equally, however, it cannot accept threats, blackmail and violence as means to attain policy aims; the EU is based on a system of law and regulation. Nor can it ignore the financial and economic realities of Turkey, which are not quite as dark in 2022 as they were in 70s but are increasingly serious, not to mention the desperate need of Turkish Cypriots who bear no share of the blame for the recent and appalling economic mismanagement in Ankara. The progress of these negotiations will determine the future of Turkey, of Cyprus, of the Eastern Mediterranean and of the EU itself (Çam 2021).

CONCLUSION

As a summary of the research and the findings, the most important reason for the rejection of the Annan Plan is the power sharing problem between the two communities. A certain majority of Greek Cypriots did not want to accept the loss of the status quo in Cyprus and did not want to share their right to exist, which has now been strengthened via EU accession.

The division of power on the island came to a clear end after the riots of 1963, which were triggered by the lack of functionality in the 1960s. A clear majority of Greek Cypriots saw this lackness as a reason why the two societies could not find common political



ground. Annan's explanation after the referendum was that while most Greek Cypriots wanted reunification, they believed that the solution would not bring any benefits and, on the contrary, would cause greater problems and increased risks (Secretary General's Report 2004).

[51]

The second reason for the rejection of the plan was the election of Papadopoulos as president in the Republic of Cyprus before the referendum. It is an important indicator that the Greek Cypriots voted for someone famous for his nationalist policies against Klerides, who supported the plan. Two points in this key political position of the president are important: the protection of the Republic of Cyprus-which means the rejection of the division of power and leadership-and the EU accession of the Republic of Cyprus, which means the balance with Turkey and the establishment of a pressure mechanism over the EU. Papadopoulos' role in the referendum negatively affected the future of the plan.

The third reason for the rejection of the Annan Plan was the AKEL. This political party first supported the plan but then changed their opinion and joined sides with the nationalist front. This policy change especially disappointed Mr. Alvaro de Soto, who was the negotiator and special advisor of the UN on Cyprus.

Perhaps one of the main obstacles preventing a resolution to the Cyprus problem is that the parties in dispute considered the negotiations a zero-sum game. Annan was convinced that the plan had a win-win quality.⁹ Even if the result in the short term considered only one party to be disadvantaged, it would show in the future that the failure would negatively impact everyone. The solution was for everyone. According to Annan, a solution within the framework could

⁹ 'One of the obstacles to solving the Cyprus problem has been the perception on both sides that this was a zero-sum game: one side's gain was the other side's loss. I am strongly convinced that, had it been accepted, my proposal would have created a win-win situation. I am equally, and sadly, convinced that while the current outcome in the short term may be a greater setback for some than for others, ultimately all are losers in the failure of the recent effort. It is in the interests of all. Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Greece and Turkey, that there should be a settlement of the Cyprus Problem' (United Nations 2003).

[52] only be successful if the leaders of both parties wanted a solution and were ready for it and the high politicians of the home countries supported this attitude. In democratic societies, the basic law is a result of social agreements. For non-homogenous communities such as in Cyprus, a constitutional agreement must be accepted by all parts of society. Therefore, in drafting a constitution, the general inclination of the parties and the essential nature of the two societies in the broadest sense must be taken into account. There is no doubt that the plan was the result of a long-standing process and had been negotiated by the parties. However, the extent to which those societies were integrated into these negotiations and that general inclinations and social dynamics were also taken into consideration is questionable. The UN's win-win principle has been applied to all UN awards on the island, but how this has affected the people and whether the system managed to dispel the doubts and uncertainties of the two societies can be questioned.

REFERENCES

- BBC News. 2021. 'Cenevre'de başarısızlık, Kıbrıs görüşmelerinin geleceğini nasıl etkiler?' 20 April. <https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-dunya-56938748>.
- Cicicoğlu, F. 2020. 'AB-Türkiye ilişkilerinde 2021 perspektifi.' *Anadolu Ajansı*, 24 December. <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/analiz/ab-turkiye-iliskilerinde-2021-perspektifi/2087371>.
- Claude, L. 1962. *Power and International Relations*. New York: Random House.
- Cyprus Mail*. 2021. 'Our View: Complete Waste of Time for Guterres to Appoint Envoy.' 1 October. <https://cyprus-mail.com/2021/10/01/our-view-complete-waste-of-time-for-guterres-to-appoint-envoy/>.
- Çam, T. 2021. 'AB, Kıbrıs müzakerelerinde bulunmak istiyor.' *Anadolu Ajansı*, 8 March. <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/ab-kibris-muzakerelerinde-bulunmak-istiyor/2168303>.
- Der Spiegel*. 2004. 'Zypern bleibt geteilt.' 13 December.
- Der Spiegel*. 2012. 'Distanz zu Zypern.' 17 December.
- Direkli, M. 2016. 'A New Period in the Cyprus Conflict: Can Anastasiadis and Akıncı Change the Status Quo?' *European Review* 24 (1): 134-48.
- Interpeace. 2011. 'Solving the Cyprus Problem: Hopes and Fears.' 28 June. <https://www.interpeace.org/2011/06/solving-the-cyprus-problem-hopes-and-fears/>.



- Kolasi, K. 2013. 'Soğuk Savaş'ın Barışçıl Olarak Sona Ermesi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorileri.' *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi* 68 (2): 149–179.
- Kızılyürek, N., and G. Klerides. 2007. 'Tarihten Güncelliğe Bir Kıbrıs Yolculuğu.' Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
- Lijphart, A. 2002. 'The Wave of Power-Sharing Democracy.' In *Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy*, edited by A. Reynolds, 37–55. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Morgenthau, H. J. 1963. *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Panayiotides, C. 2021. 'The Dilemma: 2017 Convergences or Two State.' *Cyprus Mail*, 3 October. <https://cyprus-mail.com/2021/10/03/the-dilemma-2017-convergences-or-two-states/>.
- Politis. 2005. 'İpárkhou n óla ta ekhéngia yia exévresi lisis.' 14 January. <http://www.politis-news.com/cgi-bin/hweb?-A=293314&-V=articles>.
- Press and Information Office. 2003. 'Our View.' 27 March. <http://www.piopressreleases.com.cy/easyconsole.cfm/id/46/lang/en>.
- Roeder, P., and D. Rothchild. 2005. *Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars*. New York: Cornell University Press.
- 'The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem.' 2004. http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/Annan_Plan_April2004.pdf.
- United Nations. 1984. 'Resolution 550.' s/RES/550, United Nations, New York.
- . 1990. 'Resolution 649.' s/RES/649, United Nations, New York.
- . 1992. 'Secretary-General's Report on an Overall Framework Agreement on Cyprus.' s/23780, United Nations, New York.
- . 2003. 'Report of the Secretary-General on His Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus.' s/2003/398, United Nations, New York.
- . 2004. 'Secretary-General's Report on His Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus.' s/2004/437, United Nations, New York.
- . 2020. 'Report of the Secretary-General on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus.' s/2020/685, United Nations, New York.
- Walt, S. M. 1985. 'Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power.' *International Security* 9 (4): 3–43.
- . 1988. 'Testing Theories of Alliance Formation: The Case of Southwest Asia.' *International Organisations* 42 (2): 275–316.



The EU's Missions and Operations from the Central Mediterranean to West Africa in the Context of the Migration Crisis

ANNA MOLNÁR

University of Public Service, Hungary
molnar.anna@uni-nke.hu

MARIANN VECSEY

University of Public Service, Hungary
vecsey.mariann@uni-nke.hu

This paper focuses on investigating how distance affects the political decisions on interventions, from geographically the closest to the farther CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy) missions and operations. More specifically, we look at the utilization of the CSDP missions and operations in the context of the migration and refugee crisis. As part of the broad foreign policy toolbox, the EU started to use its CSDP missions and operations to address some of the root causes of migration (like internal security and border management issues) in the countries of origin. In this research, we investigate how the mandates and objectives of the missions and operations in the Mediterranean and West African region have changed between 2013 and first quarter of 2022 in order to support the EU's migration policy. Missions and operations gained political capital and more financial and political support from EU Member States as a consequence of the migration and refugee crisis. This support is visible in the expenditures of the three examined missions in the Sahel. Moreover, the European Agenda on Migration of 2015 stated that migration is to become a specific component of CSDP missions and operations. Consequently, the EU started to count on CSDP missions and operations to handle irregular migration in 2015.

Key Words: European Union, migration crisis, Common Security and Defence Policy, EU missions and operations, securitization

 <https://emuni.si/ISSN/2232-6022/15.55-82.pdf>

INTRODUCTION

[56] During the migration and refugee crisis in 2015, the European Union proposed a comprehensive and integrated approach to answer the challenges of mass irregular migration (European Commission 2015a; 2015b; European Council 2015a; European External Action Service 2016a; Biscop 2016; Ceccorulli and Lucarelli 2017, 86–7; Buonanno 2017, 104–6). This paper focusses on the utilization of the CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy) missions and operations in the context of the migration crisis since 2015. As part of the broad foreign policy toolbox at the European Union's disposal, the EU started to use its CSDP missions and operations to address some of the root causes of irregular migration in the countries of origin. Our main goal is to investigate how geographical distance from the territory of the EU affects the political decisions on interventions, from the closest to the farther missions.

We choose to discuss the missions and operations which are located on the Central Mediterranean migration route, and the African internal route from Libya to West Africa between 2013 and 2020. During the peak of the migration and refugee crisis, the Central Mediterranean migration route was the busiest on the way to Europe from Africa. According to the map published by EU Directorate General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations on 05 January 2021, 390,005 total arrivals were registered in 2016, which declined to 188,372 in 2017. In 2018 only 147,683 arrivals were registered; 2019 saw even less arrivals, totalling in 128,536 arrivals, and the lowest number of crossings were registered in 2020 with 95,176 arrivals (Directorate General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations 2021). But the significance of this route also lies in the EU's clear geopolitical interest. There are five EU missions and operations altogether on the route from Mali to Italy, EUNAVFOR Med Operation Sophia and its successor, Operation Iriini in the Mediterranean, EUBAM Libya in North Africa, EUCAP Sahel Niger, and two missions in Mali, EUCAP Sahel Mali and EUTM Mali, which all have a certain mandate to handle migration.

The missions and operations will be discussed in geographical or-



der from the North to the South. We followed this method for the sake of traceability, and because the EU NAVFOR MED military operation in the Mediterranean caused a main turning point in the EU's approach to handling migration when the Italian government decided to support the military answer to tackle this issue. Therefore, our analysis starts with EUNAVFO MED Operations Sophia, and its successor operation, Irini, which are followed by the civilian mission EUBAM Libya, and lastly, three missions in the Sahel, EUCAP Sahel Niger, EUTM Mali, and EUCAP Sahel Mali. Migration is generally perceived as a South–North movement, but it also has a South–South aspect, which is especially prominent in West Africa (Adepoju 2008, 15–8).

[57]

Since 2011 the EU's Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel has been the main framework of action in Mali and Niger. The strategy contains a list of challenges in the Sahel region, which include environmental, economic, demographic and political factors, such as climate change, extreme poverty, frequent food crises, rapid population growth, fragile governance, corruption, risk of radical extremism, and other security related topics (European External Action Service n.d.). Because of the multidimensional crisis in the region, the EU Sahel Strategy became the point of reference, when the EU established its missions in the Sahel (Bøås 2019, 5–7).

The Valletta Action Plan and the European Agenda on Migration also became key documents in the management of CSDP missions and operations. Both the Valletta Action Plan and the European Agenda on Migration state that migration will be a specific component of the ongoing CSDP missions and operations in Niger and Mali. Besides this, the documents call for information exchange among the missions and operations along the West African migration route, in an effort to regionalise EU activities to fight irregular migration (European Council 2017d).

The use of CSDP missions and operations in tackling the migration crisis is part of the Europeanized externalization process of migration policy, which means transferring the management of migration policy to the countries of origin and transit by the European Union. This led to an increased emphasis on checking the legality of

entering the EU before the travel takes place (Bigo and Guild 2010, 273–7; Lavenex 2011, 374–5; Zaiotti 2018, 5–9).

[58] The externalization of migration has widely been discussed and debated by researchers (Martins and Strange 2019, 195–201; Reslow 2019, 31–42). According to Carrera, Radescu and Reslow (2015, 6), the aim of EU's external migration policies is to persuade non-EU countries to implement agreements, policy instruments, information exchanges, projects or cooperation mechanisms and regional processes related to the management of migration. This 'outsourcing of migration policies' was criticized for weakening the protection of human rights and for creating 'Fortress Europe' (Frelick, Kysel and Podkul 2016, 209–11; Jünemann, Fromm and Scherer 2017, 1–7; International Federation for Human Rights 2017; International Detention Coalition 2013).

An immense literature has been produced by researchers on the topic of the Europeanisation of migration and refugee policy as well (Faist and Ette 2007, 3–31; Abdou 2016, 105–17; Vatta, 2017, 13–27). While externalization means that entry procedures are exported to third countries, Europeanisation is a process where either EU norms spill over and are incorporated into national policies, or as a bottom-up process, when national policies of EU Member States influence EU policies. In the case of the CSDP the latter, bottom-up process can be observed (Radaelli 2004).

In parallel with the migration and refugee crisis in 2015, the creation of a defence union gained momentum in the EU and the need for deepening CSDP has raised the question of using CSDP military operations (Tardy 2018, 8–10; Nemeth 2018, 16–29; Rehrl and Glume 2017; Herranz-Surrallés 2019, 33–41). Until 2015, CSDP was regarded as an external military instrument. During the migration and refugee crisis, the question was raised to include CSDP missions and operations to manage migration besides Frontex (European Border and Coast Guard Agency) (Biscop and Rehrl 2016; Parkes 2016). In 2016 many mandates of CSDP missions and operations had to be extended, therefore modifications were made to fit the missions to the comprehensive migration policy (Biscop and Rehrl 2016).



METHODOLOGY

We use the qualitative method of practice oriented document analysis. This approach argues that documents are not just describing reality, but also influence it. Documents can modify our environment as well. This means that certain documents provide a modifying work, which turns paper into objects or materialities (Asdal 2015, 1–3). In this case, we examine how EU missions and operations were changed by different documents over time.

[59]

In this case, the examined documents reinforced the Fortress Europe approach of fences and legal barriers in close connection with the securitisation of migration (Jünemann, Fromm and Scherer 2017, 83–95). During our research we use both primary sources such as EU Council decisions, agendas, action plans, as well as secondary sources including results of 11 semi-structured interviews we concluded in person and online during the research between 2015 and 2019 with EU officials from DG HOME, active and former officials from EU missions and operations, like EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia, EUCAP Sahel Niger and EUCAP Sahel Mali. Among the interviewees were two middle management level EU officials from the European Commission, a former head of mission, a deputy commander, a deputy head of mission, a chief of staff, a branch chief and two analysts of different CSDP missions and operations. Our interviewees were selected using the snow-ball method.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

To investigate if the geographical proximity of different CSDP missions and operations matters, regional security complex theory must be introduced. The essence of the theory lies in geography. Proximity is the central variable in most of the regional security complex theories, but definitions differ (Kelly 2007, 224). The theory most commonly claims, that political and security threats travel easily on shorter distances (Buzan 2003, 141). Consequently, most states worry more about neighbours than about crises farther away. This can be attributed to the more serious security dilemmas related to proximate actors, which have a shared history of interactions. Moreover, regional security complexes tend to form security com-

[60] munities (Kelly 2007, 224). In the case of the EU, migration can be regarded as an externality on the borders. If securitization and regional security complex theory is combined, security communities can emerge. The EU is considered as one. Actors within the security community tend to resolve problems in a peaceful manner and no longer expect or prepare for the use of force against each other (Buzan 2003, 142–3; Háda, Rózsa and Tálás 2016, 9–13; Tuscisny 2020, 426–30)

Three different versions of securitization theory emerged during the 1990s. The first one is the speech act approach, introduced by the Copenhagen School. The second is the sociological approach, based on Foucauldian views, and the third one is the inclusive security approach, inspired by the normative-theoretical approach (Hammerstad 2016, 265–75). The Copenhagen School describes securitization as an act to highlight an existential threat, which requires immediate response (Buzan, Waever and De Wilde 1998, 23–9). The Foucauldian school, however, considers securitization as a modified politicization, which is used as an everyday act to gain political power (Bigo 2002, 67–8). The inclusive security approach abandons the negative connotations of the previous two schools. It represents a proactive, inclusive and collaborative direction of the theory (Hammerstad 2016, 272–4). For the purpose of the research we used the approach of the Copenhagen School.

According to the Copenhagen School, securitization is a move which takes politics beyond the existing rules and regulations and makes possible the implementation of special politics. Therefore, securitization can be assessed as the continuation of politicization. Politicization occurs when a topic, which is not naturally political in its character becomes the subject of political debate and needs to be dealt with. Thus, securitization is a matter that presents an existential threat and requires an immediate response, which does not fall under the normal political procedures; it needs priority decisions made by top leaders. The act of presenting a topic as an existential threat is the securitization move (Buzan, Waever and De Wilde 1998, 23–9).

The securitization of migration started in the 1990s. Concerns



were raised in parallel with the emergence of migration as a security question, claiming that the process replaced migration from the more suitable political field (Waever 1995, 46–78; Waever, Buzan, Kelstrup and Lemaitre 1993, chap. 8.; Balzacq 2005, 190; 2008, 75–96; 2011, 1–28; Huysmans 2006, 125–44; Dannreuther 2016, 215–16). The start of the migration crisis in 2015, reinforced the securitization process of migration (Balzacq, Leonard and Ruzicka, 2016, 498–507; Biscop and Rehr 2016). With the securitisation of migration and the even more apparent externalisation, the two processes mutually-reinforced each other, resulting in an ideal environment to make radical steps like the utilisation of the CSDP military operations which would be acceptable to the audiences.

[61]

CSDP OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia

After the collapse of the Qadhafi regime, the EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia was the first CSDP military operation launched in the framework of the comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises (European Commission 2013). It was deployed after Italy realized its need for assistance and solidarity at the European level. One of the main priorities of the Italian presidency of the EU Council was to develop a genuine European solidarity on the migration issue (Presidency of the Council of the European Union 2014; Molnár and Szente-Varga 2020, 86–93). At the same time the EU started to put an emphasis on externalizing migration policy at this time (European Council 2017a). In April 2015, five days after the tragedy, when approximately 800 people lost their life close to the coast of Sicily, the European Council launched EUNAVFOR MED operation in order to help ‘the disruption of the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks in the Southern Central Mediterranean’ (European Council 2015b). The deployment of the operation was to be concluded in three distinct phases. The first phase conducted information gathering on migration networks. The second introduced direct military actions, such as boarding, search and seizure of vessels suspected of being used for human smuggling or trafficking. The third phase was to introduce all necessary

measures against such vessels, including demolition. The tasks of the operation were to disrupt the business model of human smuggling networks, and to contribute to the training of the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy. The Council Decision expresses the EU's commitment to prevent illegal migration (European Council 2015b).

According to critics, however, the search and rescue activity, which was not mandated by the operation but an obligation by international maritime law (Røsaeg 2020), acted 'as a magnet' for irregular immigrants and thus the mandate of the operation was amended (UK Parliament 2016). The search and rescue activity, however, was not reaching the level of pre-EUNAVFOR results. In the first four months of 2014, 50 people died during the attempt to cross the Mediterranean, while in the same period of 2015 the figure increased to 1,687 deaths. In both periods, around 26,000 successful crossings were recorded (Heller and Pezzani 2016). Later on, the search and rescue activity received even less attention (Carrera and Cortinovis 2020, 150–2).

In 2016, an increase in migration across the Central Mediterranean route (181,126 people) made it clear that, in the absence of comprehensive European policy tools and without the cooperation with origin and transit countries, like the Libyan partner, EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia could not counteract the activities of smugglers. The operation functioned only on the high seas, and both the EU and several member states therefore called for training and equipping the so-called Libyan Coast Guard as well (*The Guardian* 2016; European External Action Service 2017b). In June 2016, the mandate of the operation was reinforced with the supporting tasks of capacity building, training of and information sharing with the Libyan Coast Guard and the implementation of the UN arms embargo on the high seas. The operation in the Mediterranean was also obliged to coordinate with EUBAM Libya, and the Frontex operation in the area (European External Action Service 2016b; European Council 2016b).

The increasing effectiveness of the so-called Libyan Coast Guard, in fact, and the introduction of a code of conduct for NGOs that rescued migrants in the Mediterranean led to a decrease in the number



of arrivals during summer of 2017. This externalization of migration policy and later the creation of Libyan SAR zone was criticized by several stakeholders (The Maritime Executive 2017). In July 2017 the Council of the EU extended the mandate of EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia until 31 December 2018 (European External Action Service 2017a). [63]

In 2018, the immigration and refugee policy of the League and the 5 Stars Movement differed considerably from the former government's and made irregular migration a national security issue. Its position became more radical, as it was confirmed when Italian ports were shut down in front of rescue ships of NGOs (Marrone 2018; Fekete 2019, 165–7). In 2019, Italy tried to block the prolongation of the EUNAVFOR MED Sophia operation's mandate. Probably due to resistance by the Italian government, the deployment of the operation's naval assets had been suspended temporarily for the duration of the extension of the mandate. The operation continued with strengthening surveillance by air assets and reinforcing support to the Libyan Coastguard and Navy (European Council 2019a; 2019b). During the second Conte Government the mandate of this operation was elongated until 31 March 2020, but the deployment of the Operation's naval assets remained suspended (European Council 2019c).

EUNAVFOR MED Operation Iriini

In 2020, EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia ended as scheduled, and a new operation took its place. The establishment of EUNAVFOR MED Operation Iriini eliminated the deadlock of a naval operation during which vessels were withdrawn. In the new mandate the EU addressed the issue of disembarkation as well. In the new mandate the consent of the port State was needed to allow disembarkation. EUNAVFOR MED Operation Iriini inherited assets, HQ and personnel from its predecessor, with an initial one year long operational period (European Council 2020a), which was later extended to 31 March 2023 (European Council 2021a). Operation Iriini also inherited the tasks of the previous operation in the Mediterranean, but the priority among these changed significantly. Iriini's core task

[64] is to contribute to the implementation of the UN arms embargo on Libya, which was the latest addition to Sophia's tasks. The second is to assist the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy in its training and capability development. The disruption of human smuggling and trafficking routes to tackle irregular migration became the third, least important task of the new operation. Also, the text of the Council Decision avoids to mention the three international conventions – mentioned in the 2015 decision launching Operation Sophia (European Council 2015b) – on the obligation to assist people in distress at sea (European Council 2020a).

The maritime operations in the Mediterranean, as the closest to the EU's territory, experienced some changes since their deployment in 2015. The birth of Operation Sophia must be mentioned, as the operation was clearly the result of the securitization of migration, and the Europeanization of national policies. For the first time the EU used a CSDP military operation to address a list of tasks, which are traditionally not military tasks. For this, the securitization of migration was needed. The predecessor search and rescue missions were turned into a military operation, and the EU turned towards securing its southern borders instead of continuing the predominantly humanitarian operations.

As it is said above, international maritime law, however, applies to military vessels as well, and the disembarkation of Operation Sophia's naval assets with migrants on board became an increasingly pressing political issue in Italy. The internal policy again was raised to the EU level, and in 2020 Operation Irini replaced Operation Sophia. The list of tasks did not change with the new mandate, just a new priority order appeared. The externalization of migration management remained important, besides securing the EU's external borders.

EUBAM Libya

The European Union launched the European Union Border Assistance Mission in Libya on 22 May 2013. The objectives of this mission aimed to support the capacity development of Libyan authorities to improve border security in the short term, and to develop Inte-



grated Border Management (IBM) in the long term (Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities in EU Conflict Prevention 2017; European Council 2013a). Despite the fact that the first mandate did not mention migration or the comprehensive approach for CSDP, introduced in 2013 by the EU (European Commission 2013), as a framework, the tasks of the EUBAM Libya were clearly designed to handle migration from Libya with the stabilization of the country. The political fragmentation of the country prevented the mission to identify and establish systemic relations with local actors, and it was not capable to carry out its tasks successfully (Christensen, Ruohomäki and Rodt 2018). Due to the deterioration of the situation in Libya, the mission had to relocate to Tunis in 2014 (Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities in EU Conflict Prevention 2017). In 2016, at the request of the Government of National Accord, the mandate of the mission was prolonged. Despite the known shortcomings, the tasks remained the same, including one addition, the support of a comprehensive civilian security sector reform (European Council 2016c; European Council 2016d; Molnár and Takács 2021, 204).

[65]

At the end of 2017, the situation allowed the EUBAM to re-establish its presence in Tripoli (European External Action Service 2019a), and due to the new mandate, the mission was no longer a mission with overarching strategic objectives. Instead, the mission focused on the sole task of supporting Libya's security sector reform in the fields of border management, law enforcement and the criminal justice system (European Council 2017c). This mandate mentioned a broad cooperation with UN and other EU missions and operations on the ground. Migratory figures peaked in May–July in 2017, counting 23,000 new arrivals in May and 23,500 in June (Frontex 2019). This happened in line with the 2016 EU Global Strategy (EUGS), which raised the establishment of closer connections among CSDP missions and operations along the West African migration route (European External Action Service 2016a). The EU's contribution to the training of the Libyan coast guard and border management in Southern Libya affected other missions in the Mediterranean and the Sahel since they were situated on the West African migration route. Therefore, the EU formed these missions

[66] and operations in a way to support each other's activities with coordination and information sharing, and to contribute to the regional security organizations as well (European Council 2017d). At the end of 2016, only the EUNAVFOR Med Operation Sophia was considered as a direct partner to engage with Libyan authorities (European Council 2017a), providing an active partner on the ground to the EUBAM. In 2017 the mandate of EUBAM Libya was changed, and the element of handling migration became more visible in this mandate, due to the mounting migration pressure on the EU (Loschi, Raineri and Strazzari, 2018). The document mentions the Malta Declaration as its fundamental document, which uses the comprehensive approach to address 'illegal flows into the EU' (European Council 2017a; Molnár and Takács 2021, 204–5).

The next mandate modification to EUBAM Libya came on 17 December 2018. The EU's strategic objective to handle immigration from the south became clearly visible in this mandate. The objective of the mission was to help the Libyan authorities, the GNA at the time of the Council Decision, in the building of state security structures in order to disrupt organized criminal networks involved in smuggling migrants, human trafficking and terrorism in Libya and the Central Mediterranean region (European Council 2018a). The EUBAM was also tasked to provide support in capacity-building in multiple fields, including border management and law enforcement. At the end of 2018, the headquarters of the mission was again in Tripoli (European External Action Service 2018a). General Khalifa Haftar's since failed offensive against Tripoli started in April 2019, just a couple of months after the Council elongated the mission (Molnár and Takács 2021; Molnár, Szászi and Takács 2021, 17–9). The military operation against Tripoli, thus the worsening security environment put the EUBAM Libya in a vulnerable situation at that time. Due to the two-base operational method, the mission staff could switch to work on the second base in Tunis where it still operates at the time of writing (European External Action Service 2021). With the interim government sworn in 15 March 2021, led by Prime Minister Abdelhamid Dbeibah, fresh hope emerges for ending the hostilities in the North African country, which at the time of writ-



ing remains torn between competing external powers and crowded with foreign fighters (Aljazeera 2021). Meanwhile the EUBAM Libya continues to operate and will continue at least until 30 June 2023 (European Council 2021b).

The role of EUBAM Libya seems less prominent in the management of migration since the host nation still faces internal instability. Notwithstanding, the mission can be an important element of externalization, since Libya lies on the southern end of the Central Mediterranean migration route, which has recently been the most used route from Africa to Europe. Given a favourable political environment in the future, the EUBAM can provide the EU with an important bridgehead in Africa. Since Libya traditionally had close relations with EU Member States due to its geographical proximity, it is plausible that, to some extent, the EU can project its security concerns to Libya. This is visible now, even in the name of the operating CSDP mission, which aims at border assistance. Migration was also mentioned in the mandate, which signifies that Libyan authorities are willing to address the question.

[67]

EUCAP Sahel Niger

The EUCAP Sahel Niger mission was launched in 2012. The decision for this mission was the result of multiple events both in the EU and Africa. First, the European Union created a comprehensive Sahel strategy. Although the strategy was focused on promoting security and development in the region, it also addressed the root causes of migration, including the presence of organised crime and radical groups (European External Action Service n.d.). The death of Qadhafi left Libya in anarchy, which led to significant spill overs affecting even distant countries like Niger (European Council 2012).

The original mandate of the mission was to support Nigerien security actors in the fight against terrorism and organized crime with the development of an integrated, coherent, sustainable human rights-based approach. Among its tasks, the EUCAP Sahel Niger provided both strategic and technical advice and trainings. Initially, the mission had only one base, in Niger's capital, Niamey. While the mandate extension in 2014 did not include major changes to the

[68] mission (European Council 2014a), in 2016, an additional objective was added to control and fight irregular migration and associated criminal activity (European Council 2016a). This element is in accordance both with the EUGS and the proposal to use the CSDP missions and operations as tools to manage migration flows (Biscop and Rehr 2016).

The EUCAP Sahel Niger started to increase its presence, and activity in the Agadez region in 2015, and a field office was established in Agadez in 2016 (European External Action Service 2018b). The creation of a multi-purpose centre in that city was proposed in 2015 in the European Agenda on Migration. This project was clearly proposed to affect irregular migration, since the centre is tasked to give information on local protection and resettlement opportunities. The field office worked in close coordination with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the UNHCR. This multi-purpose centre in Agadez was a pilot project, which led to further assumptions that the EU was planning to set up more centres like this in the Sahel region to track and gain information on migrants' journeys (European Council 2015b).

The EUCAP Sahel Niger's mandate of 2016, in line with the EUGS, included the task of close coordination and information sharing with other EU missions, and regional security organizations in the Sahel (European Council 2016a). In 2017, the EU stated that a regionalization of CSDP missions is needed to be able to support regional security cooperation in the whole G5 Sahel region effectively. The initiative included three ongoing CSDP missions in the Sahel: EUCAP Sahel Niger, EUTM Mali and EUCAP Sahel Mali (European External Action Service 2019b). This regionalization also aimed to include the stabilization of Libya (European Council 2017b). The aim of regionalization was to enable CSDP missions to become an effective tool against irregular migration from West Africa in the framework of a comprehensive and integrated approach. This ambition was reinforced when the EUCAP Sahel Niger needed further mandate elongations in 2018, which were continued to focus on the fight against irregular migration and the reduction of the level of associated crime (European Council 2018b; Lopez 2017, 7–13). In 2019



the CSDP regionalization efforts had been reinforced with adding the task to improve interoperability and support cross-border cooperation between the internal security forces of G5 Sahel (European Council 2019d), and the mandate of the mission was prolonged again in 2020 for two additional years (European Council 2020b).

[69]

The externalization of migration management and projecting securitization to third countries can be assessed as successful in the case of Niger. The EUCAP Sahel Niger experienced a meaningful change when the EU started to push for the utilization of CSDP missions and operation as a tool to manage migration. The task to control and fight irregular migration and associated criminal activity was added in 2016. This is indeed a significant step since the tasks have to be approved by the host nation as well. Thus, in the case of Niger, its geographical proximity did not influence how the country was willing to cooperate with the EU.

EUTM Mali and EUCAP Sahel Mali

The European Union deployed two missions to Mali to help Bamako reinforce its security sector and re-establish state authority in the country. The EUTM Mali started in 2013, with the aim to provide training to the Malian Armed Forces (MAF), and to advice on command and control logistical chain and human resources together with educating MAF on human rights and the protection of civilians. The mission had to conduct its tasks in close coordination with other actors in the country, the UN peacekeeping mission, MINUSMA, and ECOWAS (European Council 2013b).

The mission was launched in the framework of Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel, under the comprehensive approach (European Council 2013b). As it was stated before, the EU's Sahel Strategy did not mention migration as a security challenge in the region, but it addressed some of the root causes of migration (radical groups and organised crime). In Mali, the EU set out goals to address fragile governance, violent extremism and radicalization in the Northern regions of the country, and terrorist-linked security threats with the deployment of the EUTM. The mandate of the mission did not include tasks directly linked to the fight against ir-

[70] regular migration, but rather addressed the root causes contributing to it. As it includes training and advising the MAF, this mission is an important measure in the EU's CSDP toolbox to tackle irregular migration. The first mandate also embeds the need for cooperation with the already existing EUCAP Sahel Niger, and also the coordination of the mission's activities with Member States' bilateral actions in Mali and with international and regional actors also present in the region, like the UN, the African Union (AU) and the ECOWAS (European Council 2013b).

The original mandate changed in 2016, when it extended the area of operation of the mission, including the municipalities of Gao and Timbuktu in Northern Mali. A new coordinating partner, the G5 Sahel, also had to be added to the already existing partners (European Council 2016e). Supporting the G5 Sahel Joint Task Force means that the EU is promoting an African homegrown solution to the regional crisis in the Sahel. The African initiative of the G5 Sahel Joint Task Force includes Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, Mali and Niger. In 2018, the Council of the European Union prolonged the mandate of the EUTM Mali until 2020, stressing more the importance of G5 Sahel, which was promoted to be the beneficiary of the EUTM's training and advising activities together with the MAF (European Council 2018c). This was amended in 2020, when the mission's mandate was extended until 2024, with giving the EUTM the task to provide military assistance to the G5 Sahel Forces, as well as to the national armed forces of the regional formation (European Council 2020c).

The EU decided to launch the EUCAP Sahel Mali in 2014, but the mission formally started in 2015. The youngest EU mission in West Africa is also based on the framework of the EU Sahel Strategy. The objectives and tasks of the civilian mission were to help Malian authorities to restore and maintain law and order through the territory of Mali and improve the efficacy of their hierarchy in close coordination with other UN and EU missions in the area (European Council 2014b).

Besides this, the mandate of the mission includes the obligation to establish contacts among the EU missions in Mali, Niger



and Libya (European Council 2014b). The following mandate extensions reinforced these tasks and obligations, adding just a few changes to the mandate. The inclusion of cooperation with the G5 Sahel group's internal security forces was one of the added elements in 2017, together with delivering support for the implementation of the 2015 Accord for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali (European Council 2017d). [71]

The EUCAP Sahel Mali also contributes to the regionalization of CSDP in the Sahel (European Council 2017d). This was reinforced in 2021, when the new mandate included the need for better coordination with G5 Sahel countries, the reinforcement of G5 Sahel national forces and support information sharing with the group (European Council 2021c). Over time, the EU's commitment to maintain the EUCAP Sahel Mali became obvious from the pledged financial reference amount, which is intended to cover the expenditures of the mission. The sum grew steadily from the beginning of the mission, reaching EUR 26,300,000 between 2016–2017, and skyrocketing to EUR 89,100,000 for the two-year period until 2023 (European Council 2021c). The financing of the three CSDP missions in West Africa shows that, the EU is committed to engaging the Sahel in all possible ways. The EU's actions, however, must be accepted by the host nations, thus limited to mutually agreed interventions. This means that the EU cannot project its security concerns to third states successfully in every case.

In fact, the EU could not include migration in the mandates of the two missions in Mali, since the country did not allow it to be addressed. However, migration is an important aspect in Mali. As most of the West African countries, Mali also has a 3% population mobility rate, and an estimated quarter of its nationals take part in international migration. Mali is both a country of origin, transit and destination and, therefore, important from the EU perspective when considering the migration toolbox (Ministère des Maliens de l'Exterieur 2014). This also means that the country does not want to curb migration in any way, since it is part of Mali's culture and contributes to its economy through remittances. Thus, as the furthest examined region, here the EU no longer insisted on explicitly

mentioning migration in the mandates of the CSDP missions. This is partially because of geographical distance, partly because of the host nation's reluctance to include such aims in the deployed missions' mandates.

[72] Notwithstanding, the EU seeks to use all tools that can contribute to the management of irregular migration in the country such as by providing support for the security sector reform, and stability in Mali.

CONCLUSION

The securitization of migration and the tendency to externalize crisis handling and border management as mutually reinforcing processes made military solutions possible for handling migration. This appeared also in the EUGS in 2016, when the EU committed itself to address these challenges, which have both internal and external dimensions, like terrorism or organized crime (European External Action Service 2016a). This commitment shows in the mandates of the CSDP missions, since they are engaged first in counterterrorism and organized crime, with migration a seemingly secondary mandate.

To address migration in the Sahel, the EU uses the framework of both the Valletta Action plan and the European Agenda on Migration (European Council 2017d). The European Agenda on Migration states that migration will be a specific component of the ongoing CSDP missions and operations in Niger and Mali (European Council 2015b). This meant that the EU has officially begun to count on CSDP missions to handle the migration crisis.

CSDP missions gained capital, which shows in the figures of the expenditures of the EUCAP Sahel Mali as well. The financial framework of the mission grew steadily in the period of 2016–2018, and then the growth was either maintained or saw insignificant drops. The securitization of migration initiated a debate about using CSDP missions and operations to respond to irregular migration. At the immediate border of the EU, in the Mediterranean, it became accepted that a military operation the EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia, and from 2020 on, the Operation Irini handles tasks, which could be addressed by the Frontex, or by a civilian CSDP mission.



While the EU has influence across the examined chain of CSDP missions and operations, it is clear from the mandates that geographical distance or proximity has a two-fold impact. In the Mediterranean, Italy had the power to block the EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia from the use of its naval assets, which led to the replacement of the operation with EUNAVFOR MED Operation Irini. This occurrence is an example of how national policy could be Europeanized when it is in close proximity to EU borders. The Italian reluctance manifested in the changed priorities of the tasks of the new operation. In the meantime, Italy is engaged in both Niger and Mali to counter migration, which is a common EU effort in the Sahel region (Ciocca 2019).

[73]

The second impact of geographical distance from the EU's external borders is that the furthest host nations are not necessarily following the EU's lead in addressing irregular migration. For example, in Mali, national authorities did not approve the inclusion of migration related tasks into the mandate of the EU CSDP missions in the country.

Thus, it can be argued that in the closest geographical proximity national policies had an influence on EU policies, including CSDP, with that influence decreasing in farther regions. This research has shown that EU policies had a higher influence on EUBAM Libya and EUCAP Sahel Niger. This is shown in Libya's case in the aim of the mission; while in the case of Niger, a task was agreed to address irregular migration. In the farthest examined country, Mali, the EU had two missions deployed during the time of research, EUTM Mali and EUCAP Sahel Mali. In this case, the EU's influence was not enough to persuade national authorities to agree upon adding a migration related task to the CSDP missions.

Distance influences how the EU can intervene in countries to address irregular migration. In the closest proximity, the influence is greater; however, national policies interfere when using CSDP missions and operations. As a CSDP mission or operation is further away from the EU borders, the host nation gains increasing influence relative to the EU, and its willingness to cooperate with EU policies decreases proportionately with distance.

REFERENCES

- Abdou, L. H. 2016. 'The Europeanization of Immigration Policies.' In *An Anthology of Migration and Social Transformation*, edited by A. Amelina, K. Horvath, and B. Meeus, 105–20. New York: Springer.
- Adepoju, A. 2008. *Migration in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.
- Aljazeera. 2021. 'Libya's Interim Government Takes Power after Handover in Tripoli.' 16. March 16. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/16/libyas-interim-government-takes-power-after-handover-in-tripoli>.
- Asdal, K. 2015. 'What Is the Issue? The Transformative Capacity of Documents.' *Distinktion: Journal of Social Theory* 16 (1): 74–90.
- Balzacq, T. 2005. 'The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context.' *European Journal of International Relations* 11 (2): 171–201.
- . 2008. 'The Policy Tools of Securitization: Information Exchange, EU Foreign and Interior Policies.' *Journal of Common Market Studies* 46 (1): 75–100.
- . 2011. 'A Theory of Securitization: Origins, Core Assumptions, and Variants.' In *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve*, edited by T. Balzacq, 1–30. New York: Routledge.
- Balzacq, T., S. Léonard, and J. Ruzicka. 2016. "'Securitization" Revisited: Theory and Cases.' *International Relations* 30 (4): 494–531.
- Bigo, D. 'Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease.' *Alternatives* 27 (S1): 63–92.
- Bigo, D., and E. Guild. 2010. 'The Transformation of European Border Controls.' In *Extraterritorial Immigration Control*, edited by B. Ryan and M. Valsamis, 252–73. Leiden: Brill.
- Biscop, S. 2016. *The EU Global Strategy: Realpolitik with European Characteristics*. Security Policy Brief 75. <http://www.egmontinstitute.be/content/uploads/2016/06/SPB75.pdf>.
- Biscop, S., and J. Rehr, eds. 2016. *Migration – How CSDP Can Support*. Vienna: Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria.
- Bøås, M. 2019. *The Sahel Crisis and the Need for International Support*. Policy Dialogue 15. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.
- Buonanno, L. 2017. 'The European Migration Crisis.' In *The European Migration Crisis*, edited by D. Dinan, N. Nugent, and W. E. Paterson, 100–30. London: Palgrave.
- Buzan, B. 2003. 'Regional Security Complex Theory in the Post-Cold War World.' In *Theories of New Regionalism*, edited by F. Söderbaum and T. M. Shaw, 140–159. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Buzan, B., O. Waever and J. De Wilde. 1998. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. London: Lynne Rienner.



- Carrera, S., and R. Cortinovis. 2020. 'Search and Rescue, Disembarkation, and Relocation Arrangements in the Mediterranean: Justicing Maritime Border Surveillance Operations.' In *Fundamental Rights Challenges in Border Controls and Expulsion of Irregular Immigrants in the European Union: Complaint Mechanisms and Access to Justice*, edited by S. Carrera and M. Stefan, 148–75. New York: Routledge.
- Carrera, S., R. Radescu and N. Reslow. 2015. 'EU External Migration Policies: A Preliminary Mapping of the Instruments, the Actors and Their Priorities.' EURA-NET. <https://paperzz.com/doc/7982126/eu-external-migration-policies-a-preliminary-mapping-of-the>.
- Ceccorulli, M., and S. Lucarelli. 2017. 'Migration and the EU Global Strategy: Narratives and Dilemmas.' *The International Spectator* 52 (3): 83–102.
- Christensen, G. H., J. Ruohomäki and A. P. Rodt. 2018. 'The European Union Border Assistance Mission in Libya: Successes, Shortcomings and Lessons Identified.' Brief, January, Royal Danish Defence College. https://www.academia.edu/36040150/The_European_Union_Border_Assistance_Mission_in_Libya_-_successes_shortcomings_and_lessons_identified
- Ciocca, F. 2019. 'Italian Military Missions in the World: Where They Are, What They Do, How Much They Cost.' Lenius, 16 September. <https://www.lenius.it/missioni-militari-italiane-nel-mondo>.
- Dannreuther, R. 2010. *International Security: The Contemporary Agenda*. Cambridge Polity: Press.
- Directorate General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations. 2021. 'Arrivals of Refugees and Migrants to Europe in 2020.' DG ECHO Daily Map, 5 January. <https://ercportal.jrc.ec.europa.eu/Maps/Daily-maps#/maps/3582>.
- European Commission. 2013. 'Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council The EU's Comprehensive Approach to External Conflict and Crises.' JOIN(2013) 30 final, European Commission, Brussels.
- . 2015a. 'Joint Foreign and Home Affairs Council: Ten Point Action Plan on Migration.' European Commission, 20 April. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4813_it.htm.
- . 2015b. 'A European Agenda on Migration.' COM(2015) 240 final, European Commission, Brussels.
- European Council. 2012. 'Council Decision 2012/392/CFSP of 16 July 2012 on the European Union CSDP mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger).' *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 187: 48–51.
- . 2013a. 'Council Decision 2013/233/CFSP of 22 May 2013, on the European Union Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya.' *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 138: 15–8.

- . 2013b. ‘Council Decision 2013/34/CFSP.’ *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 14: 19–21.
- . 2014a. ‘Council Decision 2014/482/CFSP of 22 July 2014 Amending Decision 2012/392/CFSP on the European Union CSDP Mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger).’ *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 217: 31–34.
- . 2014b. ‘Council Decision 2014/219/CFSP of 15 April 2014 on the European Union CSDP Mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali).’ *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 113: 21–6.
- . 2015a. ‘Special Meeting of the European Council 23 April 2015 – Statement.’ European Council, 23 April. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/04/23/special-euco-statement>.
- . 2015b. ‘Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/778 of 18 May 2015 on a European Union Military Operation in the Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED).’ *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 122: 31–5.
- . 2016a. ‘Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/1172 of 18 July 2016 Amending Decision 2012/392/CFSP on the European Union CSDP Mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger).’ *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 193: 106–7.
- . 2016b. ‘Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/993 of 20 June 2016 Amending Decision (CFSP) 2015/778 on a European Union Military Operation in the Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED operation SOPHIA).’ *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 162: 18–20.
- . 2016c. ‘Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/207 of 15 February 2016 Amending Decision 2013/233/CFSP on the European Union Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya).’ *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 39: 45–6.
- . 2016d. ‘Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/1339 of 4 August 2016 Amending and Extending Decision 2013/233/CFSP on the European Union Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya).’ *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 212: 111–2.
- . 2016e. ‘Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/446 of 23 March 2016 Amending and Extending Council Decision 2013/34/CFSP on a European Union Military Mission to Contribute to the Training of the Malian Armed Forces (EUTM Mali).’ *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 78: 74–5.
- . 2017a. ‘Malta Declaration by the Members of the European Council on the External Aspects of Migration: Addressing the Central Mediterranean Route.’ European Council, 3 February. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/02/03/malta-declaration>.
- . 2017b. ‘Council Conclusions on Mali and the Sahel.’ 10137/17, European Council, 19 June. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/23993/st10137en17-conclusions-mali-sahel.pdf>.



- . 2017c. 'Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/1342 of 17 July 2017 Amending and Extending Decision 2013/233/CFSP on the European Union Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya).' *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 185: 60–2.
- . 2017d. 'Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/50 of 11 January 2017 Amending Decision 2014/219/CFSP on the European Union CSDP Mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali).' *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 7: 18–9.
- . 2018a. 'Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/2009 of 17 December 2018 Amending and Extending Decision 2013/233/CFSP on the European Union Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya).' *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 322: 25–6.
- . 2018b. 'Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1247 of 18 September 2018 Amending Decision 2012/392/CFSP on the European Union CSDP Mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger).' *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 235: 7–8.
- . 2018c. 'Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/716 of 14 May 2018 Amending and Extending Decision 2013/34/CFSP on a European Union Military Mission to Contribute to the Training of the Malian Armed Forces (EUTM Mali).' *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 120: 8–9.
- . 2019a. 'EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia: Mandate Extended Until 30 September 2019.' European Council, 29 March. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/03/29/eunavfor-med-operation-sophia-mandate-extended-until-30-september-2019>.
- . 2019b. 'Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/535 of 29 March 2019 Amending Decision (CFSP) 2015/778 on a European Union Military Operation in the Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED Operation SOPHIA).' *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 92: 1–2.
- . 2019c. 'EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia: Mandate Extended Until 31 March 2020.' European Council, 26 September. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/09/26/eunavfor-med-operation-sophia-mandate-extended-until-31-march-2020>.
- . 2019d. 'Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/832 of 22 May 2019 Amending Decision 2012/392/CFSP on the European Union CSDP Mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger).' *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 137: 64–5.
- . 2020a. 'Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/472 of 31 March 2020 on a European Union Military Operation in the Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED IRINI).' *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 101: 4–10.
- . 2020b. 'Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1254 of 7 September 2020 Amending Decision 2012/392/CFSP on the European Union CSDP Mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger).' *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 294: 3–4.

[77]

[78]

- . 2020c. ‘Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/434 of 23 March 2020 Amending Decision 2013/34/CFSP on a European Union Military Mission to Contribute to the Training of the Malian Armed Forces (EUTM Mali).’ *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 89: 1–3.
- . 2021a. ‘Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/542 of 26 March 2021 Amending Decision (CFSP) 2020/472 on the European Union Military Operation in the Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED IRINI).’ *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 108: 57–8.
- . 2021b. ‘EUBAM Libya: Council Extends Mandate for a Further Two Years.’ European Council, 18 June. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/06/18/eubam-libya-council-extends-mandate-for-a-further-two-years>.
- . 2021c. ‘Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/14 of 7 January 2021 Amending Decision 2014/219/CFSP on the European Union CSDP Mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali).’ *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 5: 16–7.
- European External Action Service. 2011. ‘Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel.’ European External Action Service. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/strategy_for_security_and_development_in_the_sahel_en_o.pdf.
- . 2016a. *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe; A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy*. European External Action Service. http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf.
- . 2016b. ‘Statement by HR/VP Federica Mogherini on EUNAVFOR Med Operation Sophia.’ European External Action Service, 13 May. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/2809/node/2809_mn.
- . 2017a. ‘EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia: Mandate Extended Until 31 December 2018.’ European External Action Service, 25 July. https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/japan_en/30393/EUNAVFOR%20MED%20Operation%20Sophia:%20mandate%20extended%20until%2031%20December%202018.
- . 2017b. ‘Strategic Review on EUBAM Libya, EUNAVFOR MED Op Sophia and EU Liaison and Planning Cell.’ European External Action Service, 15 May. <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2017/jun/eu-eeas-strategic-review-libya-9202-17.pdf>.
- . 2018a. ‘EUBAM Libya Becomes a Fully-Fledged Civilian CSDP Mission.’ European External Action Service, 17 December. https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/55578/eubam-libya-becomes-fully-fledged-civilian-csdp-mission_en.
- . 2018b. ‘Civilian Mission EUCAP Sahel Niger Factsheet.’ European External Action Service, August. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/factsheet_eucap_august_2018_eng.pdf.



- . 2019a. 'EU Integrated Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya) Factsheet.' European External Action Service, March. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/20190319_eubam_libya_factsheet_march_2019_en.pdf.
- . 2019b. 'The European Union's Partnership with the G5 Sahel Countries.' European External Action Service, May. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/factsheet_eu_g5_sahel_o.pdf.
- . 2021. 'About EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM).' European External Action Service. https://eeas.europa.eu/csdp-missions-operations/eubam-libya/3859/about-eu-border-assistance-mission-libya-eubam_en.
- Faist, T., and A. Ette. 2007. *The Europeanization of National Policies and Politics of Immigration: Between Autonomy and the European Union*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Fekete, L. 2019. 'Colonial Continuities within Managed Migration.' *Global Affairs* 5 (2): 163–70.
- Frelick, B., I. Kysel and J. Podkul. 2016. 'The Impact of Externalization of Migration Controls on the Rights of Asylum Seekers and Other Migrants.' *Journal on Migration and Human Security* 4 (4): 190–220.
- Frontex. 2019a. 'Number of Irregular Crossings at Europe's Borders at Lowest Level in 5 years.' Frontex, 18 January. <https://mipas.lt/en/2019/01/18/number-of-irregular-crossings-at-europes-borders-at-lowest-level-in-5-years/>.
- Háda, B., N. Rózsa and P. Tálas, eds. 2016. *Regional Security Studies*. Budapest: NKE Szolgáltató.
- Hammerstad, A. 2016. 'The Securitization of Forced Migration.' In *Oxford Handbook of Refugee & Forced Migration Studies*, edited by E. Fiddian-Quasmiyeh, 265–77. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Heller, C., and L. Pezzani. 2016. 'Ebbing and Flowing: The EU's Shifting Practices of (Non-) Assistance and Bordering in a Time of Crisis.' *Near Futures Online*, no. 1. <http://nearfuturesonline.org/ebbing-and-flowing-the-eus-shifting-practices-of-non-assistance-and-bordering-in-a-time-of-crisis>.
- Herranz-Surrallés, A. 2018. 'Paradoxes of Parliamentarization in European Security and Defence: When Politicization and Integration Undercut Parliamentary Capital.' *Journal of European Integration* 41 (1): 29–45.
- Huysmans, J. 2006. *The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU*. London: Routledge.
- Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities in EU Conflict Prevention. 2017. 'The Libya Review Revision 2.0.' Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities in EU Conflict Prevention, 1 May. http://www.ieceu-project.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/IECEU_D3.4_Libya_review.pdf.
- International Detention Coalition. 2013. *The Externalisation of Borders: Mi-*

- gration Control and the Right to Asylum*. International Detention Coalition. https://idcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/INCIDENCIA_OK_ENGLISH.pdf.
- International Federation for Human Rights. 2017. 'The Externalization of Migration Policies: A Scourge for Human Rights.' International Federation for Human Rights, 28 November. <https://www.fidh.org/en/issues/migrants-rights/the-externalization-of-migration-policies-a-scourge-for-human-rights>.
- Jünemann, A., N. Fromm and N. Scherer. 2017. *Fortress Europe? Challenges and Failures of Migration and Asylum Policies*. Wiesbaden: Springer.
- Kelly, R. E. 2007. 'Security Theory in the "New Regionalism."' *International Studies Review* 9 (2): 197–229.
- Lavenex, S. 2011. 'Concentric Circles of Flexible "European" Integration: A Typology of EU External Governance Relations.' *Comparative European Politics* 9 (4–5): 372–93.
- Lopez, E. 2017. 'Performing EU Agency by Experimenting the "Comprehensive Approach": The European Union Sahel Strategy.' *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 35 (4): 451–68.
- Loschi, C., L. Raineri and F. Strazzari. 2018. 'The Implementation of EU Crisis Response in Libya: Bridging Theory and Practice.' Working paper, Eunpack.
- Marrone, A. 2018. 'The Conte Government: Radical Change or Pragmatic Continuity in Italian Foreign and Defence Policy?' IAI Istituto Affari Internazionali, 15 June. <https://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/conte-government-radical-change-or-pragmatic-continuity-italian-foreign-and-defence>.
- Martins, B. O., and M. Strange. 2019. 'Rethinking EU External Migration Policy: Contestation and Critique.' *Global Affairs* 5 (3): 195–202.
- Ministère des Maliens d l'Exterieur. 2014. 'Document de Politique National de Migration.' Ministère des Maliens d l'Exterieur. <http://adrkayes.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/PONAM-Mali.pdf>.
- Molnár, A., I. Szászi and L. Takács. 2021. 'Security Sector Reform by Intergovernmental Organizations in Libya' *International Journal of Euro-Mediterranean Studies* 14 (1): 7–48.
- Molnár, A., and M. Szente-Varga. 2020. 'Europeanised or Sovereignist Approach to Tackle Irregular Immigration in Southern Europe.' *International Journal of Euro-Mediterranean Studies* 13 (1): 70–107.
- Molnár, A., and L. Takács. 2021. 'The European Union's Response to Mass Migration Through Mediterranean: A Shift from Humanitarian Foreign Policy Actor Towards a Pragmatist Foreign Policy Actor?' *The New Eastern Mediterranean Transformed*, edited by A. Foteini and A. Tziampirise, 199–217. Cham: Springer.
- Nemeth, B. 2018. 'Militarisation of Cooperation against Mass Migration –



- the Central European Defence Cooperation (CEDC).’ *Defense & Security Analysis* 34 (1): 16–34.
- Parkes, R. 2016. ‘Managing Migration Abroad.’ Brief 31, European Union Institute for Security Studies. https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief_31_Migration.pdf.
- Presidency of the Council of the European Union. 2014. ‘Programme of the Italian Presidency of the Council of the European Union.’ Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 16 June. <http://italia2014.eu/en/presidency-and-eu/programme-and-priorities/programme-of-the-italian-presidency-of-the-council-of-the-european-union>.
- Radaelli, C. 2004. ‘Europeanisation: Solution or Problem?’ *European Integration Online Papers* 8. <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2004-016.pdf>.
- Rehrl, J., and G. Glume. 2017. *Handbook on CSDP Missions and Operations: The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union*. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union.
- Reslow, N. 2019. ‘Horizontal and Vertical Diversity: Unintended Consequences of EU External Migration Policy.’ *The International Spectator* 54 (1): 31–44.
- Røsaeg, E. 2020. ‘The Duty to Rescue Refugees and Migrants at Sea.’ 2020. Oxford Law Faculty, 25 March. <https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2020/03/duty-rescue>.
- Tardy, T. 2018. ‘Does European Defence Really Matter? Fortunes and Misfortunes of the Common Security and Defence Policy.’ *European Security* 27 (2): 119–37.
- The Guardian*. 2016. ‘David Cameron: Send More Patrol Ships to Turn Refugee Boats Back to Libya.’ 18 March. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/18/refugee-boats-david-cameron-early-intervention-libya-migrants-mediterranean-eu-leaders>.
- The Maritime Executive. 2017. ‘EU Should Cut Ties with Libyan Coast Guard.’ *The Maritime Executive*, 21 June. <https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/amnesty-eu-should-cut-ties-with-libyan-coast-guard>.
- Tusicisny, A. 2007. ‘Security Communities and Their Values: Taking Masses Seriously.’ *International Political Science Review* 28 (4): 425–49.
- UK Parliament. 2016. ‘Operation Sophia, the EU’s Naval Mission in the Mediterranean: An Impossible Challenge.’ European Union Committee, 13 May. <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201516/ldselect/lddeucom/144/14402.htm>.
- Vatta, A. 2017. ‘The EU Migration Policy between Europeanization and Re-Nationalization.’ In *Europe of Migrations: Policies, Legal Issues and Experiences*, edited by S. Baldin and M. Zago, 13–32. Trieste: Edizioni Università di Trieste.

[81]

Waever, O. 1995. 'Securitization and Desecuritization.' In *On Security*, edited by R. D. Lipschutz, 46–87. New York: Columbia University Press.

Waever, O., B. Buzan, M. Kelstrup, and P. Lemaitre. 1993. *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*. London: Pinter.

[82]

Zaiotti, R. 2018. 'Mapping Remote Control: The Externalization of Migration Management in the 21st century.' In *Externalizing Migration Management: Europe, North America and the Spread of Remote Control Practices*, edited by R. Zaiotti, 3–30. London: Routledge.



The Spanish Campaigns against the Kingdom of Tlemcen's Cities and the Resistance Movements from 1516 to 1530

MESHAL ALENEZI

Kuwait University, Kuwait

mshal.q8@hotmail.com

Many historians have concentrated on the Spanish-Ottoman conflict in the 16th century, and they have paid attention to the piracy activities of the Barbarossa brothers in the Mediterranean in the 16th century to affirm that the brothers had been pirates. In addition, they have examined the efforts of the Barbarossa brothers to evacuate the Moriscos from the Iberian Peninsula. They have not, therefore, paid attention to the reaction of the inhabitants of the Kingdom of Tlemcen to the Spanish colonisation in the second and third decades of the 16th century. This research analyses the steps of the inhabitants of the cities of the Kingdom of Tlemcen, Oran, Mersa El-Kebir, Algiers, Tenes, and the city of Tlemcen to combat the Spanish colonists. It illustrates the relationship between the Barbarossa brothers and the efforts of the inhabitants of the Kingdom of Tlemcen to combat the Spanish colonists in the cities of the Kingdom of Tlemcen from 1516 to 1530. Consequently, this research concludes that the inhabitants of Algiers and the city of Tlemcen played a vital role against this colonisation when they summoned the Barbarossa brothers and legitimated the rule of the brothers in Algiers and Tlemcen.

Key Words: Algiers, colonisation, Barbarossa brothers, Spaniards, Charles V, Tlemcen

 <https://emuni.si/ISSN/2232-6022/15.83-104.pdf>

INTRODUCTION

In the 16th century, there were four states in North Africa. First, the Mamlūks ruled the Mamlūk Sultanate, located in what is now

known as Egypt and the Levant (1250–1517). Second, the Ḥafṣids ruled the Ḥafṣid Kingdom, which was situated in today's Tunisia and North Libya (1229–1574). Third, the Waṭṭāsids (1471–1554) ruled the Kingdom of Fez, sited in the modern-day Kingdom of Morocco. [84] Fourth, the Zayyānid dynasty ruled the Kingdom of Tlemcen, located in what is now called the Republic of Algeria (1236–1556). This kingdom was also occasionally called the Zayyānid state because it was ruled by the Zayyānid dynasty, which was also known as Banū 'Abd al-Wād of the Zanātah tribe (Al-Tinsī 2011, 22).

The purpose of this research is to concentrate on the reasons for the Spanish campaigns against the cities of the Kingdom of Tlemcen, the reactions to these campaigns and the consequences of these reactions. The prime reason that led me to concentrate on this topic is that many historians and scholars have focused on the emigration and evacuation of the Moriscos to the Kingdom of Tlemcen in the 16th century (Al-Sa'īdūnī 1994, 222–43; Miller 2008; Maillo Salgado 2002, 86–101). In addition, they have examined piracy campaigns by the Barbarossa brothers and other pirates, which launched from the coast of the Kingdom of Tlemcen against the Christian ships in the Mediterranean during the 16th century (Al-Tamīmī 1989; Currey 1910; Heers 2017). However, they have not paid attention to the reactions of the inhabitants of the Kingdom of Tlemcen to the Spanish campaigns against their cities and the consequences of these reactions. This study utilizes a historical methodology, which analyzes various Spanish and Arabic primary sources, including diaries, annals, letters and documents.

THE BEGINING OF THE SPANISH COLONISATION IN NORTH AFRICA

One of the aims of the Spanish colonisation that spread throughout the northern lands of the North African kingdoms was religious. In the 15th century, there had been hopes and also claims that the Catholic political authorities in the Iberian Peninsula, particularly the Crown of Castile, would recover North Africa from the Muslim rulers and bring the area under Christian rule. The Castilian historian and the ambassador of Henry IV of Castile (1454–1474), Ro-



drigo Sánchez de Arévalo, had hoped that 'Henry IV would recover North Africa, which his Visigoth predecessors had once possessed' (Sánchez de Arévalo 1959, 312). Meanwhile, the Castilian historian Diego de Valera commented that 'the king of the Visigoths, Wamba (672–680), had once ruled Ceuta, Tangier, and a large part of North Africa' (De Valera 1959, 173). Ceuta was seized by the Portuguese in the first half of the 15th century when de Valera was just three years old. It seems that the Portuguese colonisation of Ceuta and then Tangier gave de Valera hope that the Crown of Castile would capture other territories in North Africa and place them under Christian rule beside Ceuta and Tangier.

[85]

Additionally, the weakness of North African states and, in particular, the Kingdom of Tlemcen, encouraged the secretary of the Catholic monarchs Ferdinand II (1479–1516) and Isabella I (1474–1504) in Granada, Hernando de Zafra (d. 1507) to convince the king and queen to conquer the northern cities of the Kingdom of Tlemcen. It is even recorded that, in 1494, Zafra is said to have stated that 'God made this kingdom weak for you [Ferdinand]' (Fernández de Navarrete 1867, 72).

Consequently, in 1494, Pope Alexander VI approved Zafra's suggestion to conquer the territories of Tlemcen. He allowed the Catholic monarchs to levy a one-tenth tax on all ecclesiastics in the Iberian Peninsula, to prepare for a crusade in North Africa (Bedini 1992, 11). This assistance from Alexander VI to Isabella I and Ferdinand II was granted because the pope had an interest in restoring the church there (O'Banion 2012, 95).

In 1497, the Duke of Medina Sidonia in the southern Spain, Juan Alfonso Pérez de Guzmán (d. 1507), sent a fleet commanded by the Spanish leader, Pedro Estopiñán (d. 1505), who colonised Melilla, a coastal city in the Kingdom of Fez. Melilla was close to the north-western frontier of the Kingdom of Tlemcen, and the colonisation of Melilla occurred without any fighting. The conquest of Melilla by the Spanish fleet was due to the disputes between the Kingdom of Fez and the Kingdom of Tlemcen regarding their dominance of the port of Melilla in the late 15th century. This conflict led to the emigration of many of the inhabitants of Melilla (Bernáldez 1962, 380).

[86] The Spanish forces in Melilla consisted of seven hundred foot soldiers, fifty cavalrymen, two hundred labourers, three hundred cross-bowmen, one hundred arquebusiers, twenty artillerymen, thirty-five clerks, two clergymen, a doctor, a surgeon, and an apothecary (Bernáldez 1962, 380). The Spanish and Portuguese colonial settlements were thus spread on the northern territories of the Kingdom of Fez. The Portuguese had colonised some northern territories of the Kingdom of Fez, such as Ceuta (Sabtah) in 1415, al-Kasir al-Saghir (al-Qasir al-Şaghir) in 1458, and Tangier (Ṭanjah) and Asilah (Aşilah) in 1471 (De Pina 1901, 140–160).

Then, in the first years of the 16th century, the Spaniards concentrated on the three northern cities of the Kingdom of Tlemcen – Oran, Mersa El-Kebir, and Algiers. The Spaniards likely exploited the chaos that followed the death of the Zayyānid emir, Abū ‘Abd Allāh IV (1468–1504), to further inflame the quarrel between the Zayyānids for the throne of Tlemcen, which allowed the Spanish colonists to embark on their project against this kingdom without obstacles. Although Abū ‘Abd Allāh V (1504–1517) ruled Tlemcen after the death of his father, he was more focused on countering a rebellion by Zayyānid members, particularly his brothers Abū Zayyān and Yaḥyā al-Thābitī, than on any dangers around his kingdom. Abū Zayyān was, therefore, imprisoned in Tlemcen while Yaḥyā al-Thābitī fled to Fez (Al-Wazān 1979, 406–7).

THE FIRST SPANISH COLONY IN THE KINGDOM OF TLEMCCEN

In the spring of 1505, some Muslim corsairs of Mersa El-Kebir launched a series of devastating raids against the Iberian coasts, including the cities of Malaga, Elche, and Alicante (Heers 2017, 25). Therefore, in August 1505, the archbishop of Toledo, Francisco Jiménez de Cisneros (d. 1517), prepared a campaign, incorporating five-thousand strong army commanded by Diego Fernández de Córdoba y Arellano (d. 1518), to capture Mersa El-Kebir in the north-west of the Kingdom of Tlemcen, which included an important port. Cisneros likely wanted to benefit from the port of Mersa El-Kebir economically, as it was capable of sheltering a hundred ships during



storms and attracted merchants from the republics of Venice and Genoa (Al-Wazān 1979, 380–400). In October 1505, after more than a month of siege, the Spaniards captured it (Al-Madani 1965, 99).

The Spanish invaders of Mersa El-Kebir realised that it would be possible for them to make a life for themselves in the town if they could foster friendly relations with its existing inhabitants in order to get supplies, such as wheat and barley. However, these colonists were rejected by most of the town's inhabitants. In 1507, by way of retaliation, the Spaniards plundered the surrounding towns and captured a thousand Muslims and four thousand heads of cattle. Later in the same year, a force of many military volunteers from the city of Tlemcen responded to this plunder by killing two thousand Spaniards and carrying off four hundred prisoners (Garcés 2002, 20). However, Mersa El-Kebir remained under Spanish control until it was sold to the Ottoman authorities in Algiers in 1792 (Rummel 1999, 29). [87]

The military pressure that Cisneros brought against the Kingdom of Tlemcen stopped a few years after the conquest of Mersa El-Kebir because a crisis occurred in the throne of the Spanish Empire due to the sudden death of Philip I in September 1506. The death of Philip I raised concerns regarding potential assassination on the part of Ferdinand II (1479–1516), who had renounced the government of Castile, a huge part in the Iberian Peninsula and the lordship of the Indies in favour of Philip I in the Treaty of Villafáfila in June 1506, withholding half of the income of the Indies (Zurita 2005, 7).

THE PEAK OF THE SPANISH COLONIAL EXPANSION IN THE KINGDOM OF TLEMCEN

The Spanish campaigns to capture other coastal cities of the Kingdom of Tlemcen were resumed by Cisneros, beginning with Oran in 1509. In May 1509, the Spaniards captured the city of Oran in a single day through the military management of Cisneros, who sent General Pedro Navarro (d. 1528) to deal with this matter. The Spanish forces under the command of Navarro arrived in the Kingdom of Tlemcen on 17 May and captured Oran in the following day. The swift conquest of Oran demonstrates the lack of military arrangement be-

tween the city of Tlemcen, which was the capital of the kingdom, and the city of Oran. It also emphasises the lack of military arrangement among the inhabitants of Oran themselves.

[88] Most inhabitants of Oran decided to confront the incoming Spanish troops outside Oran. As the Spaniards were aware of this decision through their spies, they divided themselves into two battalions: the first encountered the inhabitants of Oran, while the second occupied the city (Al-Wazān 1979, 400). The authorities of the Kingdom of Tlemcen did not launch any campaigns to regain Oran, as they realised their military forces could not combat the Spaniards in Oran. The Spanish troops in Oran comprised around twelve thousand infantrymen and four thousand cavalrymen (Duro 1895, 73). Cisneros visited the city after it was captured by the Spanish forces. In addition, the Emir of Tlemcen, Abū 'Abd Allāh V angered the inhabitants of Oran by negotiating peace with the Spanish garrison in Oran and supplying them with wheat and barley in 1510 (Suárez 2005, 194). Following the conquest of Oran, the Spaniards released more than three hundred Christian captives from the hands of Oran inhabitants, most of whom were from the Iberian Peninsula (Al-Madani 1965, 113). These had been captured during the activities of the corsairs of Oran in the Western Mediterranean.

The conquest of Oran and the weakness of political and military authorities of the Kingdom of Tlemcen encouraged the Spaniards to colonise another northern coastal city of the Kingdom of Tlemcen, Algiers, the capital of the Republic of Algeria today, in 1510 (Al-Madani, 1965). The Iberian islands, Ibiza and Mallorca suffered from the raids of the corsairs of Algiers from the last decade of the 15th century (Al-Wazān 1979, 408–9).

The inhabitants of Algiers vacillated in their loyalty. In the first half of the 15th century, many of these inhabitants had been loyal to the Kingdom of Tlemcen, while others preferred to be subject to the authorities of the city of Bougie in the Ḥaḥḥid Kingdom due to its proximity to Algiers (Al-Wazān 1979, 408–9). Additionally, Algiers was granted a kind of independence by the political authorities of the Kingdom of Tlemcen, which chose Oran to be the chief seaport of the Zayyānid dynasty rather than Algiers due to Oran's proxim-



ity to the capital, Tlemcen. Algiers was thus only nominally part of the Kingdom of Tlemcen. One example in support of this view is that the Spaniards conquered Bougie on 5 January 1510, as it had launched many campaigns to attack the Iberian coasts since the second half of the 15th century (Al-Wazān 1979, 408–9). After the fall of Bougie, Salīm al-Tūmī, who belonged to the Arabian tribe, Tha'labah, exploited the situation between Algiers and the Kingdom of Tlemcen's political authorities, as well as the attitude of some inhabitants of Algiers towards Bougie, and became the emir of Algiers (Al-Wazān 1979, 410). Bougie remained under Spanish control until 1555 (Rummel 1999, 36). [89]

Accordingly, on 31 January 1510, Pedro Navarro forced Salīm al-Tūmī to accept Spanish hegemony over Algiers with an annual tribute for Ferdinand II (Playfair 1878, 35). The tribute was half of the profits obtained from agriculture and crafts. Navarro then built fortifications that included artillery and a garrison of two hundred men on the biggest rocky island off Algiers, Peñón, in order to prevent the inhabitants of Algiers from rebellion and piracy on the Iberian coasts (Sa'd Allāh 2007, 325). The loss of Algiers meant that the Kingdom of Tlemcen had lost the third of its coastal cities. The Spaniards then forced the emir of Tlemcen, Abū 'Abd Allāh V, to become a vassal of Ferdinand II in 1512. This emir therefore paid an annual tax estimated at twelve thousand *ducats*, twelve horses, and six hawks to Ferdinand II (Al-Wazān 1979, 381).

THE REACTION OF THE INHABITANTS OF ALGIERS TO THE SPANISH COLONISATION

In 1516, the natives of Algiers viewed the Barbarossa brothers, 'Arūj (d. 1518) and Khayr al-Dīn (d. 1546) as an effective power who would release them and protect them, their interests, and their rights from the Spaniards (Barbarūsā 2010, 74). The brothers had been traders in the Eastern Mediterranean, meaning that they had the ships to transfer their goods. Eventually, however, 'Arūj in particular decided to find a new career. 'Arūj thus became a sea captain, working under the authorities of the Mamlūk sultan, Qūnṣwā al-Ghūrī. During his period under the Mamlūk Sultanate, 'Arūj faced a serious event that

would impact his life: the ships that were under his leadership were attacked by the Knights of Rhodes. Subsequently, he became a pirate and corsair together with his brother Khayr al-Dīn.

[90] Current historians and scholars are divided into two camps regarding the terms used to describe the Barbarossa brothers' activities. Some Western historians, such as Albert Lovett, refer to the brothers as pirates, particularly Khayr al-Dīn, who established a pirate commonwealth in the Kingdom of Tlemcen with Algiers as its headquarters that plundered Christian ships in the Mediterranean (Lovett 1986, 132). Bernard Lewis also refers to the conduct of the brothers as piracy, as they aimed to take the money and enslave the crews of the ships they targeted (Lewis 1996, 53).

However, Eastern historians, such as the Tunisian historian 'Abd al-Jalīl al-Tamīmī, criticise the Western historians who describe the brothers as savage pirates (Al-Tamīmī 1989, 8). Al-Tamīmī accuses these historians of overlooking the brothers' honourable actions, such as the evacuation of the Moriscos from the Iberian Peninsula, which was led by Khayr al-Dīn in particular. The Egyptian historian Zakariya Sulaymān refers to the brothers as heroes who conducted *al-jihād al-baḥrī* as a mean of resisting Portuguese colonisation in the Kingdom of Fez and Spanish colonisation in the Kingdom of Tlemcen and the Ḥafṣid Kingdom. Sulaymān also considers 'Arūj's piracy as a kind of economic siege against all of the Christian states and their ships in the Mediterranean during the 16th century, as it disrupted imports and exports between them (Sulaymān 1991, 79–80).

In 1514, the brothers attacked a Spanish colony in Bougie, besieging the Spaniards there for a month. However, they were unable to expel the colonists, and 'Arūj was defeated due to the exhaustion of their gunpowder (Gómara 1853, 361). This assault threatened Spanish interests in the Ḥafṣid Kingdom. Reinforcements, therefore, arrived in Bougie from the Iberian Peninsula in the form of five ships commanded by Martin de Renteria. Consequently, a second siege conducted by the brothers in 1515 also failed (*Mémoires de l'Académie nationale de Metz* 1844, 189). However, in the first few months of 1516, some delegations from some cities of the Kingdom of Tlemcen came to the brothers, who were in their headquarter, Ježil, a north-



ern coastal city in the Ḥafṣid Kingdom after they had expelled the Genoese garrison from there in 1514 (Al-Wazān 1979, 424).

One of these delegations was from the inhabitants of Algiers, who asked the brothers to liberate their city from Spanish occupation; the Spaniards had forced them to pay tribute to Ferdinand II, who had died in the same year (Barbarūsā 2010, 74). Ferdinand II had also cut off one of the sources of income of the inhabitants of Algiers, namely piracy on the Iberian coast, from 1510 onwards (Anderson 1789, 44). 'Arūj and Khayr al-Dīn agreed to help them to overthrow the Spanish occupation, a move that would increase the brothers' popularity as well as earn them loyalty and support from the inhabitants of Algiers. They could thereby establish political strongholds in the various cities of the Kingdom of Tlemcen. Before expelling the Spaniards from Algiers, the brothers engaged in some strategic preparations.

[91]

The brothers first captured Cherchell, a coastal town in the north-central part of the Kingdom of Tlemcen, in the spring of 1516, as this was one of the chief refuges for some Granadans following the fall of Granada in 1492 (Ris 1935, 642). More than a thousand Muslims from Granada had already come to Cherchell in the 1490s. The Granadan emigrants then built the town, cultivated its lands, and also built many ships, which would be useful as reinforcements for the inhabitants and the Barbarossa brothers in their piracy operations and *jihād* against the Spaniards. Cherchell had been deserted since the conflict between the Kingdom of Fez and the Kingdom of Tlemcen in the 14th century (Al-Wazān 1979, 405). At the time, the Kingdom of Tlemcen primarily depended on the coastal cities, such as Oran, Mersa El-Kebir, and Tenes, for their ports.

At the beginning of the summer of 1516, 'Arūj arrived in Algiers and was able to expel the Spanish colonists from inside the city. In 1517, the brothers then killed some of the local rulers, such as Ḥamīd 'Eid, a ruler of Tenes who had been loyal to the Spaniards. The brothers then captured Tenes, a coastal town in the north-west of the Kingdom of Tlemcen (De Haedo 1612, 219–20). These victories assuredly increased the popularity of the Barbarossa brothers among the inhabitants of the Kingdom of Tlemcen.

[92] Following the expulsion of the Spaniards from within Algiers, 'Arūj did not immediately become its ruler. The local ruler, Salim al-Tūmī, initially remained in place. During this period, he tried to weaken the people's confidence in 'Arūj's forces, as they had been unable to displace the Spaniards from their fort on the rocky island of Peñón off the coast of the city of Algiers. As a result, al-Tūmī was executed by 'Arūj, who subsequently became the ruler of Algiers in August of 1516 (Muwafaq and Abū al-Sha'ar 1999, 17).

The domination of Algiers by 'Arūj alongside Khayr al-Dīn resulted in a number of attempts by the Spaniards to recapture Algiers. The Spanish authorities urged the local Christians of the Kingdom of Tlemcen to incite the rulers of the neighbouring towns, along with the tribesmen surrounding and within Algiers, against the brothers (Hess 2010, 64). Their attempts were unsuccessful, highlighting the desire of the inhabitants of Algiers to stabilise the brothers' rule in their city.

Subsequently, Cisneros sent the knight Diego de Vera (d. unknown) with less than a hundred ships to recapture Algiers in September 1516 (Al-Wazān 1979, 411). This campaign was repelled by the forces of the Barbarossa brothers, who captured four hundred infantrymen; they were also aided by a storm, which caused the deaths of three thousand of the Spanish forces when their fleet was sunk (Currey 2008, 48). This victory enhanced both the brothers' popularity and the enthusiasm of their followers.

THE LEGALITY OF THE DOMINATION
OF THE BARBAROSSA BROTHERS ON SOME CITIES
OF THE KINGDOM OF TLEMCCEN

In 1517, the inhabitants of the city of Tlemcen preferred the brothers over members of the Zayyānid dynasty, particularly over the new emir of Tlemcen, Abū Ḥammū III (1516–1528). The inhabitants likely began to hold the brothers in high esteem after observing their efforts, which expelled the Spaniards from Algiers. Abū Ḥammū inherited the throne of Tlemcen with the assistance of the Spaniards who dominated Tlemcen, which was contrary to the wishes of the Tlemcen city's natives. Abū Ḥammū neglected the internal affairs



of the Kingdom of Tlemcen, such as improving its economy (Sāmiḥ 1989, 59–60). The jurist of Tlemcen, Abū al-‘Abbās Aḥmad b. Yūsuf al-Malyānī (d. 1526), was, therefore, in agreement with the inhabitants of the city of Tlemcen when they revolted against Abū Ḥammū and summoned the brothers in Algiers to liberate the city of Tlemcen from Spanish domination (Muḥammad 1964, 73). This jurist was also critical of the previous emir of Tlemcen, Abū ‘Abdallāh V, due to his submission to the Spaniards.

[93]

The Barbarossa brothers' presence in Algiers increased 'Arūj's desire to conquer the city of Tlemcen. 'Arūj believed that Tlemcen would be 'a primary source of danger and crisis' for his rule in Algiers because, since 1512, the Zayyānid dynasty had been guided both internally and externally by Spanish colonists (Barbarūsā 2010, 85).

The Spanish military campaigns against the Barbarossa brothers in Algiers temporarily stopped due to some dissenting voices that rejected the rule of Charles V (1516–1556) in Spain from 1517 to 1518 (Zamalloa 1861, 51–2). However, the brothers were reluctant to conquer Tlemcen using military means, as they would have faced many obstacles if they had made such an attempt. Firstly, unlike Algiers, Tlemcen is not a coastal city; as the brothers had more expertise in fighting naval campaigns, an assault on Tlemcen would therefore have presented the brothers with difficulties regarding the use of ships to transfer their military equipment or to besiege the city. Secondly, Tlemcen was surrounded by Spanish garrisons in the north, particularly in Oran and Mersa El-Kebir in the Kingdom of Tlemcen and Melilla in the Kingdom of Fez. The brothers would have been forced to pass one of these garrisons in order to reach the city. Tlemcen had been a vital supplier of food for these garrisons, and the Spaniards would not have allowed any naval power in the Mediterranean to conquer it easily (Suárez 2005, 382). In addition, Tlemcen was too far away for the brothers in Algiers to move with their forces over land through the territories of the kingdom, most of which is desert.

However, quarrels among members of the Zayyānid dynasty and their followers for the throne of Tlemcen provided an opportunity for 'Arūj to rule the city from 1517 to 1518 without any need for a

[94] military campaign. In 1516, the emir of Tlemcen, Abū ‘Abd Allāh V, died. The preferences of the inhabitants of Tlemcen regarding the next ruler were subsequently divided between two members of the Zayyānid dynasty, Abū Zayyān and Abū Ḥammū III (Barbarūsā 2010, 82).

Most natives of Tlemcen at the time preferred Abū Zayyān, who had been in prison in Tlemcen during the rule of Abū ‘Abd Allāh V (Al-Wazān 1979, 406). The Spanish colonisation of the Kingdom of Tlemcen occurred during the rule of the latter, and after his death, Abū Ḥammū III was able to take the throne. The Spanish political authorities in Tlemcen assuredly intervened in the choice of the people of Tlemcen, working to instate Abū Ḥammū III in order to maintain Spanish dominance of the kingdom. Abū Ḥammū III was the son of Abū ‘Abd Allāh V, and the Spaniards likely believed that he would follow his father’s policy regarding the colonists.

Consequently, the inhabitants of Tlemcen revolted against Abū Ḥammū III and deposed him in 1517 (Al-Wazān 1979, 406). He fled to Spain and promised to be submissive to Charles V in order to regain the throne (ibid). The inhabitants of Tlemcen first appointed Abū Zayyān, who found that the kingdom’s army had no hope of countering the Spanish forces. The inhabitants then sent a delegation to ‘Arūj in Algiers promising their loyalty if he would agree to become the ruler of Tlemcen (Barbarūsā 2010, 86). At the beginning, ‘Arūj decided to keep Abū Zayyān as the emir of Tlemcen on the condition that he would provide the brothers with supplies, such as food and weapons, for their piratical activities, and also do as they instructed (Al-Filālī 2002, 76–7). However, Abū Zayyān rejected their demands, as they would surely have led to the Spaniards’ attempt to expel the brothers and himself from Tlemcen. He was consequently killed by ‘Arūj in 1517 (Al-Wazān 1979, 405).

The killing of Abū Zayyān did not anger the inhabitants of Tlemcen, who had previously suffered due to many conflicts among members of this dynasty for the throne during the 15th century. These inhabitants might have considered that the rule of ‘Arūj would finally put an end to any further conflict for the throne.

Accordingly, ‘Arūj stayed in Tlemcen with an army of thousand



men, while Khayr al-Dīn remained in Algiers with an army of three thousand. 'Arūj believed that Algiers needed more protection than Tlemcen, stating that 'if we lost Algiers, we would lose everything in this kingdom' (Barbarūsā 2010, 87). It is possible that the Spanish cannons situated in Peñón off Algiers were an obstacle for the brothers, as these cannons could potentially attack the coasts of Algiers, on which many of the brothers' ships were located (Gómara 1853, 368–71).

[95]

'Arūj then realised his need for human power to militarily secure Tlemcen. As such, he gathered the inhabitants from Oran and Mersa El-Kebir, along with the inhabitants of Tlemcen, and rewarded them with treasure from the Zayyānids' treasury (Heers 2017, 65). 'Arūj then planned to expel the Spanish garrison from Oran in the spring of 1518 (Barbarūsā 2010, 87).

THE REACTION OF THE SPANIARDS TO THE
DOMINATION OF THE BARBAROSSA BROTHERS
ON SOME CITIES OF THE KINGDOM OF TLEMCCEN

In January of 1518, the Spanish governor of Oran, Diego Fernández de Córdoba (1509–1512/1516–1518), sent an urgent demand to Charles V for help in combating the deteriorating situation in the outer frontiers of the Iberian Peninsula. De Córdoba considered confronting the Barbarossa brothers to be more important than holding the coastal fortifications in the Kingdom of Tlemcen. The presence of the brothers as Muslim naval forces in Tlemcen alarmed the Spanish authorities due to the possible connection of the brothers and their North African followers with the Ottoman Empire (Sorgia 1963, 15). This situation would threaten the stability of the Spanish Empire.

Accordingly, early in 1518, Charles V sent troops to the Kingdom of Tlemcen, which adopted the strategy of cutting the supply route over which aid from Algiers was sent west to the city of Tlemcen (Sorgia 1963, 15). The Spanish forces also established a blockade against the city of Tlemcen (Hess 2010, 65). The siege of Tlemcen affected the persistence of many of the local Muslim inhabitants, who were urged by the Christians of Tlemcen to renounce the rule

[96] of 'Arūj (Shanhū 1972, 71–72). Subsequently, 'Arūj was killed along with his entire force in the summer of 1518 during their attempt to break the siege at night (Gómara 1853, 374–9). 'Arūj's head was cut off and paraded through most of the Spanish cities (Belachemi 1984, 310).

According to Khayr al-Dīn's diary, 'Arūj died because of his perceived sympathies towards the inhabitants of Algiers and Tlemcen that were part of his army. 'Arūj's soldiers had become stuck in the town of el-Māliḥ, in the north-western part of the Kingdom of Tlemcen, on their way to Algiers after fleeing from the siege of Tlemcen. 'Arūj therefore returned to die with them. Khayr al-Dīn declared that 'Arūj could not bear the cries of his soldiers who had fallen into the hands of Charles V's forces, so he returned to fight with them until he was killed' (Barbarūsā 2010, 92).

Khayr al-Dīn was saddened by the death of 'Arūj, and some of the brothers' followers and soldiers doubted whether Khayr al-Dīn would be as competent as his brother (Al-Tir 1989, 70). With regard to the situation of the city of Tlemcen following the defeat of 'Arūj, Abū Hammū III returned to become the emir of Tlemcen once again through the assistance of Charles V's forces. Most inhabitants of the city of Tlemcen, however, had previously rejected both him and the Spanish colonists and did not consider him legitimate. This emir continued to pay the same tribute to Charles V that had been paid by Abū 'Abd Allāh V to Ferdinand II since 1512 (Al-Wazān 1979, 381). The rule of the Zayyānids became confined to the city of Tlemcen and a few other cities of the kingdom until their deposition by the Ottomans in 1556.

THE SITUATION OF ALGIERS FROM 1518 TO 1525

Following the killing of 'Arūj, Khayr al-Dīn faced many challenges in Algiers. One of these challenges was the desire of the Spanish forces to seize the city and to kill him. In August 1518, a military expedition commanded by the Spanish leader, Hugo de Moncada (d. 1528), attempted to regain Algiers. However, this campaign failed because of a storm in the Mediterranean, which sank most of the ships of the Spanish forces, as well as the absence of their North African allies,



in particular the military assistance of Abū Ḥammū III (Al-Wazān 1979, 411). The defeat of the Spaniards in this campaign was also due to defence preparations made by Khayr al-Dīn and the inhabitants of Algiers (Barbarūsā 2010, 94).

Khayr al-Dīn then desired to return to fight at sea as a corsair, harming and plundering Christian ships, rather than remain in Algiers with its lack of military supplies. It is even recorded that Khayr al-Dīn stated that 'my purpose was to restrict the infidels on the Mediterranean and North Africa because it was my brother's way' (Barbarūsā 2010, 94). Notwithstanding Khayr al-Dīn's decision to resume being a corsair in September 1518, he remained in Algiers as a ruler until the end of 1520 (Gómara 1853, 384). The inhabitants of Algiers at the time wanted Khayr al-Dīn to be their ruler, rather than a corsair in the Mediterranean. They also wanted Khayr al-Dīn to protect them from another potential military campaign by Charles V after his forces were defeated in August 1518 (Barbarūsā 2010, 95).

[97]

Faced with the insistence of the inhabitants of Algiers – particularly from the jurists, merchants, lawyers, and nobles – Khayr al-Dīn agreed to remain, albeit on one condition, the inhabitants needed to offer allegiance to the Ottoman Sultan, Salim I (1512–1520) (Barbarūsā 2010, 94). The latter became the caliph of the Muslims following the inheritance of the holy places in the Arabian Peninsula and the Levant from the Mamlūk Sultanate in 1517. Khayr al-Dīn believed that allegiance to Salim I would deter any potential attempts to conquer the city of Algiers, since he viewed the Ottoman Empire as the most powerful empire during this period. It is even recorded that Khayr al-Dīn stated that 'I have not heard of any force that could threaten the Ottomans and their subjects' (Barbarūsā 2010, 94). We can, therefore, infer that Khayr al-Dīn wanted to strengthen his rule in Algiers and other territories of the Kingdom of Tlemcen through Ottoman protection. He also wanted to use the Ottoman flag on his ships to protect them from Christian piracy. He stated that 'my follower, Ḥusayn Aghā, faced Venetian ships on his way from Istanbul to Algiers, but Venetian ships did not cause any problems for him because he raised the Ottoman flag on his ships' (Barbarūsā 2010, 94). Moreover, Charles V's dominance over the Zayyānid emir was

an additional reason that led Khayr al-Dīn to urge these inhabitants to proceed.

[98] Many inhabitants of Algiers agreed with this condition and wrote a request regarding this matter to Salīm I in October 1519 (TKS in Istanbul 1519, document 6456). Consequently, Salim I accepted the request of the inhabitants of Algiers without any conditions and provided Khayr al-Dīn with the Ottoman flag to terrify his enemies. It is even recorded that ‘Salīm I advised Khayr al-Dīn to carry the Ottoman flag with him wherever he went’ (Barbarūsā 2010, 96–7).

Khayr al-Dīn’s allegiance to the Ottomans removed the legitimacy of the Muslim dynasties of North Africa, especially the Zayyānid dynasty. Khayr al-Dīn obligated the people of Algiers, Tenes, and Cherchell to recite the name of the Ottoman Caliph in their Friday prayers and put the caliph’s name on their coins (Barbarūsā 2010, 96–7). The Ḥafṣid Sultan, al-Mutawkil (1494–1526), feared that Khayr al-Dīn would expand into his territories. Accordingly, the Kingdom of Ḥafṣid conspired to fight Khayr al-Dīn in the Kingdom of Tlemcen, although Khayr al-Dīn uncovered every one of these conspiracies (Ahiskali 1775, 41v–42r). One example of this is that the sultan, al-Mutawakil, incited some tribesmen in some territories of the Kingdom of Tlemcen against Khayr al-Dīn, but Khayr al-Dīn was able to defeat them, killing some of the plotters in December 1519 (Barbarūsā 2010, 101). Additionally, the kingdoms of Ḥafṣid and Tlemcen failed to incite the inhabitants of Algiers to revolt against Khayr al-Dīn. According to his diary, the people of Algiers favoured him because he had developed the trade of the city as well as united its tribes, who felt safe under the protection of the Ottoman Empire that he had initiated.

The Ḥafṣid Kingdom was likely afraid of initiating a direct confrontation with Khayr al-Dīn in Algiers because of his military reputation. Khayr al-Dīn had defeated the military campaign of Charles V’s forces against Algiers in August of 1518, resulting in the deaths of four thousand men and the capture of three thousand of Charles V’s troops (Al-Wazān 1979, 410–1). The Ḥafṣid Kingdom, therefore, relied on indirect confrontations through tribesmen in the Kingdom of Tlemcen in their attempts to unseat Khayr al-Dīn. The Ḥafṣid



Sultan convinced Aḥmad al-Qāḍī (d. 1525), the leader of the tribesmen located in the region of Kūkū in the north-eastern part of the Kingdom of Tlemcen close to Algiers, that Khayr al-Dīn was dangerous, and his aggression could possibly extend to Kūkū (Ahiskali 1775, 41v).

[99]

While Khayr al-Dīn was able to defeat al-Qāḍī's military attack, he lost two thousand men from his forces, while another two thousand were wounded (Barbarūsā 2010, 114). This event saddened him because his men had been killed by Muslims. Following the defeat of al-Qāḍī, Khayr al-Dīn was forced by his soldiers to kill more than one hundred captives who had been soldiers fighting in al-Qāḍī's offensive against Khayr al-Dīn. Many jurists, as well as the people of Algiers, asked him to forgive these captives as they had been deceived by the Ḥafṣid ruler. Following the execution of the prisoners from al-Qāḍī's campaign, Khayr al-Dīn came to believe that most residents of Algiers would be unhappy if he stayed among them (Barbarūsā 2010, 114). He subsequently left Algiers temporarily for Ježil in 1520 (Gómara 1853, 383).

Khayr al-Dīn probably wanted to show the inhabitants of Algiers what would befall the city when it was not under his rule. In Ježil, Khayr al-Dīn resumed piracy, which increased both the wealth of Ježil and the power of his fleet. He plundered ships off the coasts of Sicily, Genoa and Venice bringing barley, wheat, olives, cloth, rice, silk, honey, money, ships and pepper to Ježil (Barbarūsā 2010, 120–2). Consequently, Ježil became attractive to the tribesmen and merchants of North Africa.

Regarding the internal situation of Algiers, its native inhabitants felt worse off under the rule of Aḥmad b. al-Qāḍī. They negotiated with him to withdraw from the city, but he refused. They subsequently appealed to Khayr al-Dīn to expel and replace him (Barbarūsā 2010, 120–2). Before Khayr al-Dīn reclaimed Algiers, he moved against the territories of the Ḥafṣid Kingdom. In 1525, he captured the Ḥafṣid territories of Annaba (Anābah) and Constantine, which were adjacent to his major bases, Ježil and Algiers, to forestall the Ḥafṣids' plots (Naylor 2009, 117). He was then able to regain Algiers from al-Qāḍī after two victories against him in the

eastern section of Algiers (Gómara 1853, 390–1). Al-Qāḍī was killed by tribesmen in Algiers in 1525 (Barbarūsā 2010, 125).

THE SITUATION OF ALGIERS FROM 1525 TO 1530

[100] Following his return to Algiers in 1525, Khayr al-Dīn worked to maintain the loyalty of the tribesmen. He flattered the tribal chiefs and appointed them to local lordships that he established (Rogerson 2012, 40). It is likely that he wanted to benefit from their experience and to maintain his rule over tribal land.

In Algiers, Khayr al-Dīn resumed his piracy along with his follower, Sinān Rīs. In 1528, Sinān captured six ships carrying various items that were necessary for the war and useful to the inhabitants of Algiers, such as cannon shells, gunpowder, wooden poles, oil, tar, cheese, honey, sugar, olive oil, and money (Barbarūsā 2010, 133–4). These items possibly strengthened Khayr al-Dīn and made him decide to expel the Spaniards from Peñón island off Algiers. The Barbarossa brothers had previously been unable to expel the Spaniards from Peñón island after capturing Algiers in 1516 because the Spaniards used cannons as part of their resistance (Gómara 1853, 368–71). Khayr al-Dīn realised that the continued existence of the Spaniards on Peñón island was a strategic mistake, as this island was located only a few hundred metres from the coast of Algiers. The Spaniards on this rocky island had not been able to attack the city since 1516 due to the existence of fortifications (Barbarūsā 2010, 134–5). Khayr al-Dīn likely wanted to prevent Charles V's forces from using this island as a base for further potential campaigns to recapture Algiers. Consequently, in May 1529, he besieged the Spanish fortress in Peñón and attacked it using artillery until the Spanish garrison there surrendered later that month (Garnier 2008, 20). Khayr al-Dīn then decided to destroy the rocky island and to use its rocks to construct a breakwater for the city of Algiers (Bosworth 2007, 23).

This victory angered Charles V, who expressed his rage in the following statement: 'How dare one of the thieves of the sea take my castle (Peñón)!' (Barbarūsā 2010, 137). Charles V did not himself directly retaliate against Khayr al-Dīn and Algiers. Instead, he trav-



elled to Genoa to observe the surrender of the French troops from the War of the League of Cognac in June 1529 (Blockmans 2002, 67). From Genoa, Charles V depended on his new Mediterranean naval ally, the Genoese Andrea Doria (d. 1560), to strike Khayer al-Dīn's territories in the Kingdom of Tlemcen (Tracy 2002, 137). In 1530, Andrea Doria attacked Cherchell to free the Christian slaves, but his campaign did not succeed, as they concentrated instead on plundering the town, while Khayr al-Dīn also launched a counterattack against them (Naylor 2006, 199).

[101]

In 1530, Khayr al-Dīn sent Aydin Rīs to strike Gibraltar, Barcelona, and the Balearic Islands and to capture Andrea Doria, who had attacked Cherchell in 1530. These raids resulted in 3,000 Spanish captives (Barbarūsā 2010, 152).

CONCLUSION

At the beginning of the 16th century, Spanish colonisation extended from the Kingdom of Fez to the Kingdom of Tlemcen. The Spaniards captured some cities of the Kingdom of Tlemcen, including the capital city of Tlemcen, Oran, Mersa El-Kebir, and Algiers. The inhabitants of Algiers and the city of Tlemcen played a vital role against this colonisation when they summoned the Barbarossa brothers and legitimated the rule of the brothers in Algiers and Tlemcen. Consequently, in 1518, the Spanish Empire dispatched a military campaign to Tlemcen which resulted in the killing of 'Arūj. However, Khayr al-Dīn had been obliged to stay in Algiers due to its inhabitants' decision to comply with all his requests. He defeated the Spanish military campaign in Algiers in 1518 and expelled the Spaniards from Peñón island off Algiers in 1529. In addition, he affirmed the importance of his presence in the Kingdom of Tlemcen to the inhabitants of Algiers and of other cities of the Kingdom of Tlemcen. As a result, the legitimacy of the rule of Zayyānids in the Kingdom of Tlemcen was affected, and the Kingdom of Ḥafṣid conspired to fight Khayr al-Dīn in the Kingdom of Tlemcen. Further research relating to the period and area of the current research should be undertaken. In addition, studies of the situation of the Moriscos in Algiers in the second half of the 16th century must be analysed.

REFERENCES

- Mémoires de l'Académie nationale de Metz*. 1844. Metz: Editions le Lorrain.
- Ahiskali, H. ibn Y. 1775. *Tarih-i Cezayir veya Tehzib et Tevarih*. Istanbul: T.K.S.
- Al-Filālī, 'A. al-'A. 2002. *Tilimsān fī al-'Ahd al-Zayyānī*. Algiers: Dār Mūfam.
- Al-Madanī, A. 1965. *Ḥarb al-thalāthmi'at sanah bayn al-Jazā'ir wa Ispānyā 1492-1792*. Algiers: al-Sahrikah al-Waṭāniyah.
- Al-Sa'īdūnī, N. 1994. 'Ṣuwar min al-hijrah al-Andalusiyah ilā al-Jazā'ir.' *Al-Majalah al-'Arabiyah II- Thaqāfah* 14 (27): 222-43.
- Al-Tamimī, 'A. 1989. *al-Dawlah al-'Uthmāniyah wa al-qaḍiyah al-Mūriskiyah*. Zaghwān: Centre d'Études et de Recherches Ottomanes, Morisques, de Documentation et d'Information.
- Al-Tinsī, M. 2011. *Tārīkh Banī Zayyān muqtataf min nuẓm al-dur wa al-'uqyān fī bayān sharaf Banī Zayyān*. Edited by M. Bū 'Ayād. Algiers: Mufim.
- Al-Tir, 'A. S. 1989. *Kitāb al-Atrāk al-'Uthmāniyūn fī Ifrīqiya al-Shamāliyah*. Translated by M. 'A. 'Aāmīr. Beirut: Dār al-Nahḍah al-'Arabiyah.
- Al-Wazān, H. b. M. 1979. *Wasf Ifrīqiya*. Translated by 'A. al-R. Ḥamidah. Riyadh: Imām Muḥammad b. Sa'ūd Islamic University.
- Anderson, A. 1789-1790. *Historical and Chronological Deduction of the Origin of Commerce, from the Earliest Accounts*. Edited by W. Combe. 6 vols. Dublin: Byrne.
- Barbarūsā, K. al-D. 2010. *Mudhakarāt Khayr al-Dīn Barbarūsā*. Translated by M. al-Darāj. Algiers: Dār al-Aṣḥālah.
- Bedini, S. 1992. *The Christopher Columbus Encyclopaedia*. 2 vols. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Belachemi, J.-L. 1984. *Nous, les frères Barberousse, corsaires et rois d'Alger*. Paris: Fayard.
- Bernáldez, A. 1962. *Memorias del reinado de los Reyes Católicos*. Edited by Manuel Gómez Moreno and Juan de Mata Carriazo. Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia.
- Blockmans, W. 2002. *Emperor Charles V, 1500-1558*. Translated by Isola van den Hoven-Vardon. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bosworth, C. E. 2007. *Historic Cities of the Islamic World*. Leiden: Brill.
- Currey, E. H. 1910. *Sea Wolves of the Mediterranean: The Grand Period of the Moslem Corsairs*. London: John Murray.
- . 2008. *Flag of the Prophet: The Story of the Muslim Corsairs*. Tucson: Fireship.
- Duro, C. 1895-1903. *Armada Espanola: desde la unión de los Reinos de Castilla y León*. 9 vols. Madrid: Sucesores de Rivadeneyra.
- Fernández de Navarrete, M., ed. 1867. 'Las cartas de Hernando de Zafra al rey y la reina Católicos en enero y febrero de 1494.' In *Colección de documentos inéditos para la historia de España*, 72-83. Madrid: Calera.
- Garcés, M. A. 2002. *Cervantes in Algiers: A Captive's Tale*. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press.



- Garnier, É. 2008. *L'Alliance Impie: François Ier et Soliman le Magnifique contre Charles Quint, 1529–1547*. Paris: Editions du Félin.
- Gómar, F. 1853. 'Crónica de los Barbarrojas.' In *Memorial Histórico Espanol*, vol. 6, 327–539. Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia.
- Haedo, D. de. 1612. *Topographia, e Historia général de Argel*. Valladolid: Diego Fernández de Córdoba y Oviedo, a costa de Antonio Coello.
- Heers, J. 2017. *The Barbary Corsairs: Warfare in the Mediterranean, 1480–1580*. Translated by J. North. London: Frontline Books.
- Hess, A. C. 2010. *The Forgotten Frontier: A History of the Sixteenth-century Ibero-African Frontier*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Lewis, B. 1996. *Iktishāf al-Muslimin li Aūrubā*. Translated by M. 'A. al-Qādir. Cairo: al-Maktabah al-Akādīmiyah.
- Lovett, A. 1986. *Early Habsburg Spain, 1517–1598*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Maillo Salgado, F. 2002. 'The Almogataces: A Historical Perspective.' In *Jews, Christians, and Muslims in the Mediterranean World After 1492*, edited by Alisa Ginio, 86–101. London: Frank Cass.
- Miller, K. A. 2008. *Guardians of Islam: Religious Authority and Muslim Communities of Late Medieval Spain*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Muḥammad, Al-Ḥ. b. 1964. *Nuzhat al-anzār fī faḍil 'ilm al-tārīkh wa al-akhbār*, edited by M. b. Abi Shanab. 2nd edition. Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-'Arabī.
- Muwafaq, M., and H. A. al-Sha'ar. 1999. *Al-Dawlah al-'Uthmāniyah: bidāyat wa-nihāyat*. Awraq al-nadwah al-'ilmīyah fi Jāmi 'at Āl al-Bayt.
- Naylor, P. C. 2006. *Historical Dictionary of Algeria*. 3rd ed. Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow Press.
- . 2009. *North Africa: A History from Antiquity to the Present*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
- O'Banion, P. J. 2012. *The Sacrament of Penance and Religious Life in Golden Age Spain*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Pina, R. de. 1901. *Chronica de El-Rei d. Affonso V*. 3 vols. Lisbon: Escriptorio.
- Playfair, R. L. 1878. *Handbook for Traveller in Algeria and Tunis*. 2nd ed. London: John Murray.
- Rīs, P. 1935. *Kitāb al-Baḥriyah*. Edited by F. Kurtoglu. Istanbul: Türk Tarihi Arastirma Kurumu.
- Rogerson, B. 2012. *North Africa: A History from the Mediterranean Shore to the Sahara*. London: Duckworth Overlook.
- Rummel, E. 1999. *Jimenez de Cisneros: On the Threshold of Spain's Golden Age*. Tempe: ACMRS.
- Sa'd Allāh, A. al-Q. 2007. *Abḥāth wa arā' fī tārīkh al-Jazā'ir*. 5 vols. Algiers: Dār al-Baṣā'ir.
- Sánchez de Arévalo, R. 1959. 'Vergel de los Principes.' *Biblioteca de Autores Espanoles* 116:311–43.

- Shamhū, 'A. al-Ḥ. 1972. *Dukhūl al-Atrāk al-'Uthmānīn ilā al-Jazā'ir*. Algiers: Dār al-Ṭibā'ah al-Sha'biyah.
- Sorgia, G. 1963. *La politica nord-africana di Carlo V*. Padova: CEDAM.
- Suárez, D. 2005. *Historia del maestre último que fue de Montesa y de su hermano don Felipe de Borja: la manera como gobernaron las memorables plazas de Orán y Mazalquivir, reinos de Tremecén y Ténez en África, siendo allí capitanes generales, uno en pos del otro, como aquí se narra*. Edited by M. Á. de Bunes Ibarra and B. Alonso. Valencia: Institución Alfonso el Magnánimo.
- Sulaymān, Z. 1991. *Kitāb qirā'ah jadīdah fī Tārīkh al-'Uthmānīn*. Jeddah: 'Aālam al-Ma'rifah.
- Tracy, J. D. 2002. *Emperor Charles V, Impresario of War: Campaign Strategy, International Finance, and Domestic Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Valera, D. de. 1959. 'Doctrinal de Principes.' *Biblioteca de Autores Espanoles* 116:173–202.
- Zamalloa, M. 1850–1867. *Historia general de Espana*. 30 vols. Madrid: Establecimiento Tipográfico de Francisco de P. Mellado.
- Zurita, J. 2005. *Historia del rey Don Fernando el Católico: de las empresas, y ligas de Italia*. Edited by J. J. Iso, P. Rivero and J. Pelegrín. Vol. 2, book 7. <https://ifc.dpz.es/publicaciones/ebooks/id/2423>.



Smoothing Egyptian Households' Consumption: The Role of Credit Channel

OMNEIA A. HELMY

Cairo University, Egypt
omneia.helmy@feps.edu.eg

MONA E. FAYED

Cairo University, Egypt
monaesam@feps.edu.eg

NADINE A. DESSOUKY

Cairo University, Egypt
nadine.desouki@feps.edu.eg

This study examines whether Egyptian consumers can smooth their consumption and the role of credit markets in this regard. This is in addition to examining the effect of the credit constraints in transmitting the monetary policy decisions to the households' consumption through its credit channel. To this end, the study utilizes a Vector Autoregressive model (VAR) to examine whether the monetary policy affects consumption through its credit channel. Then, an Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) Bound test to Cointegration is used to determine the effect of the credit constraints, represented by the external finance premium, in the long run. Consumption smoothing is separately tested using an Error Correction Model (ECM) besides a VAR one. The study uses quarterly data covering the period from the first quarter of 2002 till the fourth quarter of 2017. Results reveal that the EFP negatively affects consumption in the short and long run. Egyptian consumers are not able to smooth their consumption and the existence of credit constraints is most likely to be the reason for that. Finally, the analysis shows that the credit channel transmits the monetary policy decisions to the consumption of the households sector in Egypt.

Key Words: consumption smoothing, external finance premium, credit channel, saving for a rainy day

 <https://emuni.si/ISSN/2232-6022/15.105-135.pdf>

INTRODUCTION

[106] Consumption smoothing and the role of the financial sector in this smoothing process have been of great importance for households, policy makers, and banks. Low- and middle-income households spend almost all their income on basic needs. Therefore, it is essential to be able to mitigate the negative effects of any income shock on their consumption level. This cannot be done without having diversified consumption smoothing mechanisms, in which the financial sector has a great role in providing unconstrained borrowing and saving. Having a role in consumption smoothing encourages banks to heighten their interest in the households' sector in terms of the type of financial products offered, which will consequently increase their profitability.

If households can smooth their consumption, then depending on current income for measuring inequality or establishing welfare programs for policy makers cannot hold anymore. Moreover, fiscal and monetary policies need to be unpredictable and permanent in order to affect aggregate consumption. Consumption smoothing also has many other implications in designing insurance and pension policies. Accordingly, the aim of this study is to examine whether Egyptian consumers can smooth their consumption and the role of credit markets in this regard. This is in addition to examining the effect of credit constraints in transmitting monetary policy decisions to the households' consumption through its credit channel.

As a matter of fact, Egypt's financial and banking sectors remained underdeveloped with only 32% of all Egyptians above 15 having formal bank accounts, according to Findex database in 2017. Moreover, according to the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE, <https://www.cbe.org.eg>), only 10% of the total deposits at the banking sector goes as credit to the households sector. Crowding out of the private sector by government borrowing, risk-averse banks and the underdeveloped risk assessment tools of financial institutions are the main structural constraints facing credit to the households sector.

Moreover, the lack of collateral for a large part of the poor society raises the EFP they face. Also, the lack of customized products for



underprivileged households' needs acts as an additional constraint. All of this led to the financial exclusion of a large part of the society. Some efforts have been exerted by the CBE and the micro-finance institutions to include this financially marginalized part, but with limited coverage in terms of the number of services provided and number of beneficiaries included. This is particularly relevant to Egypt given the recent successive interest rate increases that aimed at lowering inflation by reducing consumption, following the floatation of the Egyptian pound in 2016.

[107]

This study contributes to the consumption and saving empirical literature on Egypt, which is relatively small. Also, few studies tested the impact of different monetary policy transmission mechanisms on the Egyptian economy (El-Shazly 2005; Al-Mashat and Billmeier 2007; Moursi, El Mossallamy and Zakareya 2007; Moriyama and Arbatli 2011). However, almost none of them was explicitly interested in the households sector.

The study utilizes a Vector Autoregressive model (VAR) to examine whether monetary policy affects consumption through its credit channel. Then, an Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) Bound test to Cointegration is used to determine the effect of the credit constraints, represented by the external finance premium, in the long run. Consumption smoothing is separately tested using an Error Correction Model (ECM) besides a VAR one. The study uses quarterly data covering the period from the first quarter of 2002 until the fourth quarter of 2017. Results reveal that the EFP negatively affects consumption in the short and long run. Egyptian consumers are not able to smooth their consumption and the existence of credit constraints is most likely to be the reason for that. Finally, the analysis shows that the credit channel transmits monetary policy decisions to the consumption of the households sector in Egypt.

The remainder of the study is organized as follows: the second section briefly reviews some of the relevant empirical studies. The third section examines consumption patterns of the households sector in Egypt over time and in comparison with Egypt's peers. The effectiveness of the credit channel transmission mechanism is tested in the fourth section. The fifth section tests the validity of

the REPIH for Egyptian households. Finally, the study provides a conclusion and highlights some policy implications.

LITERATURE REVIEW

[108] The Life Cycle-Permanent Income Hypothesis (LC-PIH) of Modigliani and Brumberg in 1954 and Friedman in 1957 was the first to introduce the concept of consumption smoothing. It assumes that consumers estimate their lifetime resources and determine their current consumption as a fraction of this estimate in order to maximize their consumption utility. In 1978, Hall introduced the Rational Expectations Permanent Income Hypothesis (REPIH). He suggested that consumption should follow a random walk process. Therefore, the one period lagged consumption has all needed information to predict current period consumption. This implies that predicted income changes should have no effect on consumption as consumers should be already considering them when taking their current period consumption decision. Accordingly, consumption is exogenous with respect to current income changes. This is unlike unpredicted permanent income changes that should be totally reflected in consumption. However, transitory income shocks should not affect consumption at all as consumers perceive their expected value to be zero over lifetime. These transitory income shocks should be saved or dissaved. This will occur only under the assumption of perfect capital markets in which consumers are free to borrow when they expect their income to increase and save when they expect their income to decrease in the future. This implies that savings are a good predictor of current income changes, a fact known as 'Saving for a rainy-day hypothesis.'

Monetary policy tools are believed to be short-term ones. Therefore, according to the REPIH implications, monetary policy has a minor effect on aggregate consumption. On the other hand, the transmission of monetary policies to households' consumption is taken for granted by many central banks (Bacchetta and Gerlach 1997). Accordingly, monetary policies that affect credit conditions are likely to increase or decrease the amount of credit available to households and thus affect their consumption, which contradicts



the REPIH implications. This implies the existence of imperfect capital markets, which impose borrowing and saving constraints restricting the consumption smoothing behavior of households. If consumers are not able to borrow or save freely, then they will depend totally on their current income or relatively costly external finance. Capital market imperfections are also reflected in high External Finance Premium (EFP). These imperfections can result from crowding out of the private sector by government borrowing, asymmetric information problems or bureaucracy (Holtemöller 2002). The EFP also reflects the credit worthiness of borrowers. A borrower with a weak financial position cannot negotiate lower interest rates, self-finance or provide more collateral. Therefore, he faces further increases in the EFP and, as a result, becomes more credit constrained (Bernanke and Gertler 1995, 34–6). This is known as the credit channel monetary transmission mechanism. The effect of the credit channel on consumption occurs as follows; when a tight monetary policy that raises interest rates occurs, interest expenses on the borrowers' liabilities side of the balance sheet increase and collateral prices decrease, dampening their financial position. This also raises the EFP that borrowers face (Aoki, Proudman and Vlieghe 2004), and causes sharp fluctuations in aggregate consumption trends. The literature has further proved that borrowing constraints do not only constrain borrowing but also saving rates as consumers are less willing to postpone consumption to the following period (Özcan and Özcan 2015; Smith 2011).

[109]

Several empirical studies tried to test the validity of the REPIH by examining the excess sensitivity of changes in consumption to changes in current income using both micro and macro data. The earlier studies using this approach focused on estimating the effect of lagged variables on the change in consumption or consumption growth, like Hall (1978). This approach was derived from Euler's equation. Flavin (1981) was the first to find consumption excessively sensitive to current income changes. This meant that current income was more important in determining consumption decisions than permanent income in contrast with the implications of the permanent income hypothesis. Alternatively, Altonji and Siow

[110] (1986) found the coefficients of lagged income were insignificant and thus accepted the REPIH implications. Other REPIH implications derived from the random walk property of consumption were also tested, including the 'Saving for a rainy day hypothesis' and the exogeneity of consumption with respect to current income using Vector Autoregressive and Cointegration models (Campbell 1987; Anundsen and Nymoer 2015). Campbell (1987) could not accept the validity of the REPIH unlike Anundsen and Nymoer (2015). Later studies assumed that there are two types of individuals: consumption smoothing individuals ($1 - \lambda$) and individuals that depend on their current income, λ . They estimated λ using instrumental variables and examined if it was significant, implying the invalidity of the REPIH (Campbell and Mankiw 1990).

Some other studies further investigated the extent to which deviation from the REPIH can be traced back to the presence of household liquidity constraints. In other words, they tried to test the role of the financial sector in smoothing households' consumption. One group used the λ model of Campbell and Mankiw (1990) to examine the effect of either price constraints (as EFP) or quantity constraints (amount of credit), as a tool of monetary policy, on consumption expenditures (Campbell and Mankiw 1991; Bacchetta and Gerlach 1997; De Bondt 1999). Another group estimated the time varying excess sensitivity parameter and examined how it behaved over time with financial deregulations (Jappelli and Pagano 1989; Sarno and Taylor 1998; Peersman and Pozzi 2008). Other studies added extra information to the consumption equation in order to objectively differentiate between the liquidity of constrained and unconstrained individuals, including for example the amount of liquid assets they hold or the debt-service ratio (Zeldes 1989a; 1989b; Garcia, Lusardi and Ng 1997; Johnson and Li 2010). Some also used unique datasets that included direct indicators of liquidity constrained people (Jappelli, Pischke and Souleles 1998).

With continuous attempts to examine whether liquidity constraints are behind this deviation from the REPIH implications, other studies differentiated between periods of anticipated income increases and decreases (Shea 1995; Jappelli and Pistaferri 2000;



Gomes and Paz 2010; Khan and Nishat 2011). The Response of consumption to anticipated income increases was attributed to the existence of liquidity constraints. A very recent study done by Kristen and Merola (2019) used a small scale DSGE model to examine the reason for the recent drop in consumption for Irish households along with survey data to confirm the model results. The study found that the highly leveraged households were less able to smooth their consumption in time of crisis due to being credit constrained, unlike low leveraged households. Most of the above-mentioned studies concluded the invalidity of the REPIH due to the insufficient role of capital markets in smoothing household consumption.

[111]

Many other studies examined the effect of the financial sector on consumption smoothing, through directly testing the impact of the credit channel. They focused on the changing housing prices and their collateral role in affecting consumption expenditures of the households sector (Aoki, Proudman and Vlieghe 2004; Iacoviello 2004; 2005; Lustig and Nieuwerburgh 2004; Benito and Mumtaz 2009; Chen, Chen and Chou 2010; Aron et al. 2012). Most of these studies emphasized the importance of consumption in transmitting monetary policy through the credit channel.

Part of the literature was also concerned with the effect of different mitigating mechanisms for credit constrained households on consumption smoothing. Some of these mechanisms were microinsurance (Jansen and Carter 2018), remittances (Combes and Ebeke 2011; Helmy, Zaki and Abdallah 2017) and cash transfers (Bazzi, Sumarto and Suryahadi 2015).

It is worth mentioning that there is limited literature testing the validity of the REPIH for developing countries. Moreover, there are fewer studies for testing the impact of the credit channel on smoothing consumption for households in developing countries.

CONSUMPTION DEVELOPMENTS AND PATTERNS

Consumption expenditure is the largest component of Egypt's GDP. In 2017, it accounted for about 85% of GDP, according to the Ministry of Planning (MOP, <http://mpmar.gov.eg>) economic indicators. The share of households' consumption has been ranging between

[112]




FIGURE 1 Percentage of Households' Consumption to GDP, 2002–2018
(based on Egyptian Ministry of Planning Economic Indicators,
<http://mpmar.gov.eg>)

71–88% of Egypt's GDP throughout the last two decades (see figure 1). This is considered quite a high percentage compared to its peers (International Monetary Fund 2017).

The distorted pricing of consumption goods and the inefficient food subsidies system are seen as partly responsible for Egypt's large share of consumption for decades. This is in addition to energy subsidies that resulted in over-investment in inefficient and capital-intensive industries. The state played a dominant role in these investments, resulting in relatively low employment growth and a very high fiscal deficit along with crowding out of the private sector by government borrowing (see table 1) (International Monetary Fund 2018). As a result, Egypt began its reform program in 2016 by gradually alleviating energy subsidies as part of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) recommendations to remove all food and energy subsidies. The act is expected to affect mostly the poor resulting in a decrease in their consumption (Al Azzawi 2017; El Hamidi 2016). According to the IMF, the 2017 increase in energy prices decreased consumption expenditures by 5.5% on average. The government tried to mitigate this consumption decrease by doubling the



Smoothing Egyptian Households' Consumption

TABLE 1 Total Credit by Sector, 2011–2020

Year	Credit to government	Credit to public business sector	Credit to private business sector	Credit to households sector
2011	49.0%	3.7%	36.2%	11.1%
2012	54.0%	3.8%	31.8%	10.5%
2013	59.8%	3.2%	27.5%	9.5%
2014	64.3%	2.8%	24.0%	8.9%
2015	65.3%	3.2%	22.7%	8.9%
2016	67.3%	3.8%	20.5%	8.4%
2017	63.6%	4.8%	23.9%	7.7%
2018	64.1%	4.6%	23.2%	8.1%
2019	63.8%	4.3%	22.8%	9.1%
2020	65.9%	3.6%	20.9%	9.6%

[113]

NOTES Based on data from the Central Bank of Egypt (<https://www.cbe.org.eg>).

monthly food subsidy from 21 EGP per beneficiary to 50 EGP. This was to partially compensate the poorest 40 percent of Egyptians and half of the third and fourth quintiles along with ‘Takafol and Karama’¹ cash transfers (International Monetary Fund 2018).

These recent fiscal measures are expected to have significant effects on the daily consumption of people. Most of these fiscal measures are expected and permanent. Therefore, if not accompanied by a well-functioning banking sector to facilitate borrowing and saving, they are likely to increase volatility in households’ income and consumption, which will seriously hurt the low- and middle-income classes constituting the majority of the Egyptian population.

According to the Economic Census of 2017, Egypt’s population reached 94.7 million (that is 23.5 million households) with 57% living in rural areas. About 66% of total urban households live in privately owned houses versus 83% of total rural households. This might indi-

¹ ‘Takafol and Karama’ is a monetary aid program developed by the Ministry of Solidarity in March 2015. The program aims at alleviating poverty by providing conditional and unconditional monthly payments to the poor and disabled population in the Egyptian society. According to the World Bank (<https://www.worldbank.org>), the program reached 2.6 million families with average of 10 members each in 2018.




FIGURE 2 Classification of Households According to the Type of House and Place of Residence (dark – urban, light – rural; in millions; based on data from Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics, <https://www.capmas.gov.eg>)


cate that most households have a kind of collateral by which they are eligible to enter the credit market and borrow if needed and made accessible by the financial sector (see figure 2).

According to the Household, Income, Expenditure and Consumption Survey of 2015, both urban and rural households spend approximately 35% of their actual consumption expenditures on food and non-alcoholic beverages (figure 3). When adding the amount spent on housing, clothing, education, health and transportation, it is found that approximately 80% of their spending goes to necessities. This means that if any unexpected income shock occurs, it will likely directly and intensively hurt their well-being. It is worth noting that most households tend to spend an amount equal to or less than their income. However, for higher income groups, there is more tendency to spend more than their income level.

The main sources of income for individuals and households, as per the Household, Income, Expenditure and Consumption Survey of 2015, are work (about 70% of total income in both urban and rural areas), followed by current transfers, both cash and in-kind (see figure 4). The least important source is real estate and financial possessions where financial possessions represent less than 2% of total income in urban areas and less than 1% in rural ones. Furthermore, according to the International Labor Organization (ILO) in 2018, over half of the employed are informal, working without a contract, pen-



Smoothing Egyptian Households' Consumption



[115]

FIGURE 3 Classification of Households According to Main Expenditure Group and Place of Residence (dark – urban, light – rural; based on data from Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics, <https://www.capmas.gov.eg>)




FIGURE 4 Average of Annual Households' Income According to the Source of Income and Place of Residence (dark – urban, light – rural; based on data from Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics, <https://www.capmas.gov.eg>)

sion or health insurance, which could further hinder households' access to financial markets.

[116] It can thus be concluded that urban and rural households have almost the same patterns of consumption and income. However, the urban ones seem to have higher income and consumption levels. Work is the main source of income for households in Egypt while income from financial possessions is negligible. Also, 80% of households' spending goes to necessities.

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CREDIT CHANNEL
TRANSMISSION MECHANISM IN HOUSEHOLDS'
CONSUMPTION

The aim of this study is to test the significance of monetary policy transmission on Egyptian households' consumption through the credit channel. This will also include investigating whether consumption is affected by credit constraints. Even if credit constraints were found significant, the study will proceed by testing whether Egyptians can still smooth their consumption as they can be informally borrowing and saving from family and friends.

The empirical analysis in this section is based on the work of Holtemöller (2002), Bacchetta and Gerlach (1997) and De Bondt (1999). In order to test this mechanism, a VAR model is applied where impulse response functions and variance decomposition are used to analyze the short-run dynamic relationship between the variables. Then, the long-run relationship between them is investigated as well.

Data sources

Quarterly data for the period from 2002: Q1 till 2017: Q4 is employed given the availability of data on credit to the households sector. The *households sector consumption expenditures* (C_t) data is obtained from the Ministry of Planning economic indicators. Some studies suggested using consumption expenditures of nondurable goods and services instead of total consumption as a more appropriate measure for consumption. This is to avoid any possible bias due to the failure to smooth the flow of benefits coming from the use of durable goods over time (Campbell and Mankiw 1990; Bacchetta and Gerlach 1997). However, De Bondt (1999) argued that to-



tal household consumption will give a better idea about the macroeconomic effect of the credit channel, as it is more important to the GDP of a country. Furthermore, Campbell (1987) found that his results were insensitive to using total consumption or consumption of nondurable goods and services only.

[117]

Disposable income (Y_t) is calculated as quarterly gross domestic product (GDP) at market price minus direct taxes on income and profits, as household disposable income reported by the Ministry of Planning is only available in annual figures. Therefore, disposable income was proxied by the only available quarterly components, GDP minus direct income taxes. To make sure that the proposed proxy is appropriate, we calculated a correlation coefficient between the annual disposable income reported by the Ministry of National Planning and annual figures for our proxy. The correlation coefficient was found to be 0.999 (see figure A1 in Appendix A).² The quarterly GDP data is obtained from the Ministry of Planning economic indicators. The direct tax data is obtained from the Ministry of Finance monthly bulletins (<http://www.mof.gov.eg>). Quarterly figures are available from 2005: Q3 till 2017: Q4 and annual figures are available for the whole period. A linear equation was estimated for the series to extrapolate the quarterly observations from 2002: Q1 till 2005: Q2 (Abdul Wahab 2017).

*Ex ante real interest rate*³ (R_t) is equal to nominal interest rate minus expected inflation. Expected inflation is taken as next period inflation rate. For *the nominal short-term interest rate*, the interest rates on loans less than or equal to one year is used as done by Holtemöller (2002). De Bondt (1999) used a weighted average of short and long-term interest rates, where the weights depend on the maturity structure of households' debt. However, in Egypt, reported long and short-term lending rates are not available. Only lending rates for loans less than or equal to one year are available. Further-

² Appendices are available at <https://emuni.si/ISSN/2232-6022/15.105-135a.pdf>.

³ Expected inflation was used rather than actual inflation as the REPIH is concerned about expectations therefore, households should adjust their consumption behavior according to their expectations about future inflation.

more, dividing loans according to their maturity is reported only until March 2006 and are aggregated for the whole private sector, including both business and households sectors.

[118] The EFP and the amount of real credit to the households sector are used to represent the price and quantity of liquidity constraints facing Egyptian households, respectively. Measuring the EFP at the macro level will likely be subject to some measurement errors because there is no accurate data on the external and internal cost of finance facing normal households (Bacchetta and Gerlach 1997; De Bondt 1999). However, several studies suggested alternative measures for the EFP facing the household sector. De Bondt (1999) suggested using mortgage lending rate reflecting households' wealth and the most important asset in consumers' balance sheet. But due to the unavailability of such data, mortgage lending rate was not used in the analysis. Moreover, consumers usually arbitrage between different types of credits to be used for consumption purposes. Therefore, sharp distinctions between the lending rates on different types of credit would not be of great importance. Bacchetta and Gerlach (1997) suggested two other measures for the EFP, one of which is the difference between the lending rate on loans less than or equal to 1 year and the rate on 3-month T-bills (EFP), and the other is the difference between the lending rate on loans less than or equal to 1 year and the annual saving rate on 3-month deposits (EFPD). The lending rate on loans less than 1 year is the only available lending rate reported by the CBE. In our study the EFP (EFP_t) is proxied by the difference between the lending rate on loans less than or equal to 1 year and the rate on 3-month T-bills as we found it more dynamic and more responsive to monetary policy changes and consumption (see table B1 and B2 in Appendix B).

Real credit to the households sector (Cr_t) is measured by total credit to the households sector instead of the mortgage and consumer credit used in Bacchetta and Gerlach (1997).

All the data for interest rates and the households sector credit is obtained from the CBE monthly reports except for the interest rate on 3-month T-bills, which is obtained from the International Financial Statistics database. The study uses the *Consumer price in-*



dex (CPI) to calculate expected inflation and as a price deflator of consumption expenditures and credit. CPI quarterly figures are obtained from the International Financial Statistics database. Finally, *GDP deflator* is used as a price deflator for disposable income. GDP deflator quarterly figures are calculated using GDP nominal and real data available at the Ministry of Planning economic indicators. Table B3 in the appendix shows the descriptive statistics for the model variables along with scatter plots for the relationships between them (figure B1 in the appendix). [119]

Estimation Results

UNIT ROOT TEST. The Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test is firstly used to check the stationarity of the following variables of interest:

- C_t , log real consumption
- Y_t , log real disposable income
- Cr_t , log real credit to the households' sector
- R_t , real expected short-term interest rate
- EFP_t , external finance premium.

Before testing for unit roots, a evidence of seasonality was noticed in log real disposable income and log real consumption. Therefore, the STL Decomposition of Eviews was used to de-seasonalize them. Table 2 shows the results of the Augmented Dickey Fuller test of non-stationarity for the model variables. De-seasonalized log real income and log real household credit were found integrated of order 1 at the 5% significance level. However, de-seasonalized log real consumption, the EFP and real interest rate were found stationary at level.

VECTOR AUTOREGRESSIVE MODEL (VAR). In order to test whether the credit channel transmits monetary policy decisions to the consumption of the households sector, a VAR model is estimated similar to Al-Mashat and Billmeier (2007), Cambazoğlu and Karaalp (2013), Holtemöller (2002) and Moursi, El Mosallamy and Zakaria (2007). The order adopted in the analysis is C_t, Y_t, Cr_t, R_t and

TABLE 2 ADF Test Results

(1)	Level			First difference			(5)
	(2)	(3)	(4)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
C_t	Trend & intercept	-3.926159** (0)	-3.482763	None			I(0)
Y_t	None	6.070348 (3)	-1.946348	Intercept	-9.67902*** (2)	-2.910860	I(1)
Cr_t	Intercept	-2.240518 (0)	-2.908420	None	-5.77727*** (3)	-1.946447	I(1)
R_t	Trend & intercept	-4.089066*** (1)	-3.485218	None			I(0)
EFP_t	Trend & intercept	-4.105229*** (1)	-3.483970	None			I(0)

NOTES Column headings are as follows: (1) variable, (2) deterministic term, (3) ADF test statistic, (4) Mackinnon (1996) critical values at 5% significance level, (5) order of integration for variables in levels. The number between brackets refers to the number of lags; *** and ** indicate rejection of the null hypothesis of non-stationarity at the 1 percent and 5 percent level of significance respectively using Mackinnon (1996) critical values.


EFP_t , drawing on Hotlemöller (2002), Moursi, El Mosallamy and Zakaria, (2007) and Al-Mashat and Billmeier (2007). The central bank is assumed to first observe the status of the economy, regarding real consumption, income and credit in this case, then sets the short-term interest rate as a policy instrument that affects the real economy in the coming periods. Finally, the financial variables, EFP , responds.

Impulse Response Functions. Firstly, the reaction of the credit constraining variable, EFP , to monetary policy contraction or expansion needs to be examined. Secondly, the analysis looks at how this affects real households' credit and, consequently, how both affect real consumption. This enables judging the effectiveness of the credit channel for Egyptian households. Figure 5 shows the response of all the model variables to 1 standard deviation shock to the real interest rate.

The impulse response functions show a significant effect of one standard deviation shock of real interest rate on all the variables except disposable income. A positive shock to the real interest rate has a positive significant effect on the EFP that peaks at the fourth

[120]





[121]

FIGURE 5 The Response of All Variables to 1 SD Shock to Real Interest Rate

quarter and then decreases again. Also, a positive shock to the real interest rate has a negative effect on consumption that started to be statistically significant after the 5th period. This goes along with the credit channel of the monetary policy mechanism. However, a positive shock to the real interest rate increases credit till the second period then it starts decreasing again.

Figures 6 and 7 show the response of all the variables to 1 standard deviation shock in the EFP and real households' credit, respectively. The impulse response functions show a statistically insignificant effect of households' credit on all model variables. However, a positive shock to EFP significantly decreases consumption immedi-

[122]





FIGURE 6 The Response of All Variables to 1 SD Shock to EFP

ately from the first period after the shock. From the effect of interest rate and EFP in figures 5 and 6 on consumption, we can observe that an increase in the interest rate increases the EFP first, which causes a sudden decrease in consumption expenditures that lasts till the fifth period when the direct effect of the interest rate increase appears. This is the timing problem that Bernanke and Gertler (1995) introduced in the credit channel.

Variance Decomposition. To further validate the results, variance decompositions of the consumption, EFP and households' credit are reported with the same order mentioned before. Table 3 shows that



Smoothing Egyptian Households' Consumption



[123]

FIGURE 7 The Response of All Variables to 1 SD Shock to Log Real Households' Credit

after two and a half years, approximately 60% of the variation in consumption is explained by the variable itself. Then, 23% and 15% of the variation are explained by real interest rate and EFP, respectively. However, one can easily notice that the EFP was responsible for the largest part of the variation in consumption after consumption itself in the earlier periods, which coincides with the observed conclusion from the impulse response graphs.

Table 4 shows that after two and a half years, approximately 66% of the variation in the EFP is explained by the variable itself. The

TABLE 3 Variance Decomposition of De-Seasonalized Log Real Consumption

Period	SE	C	D(Y)	D(CR)	R	EFP
1	0.020521	100.0000	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000
3	0.033293	89.19848	0.982987	1.319263	2.178858	6.320408
5	0.042235	76.94929	0.759919	1.798451	7.964369	12.527980
10	0.058412	59.71265	0.504237	1.482600	23.38616	14.914280

[124]

TABLE 4 Variance Decomposition of the EFP

Period	SE	C	D(Y)	D(CR)	R	EFP
1	1.073076	0.114600	0.671275	4.791219	1.385800	93.037130
3	1.530911	0.074325	0.953562	6.209646	4.052600	88.502510
5	1.692074	0.269000	0.820530	5.493900	16.111140	77.305080
10	1.850384	2.375300	0.741784	4.624400	26.361270	65.897160

TABLE 5 Variance Decomposition of Log Real Households' Credit

Period	SE	C	D(Y)	D(CR)	R	EFP
1	0.050164	2.158710	4.347620	93.493960	0.000000	0.000000
5	0.055315	2.505343	9.850095	77.520670	9.188463	0.935432
10	0.055979	2.454093	10.071730	75.900400	9.576030	1.997700

next most important variable is the real interest rate that is responsible for approximately 26% of the variation in EFP_t .

Finally, table 5 shows that after two and a half years, 76% of the variation in households' credit is due to the variable itself. Also, 10% of variation of households' credit is due to income and the same percent due to interest rate. Only 2% of the variation in credit is due to the EFP.

VAR Granger Causality. Granger causalities between model variables are estimated (see table C 1 in the appendix for the reported results). Results show that disposable income and EFP Granger cause consumption and all the variables collectively Granger cause consumption. Interest rate is the only variable that Granger causes the EFP. Disposable income, interest rate and all the variables collectively Granger cause households' sector credit.



The results suggest that the credit channel might be quite effective in transmitting monetary policy decisions to the households sector. The EFP is Granger caused by the interest rate and is significantly affected by its shocks in the short run. Furthermore, the EFP Granger causes consumption and the effect of any increase in the EFP is transmitted first to consumption before the effect of the initial increase in interest rate is realized. However, the EFP does not appear to have any effect on households' credit. This could be explained by the fact that most of households' lending in Egypt might be under fixed interest rate agreements so the increase in interest rate might encourage existing borrowers to increase their borrowing, but it will totally shut off new borrowers. Therefore, total credit might not decrease. The Granger causality test showed that consumption is an endogenous variable unlike income which is totally exogenous, which contradicts the REPIH assumption. This means that the REPIH could be invalid too.

[125]

COINTEGRATION/ERROR CORRECTION MODEL. The long-run relationship between model variables is also checked using the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) bound test to cointegration. An ARDL (4, 0, 0, 1, and 0) minimizes SBC, where 4 lags of C_t , 1 lag of EFP_t and no lags for the other variables are required. The statistical results of the ARDL bounds test to cointegration are summarized in table 6.

The F -statistic falls above the upper bound of both Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001) and Narayan (2004) critical values at 5 % significance level. Therefore, the null hypothesis of no cointegration is re-

TABLE 6 ARDL Bounds Test to Cointegration Results

F -test	Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001)			Narayan (2004)		
	k	I(0)	I(1)	K	I(0)	I(1)
9.183908	4	2.56	3.49	1	2.823	3.872

NOTES Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001) tabulated critical value bounds for F -statistic at 5% significance level at restricted intercept and no trend. Narayan (2004) tabulated critical value bounds for F -statistic at 5% significance level at restricted intercept and no trend at $n = 50$. k refers to the number of regressors which in this case is equal to one, n refers to the number of observations.

jected indicating the existence of some equilibrium relationship between the model variables in the long run. The estimated long-run equation is given as follows:

$$[126] \quad C_t = -0.827 + 1.117Y_t + 0.2674Cr_t + 0.0077R_t - 0.013EFP_t \quad (1)$$

$$\quad \quad \quad (-1.92) \quad (5.151) \quad (2.3058) \quad (3.231) \quad (-2.054)$$

The numbers in parenthesis are the *t*-statistics. At the 5 % significance level, all model variables are significant. Disposable income and credit are positively related to consumption. However, EFP has a negative relationship with consumption in the long run. This is compatible with the theory. Results further show that credit constraints negatively affect consumption in the long run. The positive significant sign of the interest rate coefficient can be explained by the possibility of the income effect of the interest rate increase is exceeding the substitution effect for Egyptians. This is similar to the results of Hussein, Moheildin, and Rostom (2017) such that when interest rate increases, consumers decrease their savings as they can obtain the same amount of income with lower savings. Therefore, consumption increases. However, households can still be smoothing their consumption through informal channels.

Once the long-run relationship is established, the short-run dynamics can be discussed in an ECM. The results of the ECM are presented as follows

$$\Delta C_t = -0.32E C_{t-1} + 0.0018\Delta EFP_t - 0.317\Delta C_{t-1} \quad (2)$$

$$\quad \quad \quad (-7.8657) \quad (0.972) \quad (-3.197)$$

$$\quad \quad \quad -0.5459\Delta C_{t-2} - 0.39\Delta C_{t-3}$$

$$\quad \quad \quad (-5.347) \quad (-3.74)$$

The ECM shows that the error correction term is significant and less than one which confirms the existence of a long-run relationship between the model variables. Moreover, it shows that 32% of the disequilibrium in the previous period is corrected in the current one. Lags of real consumption have a significant effect on current consumption. However, disposable income, interest rate, credit and EFP do not affect consumption in the short run according to



equation 2. Both the short and long-run analyses show that credit constraints have a negative effect on consumption. Monetary policy seems to be affecting household consumption through its credit channel, which indicates that the REPIH is more likely to be invalid unless households are informally smoothing their consumption by borrowing and saving from family or friends. [127]

Testing the Validity of the REPIH for the Egyptian Households

The significant effect of credit constraints on consumption does not necessarily mean that Egyptian households are not smoothing their consumption. They could be relying on self-financing through saving or borrowing from their relatives. Therefore, the study proceeds by testing the REPIH separately. The empirical analysis of this section is based on the work of Campbell (1987) and Anundsen and Ny-moen (2015). Their work focused on testing some implications of the REPIH in order to judge its relevance. One of the implications of the REPIH is that people save because they expect their income to decline, thus people 'save for a rainy day.' Accordingly, savings is a good predictor for future income declines. To test this implication, Campbell (1987) showed that consumption and income should be cointegrated as an implication of the REPIH too, such that any linear combination of them should be stationary. Therefore, savings, that is a linear combination of consumption and income, should be stationary. In a VAR model, if REPIH is valid, savings should be the optimal forecast for the present value of future declines in income.

The 'Saving for a rainy day' hypothesis also implies the exogeneity of consumption with respect to current income (Anundsen and Ny-moen 2015). Under the REPIH, consumption should be exogenous, thus consumption growth should not be Granger caused by lagged income. It is worth noting that the consumption function of Keynes implies the opposite, that is income affects consumption or, in other words, current income is exogenous with respect to consumption. This hypothesis will be tested while examining the long-run Granger causalities between disposable income and consumption.

In order to test these two hypotheses, firstly, cointegration between the variables of interest is tested using an ARDL model. Sec-

[128] only, if a long-run relationship is found between consumption and disposable income, then long-run Granger causalities is tested in order to decide upon the direction of the relationship between consumption and disposable income. Finally, a VAR model incorporating the stationary savings and the changes in disposable income is run in order to test if savings is a good predictor of income declines.

COINTEGRATION/ERROR CORRECTION MODEL. According to the results of the ADF test, consumption is stationary. This already contradicts the implications of REPIH in which consumption is expected to be a random walk process. However, as previously mentioned, the power of the ADF test is sometimes questioned, in terms of rejecting the null hypothesis of nonstationary when in fact the variable is stationary. Accordingly, cointegration is checked using the ARDL approach. Table 7 shows the ARDL test results. ARDL (1, 0) minimizes SBC. The *F*-statistic falls above the upper bound of both Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001) and Narayan (2004) critical values at the 5 % significance level, which indicates that the null hypothesis of no cointegration between consumption and disposable income cannot be accepted.

The long-run equation appears as following:

$$C_t = -0.89 + 1.35Y_t \tag{3}$$

(12.67) (-3.47)

The numbers in parenthesis are the *t*-statistics. At the 5 % significance level, income is significantly positively related to consump-

TABLE 7 ARDL Bounds Test to Cointegration Results

<i>F</i> -test	Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001)			Narayan (2004)		
	<i>k</i>	I(0)	I(1)	<i>K</i>	I(0)	I(1)
6.6427	1	3.62	4.16	1	3.86	4.44

NOTES Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001) tabulated critical value bounds for *F*-statistic at 5% significance level at restricted intercept and no trend. Narayan (2004) tabulated critical value bounds for *F*-statistic at 5% significance level at restricted intercept and no trend at *n* = 50. *k* refers to the number of regressors which in this case is equal to one, *n* refers to the number of observations.



TABLE 8 ADF Test Results

Variable	Level		
	Deterministic term	ADF test statistic	Adj. critical values
S_{1t}	Intercept	-4.771** (0)	-3.37
S_{2t}	Intercept	-4.876** (0)	-3.37

[129]

NOTES ** Indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of non-stationarity at the 5 percent level of significance using adjusted critical values of Engle and Yoo (1987). S_{1t} is calculated as $S_{1t} = Y_t - 0.68C_t$ from equation D1. S_{2t} is calculated as $S_{2t} = Y_t - (1/1.35)C_t$ from equation 3. The number between brackets is the number of lags.

tion. Once the long-run relationship is established, an ECM can be estimated. The results of the ECM are as follows:

$$\Delta C_t = -0.27EC_{t-1} \tag{4}$$

(-4.54)

One can notice that as the optimum number of lags for income was 0 according to SBC, therefore, lags of disposable income did not appear in equation 4. The equation shows that 27% of the disequilibrium in the previous period is corrected this period. The cointegration relationship is estimated when disposable income is the dependent variable too (see Appendix D). Therefore, S_t is stationary. Savings as the residual of both cointegration equations were calculated and tested for their stationarity separately (table 8). We found that saving is stationary at level at the 5% significance level, thus we can test for the 'Saving for a rainy-day hypothesis.'

EXOGENEITY OF CONSUMPTION. The results show that there is a significant long-run relationship between C_t and Y_t . Accordingly, consumption exogeneity can be tested by ECM. From equation 4 and D2 in the appendix, there is a two way long-run relation between consumption and income, which makes the REPIH more likely to be rejected. Short-run Granger causality is also estimated using VAR Granger causality block exogeneity test. Results in table D2 in the appendix show that income Granger causes consumption but not vice versa, which contradicts the REPIH.

[130] VAR. As a final check to assure the rejection of the REPIH, testing if lags of savings are good predictors of income growth is performed using a VAR model with ΔY_t and S_t , where S_t is the estimated savings S_{1t} and S_{2t} (Campbell 1987). The ADF test above showed that S_t is stationary, so the analysis can be continued. A VAR model is estimated with 2 lags according to SBC. The two estimated equations are as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 S_t = & 0.294 + 0.925S_{t-1} - 0.28S_{t-2} & (5) \\
 & (3.008) \quad (5.22) \quad (-1.65) \\
 & -0.87\Delta Y_{t-1} - 0.32\Delta Y_{t-2} \\
 & (-3.9) \quad (-1.96)
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 \Delta Y_t = & 0.108 + 0.113S_{t-1} - 0.233S_{t-2} & (6) \\
 & (1.36) \quad (0.78) \quad (-1.59) \\
 & -0.979\Delta Y_{t-1} - 0.139\Delta Y_{t-2} \\
 & (-5.43) \quad (-1.06)
 \end{aligned}$$

Lags of savings insignificantly affect log income. On the other hand, lags of income significantly affect savings. Therefore, the REPIH is rejected. According to the macroeconomic analysis, Egyptian consumers are not smoothing their consumption and credit constraints can be one reason for that. Consumption follows current income, which means that households are sensitive to sudden changes in income, a recurring phenomenon that is greatly affecting their well-being. Moreover, any macroeconomic policy that is likely to affect households' current income will be directly affecting their consumption.

CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The study conducted an empirical analysis on the effect of liquidity constraints on consumption smoothing of Egyptian households through testing the effectiveness of the credit channel of monetary policy during the period of 2002–2017. The results showed that Egyptian households are not able to smooth their consumption. Credit constraints were found to have a negative effect on the con-



sumption of households. Moreover, the credit channel was found an effective transmission mechanism for monetary policy in affecting households' consumption.

The results of the study should be interpreted with caution due to some limitations the researchers faced and tried to deal with in the most efficient manner. The relatively small sample size might affect the results. Although there is higher frequency accurate data on interest rates and credit variables, there is no distinction between the lending rates facing the business sector from those facing households. Moreover, there is no separation between different types of credit that might give better insight into the balance sheet channel of monetary policy. Also, the amount of credit provided to the households sector is very small, which might affect the results.

[131]

For testing the REPIH, the problem of aggregation could not be avoided in quarterly data of consumption and disposable income, as consumers usually take their consumption decisions monthly or even weekly not quarterly (Jappelli and Pistaferri 2010). Moreover, differentiating between capital income and labor income can give better insight for tackling the research question. According to the REPIH, savings should be a good predictor of changes in labor income. Future capital income increases as a result of increasing savings. Therefore, this increase in future capital income can offset any decrease in the labor income (Campbell 1987). However, there is no data distinguishing between capital and labor income on the aggregate level.

This topic can be studied on either the micro or macro level. However, individual based data needed to answer this research question is missing. There is no available data on the amount of credit taken by each individual, the different lending rates they face or any data that combines consumption of the households sector along with income and financial inclusion. Moreover, since a big part of the society is financially excluded, it would have been better to differentiate between financially included and excluded individuals in the analysis. These limitations could be viewed as areas for future extensions in this topic that would allow better insights into consumption smoothing patterns and their relation to credit access.

[132]

In light of the empirical findings, it is particularly relevant for policymakers to consider the fact that households are not able to smooth their consumption. Consequently, any policy that is likely to affect their current income will cause sharp fluctuations in their consumption. Given the large and increasing poverty rate in Egypt, policies that lead to increasing income taxes or reducing in-kind subsidies will hurt households' wellbeing if not accompanied by other mitigating policies such as increasing cash subsidies or allowing for borrowing. However, this means that consumption responds to predicted income changes by monetary and fiscal policies. Therefore, stabilization policies will be able to affect consumption (Parker 1999). Finally, for households to smooth their consumption, they should first be included in the banking sector. Financial inclusion is thus considered an important step towards inclusive growth, reducing poverty, increasing saving, as well as formalizing the informal sector.

REFERENCES

- Abdul Wahab, M. 2017. 'Interpolation and Extrapolation.' Paper presented at Topics in System Engineering Seminar, Paderborn, 19 January.
- Al Azzawi, S. 2017. 'Did the Cost of Living Rise Faster for the Rural Poor? Evidence from Egypt.' Working Paper 1091, Economic Research Forum, Giza.
- Al-Mashat, R., and A. Billmeier. 2007. 'The Monetary Transmission Mechanism in Egypt.' IMF Working Papers 2007/285, International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C.
- Altonji, J. G., and A. Siow. 1987. 'Testing the Response of Consumption to Income Changes with (Noisy) Panel Data.' *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 102 (2): 293–328.
- Anundsen, A. K, and R. Nymoén. 2015. 'Did US Consumers "Save for a Rainy Day" Before the Great Recession?' Working Paper 08/2015, Norges Bank, Oslo.
- Aoki, K., J. Proudman, and G. Vlieghe. 2004. 'House Prices, Consumption, and Monetary Policy: A Financial Accelerator Approach.' *Journal of Financial Intermediation* 13 (4): 414–35.
- Aron, J., J. V., Duca, J. Muellbauer, K. Murata, and A. Murphy. 2012. 'Credit, Housing Collateral and Consumption: Evidence from Japan, the UK and the US.' *The Review of Income and Wealth* 58 (3): 397–423.
- Bacchetta, P., and S. Gerlach. 1997. 'Consumption and Credit Constraints: International Evidence.' *Journal of Monetary Economics* 40 (2): 207–38.



- Bazzi, S., S. Sumarto, and A. Suryahadi. 2015. 'It's All in the Timing: Cash Transfers and Consumption Smoothing in a Developing Country.' *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization* 119:267–88.
- Benito, A., and H. Mumtaz. 2009. 'Excess Sensitivity, Liquidity Constraints and the Collateral Role of Housing.' *Macroeconomic Dynamics* 13 (3): 305–26.
- Bernanke, B. S., and M. Gertler. 1995. 'Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission.' *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 9 (4): 27–48.
- Cambazoglu, B., and H. S. Karaalp. 2013. 'The External Finance Premium and the Financial Accelerator: The Case of Turkey.' *International Journal of Economic Sciences and Applied Research* 6 (1): 103–21.
- Campbell, J., Y. 1987. 'Does Saving Anticipate Declining Labor Income? An Alternative Test of the Permanent Income Hypothesis.' *Econometrica* 55 (6): 1249–73.
- Campbell, J., Y., and N. G. Mankiw. 1990. 'Permanent Income, Current Income and Consumption.' *Journal of Business and Economic Statistics* 8 (3): 265–79.
- . 1991. 'The Response of Consumption to Income: A Cross Country Investigation.' *European Economic Review* 35:723–67.
- Chen, N., K., S. S. Chen, and Y. H. Chou. 2010. 'House Prices, Collateral Constraint, and the Asymmetric Effect on Consumption.' *Journal of Housing Economics* 19 (1): 26–37.
- Combes, J. L., and C. Ebeke. 2011. 'Remittances and Household Consumption Instability in Developing Countries.' *World Development* 39 (7): 1079–89.
- De Bondt, G., J. 1999. 'Credit Channels and Consumption: European Evidence.' BIS Working Paper 69, Bank of International Settlements, Basel.
- Engle, R., F., and B. S. Yoo. 1987. 'Forecasting and Testing in Cointegrated Systems.' *Journal of Econometrics* 35:143–59.
- El Hamidi, F. 2016. 'Energy Subsidy Reform in Egypt: The Gender Energy-Poverty Nexus.' Working Paper 1055, Economic Research Forum, Giza.
- El-Shazly, A. 2005. 'Imperfect Information and Credit Rationing Equilibrium.' *Review of Middle East Economic and Finance* 3 (2): 151–64.
- Flavin, M. A. 1981. 'The Adjustment of Consumption to Changing Expectations About Future Income.' *Journal of Political Economy* 89 (5): 974–1009.
- Garcia, R., A. Lusardi, and S. Ng. 1997. 'Excess Sensitivity and Asymmetries in Consumption: An Empirical Investigation.' *Journal of Money, Credit and Banking* 29 (2): 154–76.
- Gomes, F., A., R., and L. S. Paz. 2010. 'Consumption in South America: Myopia or Liquidity Constraints?' *Economia Aplicada* 14 (2): 129–45.

- Hall, R., E. 1978. 'Stochastic Implications of the Life Cycle-Permanent Income Hypothesis: Theory and Evidence.' *Journal of Political Economy* 86 (6): 971–87.
- Helmy, O., C. Zaki, and A. Abdallah. 2017. 'Do Workers' Remittances Promote Consumption Stability in Egypt?' ECEs Working Paper WP187-E, Egyptian Center for Economic Studies, Cairo.
- Holtemöller, O. 2002. 'Further VAR Evidence for the Effectiveness of a Credit Channel in Germany.' Discussion Paper 2002/66, Humboldt University of Berlin, Berlin.
- Hussein, K., M. Moheildin, and A. Rostom. 2017. 'Savings, Financial Development and Economic Growth in the Arab Republic of Egypt Revisited.' Working Paper 8020, The World Bank, Washington, D.C.
- Iacoviello, M. 2004. 'Consumption, House Prices and Collateral Constraints: A Structural Econometric Analysis.' *Journal of Housing Economics* 13 (4): 304–20.
- . 2005. 'House Prices, Borrowing Constraints and Monetary Policy in the Business Cycle.' *American Economic Review* 95:739–64.
- International Labor Organization. (2018). 'Key Labor Market Trends in Egypt, 2018.' International Labor Organization. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---africa/---ro-abidjan/---sro-cairo/documents/publication/wcms_663785.pdf
- International Monetary Fund. 2017. 'Arab Republic of EGYPT.' IMF Country Report 17/17, International Monetary Fund.
- . 2018. 'Arab Republic of Egypt.' IMF Country Report 18/14, International Monetary Fund.
- Jansen, S., A., and M. R. Carter. 2018. 'After the Drought: The Impact of Microinsurance on Consumption Smoothing and Asset Protection.' *American Journal of Agricultural Economics* 101 (3): 651–71.
- Jappelli, T., and M. Pagano. 1989. 'Consumption and Capital Market Imperfections: An International Comparison.' *The American Economic Review* 79 (5): 1088–1105.
- Jappelli, T., J. S. Pischke, and N. S. Souleles. 1998. 'Testing for Liquidity Constraints in Euler Equations with Complementary Data Sources.' *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 80 (2): 251–62.
- Jappelli, T., and L. Pistaferri. 2000. 'Using Subjective Income Expectations to Test for Excess Sensitivity of Consumption to Predicted Income Growth.' *European Economic Review* 44 (2): 337–58.
- . 2010. 'The Consumption Response to Income Changes.' *The Annual Review of Economics* 2 (1): 479–96.
- Johnson, K., W., and G. Li. 2010. 'The Debt-Payment-to-Income Ratio as an Indicator of Borrowing Constraints: Evidence from two Household Surveys.' *Journal of Money, Credit and Banking* 42 (7): 1373–90.
- Khan, K., and M. Nishat. 2011. 'Permanent Income Hypothesis, Myopia



- and Liquidity Constraints: A Case Study of Pakistan.' *Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences* 31 (2): 299–307.
- Kristen, P., G., and R. Merola. 2019. 'Consumption and Credit Constraints: A Model and Evidence from Ireland.' *Empirical Economics* 57:475–503.
- Lustig, H., N., and S. V. Nieuwerburgh. 2004. 'Housing Collateral and Consumption Insurance Across US Regions.' NYU Working Paper S-MF-04-10.
- Mackinnon, J. G. 1996. 'Numerical Distribution Functions for Unit Root and Cointegration Tests.' *Journal of Applied Econometrics* 11 (6): 601–18.
- Moriyama, K., and E. C. Arbatli. 2011. 'Estimation Small Open Economy Model for Egypt: Spillovers, Inflation Dynamics and Implications for Monetary Policy.' IMF Working Papers 2011/108, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
- Moursi, T., A., M. El Mossallamy, and E. Zakareya. 2007. 'Effect of Some Recent Changes in the Egyptian Monetary Policy.' Working Paper 122, Egyptian Center for Economic Studies, Cairo.
- Nayran, P., K. 2004. 'Reformulating Critical Values for the Bounds Fstatistics: An Application to the Tourism Demand Model for Fiji.' Discussion paper 02/04, Monash University, Melbourne.
- Özcan, K., M., and Y. Z. Özcan. 2015. 'Determinants of Private Savings in the Middle East and North Africa.' *Research in Middle East Economics* 6:95–113.
- Parker, J., A. 1999. 'The Reaction of Household Consumption to Predictable Changes in Social Security Taxes.' *The American Economic Review* 89 (4): 959–73.
- Peersman, G., and L. Pozzi. 2008. 'Business Cycle Fluctuations and Excess Sensitivity of Private Consumption.' *Economica* 75 (299): 514–23.
- Pesaran, M., H., Y. Shin, and R. J. Smith. 2001. 'Bounds Testing Approaches to the Analysis of Level Relationships.' *Journal of Applied Econometrics* 16 (3): 289–326.
- Sarno, L., and M. P. Taylor. 1998. 'Real Interest Rates, Liquidity Constraints and Financial Deregulation: Private Consumption Behavior in the UK.' *Journal of Macroeconomics* 20 (2): 221–42.
- Shea, J. 1995. 'Myopia, Liquidity Constraints, and Aggregate Consumption: A Simple Test.' *Journal of Money, Credit and Banking* 27 (3): 798–805.
- Smith, D., E. 2001. 'International Evidence on How Income Inequality and Credit Market Imperfections Affect Private Saving Rates.' *Journal of Development Economics* 64 (1): 103–27.
- Zeldes, S. P. 1989. 'Consumption and Liquidity Constraints: An Empirical Investigation.' *The Journal of Political Economy* 97 (2): 305–46.
- . 1989. 'Optimal Consumption with Stochastic Income: Deviations from Certainty Equivalence.' *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 104 (2): 275–98.



*Unequal Europe: Regional Integration
and the Rise of European Inequality*

by Jason Besckfield, Oxford University
Press, 2019 (294 pages)

CSABA LAKÓCAI

Centre for Economic and Regional Studies –

Institute of World Economics, Hungary

lakocai.csaba@krtk.hu

 <https://emuni.si/ISSN/2232-6022/15.137-140.pdf>

Beckfield's¹ book is an empirical study on how European integration has affected the (mainly Western European) welfare state systems. Data analyses reveal a dual effect; household income inequality has increased over the past half century (before the global pandemic period) while the process of economic integration also drew national economies closer together among the Western European countries.

Statistically, the book investigates a period from the first decades of European integration until the mid of 2010s. It was published in 2019, three years after the Brexit referendum in the UK and just before the COVID-19 pandemic broke out. The empirical analyses are implemented with panel data on Western, Scandinavian, and Mediterranean European countries,² mainly, for which longer time series are available. Statistical data used for the quantitative analyses come from two major sources. One is the Eurostat database and other one comprises datasets of the Luxembourg Income Study. The former is mainly used for macro-economic data while the latter provides cross-national micro-economic income data.

The development of European integration has been intertwined

¹The author is Professor of Sociology at Harvard University.

²These are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK. Further (non-European) countries involved in some of the statistical analyses are Australia, Canada, Korea, Israel, and Japan.

[138] with the development of global capitalism and financialization. Therefore, it is often difficult to separate their effects on social inequalities. The applied econometric methodology, presented in the book, allows to do so by using control variables to express global economic tendencies beyond European integration.

The first chapter of the book ('Theorizing Integration and Inequality') presents statistical evidences that the Gini coefficient for household income inequality in EU member countries increased between the 1980s and 2010s. This tendency is in contrast with the first two decades of European integration (from the 1960s to the 1980s) when household inequalities decreased. These trends cannot be separated from the neoliberal turn of economy since the late 1970s. European integration seems to deepen this process by promoting problem solving procedures predominantly with markets, which led to the retrenchment of previous welfare states. Although the EU has no direct competences on national welfare policies, it can affect them indirectly. This fact can be expressed by the number of cases sent to the European Court of Justice (ECJ); according to the author, legal procedures of the ECJ institutionalize political regional integration, based on economic integration, by incorporating EU rules into national law.

In Chapter 2 ('Changing the Rules of the Game'), the author develops multiple regression models to prove the effect of European integration on the convergence between the EU15 economies as well as the living standards experienced by the average citizen of these countries for the 1986–2004 period. It is not evident from simple market and trade integration (i.e. globalization) beyond the EU; as control variable, it has no significant effect on the convergence. The results demonstrate the role of the construction of political institutions.

Chapter 3 ('Breaking the Mold: Reshaping the European Social Model') deals with the question, to what extent European integration influences the European welfare states. Although the European Union has no formal legal authority to make social policy, it has restructured the welfare state over the past decades in an indirect way. This fact is proven with statistical data: the trends of transfers expenditure (as % of GDP), decommodification (i.e. standard of living



independently from the labor market), and unemployment insurance follow an inverted U-shaped curve over the 1960–2010 period. Fixed-effect panel regression models also confirm the significant effect of regional integration on the retrenchment of the welfare state. In this chapter, the author also reports four case studies on Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Denmark that present how the European regional integration resulted in the retrenchment of welfare state in these countries.

[139]

Chapter 4 (“The European Polarization of Income Distributions”) examines how European integration contributed to the polarization of household income distribution in spite of the economic convergence among the aggregated national economies. Multiple panel regressions show that both political and economic integration have had significant effects on income inequality, expressed with Gini coefficient, in 12 Western European countries (for which data are available on the key independent variables) for the 1973–1997 period. Political integration is proxied with the number of cases referred to the ECJ while economic integration is measured as the percentage of a country’s total exports that go to EU countries. Then, the author extrapolates predictions from the regressions and compares those predictions with actual data for the first decade of the new millennium. The results show that the predictions hold up quite well for most of the examined countries individually as well as together.

As one’s household became more important in regard to the socio-economic standing than one’s nation within an integrated Europe, one of the most important questions is how the social inequalities are addressed at EU level. In the ‘Conclusion’ part, the author suggests that EU policymakers should support either the strengthening of the employees’ bargaining position or redistribution via the enhancement of the European Regional Development Fund and the Social and Cohesion Funds. The main suggestion for future European integration is that the development of a social policy dimension is required at the European level.

It is a deficiency of the book that the author interprets the results of the statistical analyses in the discussions as if they were valid for the whole EU economy, which is not necessarily the case for the Central and Eastern European countries. Esping-Andersen’s

[140]

(1990) fundamental book, titled *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, distinguishes liberal, social democratic, and conservative welfare state regimes among Western and Northern European countries. Arts and Gelissen (2002) argue that Mediterranean countries represent a separate model in regard to their welfare systems while Aidukaite (2011) highlights that post-communist Central and Eastern European countries, that joined the EU in 2004 or later, must be considered as a further separate cluster. According to the results of Beckfield's empirical research, there is a convergence among welfare state systems of Western, Northern, and Western Mediterranean European countries (the EU15) but the rest of the EU is out the scope of the investigation. Further academic research might integrate these countries into the analyses, as long as data are available, in order to figure out to what extent they modify the discussion.

In spite of the above-mentioned shortcoming, the empirical research itself may be of academic interest on the subject of the European Union and the broader topic of regional integration. Overall, the subject of the book represents an ongoing research topic, therefore, its contribution to the literature is important. The trends of national economic convergence and household inequality increase at European level over the past decades become especially interesting in light of the current economic restrictions related to the global pandemic situation. Does it mean a breakpoint in the trends at the early 2020s? If so, how will this change the development of European integration with special regard to the social policy? These are important questions to be addressed in the upcoming decades once sufficient statistical evidence is available.

REFERENCES

- Aidukaite, J. 2011. 'Welfare Reforms and Socio-Economic Trends in the 10 New EU Member States of Central and Eastern Europe.' *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 44 (3): 211–9.
- Arts, W., and J. Gelissen. 2002. 'Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism or More? A State-of-the-Art Report.' *Journal of European Social Policy* 12 (2): 137–58.
- Esping-Andersen, G. 1990. *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. Oxford: Polity Press.



Résumés

Résilience autoritaire et transformation politique dans le monde arabe : leçons du Printemps arabe 2.0

LÁSZLÓ CSICSMANN ET ERZSEBET N. ROZSA

En 2019, une nouvelle vague de protestations dans le monde arabe a attiré l'attention des universitaires sur les défis profonds de la théorisation du processus de transition politique. Cet article porte une attention particulière aux différents discours théoriques et à l'expérience antérieure de la vague de protestations de 2011. La vague de protestations de 2019 a principalement atteint les républiques rentières, où l'ancien contrat social s'était effondré et où une transition avait commencé. Cet article soutient que la transformation politique de la région n'est pas encore terminée et que la récente vague de protestation fait partie de l'émergence de régimes néo-autoritaires. Cette étude aborde les trajectoires divergentes de transformation politique dans les pays touchés par la deuxième vague de protestations. Notamment, la recherche pose les questions suivantes : quels facteurs et mécanismes expliquent les différents résultats du processus ? Pourquoi le mécontentement dans les quatre pays – Algérie, Soudan, Liban et Irak – n'a-t-il pas éclaté en 2011, mais en 2019 seulement ? L'étude considère quatre facteurs explicatifs (type de régime, rôle des forces armées, effondrement du contrat social et sectarisme) pour analyser des cas sélectionnés (Algérie, Liban, Irak et Soudan) des récents bouleversements de 2019. La théorie de l'autoritarisme adaptatif est appliquée aux quatre cas, constatant que le contexte politique initial détermine de manière significative l'issue des protestations.

Mots clés : Moyen-Orient et Afrique du Nord, revalorisation autoritaire, autoritarisme adaptatif, Printemps arabe, régimes non démocratiques, rentiérisme

IJEMS 15 (1): 3–30

De la République unie de Chypre à la mise en place d'une solution de deux États

MEHMET DIREKLI

En novembre 2002, l'ancien secrétaire général des Nations Unies, Kofi Annan, a proposé une solution globale au problème chypriote consistant

[142]

en une fédération de deux États largement indépendants. Le plan révisé quatre fois fut soumis par référendum aux deux communautés le 24 avril 2004. Les Chypriotes turcs ont accepté le plan avec 65 % des voix, tandis que les Chypriotes grecs l'ont rejeté avec une proportion de 76 % des voix. Dans ce cadre, ce travail vise d'abord à examiner le contexte politique et les causes du rejet du Plan Annan V, puis à examiner la nouvelle politique de la Turquie pour le changement du statu quo, qui a commencé après les dernières élections présidentielles dans le Nord de Chypre en 2020. Cette étude se concentre également sur la question de savoir si les raisons politiques du rejet du plan Annan sont toujours valables dans les négociations actuelles sur Chypre. Enfin, cet article considère si une structure fédérale bicommunautaire et bizonale est acceptable pour les Chypriotes, ainsi que le rôle de l'Union européenne dans les négociations en cours. Selon les faits et les conclusions sur le rejet politique du plan Annan, cette recherche montre que ces raisons affectent encore les négociations de Chypre.

Mots clés : Plan Annan V, équilibre des menaces, question chypriote, fédéralisme, solution à deux États

IJEMS 15 (1): 31–53

Les missions et opérations de l'UE au départ de la Méditerranée centrale pour l'Afrique de l'Ouest dans le contexte de la crise migratoire

ANNA MOLNÁR ET MARIANN VECSEY

Cet article vise à discerner comment la distance affecte les décisions politiques relatives aux interventions, partant des missions et opérations PSDC (politique de sécurité et de défense commune) géographiquement le plus proches et allant aux plus éloignées. Plus précisément, nous examinons l'utilisation des missions et opérations PSDC dans le contexte de la crise des migrants et des réfugiés. Dans le cadre de la vaste boîte à outils de politique étrangère à disposition de l'Union européenne, l'UE a commencé à utiliser ses missions et opérations PSDC pour s'attaquer à certaines causes profondes de la migration (telles que les problèmes de sécurité intérieure et de gestion des frontières) dans les pays d'origine. Dans cette recherche, nous étudions comment les mandats et les objectifs des missions et opérations dans la région méditerranéenne et ouest-africaine ont changé entre 2013 et le premier trimestre 2022 afin de sou-



tenir la politique migratoire de l'UE. Les missions et les opérations ont acquis un capital politique et davantage de soutien financier et politique de la part des États membres de l'UE à la suite de la crise des migrants et des réfugiés. Ce soutien est visible dans les dépenses des trois missions examinées au Sahel. En outre, dans l'agenda européen en matière de migration présenté en 2015 il était déclaré que la migration devait devenir une composante spécifique des missions et opérations PSDC. Par conséquent, l'UE a commencé à compter sur les missions et opérations PSDC pour gérer la migration irrégulière en 2015.

[143]

Mots clés : Union européenne, crise migratoire, politique de sécurité et de défense commune, missions et opérations de l'UE, sécurisation

IJEMS 15 (1): 55–82

Les Campagnes d'Espagne contre les villes du Royaume de Tlemcen et les mouvements de résistance pendant la période 1516–1530

MESHAL ALENEZI

De nombreux historiens se sont concentrés sur le conflit hispano-ottoman au *XVI^e* siècle et ils ont prêté attention aux activités de piraterie des frères Barberousse en Méditerranée au *XVI^e* siècle pour affirmer que les frères avaient été des pirates. De plus, ils ont examiné les efforts des frères Barbarossa pour évacuer les maures de la péninsule ibérique. Ils n'ont donc pas prêté attention à la réaction des habitants du royaume de Tlemcen face à la colonisation espagnole dans la deuxième et troisième décennie du *XVI^e* siècle. Cette recherche analyse les démarches des habitants des villes du Royaume de Tlemcen, Oran, Mersa El-Kebir, Alger, Ténès et de la ville de Tlemcen, pour combattre les colons espagnols. Elle illustre la relation entre les frères Barberousse et les efforts des habitants du royaume de Tlemcen pour combattre les colons espagnols dans les villes du royaume de Tlemcen entre la période 1516–1530. Par conséquent, cette recherche conclut que les habitants d'Alger et de la ville de Tlemcen ont joué un rôle vital contre cette colonisation lorsqu'ils ont convoqué les frères Barberousse et légitimé le règne des frères à Alger et Tlemcen.

Mots clés : Alger, colonisation, frères Barberousse, Espagnols, Charles Quint, Tlemcen

IJEMS 15 (1): 83–104

Lisser la consommation des ménages égyptiens : le rôle du canal du crédit

OMNEIA A. HELMY, MONA E. FAYED ET NADINE A. DESSOUKY

[144]

Cette étude examine si les consommateurs égyptiens peuvent lisser leur consommation et le rôle des marchés du crédit à cet égard. Ceci s'ajoute à l'examen de l'effet des contraintes de crédit sur la transmission des décisions de politique monétaire à la consommation des ménages via son canal de crédit. À cette fin, l'étude utilise un modèle vectoriel autorégressif (VAR) pour examiner si la politique monétaire affecte la consommation via son canal de crédit. Ensuite, un test lié au modèle de cointégration fondé sur l'approche ARDL (autorégressif à retards échelonnés) est utilisé pour déterminer l'effet des contraintes de crédit, représentées par la prime de financement externe, à long terme. Le lissage de la consommation est testé séparément à l'aide d'un modèle de correction d'erreur (ECM) en plus d'un modèle VAR. L'étude utilise des données trimestrielles couvrant la période allant du premier trimestre de 2002 au quatrième trimestre de 2017. Les résultats révèlent que l'EFP affecte négativement la consommation à court et à long terme. Les consommateurs égyptiens ne sont pas en mesure de lisser leur consommation et l'existence de contraintes de crédit en est probablement la cause. Enfin, l'analyse montre que le canal du crédit transmet les décisions de politique monétaire à la consommation du secteur des ménages en Égypte.

Mots clés : lissage de la consommation, prime de financement externe, canal du crédit, épargner pour les jours sombres

IJEMS 15 (1): 105–135



Povzetki

Avtoritarna odpornost in politična preobrazba v arabskem svetu: lekcije arabske pomladi 2.0

LÁSZLÓ CSICSMANN IN ERZSÉBET N. RÓZSA

Leta 2019 je nov protestni val v arabskem svetu opozoril znanstvenike na globoke izzive teoretiziranja procesa politične tranzicije. Ta članek posveča pozornost različnim teoretskim diskurzom in predhodnim izkušnjam protestnega vala iz leta 2011. Val protestov iz leta 2019 je v glavnem dosegel t.i. rentierske republike, kjer je propadla stara družbena pogodba in se je začela tranzicija. Ta članek trdi, da se politična preobrazba regije še ni končala, nedavni protestni val pa je del pojava neoavtoritarnih režimov. Ta študija obravnava različne poti politične preobrazbe v državah, na katere je vplival drugi val protestov. Raziskava preučuje kateri dejavniki in mehanizmi pojasnjujejo različne rezultate procesa. Zakaj nezadovoljstvo v štirih državah – Alžiriji, Sudanu, Libanonu in Iraku – ni izbruhnilo leta 2011, ampak šele leta 2019? Študija obravnava štiri pojasnjevalne dejavnike (vrsta režima, vloga oboroženih sil, propad družbene pogodbe in sektaštvo) za analizo izbranih primerov (Alžirija, Libanon, Irak in Sudan) iz nedavnih pretresov leta 2019. Teorija adaptivnega avtoritarizma je uporabljena za štiri primere, pri čemer ugotavlja, da začetni politični kontekst pomembno določa izid protestov.

Ključne besede: Bližnji vzhod in Severna Afrika, avtoritarna nadgradnja, adaptivni avtoritarizem, arabska pomlad, nedemokratični režimi, rentierizem

IJEMS 15 (1): 3–30

Od Združene republike Ciper do rešitve dveh držav

MEHMET DIREKLI

Novembra 2002 je nekdanji generalni sekretar Združenih narodov Kofi Annan predlagal celovito rešitev ciprskega problema, ki predstavlja federacijo dveh večinoma neodvisnih držav. Štirikrat popravljen načrt je bil 24. aprila 2004 predložen obema skupnostima na ločenih referendumih v glasovanje. Ciprski Turki so načrt sprejeli s 65 odstotki glasov, ciprski Grki pa so ga zavrnilo s 76 odstotki glasov. Znotraj tega okvira, to

[146]

delo najprej analizira politični kontekst in vzroke za zavrnitev Annanovega načrta V, nato pa preuči novo turško politiko za spremembo statusa quo, ki se je začela po zadnjih predsedniških volitvah na Severnem Cipru leta 2020. Ta študija se osredotoča tudi na to, ali so politični razlogi za zavrnitev Annanovega načrta še vedno aktualni v današnjih ciprskih pogajanjih. Nazadnje, ta članek preučuje, ali je dvoskupnostna in dvoconska struktura sprejemljiva za Ciprčane, pa tudi vlogo Evropske unije v trenutnih pogajanjih. Glede na dejstva in ugotovitve o politični zavrnitvi Annanovega načrta, ta raziskava kaže, da tedanji razlogi še vedno vplivajo na pogajanja o Cipru.

Ključne besede: Annanov načrt V, ravnotežje groženj, ciprsko vprašanje, federalizem, rešitev dveh držav

IJEMS 15 (1): 31–53

Misije in operacije EU iz Srednjega Sredozemlja v Zahodno Afriko v kontekstu migracijske krize

ANNA MOLNÁR IN MARIANN VECSEY

Prispevek raziskuje kako oddaljenost vpliva na politične odločitve o intervencijah, od geografsko najbližjih do daljših misij in operacij SVOP (Skupna varnostna in obrambna politika). Preučujemo zlasti uporabo misij in operacij SVOP v kontekstu migracijske in begunske krize. Kot del širokega zunanjepolitičnega orodja, ki je na voljo Evropski uniji, je EU začela uporabljati svoje misije in operacije SVOP za odpravo nekaterih temeljnih vzrokov migracij (kot so vprašanja notranje varnosti in upravljanja meja) v matičnih državah. V tej raziskavi proučujemo kako so se mandati in cilji misij in operacij v sredozemski in zahodnoafriški regiji spremenili med letoma 2013 in prvim četrtletjem 2022, da bi podprli migracijsko politiko EU. Misije in operacije so zaradi migracijske in begunske krize pridobile politični kapital ter večjo finančno in politično podporo držav članic EU. Ta podpora je vidna v izdatkih treh pregledanih misij v Sahelu. Poleg tega je v Evropski agendi za migracije iz leta 2015 navedeno, da bodo migracije postale posebna sestavina misij in operacij SVOP. Posledično je EU začela računati na misije in operacije SVOP za obravnavo nezakonitih migracij leta 2015.

Ključne besede: Evropska unija, migracijska kriza, skupna varnostna in obrambna politika, misije in operacije EU, sekuritizacija

IJEMS 15 (1): 55–82



Španske kampanje proti mestom Kraljevine Tlemcen in uporniška gibanja od 1516 do 1530

MESHAL ALENEZI

Številni zgodovinarji so se osredotočali na špansko-otomanski spor v 16. stoletju in so namenili pozornost piratstvu bratov Barbarossa v Sredozemlju v 16. stoletju zato, da bi potrdili, da sta bila brata pirata. Poleg tega so preučili prizadevanja bratov Barbarossa za evakuacijo Moriskov iz Pirenejskega polotoka. Posledično niso posvečali pozornosti odzivu prebivalcev Kraljevine Tlemcen na špansko kolonizacijo v drugem in tretjem desetletju 16. stoletja. Ta raziskava analizira poskuse prebivalcev mest Kraljevine Tlemcen, Oran, Mersa El-Kebir, Alžir, Tenes in mesta Tlemcen za boj proti španskim kolonistom in ponazarja odnos med bratoma Barbarossa in prizadevanji prebivalcev Kraljevine Tlemcen za boj proti španskim kolonistom v mestih Kraljevine Tlemcen od leta 1516 do 1530. Posledično ta raziskava ugotavlja, da so prebivalci Alžira in mesta Tlemcena imeli ključno vlogo proti tej kolonizaciji, ko so poklicali brate Barbarossa in legitimirali vladavino bratov v Alžiru in Tlemcenu.

[147]

Ključne besede: Alžir, kolonizacija, brata Barbarossa, Španci, Karel V, Tlemcen

IJEMS 15 (1): 83–104

Uravnavanje potrošnje egiptovskih gospodinjestev: vloga kreditnega kanala

OMNEIA A. HELMY, MONA E. FAYED IN NADINE A. DESSOUKY

Ta študija preučuje, ali lahko egiptovski potrošniki izravnajo svojo porabo in vlogo kreditnih trgov v zvezi s tem. Dodatno, članek analizira učinek kreditnih omejitev pri prenosu odločitev denarne politike na potrošnje gospodinjestev preko kreditnega kanala. V ta namen študija uporablja vektorski avtoregresivni model (VAR), da preveri ali denarna politika vpliva na potrošnje prek svojega kreditnega kanala. Nato za določitev dolgoročnega učinka kreditnih omejitev, ki jih predstavlja premija zunanega financiranja, raziskava uporabi test avtoregresivne porazdeljene zamude (ARDL), ki je vezan na kointegracijo. Uravnavanje porabe je, poleg VAR, ločeno testirano z uporabo modela za popravljjanje napak (ECM). V študiji so uporabljeni četrletni podatki za obdobje od prvega četrletja 2002 do četrtega četrletja 2017. Rezultati kažejo, da EFP kratkoročno in dolgoročno negativno vpliva na potrošnje. Egiptovski potrošniki ne morejo uravnati svoje porabe in najverjetneje je razlog za to obstoj kreditnih

Povzetki

omejitev. Analiza torej kaže, da kreditni kanal prenaša odločitve denarne politike na potrošnje sektorja gospodinjstev v Egiptu.

Ključne besede: uravnavanje porabe, premija zunanjega financiranja, kreditni kanal, varčevanje za črne dni

[148] IJEMS 15 (1): 105–135



ملخصات

المرونة الاستبدادية والتحول السياسي في العالم العربي: دروس من الربيع العربي 2.0

لازلو تشيكسيمان وأرزبييت إن روزا

في عام 2019 جذبت موجة الاحتجاج المتجددة في العالم العربي انتباه العلماء إلى التحديات العميقة لتنظيم عملية الانتقال السياسي. يولي هذا المقال اهتمامًا خاصًا للخطابات النظرية المختلفة والتجربة السابقة لموجة الاحتجاجات عام 2011. وصلت موجة الاحتجاجات لعام 2019 بشكل أساسي إلى الجمهوريات الربيعية، حيث انهار العقد الاجتماعي القديم، وبدأ التحول. تجادل هذه الورقة بأن التحول السياسي في المنطقة لم ينته بعد، وأن موجة الاحتجاج الأخيرة هي جزء من ظهور أنظمة استبدادية جديدة. تتناول هذه الدراسة المسارات المتباينة للتحول السياسي في البلدان المتأثرة بالموجة الثانية من الاحتجاجات. وبالتحديد، يسأل البحث، ما هي العوامل والآليات التي تفسر النتائج المختلفة لعملية؟ لماذا لم يندلع السخط في الدول الأربع -الجزائر والسودان ولبنان والعراق- في عام 2011، ولكن في عام 2019 فقط؟ تتناول الدراسة أربعة عوامل تفسيرية لنوع النظام، دور القوات المسلحة، انهيار العقد الاجتماعي، والطائفية (لتحليل حالات مختارة) الجزائر ولبنان والعراق والسودان (من الاضطرابات الأخيرة لعام 2019. يتم تطبيق نظرية السلطوية التكيفية على الحالات الأربع، حيث وجد أن السياق السياسي الأولي يحدد بشكل كبير نتيجة الاحتجاجات.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الشرق الأوسط وشمال إفريقيا، الارتقاء الاستبدادي، الاستبداد التكيفي، الربيع العربي، الأنظمة غير الديمقراطية، الربيعية

IJEMS 15 (1): 3–30

من جمهورية قبرص المتحدة إلى حل الدولتين

محمد ديركلي

في نوفمبر 2002 اقترح الأمين العام السابق للأمم المتحدة كوفي أنان حلاً شاملاً لمشكلة قبرص يتكون من اتحاد فيدرالي من دولتين مستقلتين إلى حد كبير. تم تقديم الخطة المعدلة لأربع مرات في 24 أبريل 2004 إلى كلا الطائفتين في استفتاءين منفصلين للتصويت. وافق القبارصة الأتراك على الخطة بنسبة 65 بالمائة من الأصوات، بينما رفضها القبارصة اليونانيون بنسبة 76 بالمائة من الأصوات. في هذا الإطار، يهدف هذا العمل أولاً إلى دراسة السياق السياسي وأسباب رفض خطة عنان الخامسة، ثم دراسة سياسة تركيا الجديدة لتغيير الوضع الراهن، والتي بدأت بعد الانتخابات الرئاسية الأخيرة في شمال قبرص عام 2020. تركز هذه الدراسة أيضًا على ما إذا كانت الأسباب السياسية لرفض خطة عنان لا تزال صالحة في مفاوضات قبرص اليوم. أخيرًا، تبحث هذه الورقة فيما إذا كان الهيكل الثنائي الطائفي والمنطقة مقبولًا للتفاوض، وكذلك دور الاتحاد الأوروبي في المفاوضات الحالية. حسب الحقائق والنتائج حول الرفض السياسي لخطة عنان، يظهر هذا البحث أن هذه الأسباب لا تزال تؤثر على مفاوضات قبرص.

الكلمات المفتاحية: خطة أنان الخامسة، ميزان التهديد، قضية قبرص، الفيدرالية، حل الدولتين

IJEMS 15 (1): 31–53

مهام وعمليات الاتحاد الأوروبي من وسط البحر الأبيض المتوسط إلى غرب إفريقيا في سياق أزمة الهجرة

آنا مولنار وماريان فيسي

[150]

تركز هذه الورقة على التحقيق في كيفية تأثير المسافة على القرارات السياسية بشأن التدخلات، من الأقرب جغرافيًا إلى الأبعد بخصوص مهام وعمليات سياسة الأمن والدفاع المشتركة. وبشكل أكثر تحديدًا، ننظر إلى استخدام مهام وعمليات سياسة الأمن والدفاع المشتركة في سياق أزمة الهجرة واللاجئين. كجزء من مجموعة أدوات السياسة الخارجية الواسعة المتاحة للاتحاد الأوروبي، بدأ الاتحاد الأوروبي في استخدام مهام وعمليات سياسة الأمن والدفاع المشتركة الخاصة به لمعالجة بعض الأسباب الجذرية للهجرة (مثل قضايا الأمن الداخلي وإدارة الحدود (في بلان المنشأ). في هذا البحث، نتحرى كيف تغيرت ولايات وأهداف البعثات والعمليات في منطقة البحر الأبيض المتوسط وغرب إفريقيا بين 2013 والرابع الأول من عام 2022 من أجل دعم سياسة الهجرة في الاتحاد الأوروبي. اكتسبت البعثات والعمليات رأس مال سياسي والمزيد من الدعم المالي والسياسي من الدول الأعضاء في الاتحاد الأوروبي نتيجة لأزمة الهجرة واللاجئين. يظهر هذا الدعم في نفقات البعثات الثلاث التي تم فتحها في منطقة الساحل. علاوة على ذلك، نصت الأجندة الأوروبية للهجرة لعام 2015 على أن الهجرة ستصبح مكونًا محددًا للمهام وعمليات سياسة الأمن والدفاع المشتركة. وبالتالي بدأ الاتحاد الأوروبي في الاعتماد على مهام وعمليات سياسة الأمن والدفاع المشتركة للتعامل مع الهجرة غير النظامية في عام 2015.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الاتحاد الأوروبي، أزمة الهجرة، سياسة الأمن والدفاع المشتركة، مهام وعمليات الاتحاد الأوروبي، التوريق

IJEMS 15 (1): 55–82

الحملات الإسبانية ضد مملكة تلمسان وحركات المقاومة 1516-1530

مشعل العنزي

ركز العديد من المؤرخين على الصراع الإسباني العثماني في القرن السادس عشر، ووجهوا اهتمامًا لأنشطة القرصنة التي قام بها الأخوان بروسا في البحر الأبيض المتوسط في القرن السادس عشر لتأكيد أن الأخوين كانا قراصنة. بالإضافة إلى ذلك، قاموا بفحص جهود الأخوين بروسا لإجلاء الموريسكيين من شبه الجزيرة الأيبيرية. لذلك لم ينتهوا لرد فعل سكان مملكة تلمسان على الاستعمار الإسباني في العقدين الثاني والثالث من القرن السادس عشر. يحلل هذا البحث خطوات سكان مملكة تلمسان ووهران ومرسى الكبير والجزائر وتينس ومدينة تلمسان لمحاربة المستعمرين الإسبان. ويوضح العلاقة بين الأخوين بروسا وحمود سكان مملكة تلمسان لمحاربة المستعمرين الإسبان في مدن مملكة تلمسان في الفترة من 1516 إلى 1530. وبالتالي يخلص هذا البحث إلى أن سكان الجزائر ومدينة تلمسان لعبوا دورًا حيويًا ضد هذا الاستعمار عندما استدعوا الإخوة بروسا وشرعوا بحكم الإخوة في الجزائر العاصمة وتلمسان.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الجزائر، الإخوة بروسا، الإسبان، شارل الخامس، تلمسان

IJEMS 15 (1): 83–104

تجانس استهلاك الأسر المصرية: دور قناة الائتمان أمنية أحمد حلبي، منى فايد، نادين الدسوقي

[151]

تبحث هذه الدراسة في مدى قدرة المستهلكين المصريين على تسهيل استهلاكهم ودور أسواق الائتمان في هذا الصدد. هذا بالإضافة إلى دراسة تأثير قيود الائتمان في نقل القرارات السياسية النقدية إلى استهلاك الأسر من خلال قناتها الائتمانية. تحقيقاً لهذه الغاية، تستخدم الدراسة نموذج ناقل الانحدار التلقائي (VAR) لفحص ما إذا كانت السياسة النقدية تؤثر على الاستهلاك من خلال قناة الائتمان الخاصة بها. بعد ذلك، يتم استخدام اختبار الانحدار الذاتي الموزع (ARDL) المرتبط بالتكامل المشترك لتحديد تأثير قيود الائتمان، التي يمثلها قسط التمويل الخارجي، على المدى الطويل. يتم اختبار تجانس الاستهلاك بشكل منفصل باستخدام نموذج تصحيح الخطأ (ECM) إلى جانب نموذج VAR. تستخدم الدراسة بيانات ربع سنوية تغطي الفترة من الربع الأول من عام 2002 حتى الربع الرابع من عام 2017 وتكشف النتائج أن قسط التمويل الخارجي يؤثر سلباً على الاستهلاك على المدى القصير والطويل. لا يستطيع المستهلكون المصريون تسهيل استهلاكهم، ومن المرجح أن يكون السبب في ذلك هو وجود قيود ائتمانية. وأخيراً يظهر التحليل أن قناة الائتمان تنقل قرارات السياسة النقدية إلى استهلاك قطاع الأسر في مصر.

الكلمات المفتاحية: تسهيل الاستهلاك، قسط التمويل الخارجي، قناة الائتمان، الادخار ليوم ممطر

IJEMS 15 (1): 105-135





A camel caravan on its journey of about 20 km from Rass Ramel to Merzouga, Morocco. Photo taken by Polona Oblak, October 2014.



Euro-Mediterranean University
Trevisini Palace
Kidričevo nabrežje 2
SI-6330 Piran, Slovenia
<https://ijems.emuni.si>
ijems@emuni.si